



Universidad de Deusto
University of Deusto

**SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE
FROM 2005 TILL 2011**

**Dissertation presented by
NATALIYA RESHETOVA**

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Nataliya Reshetova 2014

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Deusto

Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Humanas
Gizarte eta Giza Zientzien Fakultatea

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Signed: NATALIYA RESHETOVA

Signed: EDURNE BARTOLOMÉ

For My Ukraine

Присвячується моїй рідній Україні

CONTENTS

Acknowledgement (<i>in Spanish</i>).....	i
Introduction (<i>in Spanish</i>).....	v

PART I CONCEPTS AND THEORY..... 11

1	OBJECT OF RESEARCH: SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE.....	13
1.1	The Political Support as the Conceptual Origin of the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine. The Model of David Easton.....	13
1.2	The Main inputs to the Model of Political Support Developed by David Easton Satisfaction with Democracy as the Best Indicator for Measuring Political Support in Ukraine.....	15
1.3	Theoretical Explanation of the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine in the Fuchs Models of the Performance of Democracy.....	20
1.4	Applying Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine as the Precise Measurement of the Political Support in the Context of Post Communist Environment.....	27
1.5		30
2	TERRITORIAL DIMENSION OF UKRAINE AND SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY...	35
2.1	Theoretical Explanation of the Pro European and Pro Russian Orientation Division in Ukraine.....	36
2.2	The Distribution of Ukrainian and Russian Language	39
2.3	Ukrainian and Russian Ethnical Distribution in Ukraine	41
3	POLITICAL PARTIES IN UKRAINE AND SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY.....	43
3.1	Main Characteristic of Political Parties in Ukraine.....	43
3.2	The Ideological Distribution of Political Parties in Ukraine.....	44
3.3	The Pro European and the Pro Russian Orientated Political Parties in Ukraine.....	46
4	THE POLITICAL EFFICACY, TRUST IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE.....	51
4.1	Political Efficacy in Ukraine.....	51

4.1.2	The Education in Ukraine.....	52
4.1.3	Characteristic of Civil Society of Ukraine.....	54
4.2	Trust in Public Institutions.....	57
4.2.1	Trust in Political Parties within Ukrainians.....	58
4.2.2	Trust in Legal System in Ukraine.....	63
4.2.3	Trust in Police.....	63
4.2.4	Trust in Civil OrganizationsTrust in Education System within Ukrainians.....	64
4.2.5	Trust in Educational System within Ukrainians.....	65
4.2.6	Trust in Press in Ukraine.....	65
5	SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS AND SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE.....	67
5.1	Economic Factor in Ukraine and Political Support (in Spanish).....	67
5.1.2	Satisfaction with Economy of the Individuals in Ukraine and their Support for the Performance of Democracy (in Spanish).....	71
5.2	Sociodemographic characteristic of the Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Parts in Ukraine	73
5.2.1	Age Structure in Ukraine.....	74
5.2.2	Gender Distribution in Ukraine.....	76
	PART II HYPOTHESES, VARIABLES, DATA AND METHODS.....	80
6	HYPOTHESES AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF OUR RESEARCH VARIABLES.....	82
6.1	Hypotheses.....	82
6.2	Operationalization of Our Variables.....	88
6.2.1	The Main Applications of the Satisfaction with Democracy as the Appropriate Indicator for Political Support in Ukraine.....	88
6.3	Measuring Political Support in Ukraine by Satisfaction with the Way Democracy is Developing in the Country.....	92
6.4	Territorial Dimension in Ukraine	94
6.5	Language in Ukraine.....	94
6.6	Political Parties in Ukraine.....	94
6.7	The Left-Right Placement of the Individuals in Ukraine.....	95
6.8	Democratic Values of Ukrainians.....	96
6.9	Political Efficacy of the Voters in Ukraine, the Interest in Politics and Education...	97
6.9.1	Interest in Politics within Ukrainians.....	97
6.9.2	Educational in Ukraine.....	98

6.10	Civil Society in Ukraine.....	99
6.11	Trust in Institutions.....	99
6.11.1	Trust in Political Parties within Ukrainians.....	99
6.11.2	Confidence in Ukrainian Legal System.....	100
6.12	Economic Variables.....	100
6.12.1	Income Level of Ukrainians.....	100
6.12.2	Satisfaction with Economy in Ukraine.....	100
6.13	Contextual Variables.....	100
6.13.1	Human Development Index of Regions.....	101
6.13.2	Ethnic population.....	101

7	DATA AND METHODS.....	102
7.1	Data for our Research of the Political Support in Ukraine.....	102
7.1.2	The Data from European Values Study for Political Support in Ukraine.....	102
7.1.3	Measuring Support for the Performance of Democracy in Ukraine with the European Social Survey (ESS)	104
7.2	Methods for Data Analysis.....	106

PART III RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION..... 118

8	THE EFFECT OF THE PRO EUROPEAN THE PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED REGIONS IN UKRAINE ON THE SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY.....	120
8.1	Political Support in Western and Eastern Ukraine.....	121
8.2	Support for the Performance of Democracy in Central, Northern and Southern Part of Ukraine with Democracy. Explanatory Models.....	123
8.3	The Impact of the Regions in Ukraine on the Satisfaction with Democracy.....	128
9	THE IMPACT OF THE LANGUAGE AND ETHNIC POPULATION ON THE SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE.....	136
9.1	Satisfaction with Democracy and Language Spoken in Ukraine.....	136
9.2	Support for the Performance of Democracy and the Ethnicity in Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Regions of Ukraine	138

10	THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRO EUROPEAN AND PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED POLITICAL PARTIES ON THE SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE.....	142
10.1	Support for the Performance of Democracy within the Party of Yulia Tymoshenko and the Party of Regions.....	143
10.2	Satisfaction with Democracy and Political Parties in Ukraine. Explanatory Models.....	144
10.3	The Effect Ideology of the Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Parts of Ukraine on the Satisfaction with Democracy.....	149
10.4	Satisfaction of Democracy and Democratic Values of the Voters for the Pro European (Yulia Tymoshenko) and Pro Russian (Yanukovitch) Orientated Parties.....	153
11	THE EFFECT OF THE POLITICAL EFFICACY OF THE VOTERS FOR PRO EUROPEAN AND PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED PARTIES ON THE SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY.....	158
11.1	Satisfaction with Democracy and the Political Interest within the Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Parties.....	158
11.2	Political Support and the Educational Level of Individuals within the Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Regions in Ukraine.....	160
11.3	Support for the Performance of Democracy and Civil Society in Pro European Orientated and pro Russian Ukraine.....	164
12	THE IMPACT OF THE TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS WITHIN THE PRO EUROPEAN AND PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED REGIONS ON THE SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE.....	170
12.1	Satisfaction with Democracy and Trust in Political Parties of the Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Regions in Ukraine.....	170
12.2	Political Support and Trust in Legal System.....	176
12.3	Support for the Performance of Democracy and Trust in Police.....	178
12.4	Satisfaction with Democracy and Trust in Press, Trust in Educational System and Trust in Civil Organizations.....	179

13	EFFECT OF SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS ON THE SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN PRO EUROPEAN AND PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED REGIONS UKRAINE	182
13.1	Satisfaction with Democracy and Economic Development in Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Regions of Ukraine.....	182
13.2	Support for the Performance of Democracy and the Generation Effect in Ukraine.....	185
13.3	Final Model.....	190
14	CONCLUSIONS.....	196
15	REFERENCES.....	207
	<i>Contents of Tables</i>	<i>230</i>
	<i>Contents of Figures.....</i>	<i>232</i>

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INTRODUCCIÓN

El apoyo político es el importante componente del estado democrático según Easton (1965), Fuchs (1993), Klingemann (1998), Norris (1999) y Dalton (1999). Ucrania es una democracia joven, la tesis estudia el apoyo del rendimiento democrático de los individuos en este país. Para examinar el apoyo político en Ucrania, se analiza la literatura y los datos de la satisfacción con la democracia.

Según la definición de Freedom House y Transformation Index-BTI, Ucrania es el país en transición y se considera que el país en el periodo desde 1990 hasta 2007 pertenece al grupo de países 'el régimen híbrido y la transición hacia democracia'. De acuerdo con Mishler y Rose (2001: 304) el país en transición podría adelantar hacia la consolidación de la democracia completa, podría acabar su evaluación que resulta en la democracia permanente incompleta o en la democracia "brocken-back".

Ucrania está definido por Levitsky and Way (2002), Carothers (2002), Merkel (2003), Ryabchuk (2003) and Kuzio (2005), como un país 'híbrido' que significa una 'democracia defectuosa'. Por lo tanto, el régimen de la presidencia de Kutchma y Kravchuk Ucrania está definida también por Levitsky and Way (2002), Carothers (2002) and Kuzio (2005) and como una democracia híbrida con 'competitive authoritarian' durante. El tiempo del presidente Yanukovitch se nombra como una democracia híbrida con tendencia al régimen autoritario, a su vez, la presidencia del Yushchenko ha obtenido altos índices del desarrollo de democracia. Al final resumimos que el país durante las décadas tiene la tendencia de moverse de un régimen autoritario a una democracia o a una democracia híbrida con tendencia al régimen autoritario.

IMPORTANCIA DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN

A continuación, hay razones que hacen que caso ucraniano sea especialmente interesante. En primer lugar, por su peculiar historia de transformación del sistema política. La reciente historia de Ucrania incluye la desintegración de la Unión Soviética que lleva los riesgos de la transición política y

los problemas de consolidación de una democracia joven después de muchos años del comunismo y a su vez, la nostalgia del régimen antiguo que suele rechazar los ideales democráticos según Mishler y Rose (2003).

Por un lado, la crisis económica en los años noventa que produjo la corrupción en las instituciones públicas y la crisis política acompañada con la ausencia de la libertad de expresión y el asesinato de los primeros líderes políticos democráticos de Ucrania y los periodistas que escribían de asuntos políticos. Por el otro, desde la independencia en Ucrania se observa la lucha fuerte entre los partidos principales del país, los comunistas y los partidos democráticos. Por lo tanto, el régimen autoritario que se instaló en el país y las falsificaciones de las elecciones llevaban a las protestas en el país que luego se transformaron en la revolución naranja. La victoria de los partidos democráticos creó una euforia en la sociedad pero luego vino la decepción en el poder democrático por no haber conseguido los cambios en la sociedad prometidos a la gente durante la revolución naranja y las elecciones. A su vez, esto ha dado oportunidad a los partidos ideológicamente diferentes obtener el poder en el país. En la tesis examinamos este periodo de cambio de poder por el partido pro europeo (Tymoshenko) al partido pro ruso (Yanukovitch).

Además, tiene que ser mencionado también que estamos siendo en el año 2014 testigos de las últimas páginas de historia de Ucrania que nos ha enseñado Maidan, las protestas nacionales patrióticas contra la corrupción, la desigualdad social, el abuso del poder por la policía y para el apoyo a la integración de Ucrania a Unión Europea. La revolución 2013-2014 en Ucrania consiguió cambiar el régimen antidemocrático. Al mismo tiempo, la inestabilidad de la política interior ha dado oportunidad a Rusia crear una situación geopolítica muy tensa en la región: por haber anexionado a Crimea e intervención en las regiones del Este en Ucrania. De hecho, tiene que ser mencionado que el papel de Rusia en la política interior de Ucrania desde la independencia del país es grande y que era enseñado especialmente durante la mencionada eurorevolución y también con la última intervención rusa en el país en las regiones Donbas and Luhansk de Ucrania.

Finalmente confirmamos que el país durante las décadas tiene la tendencia de moverse de un régimen autoritario a una democracia o a una democracia híbrida con tendencia hacia régimen autoritario. Por eso pensamos que lo más importante de la sobrevivencia de la democracia en los regímenes inestables democráticamente como Ucrania es no es el apoyo popular en democracia como el ideal pero más el apoyo en el régimen incompleto que existe en realidad durante la transición. Consecuentemente, es razonable suponer que estas experiencias hayan tenido y tienen una influencia grande en el modo como los ciudadanos perciben el sistema político y cuál es su apoyo al rendimiento democrático en Ucrania.

La segunda razón porque es importante estudiar el apoyo político en Ucrania el tiene que ver con los motivos empíricos. Según los datos de European Values Study (EVS), European Social Survey (ESS), World Values Survey (WVS), el indicador más bajo en toda Europa del apoyo del rendimiento democrático está en Ucrania

Grafico 1. El apoyo político en los países europeos



Fuente: European Values Study (2008)

DELIMITACIÓN CONCEPTUAL DE LA TESIS

Según la bibliografía, el concepto de la satisfacción con la democracia esta frecuentemente utilizado como el indicador del apoyo general del sistema político según Fuchs (1993), Norris (2002), Dalton (2003, 2002) and Linde y Eckman (2002). De acuerdo con la literatura la influencia de la dimensión territorial tiene efecto en el apoyo de rendimiento democrático (Kolosov y O'Loughlin, 2000; O'Loughlin, 2002; Haukkala, 2002; Wolczuk, 2002 and Poberezny, 2006). La literatura define factores que influyen en apoyo político: por un lado, la influencia de los partidos y por el otro, el efecto que produce la ideología política en la satisfacción con la democracia según Sartori (1962, 2005), Miller y Listhaugh (1990), Farrell y Webb (1998), Kaase y Newton (1995), Kollman, Ken y Miller (1998), Tanaka (2001), Levy (2002), Norris (2002), Dalton (2004) y Thames (2005).

Según los autores el factor que influye en el apoyo de rendimiento democrático es la eficacia política (Dalton, 2002; Torcal, 2010). La confianza en las instituciones influye en el apoyo político (Evans y Whitefiel, 1995; Gibson, Duch y Tedin, 1992; Montero y Torcal 1998 y Dalton, 2004). De acuerdo con Lipset (1956), Weatherford (1987), Gibson, Duch y Tedin (1992), Klingemann y Hofferbert (1994), Reisinger and Miller (1994), Evans y Whitefiel (1995), Anderson (1998), Mcallister (1999), Montero (1998), Bratton y Cohen (2004), Mishler y Rose (2001) y Navarro y Shi (2001) un indicador que influye en gran medida a la satisfacción con la democracia es el factor económico, cuánto mejor es la evaluación de la situación económica, mayor será el nivel del apoyo democrático.

Para resumir, la tesis doctoral presenta el análisis acerca de los indicadores más importantes que influyen en apoyo político en Ucrania. Que de acuerdo con el esquema de la tesis y el análisis de la literatura son la influencia que produce la dimensión territorial de Ucrania, especialmente se hace enfoque en la orientación pro europea y pro rusa de las regiones del país y su efecto en apoyo del rendimiento democrático de los individuos. Así como el impacto que causan los partidos del parlamento ucraniano subrayando los partidos que se consideran más orientados a

Europa y los partidos que se orientan a Rusia en su política en Ucrania y su impacto en satisfacción con la democracia en este país. La influencia que ejerce la ideología de los partidos orientados pro europeos y pro rusos en Ucrania y el nivel de confianza de los individuos en las partes orientadas pro europeas y pro rusas del país en las instituciones públicas y del mismo modo el efecto que causa en apoyo político la eficacia política. Se entiende también que el factor económico, la satisfacción con la economía tendrán impacto en apoyo del rendimiento democrático. A su vez, el impacto de los factores socio demográficos también está incluido en análisis del apoyo político en Ucrania.

Consecuentemente, la pregunta de investigación es cuales son los efectos de los indicadores mencionados anteriormente en el apoyo de rendimiento democrático en Ucrania. Durante la investigación surgieron muchas preguntas: como está distribuido el apoyo político en Ucrania dentro de las regiones del país especialmente si hay una tendencia de distribución de la satisfacción con la democracia en el parte pro europea y pro rusa. Por lo tanto, surge la pregunta de la influencia de la lengua y la etnicidad en el apoyo político en Ucrania dentro de las regiones. Del mismo modo, preguntamos cómo influye el voto por el partido político pro europeo o pro ruso en Ucrania en el apoyo del rendimiento democrático de los individuos. A su vez, cual es el efecto de la ideología en la satisfacción con la democracia en el país y si hay una distribución diferente de la eficacia política entre las partes orientadas pro europeos y pro rusos y como este indicador afecta en apoyo político en Ucrania. Por tanto, surgió también otra pregunta del impacto de la confianza en las instituciones y su efecto en la satisfacción con la democracia en las regiones orientadas pro europeas y pro rusas. Por otro lado, preguntamos qué impacto produce el factor económico, la satisfacción con la economía en el apoyo político en diferentes regiones del país.

En resumen, la tesis centra en investigar el caso de Ucrania en torno a la satisfacción con la democracia en el periodo de transición, y a él se refiere la mayor parte de los datos empíricos que se utilizan en la investigación. Los años que analizamos en la tesis por la disponibilidad de los datos de las encuestas que están disponibles para Ucrania son los años desde 2005 hasta 2011. La tesis doctoral es del

interés científico porque estudia, analiza y profundiza los datos de los indicadores que influyen en la satisfacción con la democracia en Ucrania y puede servir como ejemplo para análisis del apoyo político en las democracias jóvenes que están aun en el periodo de transición, especialmente las del Europa del Este, los países ex soviéticos que están intentando cambiar el sistema político y el régimen al modo democrático.

LA ESTRUCTURA DE LA TESIS

La tesis está escrita en inglés. La introducción y el capítulo 5, la parte del impacto de factor económico y de la satisfacción económica en apoyo político en Ucrania - en castellano según las normas del título de mención europea para la tesis. Esta tesis doctoral es escrita dentro del programa del doctorado en Estudios Internacionales e Interculturales en la Universidad de Deusto en Bilbao y esta aplicada en el Equipo de Investigación de los Valores Sociales en la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Humanas de la Universidad de Deusto.

