Examinando por Autor "Stojanovikj, Martin"

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    Ítem
    The choice of monetary regimes in emerging market economies: inflation targeting versus its alternatives
    (Elsevier Inc., 2024-06) Stojanovikj, Martin; Petrevski, Goran
    This paper examines the macroeconomic, financial, and institutional factors that affect the adoption of inflation targeting vis-a-vis alternative monetary policy strategies for 44 emerging market economies during 1990–2017. We employ a multinomial logistic regression with inflation targeting and exchange rate pegs as treatment groups, and intermediary monetary strategies as the baseline group. The main findings from our study are as follows: higher average inflation is associated with lower probability of adopting inflation targeting; while both output growth and its volatility make the adoption of inflation targeting less likely. Concerning the effects of the control variables, financial sector development, central bank independence, greater exposure to capital flows, and the level of economic development are all associated with higher likelihood of adopting inflation targeting, whereas higher public debt, trade openness, and money growth have the opposite effect. Macroeconomic conditions seem to have different impact on the choice of inflation targeting and exchange rate pegs, whereas similar institutional conditions are conducive to the implementation of both regimes. Finally, the effects of macroeconomic and institutional conditions do not depend on the type of inflation targeting.
  • Miniatura
    Ítem
    Extractive institutions and the takeoff to long-run growth: a Schumpeterian perspective
    (Elsevier B.V., 2026-07) Prettner, Klaus; Stojanovikj, Martin
    We examine how extractive institutions affect the timing of the takeoff to sustained economic growth, the pace of industrialization, and the long-run balanced growth path of an economy. The politically dominant ruling elite can choose to extract a share of output and/or to interfere with creative destruction by extracting innovation resources. In so doing, the ruling elite needs to balance its desire for grabbing a greater share of resources with the constraint of being able to stay in power. We show that extraction from output delays the takeoff to sustained economic growth and reduces economic growth in the early industrial period. However, taken by itself, output extraction does not reduce the long-run balanced growth rate. By contrast, if the ruling elite interferes with creative destruction by extracting resources meant for innovation, it suppresses economic growth during industrialization and along the balanced growth path. After deriving the main results analytically, we calibrate the model to the U.S. economy to illustrate the adverse long-run development effects of extractive institutions. According to our results, institutions and policies that reduce the extractive power of the ruling elite can boost economic development to a substantial degree.