Previous knowledge can induce an illusion of causality through actively biasing behavior

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dc.contributor.authorYarritu Corrales, Ion
dc.contributor.authorMatute, Helena
dc.date.accessioned2026-02-13T11:09:48Z
dc.date.available2026-02-13T11:09:48Z
dc.date.issued2015-04-08
dc.date.updated2026-02-13T11:09:48Z
dc.description.abstractIt is generally assumed that the way people assess the relationship between a cause and an outcome is closely related to the actual evidence existing about the co-occurrence of these events. However, people's estimations are often biased, and this usually translates into illusions of causality. Some have suggested that such illusions could be the result of previous knowledge-based expectations. In the present research we explored the role that previous knowledge has in the development of illusions of causality. We propose that previous knowledge influences the assessment of causality by influencing the decisions about responding or not (i.e., presence or absence of the potential cause), which biases the information people are exposed to, and this in turn produces illusions congruent with such biased information. In a non-contingent situation in which participants decided whether the potential cause was present or absent (Experiment 1), the influence of expectations on participants' judgments was mediated by the probability of occurrence of the potential cause (determined by participants' responses). However, in an identical situation, except that the participants were not allowed to decide the occurrence of the potential cause (Experiment 2), only the probability of the cause was significant, not the expectations or the interaction. Together, these results support our hypothesis that knowledge-based expectations affect the development of causal illusions by the mediation of behavior, which biases the information received.en
dc.description.sponsorshipSupport for this research was provided by Grant PSI2011-26965 from Dirección General de Investigación of the Spanish Government and Grant IT363-10 from the Basque Governmenten
dc.identifier.citationYarritu, I., & Matute, H. (2015). Previous knowledge can induce an illusion of causality through actively biasing behavior. Frontiers in Psychology, 6. https://doi.org/10.3389/FPSYG.2015.00389
dc.identifier.doi10.3389/FPSYG.2015.00389
dc.identifier.eissn1664-1078
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14454/5112
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherFrontiers Research Foundation
dc.rightsCopyright ©2015 Yarritu and Matute
dc.subject.otherPrevious knowledge
dc.subject.otherExpectations
dc.subject.otherCausal judgments
dc.subject.otherCognitive bias
dc.subject.otherCausal learning
dc.subject.otherContingency learning
dc.subject.otherContingency judgment
dc.subject.otherIllusion of causality
dc.titlePrevious knowledge can induce an illusion of causality through actively biasing behavioren
dc.typejournal article
dcterms.accessRightsopen access
oaire.citation.titleFrontiers in Psychology
oaire.citation.volume6
oaire.licenseConditionhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
oaire.versionVoR
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