La estructura del trabajo esta presentada en tres partes. La primera parte empieza con la discusión teórica y revisión de la literatura del concepto del apoyo político, relevantes teorías y aplicación del concepto a nuestro objeto de investigación, el apoyo del rendimiento democrático en Ucrania. Por tanto, incluye los capítulos que describen la base teórica de los indicadores que producen el efecto en la satisfacción con la democracia en país.

El capítulo uno se trata de definición del apoyo político como el origen conceptual de la satisfacción con la democracia en Ucrania, de la teoría del apoyo político en el modelo de Easton (1965, 1975). En el capítulo se describen también las contribuciones al modelo del apoyo político de parte de Dieter Fuchs (1993), Klingemann (1998), Pippa Norris (1999), Russell Dalton (1999, 2004) donde ellos elaboran sub categorías en los modelos de los objetos del apoyo, especialmente al apoyo del rendimiento del régimen. Por otro lado, se analiza también la aplicación del indicador de la satisfacción con la democracia como un factor del apoyo político en los trabajos del Christopher Anderson (1998), Damarys Canache, Jeffery Mondak and Mitchell Seligson (2001), William Mishler y Richard Rose (2002) y Jonas Linde y

Joakim Ekman (2003). Consecuentemente, el objeto del apoyo del rendimiento democrático es el principal concepto para medir la satisfacción con la democracia en Ucrania.

El capítulo dos describe el papel de la dimensión territorial en Ucrania y su posible efecto en el apoyo político. Se explica según la literatura y experiencia histórica de Ucrania la división de las regiones por la orientación pro europea y pro rusa. Del mismo modo, se analiza la distribución lingüística y étnica en Ucrania y su hipotético impacto a la satisfacción con la democracia en las regiones. Por otro lado, el capítulo tres centra en investigación teórica de los partidos políticos del país. Se analiza las características principales de los partidos orientados pro europeos y pro rusos en Ucrania y su distribución ideológica. A su vez, se espera que voto por los partidos orientados pro europeos y pro rusos influye en apoyo político de los individuos.

El capítulo cuatro incluye la explicación teórica de la eficacia política y la confianza en las instituciones en Ucrania y su posible impacto en el apoyo de rendimiento democrático. Se analizan, por un lado, la educación, la sociedad cívica del país y por el otro lado, la confianza en los partidos políticos, en sistema legal, en la policía, la confianza en media, en sistema educativo y en las organizaciones civiles del país como posible el efecto en la satisfacción con la democracia en Ucrania. El capítulo cinco describe la base teórica del impacto del factor económico en la satisfacción con la democracia en Ucrania y las importantes características de la situación económica en país. Del mismo modo, se analiza la literatura del efecto que produce la satisfacción con la economía en las regiones en apoyo político de los Ucranianos. Por otro lado, se menciona también las características socio demográficas de las regiones en Ucrania y su posible efecto en apoyo político.

La segunda parte centra en un enfoque más específico al tema del trabajo acerca de las hipótesis del trabajo, la perspectiva metodológica y los datos. En el capítulo seis al hilo de la exposición teórica de la primera parte de trabajo y como sucesión lógica dentro de la investigación se plantean una serie de hipótesis. Esas hipótesis son las expectativas de la realidad de sociedad ucraniana traducidas en los

datos encajados en la teoría presentada y argumentada en el trabajo. El capítulo presenta las hipótesis principales de la tesis que estarán verificados y demostradas en la parte empírica de la tesis y también están explicados los instrumentos de medición y los variables para el análisis de los datos.

El concepto de apoyo político, especialmente su objeto, el apoyo del rendimiento democrático en Ucrania conjunto con los indicadores explicados en la parte teórica de la tesis estarán transformados en las preguntas de los cuestionarios y medidos por los datos. Las hipótesis están relacionadas con la explicación teórica del objeto de estudio y los objetos específicos del trabajo así como la satisfacción con la democracia en Ucrania y los factores que la afectan. Las hipótesis también están relacionadas con las diferencias entre las regiones de Ucrania, especialmente dentro de las partes orientados pro europeos y pro rusos de país. Para realizar los objetivos de la tesis y confirmar las hipótesis de la tesis se plantean un análisis cuantitativo secundario de los datos, utilizando las bases de datos disponibles, tales como European Values Study (EVS), European Social Survey (ESS), World Values Survey (WVS) y análisis de datos agregados, tales como Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID), Freedom House, World Bank y Transformation Index (BTI), Ukrainian Census 2001.

El capítulo siete, a su vez, refleja el método de investigación y la descripción de las bases de datos más utilizados en el trabajo. La metodología de la tesis prevé, por un lado, uso del análisis descriptivo, comparando la situación democrática en Ucrania entre las regiones, también, estudiando los datos de los indicadores que influyen a la satisfacción con la democracia durante el periodo de transición, por otro. A su vez, el análisis exploratorio muestra la satisfacción con la democracia en Ucrania en relación con las variables con las que se menciona en la tesis que existe una estrecha relación: el efecto de los regiones, por un lado y el impacto de los partidos por otro, así como la influencia de la eficacia política y efecto de la satisfacción con la economía de Ucrania a la satisfacción con la democracia. Por tanto, el análisis explicativo de este trabajo requerirá el uso de metodologías como la regresión multinivel y análisis multinivel y otro tipo de análisis relacionados.

La tercera parte incluye trabajo empírico, la interpretación de los datos y el análisis de todos indicadores que afectan en la satisfacción con la democracia en Ucrania. La parte empírica está presentada desde el capítulo ocho hasta el capítulo trece. Capítulo ocho presenta el análisis empírico de distribución del apoyo político en las regiones de Ucrania, haciendo énfasis en las partes orientadas pro europeas y pro rusas del país y su impacto en el objeto de estudio. Se analizan los datos del apoyo político de cada región.

En capítulo nueve explica el análisis del efecto en la satisfacción con la democracia de la lengua hablada en las regiones y el impacto de la etnicidad de los ambos partes de Ucrania. De otro modo, los resultados del análisis de los datos del efecto de ideología de los individuos en las partes pro europeas y pro rusas está enseñado en el capítulo diez como y del estado de la satisfacción con la democracia del voto por el partido pro europeo y pro ruso. También se analizan los valores democráticos de los individuos. A su vez, el capítulo diez incluye el análisis del efecto de todos los partidos políticos en Ucrania en el apoyo político. El interés político de los votantes por el partido orientado pro europeo y pro ruso como y el nivel educativo de los individuos en las regiones en Ucrania están analizados en el capítulo once de la tesis. Del mismo modo, se estudia la sociedad cívica en las partes orientadas pro europeas y pro rusas de Ucrania y su efecto en la satisfacción con la democracia.

El capítulo doce profundiza el análisis de los datos de la confianza en las instituciones en Ucrania y su efecto en el apoyo del rendimiento democrático. El capítulo trata del impacto de la confianza en los partidos políticos en las regiones del país de ambas partes en la satisfacción con la democracia, de un lado, y la influencia de la confianza en sistema legal, la policía, por otro. También se analizan los datos de la confianza en la media, el sistema educativo y las organizaciones cívicas y su efecto en apoyo político en Ucrania. Por lo último, el capítulo trece se trata del análisis de los factores socio demográficos y su impacto en apoyo del rendimiento democrático en Ucrania. Por lo tanto, se analiza el efecto del indicador económico, específicamente la influencia de la satisfacción con la economía de los ciudadanos en apoyo político en las regiones del país. De otro

modo, se analizan la edad y género y su distribución e impacto en la satisfacción con la democracia. Por lo último, se presenta el análisis multinivel, el modelo final de la tesis que explica el efecto de todos los indicadores estudiados en la tesis doctoral en la satisfacción con la democracia en Ucrania.

Finalmente, las principales conclusiones observadas y analizadas de los datos están presentados en el capítulo catorce, después de la observación de todos los datos de los indicadores que afectan en apoyo político en Ucrania. En las siguientes páginas, la meta principal es saber cómo se puede aplicar el concepto de apoyo político en Ucrania y cuáles son los instrumentos y las peculiaridades de la medición de este concepto en el país.


PART I
CONCEPTS AND THEORY

CHAPTER 1

OBJECT OF RESEARCH: SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE

1.1. - The Political Support as the Conceptual Origin of the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine. The Model of David Easton

The concept of political support arises from the debates within the study of the political culture. It can be directly associated with the systems legitimation developed by Seymour M. Lipset (1959). As our main object of research is the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine, we start our research with the analysis of the political support from the model of David Easton that he has proposed in his book *A System Analysis of Social Life* in 1965. Easton (1965) argues that support is filed into the political system in relation to three objects: the community, the regime, and the government. We will focus on the regime as it directly corresponds to our object of research. So far, the regime in the model of political support developed by David Easton (1965) is defined by him as the support for a second major part of political system that helps to supply the energy to keep the system running. The regime consists of the arrangements that regulate the way the demands put into the system are settled and the decisions are put into effect, the rules of the game, where the actions by members of system are legitimated and accepted by the members as authoritative. He explained that if there is a minimum convergence of attitudes in support of the fundamental rules, the constitutional principles, there would be insufficient harmony in the actions of the members of a system to meet the problems generated by their support of a political community (Easton, 1965:391).

Table 1.1 - Model of Political Support Elaborated by David Easton**DIFFUSE SUPPORT**

Source: Easton (1975)

To sum up, he clearly divides diffused and specific support of the three political objects that are political community, the regime and the authorities. He explains that it is very important to measure the political support within the society as it is known that political discontent is usually the signal for the basic political change. Easton (1975:439) is basing his division of support on the traditional theory of democracy that is the following, democracy is government based on the consent of the governed, a consent that is contingent on popular demands being expressed and explicitly satisfied through the representative process. So far, Easton (1975:436) defines support as an attitude by which a person orients himself to an object either favorably, positively or negatively. To follow, the support is understood as the person's attitudes or behavior to the specific object. Within the context of systems analysis, Easton makes the division to the specific and diffuse support. Specific support means the satisfaction of the members of the system from the perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities. To sum up, the specific support is the response to the authorities, it is directed towards political authorities and authoritarian institutions, and it is assumed by Easton (1975:439) that citizens have sufficient political awareness to be able to associate satisfaction

and dissatisfaction with the perceived behavior of these authorities where the behavior is in the form of identifiable actions or some attributed general performance.

Easton in his analysis of the specific support is taking as reference the Muller's concept of support, where he defines the support not only the satisfaction of specific demands of the citizens but also the expectations of the general performance by authorities. Muller (1970) defines three type of performance of the citizen's evaluation of authorities that is instrumental (member's policy preferences), expressive (authorities viewed as generally qualified persons) and extraneous (authorities perceived as being likeable), evaluated positively or negatively. To sum up, Easton argues that specific support is based not only on concrete outputs but simply on the authority's general performance. He also emphasize that in order to find out the specific support within the society it is needed to discover whether citizens do feel satisfied with perceived governmental outputs or performance.

According to Easton (1975) the regime includes the regime values, regime principles that are measured now in many surveys as democracy is the best form of government and the regime performance by the satisfaction with democracy. So far, we already can find in this model our main object of research that is support for the performance of democracy that is based in Easton's model in the second object of political support in the regime. To add, Easton (1975) refers political support to the way in which a person evaluatively orients himself to a political object through his attitude.

1.2. - The Main Inputs to the Model of Political Support Developed by David Easton

The first contribution to the model of political support was made by Dieter Fuchs (1993). He has associated the three sources of regime support from the Easton interpretation of political support and the three universal modes of evaluative orientation towards objects defined by Parsons (1969): expressive, moral, and instrumental. As has been just mentioned, they were related with the objects of the political system that are the community, regime and the authorities.

So far, Fuchs (1989: 26; 1993: 238) constructed the taxonomy with nine forms of support. Consequently we have got the three forms of support relating to the object of political support the regime and its combination with expressive orientation that is identification with the regime, with moral orientation that is the legitimacy of the regime and with instrumental orientation that is the effectiveness of the regime.

Table 1.2 - Taxonomy of Political Support Inputted by Dieter Fuchs


		Attitude objects		
		<i>Community</i>	<i>Regime</i>	<i>Authorities</i>
Modes of attitudes	<i>Expressive</i>	INDENTIFICATION with the community	Indentification with the regime	Indentification with authorities
	<i>Moral</i>	Legitimacy of the community	LEGITIMACY of the regime	Legitimacy of the authorities
	<i>Instrumental</i>	Effectiveness of the community	EFFECTIVENESS OF THE REGIME	EFFECTIVENESS of the authorities

Source: Fuchs “Trends of Political Support in Federal Republic of Germany” (2003:238)

To continue, Klingemann (1998) has produced another input to the model of political support in his article *Mapping political support in the 1990s: a global analysis* has approved the utility of the Easton/Fuchs taxonomy of system support. The factor analysis of surveys from dozens of countries on the political support reported by Klingemann shows the following results: support for the community matches the nine-cell scheme of Funch (2003) taxonomy of political support at the attitude object as political community and the mode of attitude is expressive that is Identification with the Political Community by citizens. On the other hand, the approval of democracy as a form of government was defined as regime on the attitude object. The model of attitude is the moral one and forms the legitimacy of the political regime.

We refer to the Pippa Norris (1999) and her book *Critical Citizens* where she defines five level of political support basing on the Easton model as another important contribution to mentioned model. According to her model we can find two more objects that were not present in the Easton model. The first level of diffuse support is political community the same as in the previous model, the second one is the regime principles that is measured as democracy is the best form, the second one level that is our main object of the research and is defined in the regime performance and that Pippa Norris (1999) propose to measure with the value whether are you satisfy with the way democracy is working in your country. To follow, the forth level is the regime institutions and the fifth one is political actors. So far, the third level concerns evaluation of regime performance that is understand by Norris (1999) as support for how authoritarian or democratic political systems function in practice that is our main object of research, the satisfaction with the way democracy is functioning in Ukraine.

Table 1.3 - The Model of Political Support Contributed by Pippa Norris



Source: Norris "Critical Citizens, Global Support for Democratic Government" (1999:10)

To add to the contribution to the model of Pippa Norris (1999), Klingemann (1998) in his article *Mapping political support in the 1990s: a global analysis* (that was included as the chapter of the book of Pippa Norris the “Critical Citizen, Global Support for the Democratic Governance”) also confirm that the concept of political support proposed by the David Easton (1975) is multi-dimensional. To explain, he means that exist different levels, objects of political support as political support for the community, regime principles, regime performance (our object of research), regime institutions and political actors.

Finally, we sum up, the contribution to the model of political support developed by Dalton (1999). As Norris (1999), Fuchs (2003) and Dalton (1999) distinguishes different dimensions of political support, naming it as a multi-dimensional concept. The author has revised the theoretical part of the concept proposed by Easton (1965) not only in the objects of political support proposed also by Norris (1999) but also in the mode of this support as Fuchs (2003) has done. Dalton as Norris define the levels of analysis that are the objects of political support earlier developed by Easton but at the same time he defines the two modes of attitudes taking into account the Fuchs taxonomy. The mentioned modes are the affective orientation to the different objects of political support and instrumental evaluations. So far, the model of political support produced by Rassel Daton (1999:58) is the following:

Table 1.4 - Model of Political Support added by Russell Dalton

LEVELS OF ANALYSIS	AFFECTIVE ORIENTATIONS	INSTRUMENTAL EVALUATIONS
<i>Community</i>	National Pride	Best nation to live
<i>Regime</i>	National Identity	
	Principles Democratic values	Democracy best form of government
PERFORMANCE	Participatory norms	Evaluations of rights
	Political Rights	SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
<i>Institutions</i>	Institutional Expectations	Performance Judgements
	Support for Parties	Trust in Institutions
	Output Expectations	Trust in Party System
<i>Authorities</i>	Feelings towards Political Leaders	Evaluations of Politicians
	Party Identification	

Source: Dalton “Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies” (1999:58)

To explain, in the model of Dalton, the political support consists of the support for institutions (parliament, political parties, civil service, legal system that is measured by the trust in institutions, trust in political parties) and the support for authority: satisfaction with the incumbents, performance rating of the current government). He measures the support for political community with the values of national pride, fight for the nation. On the other hand, the support for political system by the support for principles that are the democratic values and as, for example, democracy is the best form of government.

So far, Dalton (1999) makes the distinction between the different objects of political support but the differences between them are not very clear. Dalton explain that the diffuse support measures the legitimacy of political system, political institutions. And the specific support refers to the actions and results of the government and political elites. The affective orientations in his model mean the political values that Easton defines as diffuse support. On the other hand instrumental evaluations are the political phenomenon, specific support. The contribution to the model of political support developed by Russell Dalton is very

important as it combines the political level and the level of support with the modes of attitudes that give us a broad picture of orientations for the political system. Dalton (1999) argues that the dissatisfaction with the legitimacy of the regime can lead to weakness of the political system and consequently can the revolution, war or the loss of democracy can happen.

1.3- Satisfaction with Democracy as the Best Indicator for Measuring Political Support in Ukraine

Having analyzed the model of political support developed by David Easton (1965) and the main contributions to this model made by Dieter Funch (1993), Pippa Norris (1993), Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1990) and Russel Dalton (1999), we can start with the explanation of our main variable of research and why does the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine is the best indicator of the political support picked for the investigation of our thesis. This indicator was chosen for Ukraine as this is a young democracy, an emerging democracy and the best indicator that can measure the political support we suppose is the regime performance, the way people are satisfied with functioning, working of democracy. We expect that this item will define correctly the political support in Ukraine as Ukrainians do not have a long experience of living in democratic state but do have the experience of different regimes that have been ruling the country since its independence obtained in the 1991. As the regime transformation is a better description then the term democratization that is usually misunderstood since the outcome of the transformation process is unknown at the start and not everyone in society wants the process to culminate in democracy (Mishler and Rose 2001:304). So far, it is the satisfaction with democracy in the period of transition not during the democratization.

