Examinando por Autor "Wang, Ziqi"

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  • Miniatura
    Ítem
    FedADMM-InSa: an inexact and self-adaptive ADMM for federated learning
    (Elsevier Ltd, 2025-01) Song, Yongcun; Wang, Ziqi; Zuazua, Enrique
    Federated learning (FL) is a promising framework for learning from distributed data while maintaining privacy. The development of efficient FL algorithms encounters various challenges, including heterogeneous data and systems, limited communication capacities, and constrained local computational resources. Recently developed FedADMM methods show great resilience to both data and system heterogeneity. However, they still suffer from performance deterioration if the hyperparameters are not carefully tuned. To address this issue, we propose an inexact and self-adaptive FedADMM algorithm, termed FedADMM-InSa. First, we design an inexactness criterion for the clients’ local updates to eliminate the need for empirically setting the local training accuracy. This inexactness criterion can be assessed by each client independently based on its unique condition, thereby reducing the local computational cost and mitigating the undesirable straggle effect. The convergence of the resulting inexact ADMM is proved under the assumption of strongly convex loss functions. Additionally, we present a self-adaptive scheme that dynamically adjusts each client's penalty parameter, enhancing algorithm robustness by mitigating the need for empirical penalty parameter choices for each client. Extensive numerical experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets have been conducted. As validated by some tests, our FedADMM-InSa algorithm improves model accuracy by 7.8% while reducing clients’ local workloads by 55.7% compared to benchmark algorithms.
  • Miniatura
    Ítem
    Nonlinear equilibrium transitions in a potential game model for federated learning
    (Elsevier B.V., 2026-10) Liu, Kang; Wang, Ziqi; Zuazua, Enrique
    In federated learning (FL), a central server typically allocates training efforts to clients. However, from a market-oriented perspective, clients may independently choose their training efforts based on rational self-interest. To study this setting, we propose a potential game framework in which each client's payoff is determined by its individual effort and the rewards provided by the server. The rewards are influenced by the collective efforts of all clients and can be modulated by a reward factor. We first establish the existence of Nash equilibria (NEs) and then investigate their uniqueness in a stationary setting. We show that the NEs depend nonlinearly on the reward factor and exhibit a nonsmooth transition at a critical value, where the stationary potential loses strict curvature, leading to nonunique NEs and a jump between low-effort and high-effort branches. Furthermore, we prove the convergence of the best-response algorithm for computing NEs in our FL game. Finally, we apply the clients’ rational efforts derived from the NEs to FL training with various datasets and models, thereby validating the effectiveness of the identified critical reward factor.