To start, we confirm the existence of our main object of research satisfaction with the way democracy is working Ukraine within the Easton model of political support. According to Easton (1975), this is a specific support of the citizens. To remind, by specific support he means the output and short term orientated and diffuse support is a long-term value commitment that depend on the actual performance of the system. In our research we focus on the support for the

performance of regime in Ukraine as an object of specific support. We suppose that this is the best item that can measure the political support in Ukraine as it refers to the performance of democracy but not to the principle of democracy. Pippa Norris (2002) proposed that political support can be measured by satisfaction with democracy. According to the author this item corresponds to middle level of support of her model described before, the regime performance. As was already declared, we are measuring the political support in Ukraine with the performance of the actual government because this item can broadly show the real support of the way democracy is working in the state.

To follow, Klingemann (1998) is evaluating the current performance of democracy by the regime that is attitude objects, basing on the Easton definition of the objects of political support and by instrumental mode of attitude. In his contribution to the model of political support we have found our main object on the third level of fivefold framework of his classification of political support that is the evaluations of regime performance. To explain, he understands it as the support for how authoritarian or democratic political systems function in practice. We have to specify here that Klingemann (1998) classifies the support for the performance of democracy as the object of regime performance not as the regime principles. This level covers a middle level of support and as Klingemann (1999) argues the focus on how democracy is working makes the item satisfaction with democracy suitable to test the public evaluation of democratic performance more than principles. To sum up, he defines that the regime performance can be measured by the satisfaction with the working of the regime.

So far, it confirms our choice of the variable that we are measuring the political support in Ukraine with the item satisfaction with the way democracy is working, meaning the regime performance not the support for the democracy as the principle but the performance of this regime. We suppose it is crucial to measure how the nation, people in Ukraine is assessing the actual regime as Ukraine do not have long experience of democracy (as the principle) but do have the experience with the working of the regime, it can claim to be democratic but in practice it can work totally not democratically as it has shown the last events in

Ukraine, taking part in Maidan (February 22, 2014; where around 100 of people where shoot by riot police). According to Mishler and Rose (2001) at any moment during the transformation, a new regime is perceived as “incomplete” because we do not know where it is moving regarding the direction of the transformation whether it will transform to the democracy, a different type of undemocratic regime, or the re-emergence of something resembling the old undemocratic regime. This statement once more confirm that for measuring the political support for Ukraine it is better to define it with the performance of regime because people can really asses the functioning of the actual regime, whether they are satisfy with the developing, working and functioning of democracy in exact time in their country.

It is known that performance is a very important indicator of different political regimes that are democratic or not. To explain, Linde and Ekman (2003) argue that when we are analyzing support for democracy in new democracies we have to realize that the support for democracy is measured as an ideal form of government, and the support for the performance of the regime (that is our main object of research of our thesis) is understand as the support that has to do with what the regime delivers to its citizens and how the government of the day is capable of dealing with important issues. Thus they explain that dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy does not necessarily imply dissatisfaction with democracy as such, or that people would prefer some authoritarian alternative. To sum up, Linde and Ekman (2003) point that indicator satisfaction with the way democracy works is an indicator of the performance of a democratic regime and not of democratic legitimacy. In their research they have shown that satisfaction with the way democracy works is not an indicator of support for the principles of democracy but item that taps the level of support for how the democratic regime works in practice. So far, we reconfirm that the satisfaction with the way democracy is working in Ukraine is the best indicator to measure the performance of regime that by its way directly measures the political support in this state.

Referring once more the Easton model (1975) of political support and Fuchs (1998) theoretical contribution to it, Klingemman (1998) make the conclusion that

the evaluation of current performance of democracy should be specified as the regime as attitude object and the instrumental mode of attitude (Fuchs taxonomy explained before in this chapter). To sum up, Klingemann (1998) is measuring the evaluation of the performance of regime as the effectiveness of political regime. To remind, Lipset (1959:86) define the effectiveness as the actual performance of a political system, the extent to which it satisfies the basic functions of government as defined by the expectations of most members of society. Citizens are not satisfied with the regime when its performance is not good and vice versa. Linde and Ekman (2003) also determine the satisfaction with the way democracy is working as the effectiveness, the actual performance in the eyes of the public. The authors assume that effectiveness influence the regime's legitimacy, and as was just mentioned the last indicator according to Lipset (1959:86) involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.

To add, this is a crucial definition to measure the political support in Ukraine with the item satisfaction with democracy as was mentioned before it is important to catch the effectiveness of the actual regime that evaluate the performance of regime. The performance of democracy that is identical with the attitudinal construct of functioning of democracy in the Fuchs (1998), models describe our main object of research, the satisfaction with the way democracy is working in Ukraine. Jonas Linde and Joakim Ekman (2003) also refer the support for how the democratic political system functions in practice to the regime performance.

On the other hand, Misher and Rose (2001) claim that it is important to capture the realities facing citizens in new democracies and in transitional regimes as Ukraine is that moves from an undemocratic past to an uncertain future. As it was already claimed the idealist approach cannot capture the political support in Ukraine as support for the established democracies where the choice the citizens make is between a democratic and making it more democratic. In Ukraine people should measure the political support assessing the current regime against the performance of the replaced regime that was experienced before by citizens of transitional regimes. So far, this once more confirms that our item the satisfaction

with democracy that according to the theory of political support (Easton, 1975; Fuchs, 1998; Klingemann, 1998; Norris, 1999) that measure the performance of regime is perfect for Ukraine (in the postcommunist state a new democratic country that is usually called as an emerging democracy) in order to evaluate the political support of the Ukrainians. To sum up, we can suppose that Ukrainians will measure the support for the performance of democracy by the item satisfaction with the way democracy is working/developing in Ukraine comparing it to the recent regime's performance that have been before the actual one.

It is explained that initially people are socialized into an undemocratic regime, then, they must re-learn political support in relation to a new regime. In our case, it is clear that the society of Ukraine is socialized in both soviet way that is the communist one and the democratic way through transitional, emerging democracy this state claim to be. To explain, in an established democracy, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of early socialization and current performance because both refer to the same regime. However, this is both possible and necessary in countries where there has been a change in regime like it has taken place in Ukraine. Ukrainians have observed the change of regime and that is why we suppose that political support in this country should be measured with the performance of regime, the way this regime is functioning in practice, the way the democracy is working and functioning in Ukraine because people can truly assess it, perceive it, comparing the both multiple regimes they have been socialized. To continue, Delhey and Tobsch having as the reference the work of Mishler and Rose (2001) have made some inputs to the measuring satisfaction with democracy in post communist countries. They (Delhey and Tobsch, 2003:128) describe the consolidation of democracy as the process of behavioral and attitudinal adaptation that promotes the stability and effective functioning of the new regime.

To sum up, the rational theory proposes to evaluate the post-Communist system in the terms of performance meaning what it is and what it does. We consider that it is the best option for Ukraine to measure the political support with the performance of democracy (satisfaction with the way democracy is working in Ukraine). According to rational theory in new democracies as Ukraine, the situation

of post-Communism where the political institutions and democratic culture are in the phase of development and low satisfaction with democracy, the level of specific support can threaten the existence of democracy because people can be attacked by authoritarian alternatives. This explains that people in Ukraine will measure better the political support with the performance of regime as they can evaluate it whether they are satisfied with the way it is functioning or not because measure the regime as principle as the democracy is the best form is not appropriate in the case of Ukraine as it is young democracy and has little experience of consolidated democratic state. To add, we once more confirm that it is important to measure the political support in Ukraine with the performance of regime in this state meaning whether are you satisfied with the way democracy is working in your country. To follow, the process of regime transformation in Ukraine can end in the establishment of a complete democracy, a broken back democracy, or an undemocratic regime may depend less on popular support for democracy as an ideal and more on popular support for the incomplete regime that actually exists during the transition (Mishler and Rose, 2001). Consequently, in our case this is perfect example for measuring the political support in Ukraine with the performance of regime by the item satisfaction with the way democracy is developing in this country.

We can conclude that new democracies (Ukrainian case) are a good testing ground for competing theories of learning and re-learning political support. In an established democracy, it is very difficult to test the relative importance of socialization and performance for regime support since both make the same empirical prediction: most citizens will support an established democracy. On the other hand, in post-communist societies (as the one of Ukraine) perfectly represent citizens who have lived under two regimes, each of which has sought their support. So far, political support of citizens of new democracies reflects two sets of experiences. This is very important observation made by rationalist (Anderson, 1998; Mishler and Rose, 2003) as it directly concerns Ukraine. As the result we reconfirm that political support is better evaluated in such states with the regime

performance but not with the regime principles (as support for democracy for example).

So far, our assumption is that people in Ukraine, in a new democracy have little experience with democratic theory but ample experience with the real world they live in (Mishler and Rose, 1995: 559) help us to avoid the non-attitude measurement (Converse, 1964; Anderson, 1998) of the political support with the principles of regime but with measuring it with the actual performance of regime that is the item of the satisfaction with the way democracy is functioning in your country.

Consequently, having analyzed the literature of our main object of research we can say that satisfaction with democracy is the most widely used indicator of the support for performance of regime. We have also observed that when we analyze the support for the performance of democracy in new democracies as Ukraine, it is important to distinguish between support for democracy as an ideal form of government and support for the performance of the regime. In our research we are analyzing the satisfaction with the way democracy is working/developing in Ukraine that is the support for the performance of the regime which has to do with what the Ukrainian regime delivers to its citizens and how the government of the day is capable of dealing with important issues that we understand as the effectiveness of the regime in Ukraine (as was defined previously by Klingemann, 1998; Anderson, 1998; Linde and Ekman, 2003; Mishler and Rose; 2001). It should be also noticed that dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy does not necessarily imply dissatisfaction with democracy as such, or that people would prefer some authoritarian alternative as was claimed by many political scientists. We can find that respondents in Ukraine may be strong supporters of democracy as the principally superior form of government, but still feel that their country is not ready for democracy for one reason or another and this we can measure with the support for the performance of democracy.

In our research our main object, the satisfaction with the way democracy is working, functioning and developing in Ukraine means the support for the performance of regime within Ukrainians that at the same time measure the specific

political support of the regime performance and is understood as the effectiveness of the existing regime according to corresponding literature that have been analyzed in this study. To conclude, we think that the item of the satisfaction with democracy is the best indicator of the support for the political system in Ukraine as it measures the performance of the current regime is that how the people evaluate the functioning of the democratic system and will depict the real picture of the people's political support in this country.


To remind the realist conception of political support that means that citizens of new regimes have little understanding of democratic ideals but strong feelings about the performance of the new regime especially in comparison to the past. As was described and proved before we are sure in Ukraine people do believe in democratic principles but as the previous results of analysis shows at the same time they are totally dissatisfied with the way democracy is working. That is why we once more argue that the performance of democracy is the best indicator for measuring political support in Ukraine because it helps to assess the actual situation of the political support.

1.4- Theoretical Explanation of the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine in the Fuchs Models of the Performance of Democracy

In order to have a theoretical perception of the performance of democracy, we address the Fuchs (1998) research on this topic. Within the mentioned above crucial contributions to the model of political support, we have to note another contribution of Dieter Fuchs to the model of David Easton of political support, the model of the performance of democracy. Dieter Fuchs and Edeltraud Roller in their chapter *Cultural Conditions of the Transition to Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe* for the book of Samuel Barnes and János Simon *The Postcommunist Citizen* published in 1998 define the performance of democracy as the level of the relationship between the normative order and the actual actions performed by the actors. Fuchs and Roller (1998) add to their model of performance of democracy two objects of specific support from the Eastonian model that are the current government and the economic situation. They explain it by two constructs. The first one is a general evaluation of the functioning of democracy in the respondent's

evaluation of the functioning of democracy in their country. The second one is the effectiveness of democracy (Lipset, 1981:64; Fuchs, 1998) that is related to the outcomes of democratic processes that is not understood as the day by day actions of the governments but the extent to which the system satisfies the basic functions of government. In the similar way Linz (1978:20) defines the effectiveness of democracy as the capacity of a regime to find solutions to the basic problems facing any political system. To continue, Dahl (1971:144) also emphasizes the importance of the effectiveness of different regimes in dealing with the critical problems. Since the Ukrainian political system is facing now (recent protests in Maidan in Kyiv December, 2013) and has been facing the basic problems as corruption, poverty, violations of human rights and the importance to meet the basic economic needs of the citizens. The factor of the effectiveness of democracy will play an important role in the evaluation of the performance of democracy in Ukraine.

Table 1.5- Model of Performance of Democracy by Dieter Fuchs and Edeltraud Roller




Source: Fuchs and Roller “Cultural Conditions of the Transition to Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe” (1998)

To sum up, the perceived difference between constitutional norms and constitutional reality forms one of the bases on which citizens evaluate the performance of democracy (Fuchs and Roller, 1998). To explain, the decisive criterion for the performance of democracy in the Fuchs and Roller’s model is the

extent of agreement between constitutional norms and constitutional reality, they argue that this criterion becomes one of the standards by which the community assesses the performance of democracy. Depending on the outcome of the evaluation, there is either positive or negative feedback to the community's legitimacy convictions and value commitments. Fuchs shows the example of Italia but Ukrainian case is also very informative is that the permanent violations of the rules by political elite, violations that have taken on the character of established informal rules, are not hidden from the community. So far, this led Ukrainians to a considerably more negative evaluation of the performance of democracy in Ukraine. We have to mentioned his another model of the support for the democracy as the contribution to the Eastonian model of political support and is especially important for the measuring of our main variable of research. The dimensions of democracy distinguished in this model by Fuchs (1998) the values of democracy correspond to regime principles, type of democracy to regime institutions, performance of democracy to regime processes, and performance of government to political actors.

Table 1.6- Model of Support for Democracy Presented by Fuchs



Source: Fuchs "Political Culture of Unified Germany" (1998:8)

So far, in his model, we can observe that the performance of democracy that is our main object of research and it is assumed to directly influence the formation of the consolidation of democracy. This means that evaluation of performance can modify the influence of value orientations on the type of democracy. As it is known a newly introduced democracy can consolidate only if there is positive feedback from the experience of the citizens with the performance of democracy to the structure and values of democracy (Fuchs, 1998). What is decisive in the model of the performance of democracy introduced by Dieter Fuchs is not the objectively ascertainable performance but the performance perceived by citizens. The sense of such legitimation model is that the evaluation of the reality of a democracy by its citizens (in our case by Ukrainians) is presumed to obey criteria by which democracy legitimates itself and these according to Fuchs (1998) are primary certain democratic values and the related behavioral norms contained in his model of the support for the performance of democracy.

1.5. - Applying Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine As the Precise Measurement of the Political Support in the Context of Post Communist Environment

Another prominent research on the political support was made by Mishler and Rose (2002) and concerns the satisfaction with democracy in Post Communist countries. This study is of our focus of interests as it describes the political support in new democratic states as Ukraine is considered to be. The authors argue that the logic of the Easton model, the level of political support is affected by the feedback from political performance as political learning in post-communist regimes. The people learn depends on what types of performance they value, what they learn about their new regime and what the legacy of the past is. If a regime is repressive, disregards the rights and liberties of citizens and is incompetent in managing the economy, citizens draw very different conclusions than their counterparts in a regime that promotes freedom and rejects authoritarian alternatives (Mishler and Rose, 2002:29). We can observe this in Ukraine that represent one of the lowest

indicators of trust in public institutions, trust in police within all European countries and finally depicts the lowest satisfaction with the way democracy is working.

To follow, in their research of *Political Support for Incomplete Democracies: Realist vs. Idealist Theories and Measures* propose that was published in *International Political Review* in 2001 assess the performance of realist and idealist measures with data from World Values Surveys (1995 -97) comparing their ability to describe and explain variations in support both for democratic regimes and non-democratic regimes including both long established regimes and those in the process of transition.

So far, they explain that in new democracies where, democratizing regimes, the identity and survival of the regime are very much in question. To follow, even if there are competitive elections as in Ukraine, there can be substantial violations of civil liberties, political accountability and the rule of law that we are also noticing in Ukraine since its independence in 1991, it is problematic whether such regimes will ever become fully consolidated democracies. According to the authors the transition may be reversed or progress toward democracy, may simply stop resulting in a permanently incomplete or “broken back” democracy. Taking this into account, we are curious of the performance of the regime in Ukraine, its political support as this can help us to understand which way the democracy is moving in Ukraine and what is more important the attitudes of Ukrainian society.

Mishler and Rose (2001) found that economic and political performance explains the most variance in support and, secondarily the communist legacy and that early socialization is insignificant. They add that, however, contrary to economic theories of voting, the impact of political performance is greater than the impact of economic performance in post-communist countries – and its impact is increasing (Mishler and Rose, 2001). In new democracies as in Ukraine, the situation of post-Communism where the political institutions and democratic culture are in the phase of development, the low satisfaction with democracy that depict the level of specific support can threaten the existence of democracy because people can be attacked by authoritarian alternatives. To continue, the rationalists argue

that the main problem for the post-Communist countries is to carry out both political and economic reforms. For example, Delhey and Tobsch (2003) called this a double success that was achieved by East Germany, Czech Republic, Poland but not in Hungary, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine that they name as a double failure meaning that the evaluation of the citizens of both political and economic system have turned to the worse comparing to the socialist past. To sum up, in Ukraine we are dealing with the support for the performance of democracy in the post-Communist, transitional state, where political reforms and economic development has not been succeeded, so far, we can observe very low satisfaction with the way democracy is working in Ukraine.

Afterwards Anderson (1998) has made some inputs to the Mishler and Rose (2002) research on the item satisfaction with democracy. To follow, the analysis of the outline of the literature on the support for the performance of democracy, we refer to Anderson and his articles *Political Satisfaction in Old and New Democracies* and *Good questions, dubious inferences, and bad solutions: some further thoughts on satisfaction with democracy*. In his research he examines the determinants of cross-national differences in political satisfaction across established and new democracies, using the directly comparable Eurobarometer data from over twenty West and East European countries collected between 1993 and 1995. The Eurobarometer's survey questions that are using Anderson (1998) in his research to measure the support for the performance of democracy are the following:

- On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (our country)? - That is asked for the citizens in the member states of the European Union
- On the other hand, in Central and Eastern Europe, the question is the following: On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in (our country)?

Bratton and Mattes (1999) explain that support for democracy (as a preferred form of government) is rooted more deeply in an appreciation of new-found political freedoms. They divide regime performance into distinct baskets of goods: an *economic* basket (that includes economic assets, jobs, and an array of

basic social services) and a *political* basket (that contains peace, civil liberties, political rights, human dignity, and equality before the law).

As it have been already mentioned many scientists confirm that the main measurement of the satisfaction with the way democracy is working/developing in your country is citizen's responses to the actual process of democratic governance (Weil, 1989), citizen attitudes toward a country's constitution in operation (Lane and Ersson 1991: 194) or its constitutional reality (Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson, 1995: 328). The satisfaction with democracy measures support at a low level of generalization, it does not refer to a democracy as a set of norms or ideal principles, but to the functioning of the actual system people live in (Anderson, 1998:5). Thus, it measures neither diffuse nor specific support in the Eastonian sense, but a form of support not recognized or inadequately conceptualized by Easton (1965, 1975). He explains that the support for the performance of democracy does not capture citizen attitudes toward democratic constitutions as the written rules of the game or as ideal versions of them but that item satisfaction with democracy that is our main object of research reflects a sort of emotionally-biased running tally that citizens keep on the performance of a system (Anderson 1998: 5).

Finally, we have to mention also here the article of Canache, Mondak and Seligson the *Meaning and Measuring in Cross-National Research on Satisfaction with Democracy* in *The Public Opinion Quarterly* in 2001, where they claim that satisfaction with democracy item taps multiple dimensions of political support and that the substantive content represented by the item varies across both individuals and is that satisfaction with democracy means different things to different people. They argue that satisfaction with democracy capture one of seven dimensions: support for authorities, system support, support for democracy as a form of government, any two of these three dimensions of support, or all three. In our research, satisfaction with democracy means the performance of the regime in Ukraine and directly defines the political support within Ukrainians. The authors argue that at the individual level, satisfaction with democracy means something different to respondents with high and low levels of knowledge about politics and at the aggregate level, the mix of considerations represented by satisfaction with

democracy varies from one nation to the next. In our research, we will check this within the educational level and the gender of Ukrainians. Canache, Mondak and Seligson (2001) claim that the satisfaction with democracy item leaves it to respondents to determine what criteria should be used in assessing democracy. To sum up, their results reveal that the satisfaction with democracy item taps multiple dimensions of political support and that the substantive content represented by the item varies across both individuals and nations. We are measuring support for the performance of democracy within one country, Ukraine, and research how does it differ within individuals and consequently what is the level of political support within the regions of the state. To conclude, we assume that by the satisfaction with the way democracy is developing in Ukraine, people are measuring the performance of the actual government that finally depicts the real picture of their political support.

CHAPTER 2

TERRITORIAL DIMENSION OF UKRAINE AND SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

Satisfaction with democracy is defined by many researches of political science as the component political support (Easton, 1965; Fuchs, 2003; Norris, 2002, Dalton, 2003; Linde and Ekman, 2003). It is conventional wisdom among social scientists that a stable democracy requires citizens who believe in the principles of democracy; it needs at least a majority of its citizens to share such a belief (Linde, Ekman, 2003: 392). To start, we are analyzing the distribution of the support for the performance of democracy of Ukrainians in the territorial dimension. So far, we focus on examining the level of satisfaction with democracy in the regions of Ukraine.

Consequently, our main objective is to establish the relationship between the satisfaction with democracy and the regional factor in Ukraine. To explain, we analyze satisfaction with democracy in the regions of this state, specifically making focus on the Eastern and Western Ukraine. The specific objectives of the research will be to observe and compare the level of the satisfaction with democracy in Western and Eastern regions. This two parts were picked up for investigation due to the historical and geopolitical reasons that have lead to such division. Eventually, our research question is “What is the level of satisfaction with democracy in Western and Eastern regions in Ukraine?”

Ukraine continues to offer a significant opportunity to track the development of geographic-based explanations of political behavior in a polity that is still in transition. Whether Ukrainian politics becomes nationalized as is expected from the political science models, devolves to smaller geographic units in a more complicated mosaic of votes and political behaviors, or maintains its current modest regional divisions is still open (O’Loughlin, 2001:37). This author argues that it remains a question whose answer will have many implications for other societies in

the early stages of the transition to sustainable democracy and for the study of political geography. Regionalism is the constant factor in Ukrainian political life, and it will stay this way for a long time to come (Poberezny, 2006:8). To continue this chapter explains the relation of the satisfaction with democracy with specific nature of the regional factor in Ukrainian society.

The regional cleavages in Ukraine are formed historically: regions' experience of coexistence in one country is relatively short – just half a century, and mostly under foreign domination (Poberezny, 2006:8). Throughout history, Ukraine was a 'battle ground' over which the states that surrounded it, such as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Ottoman Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Crimean Tatar Khanate, Moscow, the Russian empire, the Habsburg empire, Poland, Romania and Hungary, fought for domination on Ukraine (Doroshenko, 1992; Grushevsky, 1991; Ryabchuk, 2003). To add Wolczuk (2002:4) claims that yet upon emerging as an independent state following the break-up of the Soviet federation, Ukraine became haunted by the spectra of internal centrifugal forces. So far, we can observe that during long time regional factor is very important issue in Ukrainian politics.

2.1- Theoretical Explanation of the Pro European and Pro Russian Orientation Division in Ukraine

A lot of Ukrainian researchers also agree that having played a central role in the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has spent the past ten years seeking a place for itself between East and West. It is known that Ukraine has been trying to forge close institutional ties with the West, while at the same time keeping an eye on the rear-view mirror to see what the former motherland, Russia, is doing. The similar statement can be found in the work of Light, White and Löwenhardt (2000: 82-83) i.e., the regional patterns in political preferences come through clearly in relation to Ukrainian foreign policy with two broad preferences apparent which can be usefully, though perhaps simplistically, represented as those who would prefer Ukraine to adopt a "Slavic choice" and those who support a "European choice".

They claim that communists and other left-wing groups favor the restoration of the Soviet Union or at the least, a Slavic confederation with Russia and Belarus; they live predominantly in the east, south and Crimea. Light, White and Löwenhardt (2000: 82-83) explain that those who favor a European choice tend to be centrists by political conviction, staunch defenders of Ukrainian sovereignty, in particular its independence from Russia, though they understand that Ukraine must have good relations with Russia; they tend to predominate in the center, including Kyiv, and the west. To continue, we can observe different development of the geographical parts of Ukraine, different historical experience and distinct view on the Ukrainian policy. So far, we expect that support for the performance of democracy will be different in the Western regions and Eastern regions due to the historical experience.

On the other hand, Shulman's (1999) survey of approximately 1000 members of the elites in L'viv and Donetsk also confirms the powerful pull of external linkages to Russia in the east and the degree of alienation of elites in the west towards the Donbas. He finds that elites in L'viv are suspicious of the ethnic and national ties between Russians in the Donbas and fellow Russians across the border, believing that these ties tug on Russian loyalties in the Donbas: elites in Donetsk strongly reject this claim. On the basis of these answers, he argues that this "asymmetrical international integration" weakens the state and undermines national unity in Ukraine. To sum up, this also brings us to pick up for our research of the satisfaction with democracy, the Western and Eastern Ukrainian regions.

The differences between East and West have been proved by other researchers, among those, O'Loughlin (2001:37) that claims significant differences in political preferences, ethnic identification, national mobilization, regional loyalties, and language use exist between west and east/south Ukraine. These elements overlap to such an extent that it is difficult to isolate the relative importance of each and that in the past 5 years, numerous studies have used statistical methodologies to determine the relative importance of the regional factor, controlling for other compositional characteristics (ethnicity, language use,

age, education, etc.). In the numerous surveys of Ukrainians taken since 1991, one of the most remarkable features is the east-west split in perspectives on the future prospects for the Ukrainian state (O'Loughlin and Bell, 1999). They argue that respondents in the west are significantly more optimistic than other Ukrainians and more supportive of the attempts of the Ukrainian regimes since 1991 to reduce economic dependence on Russia and promote political and economic ties to the West. O'Loughlin and Bell (1999) also add that even simple measures of civic engagement, such as membership of clubs and organizations, also show a strong east-west gradient, further evidence of the acceptance and optimism that people in the western part of Ukraine hold for the new state and society. Åberg (2000) also confirm that residents of L'viv are much more likely to join organizations, to sign petitions, to contact government officials and to participate in demonstrations than residents of Donetsk. To sum up, according to the literature always the difference between Eastern and Western part of Ukraine have been observed, that is why we also suppose that satisfaction with democracy will also differ within this parts.

To continue with the theory on the territorial dimension of Ukraine Wanner (1998), Molchanov (2002) also confirm that Ukraine is a country of rather clearly defined regions, with their distinct social, cultural and political traditions. Persistent regional identities, the lack of intensive cultural and political communications between regions, their resistance to the centripetal pressure by an appeal for autonomy constitute the evidence of that. They claim that this does not find its reflection in the politico-administrative organization of the country. Meanwhile, Kolosov and O'Loughlin (1998) claim that in order to prevent against the possibility of further integration with Russia and a loss of political and economic independence for Ukraine, nationalists in the west want a unitary territorial-administrative structure, while for the elite residents of the Donbas, a more federal structure that would allow their region more autonomy including the chance to intensify cross-border relations with neighboring Russian regions. So far, we can observe also different views on the territorial-administrative structure

of Ukraine in Western and Eastern Ukraine that is why we also expect that the support for the development of democracy will be different in these regions.

To prove our choice of the selecting the Western and Eastern regions for the research of the satisfaction with democracy, in a comparative study of social identities in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania between 1995 and 1997 where Miller, Klobucar, Reisinger and Hesli (1998) found that the explanatory regression model for Ukraine was significantly improved by dividing the sample into respondents from West and East Ukraine. They confirm that in east Ukraine, political orientation was strongly connected to class identification, while in the West, ethnic identification was dominant, leading to the conclusion that in this region, a strong national identity promotes democracy and opposition to communists. However, the authors optimistically conclude that, in Ukraine, as in Russia and Lithuania, class interests are replacing ethnic identification as the major factor behind the consolidation of state identification. O'Loughlin (2001:31) also argues that ethnic Ukrainians in the West have a significantly higher level of support for the Western model than the other two groups (Ukrainians in the East and Russians in the East) at all age intervals. O'Loughlin claims that the gap between the groups is common throughout the former Communist states, support for the Western model is strongest for the younger populations and decreases gradually for all groups.

2.3- The Distribution of Ukrainian and Russian Language

To start, the part of those whose mother tongue is Ukrainian totals 67.5% of the population of Ukraine, this is by 2.8 percentage points more than in 1989. The percentage of those whose mother tongue is Russian totals 29.6% of the population. Comparatively with the data of previous census this index has decreased by 3.2 percentage points. The part of other languages, specified like mother tongue, during the period that have passed since previous census has increased by 0.4 percentage points and accounts for 2.9%.

To follow, O'Loughlin (2001) claims that because so many ethnic Ukrainians speak Russian as their first language, Ukrainian society should not be dichotomized

into Ukrainians and Russians, but into at least three major groups: Russophone Russians (about 20 percent), Ukrainophone Ukrainians (about 45 percent) and Russophone Ukrainians (about 30 percent). That it is why Ryabchouk (1999) argues that this asymmetry of language and nationality has led to the weakest sense of national identity among the Russophone Ukrainians, who are mostly “Ukrainian” in political terms, and mostly “Russian” in terms of culture. In our research we are interested how speaking Ukrainian or Russian language impact on the political support of the individuals.

Though many Russians claim to speak Ukrainian fluently, in practice almost all members of this ethnic group chose Russian as the language of the home (Janmaat, 1999; Lieven, 1999). Janmaat, 1999 adds that official language policies since 1991 to promote Ukrainian as the national language are making inroads in the Russian populations in L’viv and Kyiv, especially in the areas of schooling and state institutions, but are encountering resistance in Odessa and Donetsk (Janmaat, 1999). On the other hand, O’Loughlin (2001:4) explains that the high rate of intermarriage between Ukrainians and Russians and the presence of children in these families, especially in the center and east of the country, do not allow a simple equation of region and nationality.

Pirie (1996) and Lieven (1999) also confirm that multiple identities characterize a large proportion of the population; a strong feeling of attachment to the locality is added to the cultural-linguistic, national and state identities (Pirie, 1996; Lieven 1999). To follow, Janmaat (1999) finds regional differences in language retention policies – Russians opt for language retention in Donetsk and Odessa, for language integration in Kyiv, and depending on family situation for assimilation (Russians in mixed couples) or retention (Russians in purely Russian families) in L’viv; Janmaat thinks that fear of cultural loss may have prompted the response of Russians in L’viv. O’Loughlin (2001:9) claims that underlying most explanations of the regional patterns, both statistical and historical, is the linguistic distribution of Russian and Ukrainian-speakers and correlation with ethnic Ukrainians and Russians. So far, we are also interested in the impact that can produce speaking Ukrainian and Russian in

the Pro European and pro Russian regions on the individuals support for the performance of democracy.

We can also address the data of Razumkov Center, which language Ukrainians consider their mother tongue. It was observed that more than the half of population considers Ukrainian their mother tongue but we can examine that this percentage is decreasing since 2006 till 2008 but those who consider their mother tongue both Ukrainian and Russian vice versa is increasing.

Janmaat (1999) argues that with respect to geographic distribution, the west of the country has a small Russian minority with a strong preponderance of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, the center of the country (including Kyiv, the capital) has a large Ukrainian majority but a mixed Russian-Ukrainian speaking population; the south has a Ukrainian majority but a Russian-majority (over 60%) in Crimea and a mixture of languages; and the east has close to a 50-50 ratio of the two nationalities but a Russian-speaking majority.

2.4- Ukrainian and Russian Ethnical Distribution in Ukraine

It has to be mentioned that the last population data census in Ukraine was held in 2001 and the previous one in 1989. The peculiarity of the national structure of the population of Ukraine is its multinational composition. The representatives of more than 130 nationalities and ethnic groups live on the territory of the country. Even though Ukraine is an ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse country, ethno-political conflicts remain insignificant.

According to State Statistics Committee of Ukraine the part of Ukrainians in the national structure of population of region is the largest, it accounts for 3.754.700 people i.e. 77.8% of the population. During the years that have passed since the census of the population '1989 the number of Ukrainians has increased by 0.3% and their part among other citizens of Ukraine has increased by 5.1 percentage points. Russians are the second numerous nation of Ukraine. Since 1989 their number has decreased by 26.6% and at the date of the census it accounted for

8.334.100 people. The part of Russians in total population has decreased by 4.8 percentage points and accounted for 17.3%. To add, Miller, White and Heywood (1998:446) noticed that it is important to keep in mind that Ukrainians prefer Russians more than any other nationality. On the other hand, O'Loughlin (2001:4) claims that Ukraine is officially in the process of building a "civic nation", one whose ideals are not ethnic-based but that transcend national interests in the goal of uniting all residents as part of the Ukrainian nation.

According to O'Loughlin (2001:31) there is no significant difference between the ethnic groups in the east of Ukraine, with non-Ukrainians (almost all are Russians) and Ukrainians, the gap between these groups in the eastern region has grown as a result of more support for the Western model by the Ukrainian sample but the confidence intervals overlap so that the gap is not statistically significant. He interprets that a typical 50 year old Ukrainian in the west of the country have a 45% chance of choosing a Western country as a partner, while the same person in the east has only a 22% chance of picking this option for the future. Taking into account the analysis carried by the O'Loughlin (2001) we can also confirm our choice of the picking up the Western and Eastern regions for our hypothesis in evaluating its influence on the support for the democracy in Ukraine.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL PARTIES IN UKRAINE AND SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

3.1- Main Characteristic of Political Parties in Ukraine

Levy (2002:1) claims that political parties are a hallmark of democracies. In every democratic regime, claims Levy, groups establish these institutions (political parties) in order to gain political influence and direct government policy. As Ukraine is recently a democratic regime, before 1991 Ukrainian Republic within the Soviet Union was a communist regime, now Ukraine has created its own Parliament which is called Verkhovna Rada and political parties within it struggle to gain political influence and to create the majority in order to form a government and to adopt new laws. Political parties of Ukraine are visible and important institutions. Since 1994 when were held the first elections to the Ukrainian Parliament and till nowadays, Ukrainian parties were represented at the elections and were capable to place through elections, candidates for public office. Levy assumes that political parties are ubiquitous; and therefore, have to be taken into account in any analysis of a democratic political debate. So far, political parties are included in our analysis as the pro European and pro Russian and their impact on the political support in Ukraine. To add, Miller and Listhaugh (1990:385) confirm that parties play an important role in aggregating interests and integrating citizens into the political community.

The sole body of legislative power is Parliament — the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine which consists of 450 national deputies who are elected for a four-year term (Article 75, Chapter IV, Constitution of Ukraine). Ukraine is a mixed-member system which selects 225 legislators in single-member district plurality elections and 225 legislators in nationwide, closed-list proportional representation elections. This system requires parties to reach a minimum percentage threshold of the proportional representation vote to obtain seats from this tier. However, in Ukraine

are registered many parties but indeed there are always struggle between two main parties which are trying to create blocks or coalition within the Parliament.

To explain, as was just mentioned the first parliamentary elections which were held in the newly independent country took place in 1994. The major of seats took Communist party - 86 seats and People's Movement of Ukraine 20 seats of the 450 seats in the Parliament. In 1998 the struggle continued within the same parties, with 24,7% of votes (84 seats) for Communist party and 9,4% (32 seats) for the People's Movement of Ukraine. In 2002 it was one block of parties in the Parliament which was governed by the party Our Ukraine which took on the vote 23, 57% and another block of parties leaded by the Communist Party - 19, 98%. In 2006 party Our Ukraine lost support of electors and the struggle continued between the party Block of Yulia Tymoshenko which had 22, 29% of votes and Party of Regions with 32, 14% of votes. This parties remained the main rivals in the pre-election of people's deputies to Ukrainian Parliament in 2007 where Regions gained 34, 37 % and Block of Yulia Tymoshenko - 30,71% of votes. Finally, these main two parties are included in our analysis as those that are the Pro European Party and Pro Russian. Due to these facts we can state that de jure a party system of Ukraine is highly fragmentized but de facto it is usually two blocks-coalition format (block of opposition and the block of current power) which has been created in the Parliament after elections during the last decades. We also define them as the Pro European orientated party and pro Russian one.

3.2- The Ideological Distribution of Political Parties in Ukraine

To continue, we are analyzing the influence of the left right placement of the individuals of Ukraine on the satisfaction with democracy. According to Dalton partisanship measures not just whether individuals like a specific candidate of a left wing party, right wing or center parties but whether they identify themselves as a Communist, Nationalist, Liberal, Democrat or based their general support of the party and its candidates. Partisanship taps normative attitudes regarding the role that political parties should play in the democratic system (Dalton, 2004: 32). To

add, Evans and Whitefiel (1995:500) argue that identification with political parties may be counted as one of the indicator of people's involvement with electoral politics.

Miller and Listhaugh (1990:367) argue that the issue of differences and ideological distances between parties should exhibit greater variance and be clearer in multi-party than a two-party system. As it is known Ukraine is a multiparty system and in a multi-party system the individual merely has more options when selecting a preferred party and consequently the laws of competition frequently move the parties towards the centre, thereby raising concerns about whether any meaningful differences exist between them. The Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine there were officially registered 173 political parties. Is large number of parties bound to destabilize a political system, the question that makes Duverger (1954), Lijphart (1968) and Nilson in 1974. Before answering this question Taagapera and Laakso (1979) claim that the number of parties must be operationally defined in the way that takes into account their relative size. To specify, according to them, the effective number of parties is the number of hypothetical equal-size parties that would have the same total effect on fractionalization of the system as have the actual parties of unequal size.

On the other hand, Croissants and Merkel (2004:10) explain that collapse of the communist systems where they had found strong polarization in Eastern Europe it is more likely to be the consequence of ethnic structure or of conflict between individual political leaders than between the radical right and the radical left. To add, Croissant and Merkel (2004) argue that the fragmentation and polarization of party systems so disastrous for the Weimar republic, the Third and Fourth French Republic, and in some African and Asian democracies after the attainment of independence, continues to be a problem only for Russia, Benin, and Ukraine. They have determined Ukraine as third wave democracy. They explain that the third wave democracies exhibit a much lower polarization than did the Interwar democracies in Europe.

To follow, the several rounds of parliamentary elections in Ukraine since 1991 the left parties do not receive more than 40% of the popular vote and thus are unable to construct a legislative majority to implement constitutional changes. Like the left, national-democrats have never been able to control single-handedly the legislative agenda in the parliament. In 2002 parliamentary elections again proved that their electoral base did not exceed 25% of votes. In order to observe the tendency of the distribution of the votes in the left right scale, we have carried analysis of our data for Ukraine of European Values Study (EVS) and the results confirm the mentioned before statements from the literature that is centre parties have around 80,4% votes when 11.6% give their votes to left wing parties and for the right parties will 8,0% of the population of Ukraine. To add, Protsyk (2003:1090) claims that the level of electoral support of the left parties does not allow them to overhaul the constitutional system during decades in Ukraine. To sum up, neither left nor right parties can have the majority of votes in Ukrainian Parliament. In our case we are interested how it will impact on the political support in Ukraine.

3.3- The Pro European and the Pro Russian Orientated Political Parties in Ukraine

To continue, we are analyzing parliamentary elections that took place on September 30, 2007 as the data is available for this period. Our variable political parties that we take from the European Values Study includes following political parties of Ukraine that corresponds to the parliament elections of 2007. We will describe the main parties that participate in elections. To follow, the Communist Party of Ukraine is a party that strongly supports the communist ideology, nationalization of big industry, extend and make more close relationships with Russia and Byelorussia, joining the United Economic Space. The party is in the strong opposition to joining the NATO. The electorate is situated mostly in the big cities of the South and East. Secondly, the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine that is extreme left-wing party whose leader is Nataliya Vitrenko. The position of the party is the integration with Russia and Byelorussia, anti-NATO, anti-EU. The party members strongly support the idea of nationalization of the economy, giving the

Russian the state status. Then the Socialist Party of Ukraine, the ideology of the party is European socialism. The leader of the party is former speaker of the parliament Oleksandr Moroz. The party supports the idea of great regulation of the economy by the state, increasing social help programs. The party members are against privatization of big state factories and plants.

Now we will focus on two main big parties in Ukraine that can be named the Pro Russian Party and Pro European Party that are the Party of Regions and the Yulia Tymoshenko Party. To explain, the Party of regions was created in March 2001. According to the party's leadership in 2002, from the creation of the party to the end of 2001 the number of members jumped from 30,000 to half million. The party's leader in 2007 is former Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. Its electoral and financial base is located primarily in the east and south-east of Ukraine, where it enjoys wide popular support. In the Eastern Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast the party claims to have over 700,000 members. The ideology of the party is close to the liberal one. The party program supports big and medium business interests. Besides the program of the party is pro-Russian, the party supports the idea of giving the Russian the state status and to exercise more close relations with Russia. The party is against joining the NATO.

On the other hand, The Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko - the bloc consists of 3 parties: Reforms and Order party, All-Ukrainian Union "Fatherland", Ukrainian Social Democratic Party. The leader of the party in 2007 is the Prime-Minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko. The ideology of the party is social-democratic: the party program supports the idea of solidarity and justice, as a result – their position is to extend the social programs in order to establish more fair order. The party electorate is situated mostly in the Central and Western regions.

Another party that was that elected that year is People's Self-Defence Bloc that is the bloc of parties that consists of Civic party "PORA", European party of Ukraine, and civic movement People's Self- Defense. In 2007 it is the part of wider Our Ukraine - People's Self Defence Bloc in the parliament. Unlike propresidential

Our Ukraine (as in 2007, the President of Ukraine was Victor Yushchenko) this bloc is more likely to support the prime-minister Yulia Tymoshenko, and her policy.

Finally, the party Lytvyn Bloc consists of 2 parties: People's Party and Labor Party. The leader is the former speaker of the parliament Volodymyr Lytvyn. The ideology of the party is centrist. In 2007 the party tries to position themselves as "the bridge" between Western and Eastern Ukraine. "United Center" Party, this party was organized from some members of Our Ukraine - Self-Defence Bloc with the help of the president Viktor Yushchenko secretariat's head Viktor Baloga (2007). Its ideology consists of patriotism, pragmatism, and truth. The party positions itself as propresidential, and promotes the idea of uniting around the president V.Yushchenko, Our Ukraine Bloc The bloc of People's Union "Our Ukraine", and 4 smaller parties. The bloc members are more likely to support the president V. Yushchenko, and follow his policy. The ideology is close to the liberal one, but unlike Party of Regions is pro-Western - the members of the party strongly support the joining to NATO and EU. Besides unlike Party of Regions the party members support and organize programs of ukrainization. The electorate is situated mostly in the Western regions. All-Ukrainian Union "Freedom" the right-wing party whose leader is Tyagnybok, the party strongly supports anti-Russia, nationalistic and xenophobia ideas. The 3 percent threshold has passed five political parties in 2007. These were the Party of Regions, BYT, Our Ukraine Bloc, Communist Party of Ukraine, and Lytvyn's Bloc. On the following table we can observe the distribution of votes.

Table 3.1. Political Parties in Ukraine, the Number of Seats in Parliament (2007)

	PARTY/BLOC	% VOTES	NUMBER OF VOTES	NUMBER OF SEATS*
1	PARTY OF REGIONS	34.37	8,013,895	175
2	BLOC OF YULIA TYMOSHENKO (BYT)	30.71	7,162,193	156
3	BLOC "OUR UKRAINE-PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE"	14.15	3,301,282	72
4	COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE	5.39	1,257,291	27
5	LYTVYN'S BLOC	3.96	924,538	20

Source: Freedom House (2007)

To sum up, the Party of regions is the Pro Russian orientated party in Ukraine. This party has obtained the more votes on the elections - 34.37% and became the party that controlled the government that year. On the other hand, those who have voted the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko are the individuals who have voted the Pro European Party that has obtained 30.71% on the elections. We will focus on these two main parties that represent mostly the pro Russian and pro European political division in Ukraine. However, our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense Bloc with (14.15%), Lytvyn Bloc (3.96%) and All-Ukrainian Union "Freedom" - 0,76% are usually considered the pro European Parties meanwhile the Communist Party of Ukraine with 5,39% of votes is known as Pro Russian orientated party. In our research the Party of Regions is understand as the pro Russian Orientated Party and the Party of Yulia Tymoshenko as the Pro European Orientated one.

CHAPTER 4

THE POLITICAL EFFICACY, TRUST IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE

4.1- Political Efficacy in Ukraine

There are different approaches in political science that define the political efficacy of individuals. To explain, the political efficacy is understood as the sense that citizens can make the difference in society through their participation in it, in civil activity that produces their sense of efficacy. On the other hand, it is known that the more will be the education level of the individuals, their interest in politics, their perception if the politics is important or no, the more will be their political efficiency that is their civil participation. We can address the famous study “The Civil Culture” of Almond and Vebra that was published in 1963, where they comment on the sense of individual’s confidence and competence as the main indicators of political attitude and that such people are more active to take part in politics and to be democratic citizens. It should be also noted that if the political efficacy of individuals is on a high level, they would probably vote (Conway, 2000) and the civil participation will be higher. It should be mentioned that researchers (Vebera, Nie, 1972; Almond and Vebera, 1963) define “internal” and “external” political efficacy. It must be group membership if there is a single key to political participation, words of (Parry, Moyser and Day, 1992: 442).

The internal efficacy signifies the person’s sense of his or her own ability to participate effectively in the political process (Kahne and Westheimer, 2006). Meaning that the more is internal efficacy, the higher is their participation. The main indicators of the internal political efficacy are the education level of individuals and their interest in politics. On the other hand, external efficacy is perceptions of governmental and institutional responsiveness to citizens’ needs and demands as political trust (Craig, 1993), for example trust in legal system, in police or trust in political parties. All this indicators we will analyze in our research and examine their influence on our dependent variable that is support for the democratic performance.

Can we talk about political efficacy in Ukraine? Of course we can, it has its own peculiarities as Ukraine is still young democracy and is in its phase of transition as hybrid democracy but exist civil society and so far, exist political efficacy of the members of this society that has its own-special form when we compare it to the civil societies of developed democracies. To follow, we want to study the level of political efficacy in Ukraine and to know its impact on the satisfaction with democracy. In order to examine the values of Ukrainians that reflects the development of the political efficacy in this country, we will use the available data set of European Values Study for Ukraine. The variables that we have chosen for our analysis reflects the “internal” political efficiency of the citizens and are the following, the level of education, the political interest and the political interaction. As it is believed that the more educated is a nation the more political efficacy it would have and the more will be interaction in politics within the citizens. The same can be stated for the political interest is that the more individuals are interested in politics, the higher will be their political participation. Eventually we will analyze the political interest and will see its distribution within the regions of this country and its relation to our dependent variable, satisfaction with democracy. With our data we can check also the level of education and its correlation with the satisfaction with democracy and see its distribution on the territorial dimension.

4.1.2- The Education in Ukraine

It is explained by Gibson, Duch, Tedin (1992: 354) that individuals with higher education are more exposed to and socialized into accepting officially sanctioned norms promoting democratic values and that education may inherently instill or reinforce liberal values such as equality, tolerance, and respect for individual liberty. To proceed, Mcallister (1999:195) specifies that democratic values and support for the performance of democracy are enhanced more by increased civic education during the teenage years, and not by university study: while tertiary education does produce a more politically sophisticated and aware electorate, it has few consequences with regard to support for the system as whole.

On the other hand, Dalton (1999) argues that the greatest declines in political support have not come from those at the margins of politics and society, but from the very groups that have benefited most from their nation's advances: the young, the better educated, and postmaterialists. In his research is analyzing industrial democracies which are the USA and developed democracies of Europe. In case of Ukraine, we are analyzing an emerging democracy with a strong materialism orientated society but we also expect that young and better educated Ukrainians would have less political support.

Now we will observe the current situation with education in Ukraine and its peculiarities. To continue, it should be noticed that according to Human Development Index of United Nations Ukraine's Educational index is 0.96 (on a scale of 0–1, where 1 represents the higher indicator). Almost 99,7% has adult literacy and enrollment. So far, it can be said that people in Ukraine are generally well educated. For example, Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) states that the gross enrollment rate in tertiary education is at 79%. The number of private secondary education institutions is growing steadily. In 2004/2005, 61% of those enrolled in post-secondary education paid tuition fees (BTI). Life-long education is planned in the framework of the Millennium Development Goals. Within the gender, we can address the data of World Bank that states that around 91.5 percent of adult women have reached a secondary or higher level of education compared to 96.1 percent of their male counterparts. About 70 percent of Ukraine's institutions of higher education and 90 percent of secondary schools are public (Freedom House). In order to get the profile of education of our respondents from the data of European Values Study for Ukraine, we have carried frequency, description and dispersion analysis and found out that distribution of education within Ukrainians is the following most of individuals have secondary (45%) and first stage of tertiary education (40%).

4.1.3- Characteristic of the Civil Society in Ukraine

It should be mentioned that some peculiarities that has the civil society in Ukraine, it takes from the past experience of being a part of Soviet Union and of course, in that period the party of the state was controlling and oppressing the civil society. On the other hand, in that time had appeared famous Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union and Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group that were the main human rights organization. According to different surveys as Freedom House, Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI, World Bank popular acceptance of and involvement in civil society improved, even though few people have become NGO members.

To continue the number of nongovernmental organizations in Ukraine since 1995 has increased dramatically. In 1995 there were only 4,000, and then in 2000 we have 30,000 nongovernmental organizations and 35,000 in 2002, more than 37,000 in 2004 (Freedom House). According to a Razumkov Center poll in 2002 more than 1 million of Ukrainians belong to new trade unions. It shows that the citizens of Ukraine have become more active in the social and political life of the country and political interaction has increased and individuals have found more possibilities for self-fulfillment in civil organizations. But it should be noticed so far that philanthropy and volunteerism is not sufficiently developed in Ukraine, for example according to Razumkov Center only 5% of population of Ukraine actively take part in civil society. On the other hand, the political interaction of individuals usually becomes more active before the elections. Ukrainian NGOs were very active during the 2002 parliamentary elections such as All-Ukrainian Monitoring Committee, International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) that have organized First Civic Forum of Ukraine. Famous public policy research institutes such as the Razumkov Center and the East-West Institute have been very active in policy debate. Also in 2002 the Democratic League was established, a coalition of a dozen leading think tanks with the aim to address the problems of civil society and its interaction with government authorities. It is known that from 2002 the civil society is increasingly developing in Ukraine as democratically oriented nongovernmental organizations were very

active during the 2002 parliamentary elections and were preparing for the 2004 presidential campaign. According to Freedom House Ukraine's rating civil society declines from 3.50 in 2002 to 3.75 2003 owing to the apparent efforts to limit the influence of NGOs in the run up to the 2004 presidential elections.

The 2004 presidential campaign achieved the highest level of civil engagement in Ukraine since the country's independence in 1991. Self-organized civil energy played a crucial role in the Orange Revolution, which was a response to massive election fraud on the President elections of the 21 of November. These large-scale expressions of public protest took place from November 22 till December 8 in all Ukraine especially massive protests were in Kyiv and were organized and promoted primarily by civil activists. It was up to civil activists not to the leaders of the party to organize and maintain public participation at the events of Orange Revolution. Around 3 million were involved in Orange Revolution in all Ukraine. In Kyiv people has expressed a strong voluntarism and philanthropy, providing money, food, and clothes to shelter participants in tent cities that were in Kyiv during the period of Revolution since November 22. Ukrainians has shown high self-determination and self-organization during the time of protests that has also lead to peaceful solution of the protests. That time was crucial for Ukrainians to protect their liberty and their rights as citizens that they could not have achieved during the presidency of Kutchma. Finally it was not the protest for the President Yushchenko but more for their right to vote and for free elections, the nation has shown that they want to elect political leaders not vice versa. The core slogan of the campaign was Свободу не спинити! (Freedom can't be stop!) Разом нас багато, нас не подолати! (We are a lot and we can't be overcome!). The Orange Revolution provided a strong impulse for further development of civil society, which can lead to the formation of new, democratic, institutionalized, and transparent relations between government and society in Ukraine.

According to Freedom House Ukraine's rating for civil society improves from 3.75 to 3.00 owing to the explosion of self-organized civil activity during the presidential campaign and Orange Revolution. It was a great breakthrough in the

developing of civil society in Ukraine. Since 2004 we can state that civil society in this country has become increasingly vocal, active, and influential in the development of democratic institutions and political behavior. It should be mentioned that in 2004 we can note a lot of new number of civic movements and NGO coalition initiatives aimed to ensure a free and fair election as *Попа (It's Time)*, *Студенська Хвиля (Student's Wave)*, *Чиста Україна (Clean Ukraine)*, and *Знаю (I Know)*. The main aim of this nongovernmental organization was to protect the voting rights of young citizens of Ukraine and to wake up their political awareness. During 2004 there were coalitions of nongovernmental organizations such as *Choice 2004* and *Freedom of Choice* that consolidated their efforts to make use of the expertise gained in previous elections aimed to ensure a free and fair election. As it was already mentioned nongovernmental organization in Ukraine got financial support from Ukraine's *Soros Foundation* i.e. *International Renaissance Foundation* and *National Endowment for Democracy* that is a U.S. donor organization. So far, we can say that civil society in Ukraine was strongly supported by the International donors, especially Western ones.

It is obvious that civil society in Ukraine started developed very quickly since the Orange Revolution, we can see that the scores for this factor has become much more better in 2005, 2006 and 2007 that remains at the same level 2.75 (*Freedom House*). So far, the political situation has become more democratic since 2004 unlike it was during the Kuchma government. On the other hand, during these years we can observe a new radical organizations with pro-Soviet ideological backgrounds conducted actions threatening the peaceful development and even territorial integrity of Ukraine. This indicates that the civil sector remains vibrant and sensitive to the negative political trends that still appear as part of the incomplete nation-building process in Ukraine (*Freedom House*). It also should be mentioned that the number of nongovernmental organizations has increased during this period due to business interests in order to promote their image within citizens.

In 2007 the number of nongovernmental organizations registered in Ukraine was 52,693 is much bigger than in the previous years and we can constant that civil

society in Ukraine continues to develop. More than 40% of population of Ukraine are members of nongovernmental organizations, it is around 20 million (Freedom House). Trade unions, charitable and religious organizations, and groups engaged in ethnic, cultural, youth, professional, and human rights activities are the most common nongovernmental organization in Ukraine.

4.2 -Trust in Public Institutions

Trust in public institutions of individuals defines their “external” political efficacy and plays very important role in support for the performance of democracy (Seligman, 1994). As it is known, trust in all kind of institutions is very low in Ukraine. Mcallister (1999:201) explains that institutional confidence is strongly related to the period of time that democratic institutions have been in existence.

However, 2004 president elections marked a significant (10%) rise in the public’s interest in political issues. The main political institutions of the state faced strong public reaction to presidential elections of November 21, 2004. It was also noticed that in February 2005 the Parliament, the judicial system, media and nongovernmental organizations were more positively viewed by people than before. On other hand, surveys of November 2005 show that after the Orange Revolution when trust in political institutions has increased, people haven’t experienced social and political changes in the country that means dissatisfaction with the new government that didn’t meet the population’s expectations with regard to socioeconomic development, public welfare and the rule of law (BTI). The expectations that Ukrainians have from the government where: to reduce unemployment, improve quality of health care and pension payments. So far, we see that the trust in institutions decrease within Ukrainians in the end of 2005 and in 2006, 2007 coming back to the times of Kuchma government when the situation with democracy was very difficult. It can be said that after Orange Revolution a lot of people were disappointed in political institutions and have lost trust in them.


4.2.1- Trust in Political Parties within Ukrainians

According to Miller and Listhaugh (1990:371) distrust of public institutions grows when people have definite policy preferences which they believe have gone unrepresented, rather than when they perceive only minimal differences between the parties. Miller and Listhaugh (1990:372) conclude that the relationship between party choice and distrust may reflect judgments of whether or not the parties adequately represent the citizens' policy or ideological preferences. As shows the indexes of the corruption in this period, they hadn't become low but even high, and the trust in public institutions hadn't become high, we can assume that one of the reasons of the defeat of the democratic block can be explained also by the statement of Evans and Whitefield (1995:511) that democracy is the best instrument of the losers in the transition then the winners may become increasingly anti-democratic in their orientation. As it is known after the orange revolution democratic forces had come into power in Ukraine but no big changes were seen in political life of the country apart of that appeared more freedom for mass media. And Ukrainians didn't feel that their interests were fully represented by the parties they voted for before and after the Orange Revolution that has started due to massive protests of the citizens of Ukraine against the fraud of the president's election which were held on the 21 of November in 2004. Ukrainians didn't believe that elections have been conducted fairly. Neither individuals of Ukraine believed there was a big difference between two blocks of parties in the elections to the Parliament in 2006. So far, we observe very low trust in political parties.

To continue, we would like to examine the effect that produces trust in political parties on the satisfaction with democracy of Ukrainians. We argue that there is interdependence between mentioned above factors. Eventually, we want to research the impact of trust in political parties of Ukrainians on their political parties. According to different surveys the indexes of trust in political institutions and support for the performance of democracy in Ukraine are ones of the lowest within the countries of Western and Eastern Europe (see table 4.1). We can observe that Ukraine shows very low trust in political parties. Political theory explains this

that Ukraine is the new democracy and is considered as a state in transition, from the communist regime to democracy.

Figure 4.1- Trust in Political Parties



Source: European Values Study (2008)

In order to try to understand the impact of trust in political parties on the support for the performance of democracy in Ukraine during the last decade, we will carry out some historical analysis of the political situation in this state. As it was already mentioned, we suppose that exist high correlation between the mentioned above factors that is the more is the trust in political parties in Ukraine, the higher

will be support for the performance of democracy within Ukrainians. Due to different surveys, we already know that indicators for these variables are very low in Ukraine.

To continue, Dalton (2004:180) argues that there is a disturbing link between political distrust and the belief that elections are not conducted fairly. All social surveys show great decline of support for political parties in Ukraine during the period from 2005 till 2010. This statement can be confirmed by the data of ESS, EVS, WVS, Rozumkov Centre that trust in political parties and support for the performance of democracy within Ukrainians during the last decade is very low. After the Orange Revolution, it was expected by the citizens that the democratic block of parties as they called themselves (Our Ukraine and Block of Yulia Tymoshenko) fulfill their platform which consisted of the exact democratic steps which they declared before the elections (to make independent a system of justice, to fight corruption, to carry out transparent elections, to make visible the accountability of public institutions and politicians).


Eventually, within next years no big changes were seen, people became disappointed with the choice they made and in the next elections of national deputies in 2006 the party Our Ukraine totally lost its support and Ukrainians gave their voices for the Party of Regions (which was blamed in a fraud of President elections during Orange Revolution in favor of their leader Victor Yanucovich who was one of the main pretenders for the presidency in Ukraine in 2004) in order to form a new government which will defend and conduct a new policy. Thus, cynicism may grow as claimed Dalton from replacing Republicans with Democrats which in case of Ukraine is a Party Our Ukraine with Party of Regions, and still feeling that the government is not effectively addressing one's preferences. According to different social services which were mentioned earlier, we have obtained a result that Ukrainians have very low trust in political institutions while replacing the power by one block of parties by another during the last decade.

Miller and Listhaugh (1990:382) confirm that democracies rely upon the institution of elections to maintain satisfaction with government as an arena of

authoritative decision making. According to their statement if the same social problems persist across a series of governments that are led by different parties which, for example, had happened in Ukraine, an increasing number of people come to believe that none of the parties reflect a particularly viable alternative. We can notice the disappointment of Ukrainians in the replacing of political parties which form the government reflects in the low trust in political parties.

In order to examine trust in political parties within the Ukrainians and how it impacts the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine, we have carried analysis. We were curious about the trust in political parties within different age groups, gender and educational level of the citizens of Ukraine. To check the level of trust within the individuals of Ukraine we have run an analysis that we can observe on a diagram of available data set of WVS for the period since 2005 till 2010. We correlated the variable trust in political parties with the age group (Note: $\chi^2=59.43$ and $p<0.001$)

Figure 4.2- Trust Political Parties within Age groups in Ukraine




Source: World Values Survey (2005-2010)

According to the results obtained from analysis, people who are in the age groups from 30 till 49 years and from 50 till 98 trust more political parties than citizens from 15 till 29. So far, the young generation of Ukraine distrusts more political parties than elder population of Ukraine. It can be said that decline in political support also came from a young people not only in industrial democracies as was proved by Dalton (2004) but also in a new emerging, democratic states as Ukraine. Probably it would have the similar effect in the support for the performance of democracy within Ukrainians. We were also curious if there is a

difference between the trust in political parties among men and women in Ukraine. So, we run an analysis with the data of WVS and we find out that during the period from 2005 till 2007, Ukrainian men trusted more political parties than women (Note: $\chi^2=.18$ and $p>0.01$)

Figure 4.3- Trust Political Parties within Gender in Ukraine



Source: World Values Survey (2005-2010)

According to the analysis of a data set of EVS the situation had changed in 2008 and the number of women and men who distrust political parties was equal. Eventually, we can conclude that there is no big difference in the trust in political parties within the gender in Ukraine though men expressed a little bit more trust during the last decade in Ukraine.

In order to check the distribution of trust in political parties of Ukrainians and their educational level we have carried an analysis. So far, we find out that more educated individuals have the tendency to distrust more political parties in Ukraine than those who do not have proper education. But interesting data was found for people with incomplete primary school education, these individuals in Ukraine do not have any trust in political parties meanwhile those who have no formal education express the great trust in political parties of Ukraine.

4.2.2- Trust in Legal System in Ukraine

We continue examine the impact of the trust in public institutions and now specifically confidence in legal system of Ukrainians. It is known that justice system is very important institute in democratic state and consequently trust in this institution will have strong influence on the support of the individuals for the performance of democracy.

To begin, the Constitution of Ukraine prohibits discrimination based on religion, political views, gender, ethnic or social origin, or other grounds. It also guarantee human rights and civil liberties but these rights are not always secure. To explain, during the decades in Ukraine we can find political prisoners. It was also reported by the European Court of Human Rights that Ukrainian inmates usually suffer torture and inhuman treatment. To add, prisons in Ukraine are overcrowded, and many inmates suffer from tuberculosis (Freedom House).

It also has to be noticed that in Ukraine public defenders are provided for every individual who need it. But indeed it is said that they are not qualified enough to deal with the cases and people prefer better to hire private defenders. However, it is said that private defenders are pressured by authorities to make decisions that are not in the interests of their clients (Freedom House). On the other hand, the Constitution and the Law on the Status of Judges guarantee impartiality of judges in Ukraine. But the courts are funded through the Ministry of Justice and often subject to executive influence. According to the Constitution, the president appoints judges for initial terms of five years. After that, except for Constitutional Court judges, Parliament may endorse judges for life terms and therefore make them immune from prosecution. A judge can be arrested only with the permission of Parliament.

4.2.3- Trust Police

To follow with the analysis of the influence of indicators of external political efficacy on the support for the performance of democracy in Ukraine, we will analyze another factor that can have impact on our dependent variable that is satisfaction with democracy within the individuals. So far, we are going to check the effect of the trust in police that is important public institute in Ukraine and plays important role in Ukrainian society and it is supposed that will have strong influence on the support for the performance of democracy. More than 50% do not support the activity of the courts and the police in Ukraine. To continue, politicians and police officers are among the most distrusted professions (Razumkov Center, BTI).

4.2.4- Trust in Civil Organizations

It is also known that trust in civil institutions completes democracy and as a result influence on the satisfaction with the way democracy is working (Dahl, 1989; Mishler and Rose, 1996). We are continuing measuring trust in public institutions with the trust in civil organizations. The trust in civil organizations within Ukrainians remains at the similar low level as general confidence in public institutions ranging between 25% – 35%. Nongovernmental organizations do not have a significant impact on decision-making processes in Ukraine. In Ukraine a lot of civil organizations depend on local administration.

To add, the political leadership of Ukraine used to use this organization in order to legitimize their decisions. So far, it leads to distrust because the chairs of the organization not only cooperate with the state, but also often personally depend on the state for their livelihood. Another factor that weak the trust in civil organizations in Ukraine as that many NGOs depend on support from outside agencies. Nongovernmental organization in Ukraine has little impact on political decisions. Recently in Ukraine with the presidency of Victor Yanukovich the National Committee for Freedom of Speech, the National Center for Euro-Atlantic Integration or the National Constitutional Council were closed that diminish the influence of civil society on decision-making in Ukrainian politics. It can be also said that political leadership frequently ignores civil society actors and formulates its policy autonomously (BTI). According to our data of European Social Survey we can

observe the distribution of the variable trust in nongovernmental organizations in Ukraine, so far we observe around 60% do not trust NGO but around 30% do have quite a lot trust in this civil institutions.

4.2.5- Trust in Education System within Ukrainians

To continue with trust in public institutions we examine trust in educational system in Ukraine. The Gallup poll (August 2010) states that less than the half of population is satisfied with the quality of education. Access to high-quality, recognized education institutions often requires significant financial capability or corruption. It should be also noted that the quality management is not implemented in Ukrainian educational system (BTI). To continue, Ukraine has a lot of state and private institutions for education, training and development exist in all fields and at all levels, but on another hand the standards vary greatly. Expenses for R&D have decreased: They amounted to 1.1% of GDP in 2003 and to 0.85% of GDP in 2007 (BTI). It should be also noticed that Ukraine is suffering a brain drain, particularly in technology and the natural sciences, both to Russia and the West. On the other hand, the major problem of the educational system in Ukraine is the protection of intellectual property rights. The Global Innovation Index 2009/2010, which measures the business outcomes of innovation and government's ability to encourage and support innovation through public policy, ranked Ukraine 61 out of 132 countries. All these characteristics of the educational system of Ukraine cause that individuals have very low trust in it.

4.2.6 - Trust in Press in Ukraine

Freedom of speech is very crucial element of democratic society. It is known that mass media are considered to be the “forth” power after the legislative, executive and judicial. It is known that issue with the Freedom of Speech has been always was very critique in Ukraine (Freedom House, BTI) the well known case of Gregory Gongadze, a journalist who mysteriously disappeared and then was found killed during the Kuchma Presidency. Sartori (1962:75) explains that whenever we

meet with an efficient, unrestrained totalitarian monopoly of mass media there is no true public opinion, does not settle the question of just how true public opinion is in the case of a loose, plural system of opinion formation. As a result, Ukrainians observe not transparent mass media and do not trust it and we expect this will influence their support for the performance of democracy in Ukraine.

To continue, we would like to know the level of trust in press within Ukrainians and its effect on the support for the performance of democracy. Ukraine has a fairly sizable and vibrant media, journalists and media outlets--both state owned and private--typically lack true independence (Freedom House). It is also reported that journalists face regular harassment and violence for their reporting, particularly investigative work on corruption and crime linked to the authorities or to the country's powerful oligarchs. More than 70 percent of Ukraine's print media and up to 95 percent of TV and radio broadcasting companies are privately owned. However, the true owners often prefer to hide their names, as many outlets are controlled by oligarchs. In Freedom House's Survey of Press Freedom during the last decade Ukraine moves from "Partly Free" to the "Not Free" category and vice versa depending who is in power.

CHAPTER 5

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS AND SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE

5.1- El Factor Económico en Ucrania y Apoyo Político

La tesis analiza los factores que influyen en la satisfacción con la democracia en Ucrania, ahora vamos a estudiar el impacto del factor económico en el apoyo del rendimiento democrático entre los ucranianos. De acuerdo con Lipset, 1956; Gibson, Duch y Tedin, 1992; Evans, Whitefield, 1995; Anderson, 1998; Montero, 1998; Hofferbert, Klingemann, 1999; McCallister, 1999; Mishler y Rose, 2001; Bratton, Cohen, 2004 un indicador que influye en gran medida a la satisfacción con la democracia es la satisfacción con la economía, cuanto mejor es la evaluación de la situación económica, mayor será el nivel del apoyo democrático.

A continuación, Anderson (1998:11) asume que los países con nivel económico alto presentan una mayor proporción de los ciudadanos satisfechos con la democracia. Se observa que los estados democráticos necesitan garantizar estabilidad macroeconómica aparte de los derechos básicos de las libertades políticas (Delhey and Tobsch, 2003:116). Por otro lado, Fuchs (1998) observa que el problema económico es muy importante para los países de Europa del Este. En Ucrania la transformación se observan un “double failure” (Delhey and Tobsch, 2003:119) que significa que los sistemas políticos y económicos están mal. Muchos autores como Evans, Whitefield (1995: 486) también confirman que el prerrequisito de la consolidación democrática en las sociedades post comunistas es la creación simultánea de las instituciones democráticas y las instituciones de mercado. Ellos observan que las estructuras del mercado contribuyen a la aparición de los grupos de la clase media que apoyan mucho la democracia y añaden que la transición de mercado tenga que promover bienestar económico y como consecuencia el apoyo de los ciudadanos en los regímenes democráticos. Delhey y Tobsch (2003:119) también añaden que el problema importante de los países post comunistas que es Ucrania es el problema del desarrollo de las reformas políticas y económicas.

Para evaluar situación económica del país partimos del análisis de datos agregados de bases de datos disponibles del Banco Mundial. De este modo, según los datos del Banco Mundial en 2009 población total del Ucrania era 46, 008,406; el PIB de Ucrania era \$113, 545, 183,714 y el PIB per cápita - \$2,800. En la tabla 1 se observa los indicadores macroeconómicos del país desde 2003 hasta 2010.

Tabla 5.1. Los indicadores macroeconómicos de Ucrania

Los indicadores macroeconómicos de Ucrania	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Nominal PIB,UAH billion	267.3	345.1	441.5	544.1	712.9	973.1	914.7	1070.8
Real PIB, %	09.6	12.1	2.7	7.3	7.6	2.1	-15.1	3.5
Inversión constante,%	22.5	20.5	3.9	21.2	24.8	1.6	-46.2	3.8
Exportación,%	10.3	21.3	-12.2	-5.6	3.2	5.2	-25.6	6.2
Importación, %	16.4	15.5	6.4	6.8	21.5	17.1	-38.6	9.1
PIB coeficiente corrector, %	8	15.2	24.6	14.8	22.7	29.2	13.7	13.1
Índice de precios al consumo,%	8.2	12.3	10.3	11.6	16.6	22.3	12.3	11.9
Balance cambista, %	5.8	10.6	2.9	-1.5	-3.7	-7.2	-1.6	-1.5
Términos de intercambio, %	1.7	3.5	8.3	4.9	9.8	6.1	-6.8	3.7
Rentas interiores,%	38.0	37.1	41.8	43.7	42.3	43.9	41.0	41.8
Presupuestas de los gastos,%	38.9	41.5	44.1	45.1	44.3	47.0	49.4	47.0
Balance monetario, %	-0.9	-4.4	-2.3	-1.3	-2.0	-3.1	-8.7	-6.0
Deuda externa nacional,%	47.5	47.1	45.3	50.4	58.6	83.8	90.8	79.8
Deuda pública y finza,%	29.0	24.7	17.7	14.8	12.4	20.1	34.7	39.1
Consumo, %	10	9.7	15.7%	12.4	13.6	9.0	-12.1	4.2

Fuente: The World Bank, Ukraine Economic Update (2010)

En la tabla 5.1. se observa que el valor monetario total de la producción corriente de bienes y servicios de Ucrania durante estos años ha subido. La

magnitud de flujo ha contabilizado una subida de los bienes y servicios producidos durante este periodo. Lo que se puede notar es que la subida nominal no es proporcional a la subida real. Sin embargo, estamos en una situación de inflación alta, porque la producción no ha aumentado demasiado. Por lo tanto, los datos del PIB dan la impresión de un aumento sustancial del PIB. Lo que ocurre es que el valor monetario de todos los bienes y/o servicios que produce Ucrania esta deflactando el valor del PIB según el índice de inflación es más bajo. Todavía Ucrania se encuentra en una situación de cierre hacia el exterior a nivel de exportación, pero a nivel financiero es más abierta hacia las deudas públicas. En toda esta situación la baja producción industrial no ayuda al desarrollo económico y la diferencia entre el índice salar y real de precios al consumo tampoco mejoran el bienestar de la población (tabla 5.1).

A continuación, los motivos económicos tienen que dominar en la evaluación del sistema político (Przewoski, 1991; Kitschelt, 1994; Anderson, 1998). Es decir, cuanto mejor es la situación económica, más alto es el nivel del apoyo democrático (Lipset, 1956). Por otro lado, (Mcallister, 1999:189) también dice que el rendimiento económico es la causa fundamental de la forma en que los ciudadanos valoran sus gobiernos y como valoran sus instituciones democráticas. A su vez, en la tabla 3 se examina el índice medio de las variables de la satisfacción con economía y democracia. En 2004 los indicadores mencionados antes en Ucrania eran iguales. La tabla 3 confirma que los datos del European Social Survey reflejan que existe un grado de la interdependencia entre los factores mencionados anteriormente. De estos modos politólogos confirman que el rendimiento macroeconómico tiene que ser el determinante más importante del apoyo del sistema (Anderson, 1998:10)

Tabla 5.2- Datos del apoyo político y satisfacción con la economía de los países europeos del 2004 y 2006

Países	Satisfacción con la economía, 2004	Satisfacción con democracia, 2004	Satisfacción con la economía, 2006	Satisfacción con democracia, 2006
Austria	5,2	6,03	6,17	6,04
Bélgica	5,09	5,56	5,45	5,49
Suiza	5,26	6,36	6,55	6,87
Alemania	3,44	5,06	4,25	5,01
Dinamarca	7,06	7,31	7,6	7,45
Estonia	4,61	4,56	5,57	4,87
España	5,28	6,05	5,32	5,92
Finlandia	6,54	6,7	6,78	6,76
Francia	3,76	4,85	3,7	4,57
Reino Unido	5,28	5,09	5,18	4,88
Hungría	3,12	4,05	2,89	3,57
Noruega	6,37	6,23	7,08	6,63
Polonia	3,19	3,71	4,08	4,34
Portugal	2,64	3,39	3,2	4,22
Suecia	5,01	5,91	6	6,35
Ucrania	4,04	4,04	2,33	3,1


Fuente: European Social Survey (2004, 2006)

Los análisis empíricos muestran que la edad de la democracia, el capital social y el rendimiento político y económico están asociados con la satisfacción democrática en las democracias maduras de Europa Occidental (Anderson, 1998:13). La confianza en la gente, en el parlamento, en sistema legal gobierno y la satisfacción democrática depende del rendimiento económico (Clarke, Weatherford 1992; Dutt and Kornberg 1993; Guillory, 1995; Anderson, 1998,)

5.1.2- Satisfacción con la economía y apoyo de rendimiento democrático

Según los datos del Freedom House, World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID), el Comité de Estadística Estatal de Ucrania el país sufre una profunda crisis económica. Los índices de corrupción e inflación son significativamente altos; el PIB per cápita es muy bajo y el porcentaje de la gente que vive por menos de \$1 el día constituye 19,5% (2007). Todo esto influye en la creciente baja satisfacción con la economía entre individuos en Ucrania que podemos observar (Gráfico 5.1).

Gráfico 5.1- Satisfacción con la economía




Fuente: European Social Survey (2008)

En el gráfico 1, los datos del European Social Survey (ESS) nos enseñan que la satisfacción más baja con la economía entre los países de la Europa de Este (Bulgaria, Hungría, Rusia) que se encuentran en desarrollo económico era en Ucrania. Por otro lado, hay bastante satisfacción con el factor ya mencionado en los países como Austria, Bélgica, Alemania, Estonia, España, Francia, Gran Bretaña, Irlanda, Países Bajos, Polonia, Portugal, Eslovenia, Eslovaquia que tienen un nivel bastante alto de los indicadores macroeconómicos. A continuación, el gráfico 1 confirma que existe mucha satisfacción con economía en los países escandinavos

donde los indicadores mencionados anteriormente son muy altos (Nota: $\chi^2= 2121.11$ and $p<0.001$)

Consecuentemente, existe una covariación casi perfecta entre el grado de satisfacción con la situación económica y valoración de las condiciones políticas Montero (1998:20) y esto supone que en las sociedades con nivel bajo de la estabilidad democrática, el apoyo del proceso democrático depende en mayor medida del rendimiento económico pero en las sociedades con la estabilidad democrática el apoyo depende más de los aspectos culturales y que los apoyos dependen mucho de las sociedades. De este modo, el gráfico 2 nos enseña que en los países económicamente desarrollados, en Austria, Bélgica, Alemania, Estonia, España, Francia, Gran Bretaña, Irlanda, Países Bajos, Polonia, Portugal, Eslovenia, Eslovaquia existe significativa satisfacción con la democracia y economía y en los países con un bajo nivel económico como Bulgaria, Hungría, Rusia y Ucrania los dos factores ya mencionados se dan en el mismo bajo nivel (Nota: $\chi^2=107.55$ and $p<0.001$).

Gráfico 5.2- La interdependencia entre la satisfacción con la economía y la democracia de los países de Europa



Fuente: European Social Survey (2008)

Por eso, queremos examinar el efecto que causa la satisfacción con la economía en la satisfacción con la democracia. Por tanto, la pregunta de investigación de las variables mencionadas será: “¿Qué efecto tiene la satisfacción con la economía en el apoyo del rendimiento democrático dentro de la parte pro Europea y pro Rusa en Ucrania?”

5.2- Sociodemographic Characteristic of the Pro European and the Pro Russian Orientated Part in Ukraine

In order to have general view of the territorial dimension of Ukraine, we will describe shortly its main characteristics. To start, Ukraine consists of 24 administrative regions, Autonomous Republic of Crimea and 2 cities (the city of Kyiv and Sevastopol') with a special status. This state is one of the largest countries in Europe. Has an area of 603,628 km². Population is around 45 million (World Bank data, 2010). It should be mentioned that the total number of the actual population of the Ukraine, according to the All-Ukrainian Population Census '2001 data, accounted for 48 million 457 thousand persons. Ukraine is characterized by high population density, according to the All-Ukrainian Population Census data, it accounted for 80 persons per sq. km. on average in the country. The least population density is in North-West and South of the country, where it makes up 60 persons per sq. km. This index is especially low in Chernihiv region – 39 persons per sq. km. The East industrial regions are the most densely populated, there this index makes up more than 90 persons per sq. km. and in Donets'k region it totals 183 persons per sq. km. (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine).

Table 5.3- Education Level of the residences in the Western and Eastern Ukraine (%)

UKRAINE'S REGIONS	EDUCATION LEVEL			
	NONE EDUCATION	ELEMENTARY EDUCATION	SECONDARY EDUCATION	HIGHER / TERTIARY EDUCATION
WESTERN REGIONS	7	2	53	43
EASTERN REGIONS	2	4	54	44

Source: European Values Study (2008).

Note: $\chi^2=252.25$ and $p<0.01$

Another factor that was examined in the mentioned regions is educational level. So far, people in these regions and found out that the data are similar for both parts, that almost the all population in both parts has secondary education or higher education (see table 5.3). We can observe that in Western and Eastern regions people are well educated. It also confirms Human Development Index that Education Index (0.858) is quite high within the individuals in Ukraine.

5.3.1 - Age Structure in Ukraine

Ukraine is undergoing a severe demographic crisis characterized by an aging and shrinking population. According to World Health Organization, the average life expectancy was 61 years for men and 73 for women in 2006. The part of children in population has decreased, while the part of the persons at the age older than able-to-work has increased, that considerably complicates present demographic situation in the country and says about ageing of the population. The country's fertility rate is among the lowest in the world, which will cause economic and social problems in the future. So far, policies and institutions are ill-equipped to deal with the consequences of this development, such as higher expenditures in health care, elderly care and pensions as well as a declining labor force (BTI).

Table 5.4. Age Structure of the Population able to Work in Ukraine

AGE	PERMANENT OF POPULATION THOUSAND PERSONS	AS % TO THE TOTAL 2001
YOUNGER THAN ABLE-TO-WORK AGE	8743.7	18.1
ABLE-TO-WORK AGE	27984.7	58.0
OLDER THAN ABLE-TO-WORK AGE	11492.8	23.9

Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (2001)

Ukraine has the highest prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS in the former Soviet states. Since 1995, the virus has spread dramatically, first among drug addicts, but increasingly through sexual transmission. According to UNAIDS, the estimated percentage of Ukrainian adults and children living with HIV/Aids at the end of 2008 was about 1.6%. The policy response of the Ukrainian state is viewed positively, but remains insufficient. The epidemic will also contribute to higher costs for health care and a decline in the labor force. The age structure of the population, stated by the All-Ukrainian Population Census '2001, is characterized by the following data:

Table 5.5. The Age Structure of the Population

AGE	PERMANENT POPULATION THOUSAND PERSONS	% OF THE LEVEL OF	
		2001	1989
0-9	4533.3	9.4	14.5
10-19	7308.1	15.2	13.9
20-29	6891.6	14.3	14.2
30-39	6621.2	13.7	14.9
40-49	7298.7	15.1	11.5
50-59	5245.3	10.9	12.9
60-69	5522.2	11.4	10.2
70-79	3740.0	7.8	5.5
80 AND OVER	1060.8	2.2	2.4

Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (2001)

5.3.2 - Gender Distribution in Ukraine

During the All-Ukrainian census of the population besides actual there have been accounted permanent population, which is used in calculations of indices, characterizing socio-economic structure of the population. Permanent population of Ukraine, at the date of 5 December 2001 accounted for 48,241 thousand people, including men - 22,316 thousand people, or 46.3%, that of women - 25,925 thousand people, or 53.7%, urban population – 32,291 thousand people, or 66.9%, that of rural population – 15,950 thousand people, or 33.1%. Among permanent population citizens of Ukraine totalled 47,950 thousand people, citizens of other countries – 168 thousand people, including citizens of CIS (Commonwealth Independent States) – 151 thousand people. There were about 83 thousand persons without citizenship in Ukraine and those who haven't specify their citizenship – 40 thousand people. The gender distribution within the regions of Ukraine can be seen in the table. So far, in both parts was observed that are more women than man, this relation is around 55 to 45 percent.

Table 5.6- Gender of the residences in the Western and Eastern Ukraine (%)

UKRAINE'S REGIONS	GENDER	
	MALE	FEMALE
WESTERN REGIONS	48	52
EASTERN REGIONS	45	55

Source: European Values Study (2008)

Note: $\chi^2=41.79$ and $p<0.01$

According to the data of the All-Ukrainian Population Census'2001, the number of men totalled 22,441,000 people that is 46.3%, that of women - 26,016,000 people, or 53.7%. Ukraine's gender inequality index according to UNDP (2010) is 0.463 (on a scale of 0–1, 1 signifying complete gender equality). The World Economic Forum's

Corporate Gender Gap Report (2010) places Ukraine at position 62 out of 130 countries with an index of 0.6856 (on a scale of 0–1, 1 signifying complete gender equality).

According to BTI, women in Ukraine are underrepresented in economic and political leadership positions. Women earn 27.6% less than men for equal work. The sixth convocation of the Verkhovna Rada (after the 2007 elections), for example, has only 34 women among its 450 deputies, or 7.6%. There is a distinct tendency for councils to be more gender balanced the lower they are in the government hierarchy. Women are overrepresented in tertiary education, but have inferior positions on the labor market. The new government opposes women's participation in politics, relegating them to their "proper places" in the domestic sphere.

Table 5.7- Gender Structure of Population by Regions of Ukraine

	ACTUAL POPULATION THOUSAND PERSONS		AS % OF TOTAL POPULATION		REFERENCE BY 1989 YEAR	
	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE
AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA	937.6	1096.1	46	54	47	53
CHERKASY REGION	638.8	764.2	46	54	45	55
CHERNIHIV REGION	565.5	679.7	45	55	44	56
CHERNIVTSI REGION	432.1	490.7	47	53	46	54
DNIPROPETROVS'K REGION	1643.3	1924.3	46	54	46	54
DONETS'K REGION	2219.9	2621.2	46	54	46	54
IVANO-FRANKIVS'K REGION	665.2	744.5	47	53	47	53
KHARKIV REGION	1339.5	1574.7	46	54	46	54
KHERSON REGION	548.5	626.6	47	53	47	53
KHMEL'NYTS'KYI REGION	659.9	770.8	46	54	46	54
KIROVOHRAD REGION	520.8	612.2	46	54	46	54
KYIV REGION	845.9	982.0	46	54	46	54
LUHANS'K REGION	1169.9	1376.3	46	54	46	54
L'VIV REGION	1245.1	1381.4	47	53	47	53
MYKOLAIV REGION	588.2	676.6	47	53	46	54
ODESA REGION	1155.4	1313.6	47	53	47	53
POLTAVA REGION	747.4	882.7	46	54	45	55
RIVNE REGION	555.6	617.7	47	53	47	53
SUMY REGION	593.8	705.9	46	54	45	55
TERNOPII' REGION	530.2	612.3	46	54	46	54
VINNYTSIA REGION	809.6	962.8	46	54	45	55
VOLYN' REGION	500.1	560.6	47	53	47	53
ZAKARPATTIA REGION	605.5	652.8	48	52	48	52
ZAPORIZHZHIA REGION	886.6	1042.6	46	54	46	54
ZHYTOMYR REGION	644.8	744.7	46	54	46	54
THE CITY OF KYIV	1218.7	1392.7	47	53	47	53
THE CITY OF SEVASTOPOL' X)	173.5	206.0	46	54	47	53

^{x)} Including settlements that are administratively subordinated to the town's council

Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (2001)

Foregoing data say about gradual decrease in gender disproportion in the population of Ukraine, if in 1989 there were 1163 women per 1000 men, than in 2001 – 1159. These changes are explained by changes in gender structure of rural

population, where since 1989 gender ratio has changed from 1205 women per 1000 men to 1151 women per 1000 men. The reverse situation is in towns, where this index has increased from 1143 women per 1000 men in 1989 to 1163 women per 1000 men in 2001. Besides, according to the data of the last census, the proportion of women to men at the reproductive age become better, since the index, calculated like division of number of women in this age group by 1000 men in corresponding age, come to 1031.

PART II

HYPOTHESES, VARIABLES, DATA AND METHODS

CHAPTER 6

6. - HYPOTHESES AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF OUR VARIABLES

6.1- HYPOTHESES

The regional cleavages in Ukraine are formed historically: regions' experience of coexistence in one country is relatively short – just half a century, and mostly under foreign domination (Poberezny, 2006:8). Throughout history, Ukraine was a 'battle ground' over which the states that surrounded it, such as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Ottoman Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Crimean Tatar Khanate, Moscow, the Russian empire, the Habsburg empire, Poland, Romania and Hungary, fought for domination on Ukraine (Doroshenko, 1992; Grushevsky, 1991; Ryabchuk, 2003). To add, Wolczuk (2002:4) claims that yet upon emerging as an independent state following the break-up of the Soviet federation, Ukraine became haunted by the spectra of internal centrifugal forces. So far, we can observe that during long time regional factor is very important issue in Ukrainian politics. Having analyzed all the information obtained from the theoretical base on the regional factor in Ukraine and specific characteristic of the Western and Eastern Ukraine, we can state our main hypothesis on the impact of the territorial dimension on the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine.

Hypothesis 1

The Eastern part of Ukraine that is usually characterized as Pro Russian orientated territory of Ukraine has less political support then the Pro European Western regions. Consequently, exist a difference in the satisfaction with democracy between the Pro European and Pro Russian orientated regions in Ukraine and Ukrainian language that is usually is more spoken in Western and Central and Northern part of Ukraine positively impacts on the support for the performance of democracy in this regions while in the Eastern and Southern Ukraine where the Russian language is a dominant one has a negative effect. To follow with our hypothesis of the impact of the Pro European and Pro Russian orientated regions on the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine: those individuals that

identify themselves as Ukrainians will be more satisfied with the performance of democracy than those people who considered themselves to be Russian ethnicity.

We have already investigated the territorial dimension in Ukraine and it plays very important role in the current politics of Ukraine and in the development of the democracy in this state. As was just exposed in the hypothesis and according to the researched theoretical base on this theme we expect that political support in Pro European orientated part of Ukraine will be higher than in the Pro Russian orientated one. We also expect that ethnicity and language will also effect on the support for the performance of democracy. We expect that Ukrainians will be more satisfy with the way democracy is functioning in Ukraine then those who consider themselves to be Russian. On the other hand, we also predict that speaking Ukrainian will have positive effect on the political support nevertheless it is a Pro European or Pro Russian orientated regions.

In relation to the mentioned hypothesis the next three hypotheses of the thesis are developed.

Hypothesis 2

To follow, with our hypothesis of the effect of the Pro European and Pro Russian orientated regions of Ukraine on the individual's political support: those individuals who proceed from the Western Ukraine and have voted the Pro European orientated party and on the left-right placement place themselves more to the right are more satisfied with the performance of democracy than those individuals from the Eastern regions that have voted the Pro Russian orientated party and their ideology is more left placed. To specify, people who have voted the Pro European orientated party (Yulia Tymoshenko) are more satisfied with democracy than those who have voted the Pro Russian orientated party (Victor Yanukovitch).

During all elections that have been carried in Ukraine both presidential and parliamentary, the division of the vote for the Pro European and Pro Russian orientated candidate or party was always observed. Having revised all the necessary information from national and international surveys and relevant written literature

we have made stated a mentioned hypothesis on the impact that produce the vote for the Pro European or Pro Russian orientated party in Ukraine on the individual's support for the performance of democracy. As was declared in our hypothesis we expect that those people who have voted the Yulia Tymoshenko party will have more political support than those who have chosen the Party of Regions in the last elections. We are also curious of the impact of the ideology of the respondent, meaning that this factor can also have strong influence on the support for the performance of democracy in Ukraine. According to hypothesis those voters that place themselves on the right (as the Pro European orientated parties in Ukraine have the tendency to be more right orientated) they will be more satisfied with the developing of democracy as those who tend to be more left orientated. The Pro Russian orientated parties are mostly left orientated in Ukraine. From this hypothesis arise another hypothesis of the effect of the political efficacy of the voters in Ukraine on their political support. To explain, we expect that those people from Western Ukraine who have voted the Yulia Tymoshenko (Pro European party) will have higher level of political efficacy then those individuals from the Eastern Ukraine who have voted the Yanukovitch (Pro Russian orientated party). As it was previously stated the political support is higher in the Western regions and within the voters of Pro European parties. So far, our next hypothesis is the following.

Hypothesis 3

To continue with the analysis of the impact of the Pro European and Pro Russian orientated regions: the voters of the Pro European orientated party are more satisfied with the way democracy is working in Ukraine and have more political efficacy then those individuals who have elected the Pro Russian orientated party. To add, the more trust in political parties is observed within the voters of Pro European orientated parties then in the individuals who have voted the Pro Russian one. On the other hand, the trust in institutions is also higher in Western regions then in Eastern regions known as more the Pro Russian orientated ones. To conclude, the civil society is also weaker in Eastern part of Ukraine then it is the Pro European orientated west.

To explain, we also suppose that those individuals from the Western part of Ukraine that have voted the Pro European orientated party will be more interested in politics and will be more educated and as the result will be more satisfied with democracy then those people who proceed from Eastern Ukraine and have voted the Pro Russian orientated party. According to our hypothesis of the impact of the Pro European and Pro Russian orientated regions on the support for the performance of democracy in Ukraine we suppose that trust in legal system and in police, in educational system, in press will be higher within the individuals of Pro European regions (Western part of Ukraine) then in the Eastern Pro Russian orientated regions.

Having analyzed all the important literature of the modernization theory and the influence of economic factor and its crucial role in new democracies as Ukraine is and having revised all necessary information on this issue, we state our next hypothesis of the impact of the economic factor on their satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine.

Hypothesis 4


Following, our hypothesis of the impact of the Pro Russian and Pro European orientated part of Ukraine on the political support, we state the next one: the economic development of the regions has positive effect on the satisfaction with democracy of the individuals in both parts of the state, the Western and Eastern regions of Ukraine. To complete the hypothesis of the effect of sociodemographic factors on the satisfaction with the developing of democracy in Ukraine: the younger generation in the Western part has more political support then in the Eastern regions.

To explain, we also analyze the effect of sociodemographic data in out theis on the political support in Ukraine as the imact of age and gender. We supposed that age will effect the level of the satisfaction with democracy within Ukrainians. It is expected expect that younger generation in Ukraine will be more satisfied with

democracy in Pro European orientated part of Ukraine then in the Pro Russian orientated one.

To sum up the hypotheses of the thesis we have made the table in of the effect of the specific objectives that were chosen for our analysis due to the literature that has been revised on this topic during all our research and according to the importance of these factors in Ukrainian society. So far, you can follow the final diagram of the impact of the main indicators on our object of research, satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine.

Figure 6.1- The Impact of the Researched Indicators of the Dissertation on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine



Source: Hypotheses of the Dissertation

Having formulated the hypotheses of our research that derives from the examined already theoretical base of our thesis on the relative factors that produce the impact on the political support in Ukraine we will pass to the measurement of

the concepts that will be applied in the empirical part in order to test our hypotheses.

6.2. OPERATIONALIZATION OF OUR VARIABLES

6.2.1 - The Main Applications of the Satisfaction with Democracy as the Appropriate Indicator for Political Support in Ukraine

Having analyzed all the theoretical part developed by David Easton (1965, 1975) on the model of political support and the main contributions explained by Fuchs, 1998; Norris 1999; Klingemann, 1998; Dalton 1999 and the described before the models of Fuchs about the performance of democracy. We can start the instrumental analysis of the item of the satisfaction with democracy as was picked up as the best factor that can measure the political support in Ukraine. It is known that this variable firstly has been using in the following international surveys as the World Values Survey (WVS), Eurobarometer (EB), the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB) and the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and European Values Study (EVS) and European Social Survey (ESS). The authors as other mentioned before empirically orientated political scientists that are using the quantitative measurements agree that mass level survey data provide a truly useful means to measure how people regard and evaluate the democratic regime and the way democracy works (Linde and Ekman 2003). As it is known in many countries the attitudes of citizens are monitored frequently as International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and of the New Democracies Barometer (NDB), European Values Study (EVS), European Social Survey (ESS). But during all this time always the question of what really measures the item satisfaction with democracy has been arising.

So far, we can start with the analysis of the satisfaction with democracy of Pippa Norris (1999) where she addresses the Eurobarometer Survey where this item is measured by satisfaction with the performance of democracy as how democracy functions in practice. The question in the mentioned survey is the following:

- Are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is functioning (in your country)?

She also explains that this object covers a middle level of support that is difficult to define as was mentioned before Easton define our main object of research as the object of specific support in his model. To sum up, according to Pippa Norris (2002: 310) political support can be measured by satisfaction with democracy. On the other hand, Klingemann (1998) has made a huge analysis of political support in his comparative survey research of global political support of the 90s had been using the data from the World Values Survey coordinated by Ronald Inglehart. Being mentioned above Klingemann was measuring the relevant aspects of political support with World Values Survey. The *regime performance* that contains our main object of research – the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine - is measured in four questions in the Klingemann's analysis:

- People have different views about the system for governing this country. Here is a scale for rating how well things are going: (1) means very bad and 10 means very good. Where on this scale would you put the political system as it is today?
- How satisfied are you with the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs? Would you say you are (4) very satisfied, (3) fairly satisfied, (2) fairly dissatisfied or (1) very dissatisfied?
- I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it (4) a great deal of confidence, (3) quite a lot of confidence, (2) not very much confidence, or (1) none at all?" The Parliament; The Government in (Capital City)

It has to be noticed that the reference object is the quality of the democratic process that is the constitutional reality in the citizen's country (Klingemann, 1998:12) and is our main object of research of the thesis. To continue, the relevant question for the Western European and the Latin American surveys is the following:

- On the whole, are you (4) very satisfied, (3) fairly satisfied, (2) not very satisfied, or (1) not at all satisfied with the way democracy works (in your country)?

When for the Central and Eastern European surveys the same question that corresponds to our dependent variable in our analysis of the satisfaction of democracy in Ukraine is wording is slightly different:

- On the whole, are you (4) very satisfied, (3) fairly satisfied, (2) not very satisfied or (1) not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in (your country)?

To sum up, Klingemann (1998) argues that the focus on how democracy is working is suitable item to test public evaluation of democratic performance.

Because the citizens can believe strongly in democratic values but still feel that the way democracy is functioning in their country leaves much to be desired. In our research of the political support in Ukraine, we are using the just mentioned question for the satisfaction with the way democracy is developing. To continue, we have found the definition of our dependent variable that is support for the performance of democracy in the article *Satisfaction with democracy: A note on a frequently used indicator in comparative politics* published in *European Journal of Political Science* in 2003 by Jonas Linde and Joakim Ekman. Departing from the a theoretical multidimensional model of political support that was described before in our research, the authors argue that satisfaction with the way democracy works is not an indicator of support for the principles, rather, it is the item that taps the level of support for the way democratic regime works in practice. So far, Jonas Linde and Joakim Ekman (2003) in their analysis are trying to answer this question “What does it really measure?” Thus they emphasize that it is important to distinguish between that the support for the democracy in principle and performance. They also add as the previously mentioned authors that the item satisfaction with democracy has in fact been incorrectly used as an indicator of popular support for. It have been proved already that the respondents may be strong supporters of democracy as the principally superior form of government, but still feel that their own country is not ready for democracy for one reason or another.

Table 5.8- Objects of Political Support

Objects	Type of support	Examples of survey questions
The political community	A basic attachment to the nation beyond the present institutions of government and a general willingness to cooperate together politically	“How proud are you to be a [citizen of this country]: very proud, quite proud, not very proud, or not at all proud?”
Regime principles	Support for ‘democracy’ as a principle or an ideal (i.e., as the most appropriate form of government)	“Our current system of government is not the only one that this country has had. Some people say that we would be better off if the country was governed differently. What do you think?” [alternatives]
Regime performance	Support for how the democratic political system functions in practice.	“On the whole, are you satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [our country]?”
Regime institutions	Attitudes toward governments, parliaments, the executive, the legal system, the state bureaucracy, political parties and the military. Support for the institutions rather than persons (e.g., support for the presidency as an institution rather than support for George W. Bush as president).	“There are many different institutions in this country, for example, government, courts, police, civil servants. Please show me on this 7-point scale, where 1 represents no trust and 7 great trust, how great is your personal trust in each of these institutions: [alternatives]”
Political actors	Specific support for political actors or authorities.	“How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country’s affairs?”[alternatives]

Source: Linde and Ekman (2003)

To continue, dissatisfaction with the way democracy works could be described as a general phenomenon in Central and Eastern Europe, and not necessarily a phenomenon that is dependent upon the political-ideological orientations of the respondents. On the other hand, one could argue that political culture in the post communist countries is more confrontational than in the established West European democracies. Consequently, political-ideological orientations should indeed have a strong impact on the levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works claim Linde and Ekman (2003:402).

It is claimed that the regime performance are the system outputs, the object of specific support, should be measured not only by the economic factor, the matter of economic growth or social reforms but the regime’s capacity to maintain order, to maintain the rule of law, and to otherwise respect human rights and the democratic rules of the game. To conclude, they argue that public support for the

regime performance erodes the diffuse support, the democratic legitimacy, the support for the principles of democracy. To sum up, we are measuring in our research, satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine as the object of specific support that directly influence the legitimacy of the regime that is in Ukraine and evaluate the effectiveness of this regime and this is our main dependent variable of research.

6.3- Measuring Political Support in Ukraine by Satisfaction with Democracy

According to the theme of the thesis our dependent variable is satisfaction with democracy (v223) (Q63) of people in Ukraine. From our survey (EVS) we have got for Ukraine 1507 cases. For our dependent variable that is satisfaction with democracy we have 1380 individuals who have responded for our main question 'satisfaction with democracy' and 127 cases as missing values that are) 8 cases as 'na' (no answer) and 118 individuals that don't know ('dk') whether they are satisfied with democracy in Ukraine or no.


The question for this variable in the survey as was already mentioned is:

“On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?” (very satisfied (1), rather satisfied (2), not satisfied (3), not at all satisfied (4))

Our dependent variable, satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine in the period of transition is ordinal one meaning that it is coded in data base as very satisfied, rather satisfied, not satisfied and not at all satisfied. To proceed, on the graph below, we can see the dispersion of residuals of our regressed variable, satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine. This variable has such distribution of residuals because it has four categories as was mentioned before (very satisfied, rather satisfied, not satisfied and not at all satisfied) according to the European Values Study. The darker residuals correspond to not satisfy and not at all and more transparent ones to very satisfied and rather satisfied. In our analysis most of our research variables are ordinal ones that is for example, our dependent variable, satisfaction with democracy (not satisfied, satisfied, strongly satisfied) in Ukraine in the period of transition and our independent variables, trust in public institutions, in political parties, satisfaction with economy, etc. Nominal variables are gender, marital

status, education, etc. For example, on the graph below, we can see the dispersion of residuals of our regressed, satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine. This variable has such distribution of residuals because it has four categories as very satisfied, rather satisfied, not satisfied and not at all satisfied according to the European Values Study. The darker the residuals correspond to not satisfied and not at all and more transparent ones to very satisfied and rather satisfied.

Figure 6.2- Dispersion of Residuals of our Dependent Variable, Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine



Source: European Values Study (2008)

We have recorded our variable satisfaction with democracy as 1 is not at all satisfied, 2- not satisfied, 3- satisfied and 4- very satisfied and all missing values that are coded in the questionnaire into -1 to -5 values where (-5 other missing, -4 question not asked, -3 nap, -2 na, -1 dk). In order to obtain in our analysis the line that indicates the increasing of the variable, meaning that the higher is the score, the higher is satisfaction with democracy within Ukrainians. So far, the answers to our question:

“On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?”
(not at all satisfied (1), not satisfied (2), rather satisfied (3), very satisfied(4))

6.4- Territorial Dimension in Ukraine

Variable v371b_N3 from the European Values Study correspond to the Region where live the respondent (Q136) and the question is the following:

“In which region do you live?”

So far, in the survey the regions are coded as following, our variable of regional distribution of Ukraine in European Social Survey means that Kyiv city corresponds to Kyiv city, the North includes Zhytomyrska, Kyivska and Chernigivska oblasts when the Center is Vynnytska, Kirovogradska and Poltavska oblasts, the North-East of Ukraine means Sumska and Kharkivska oblasts, on the other hand the North-West is Volynska and Rivenska oblasts when South-East is Dnipropetrovska and Zaporizska oblasts, West of Ukraine is Ivano-Frankivska and Lvivska oblasts meanwhile South-West Ukraine is Zakarpatska oblast, on the other hand South includes Mykolaivska, Odesska and Khersonska oblasts, Crimea is Crimea and Autonomy Republic, finally East of Ukraine are Donetska and Luganska oblasts. We do not have any missing value for our independent variable -regional factor, meaning that all 1507 individuals have answered in what region they live.

6.5- Language in Ukraine

In order to check the impact of the language spoken within individuals on their support for the performance of democracy in Ukraine, we have taken this variable from the European Social Survey and the question is the following:

“Which language do you usually speak at home?” (Ukrainian (1), Russian (2), another (3))

6.6- Political Parties in Ukraine

According to the Ukraine's electoral system, the 450 seats in Parliament are divided among all parties that achieved a minimum 3% nationwide vote tally. The number of seats that are allocated to each party, above the 3% participation rate quota, is calculated using the Hamilton method of apportionment. Electoral system in Ukraine as it was already mentioned that the half of Ukrainian Parliament (225 mandates) is elected in one all-Ukrainian multimandate constituency and half is elected in 225 single-mandate constituencies. Every registered for election party or election bloc makes one list of candidates for the whole of Ukraine. This list is ordered. The number of mandates (several first candidates from this list can be elected) depends of the result of the party at the national level. Every voter get two ballots - first with list of candidates in the district (225 single-mandate constituencies in the country, every single-mandate constituency has own and different list, candidates in all this lists are independent, i.e. they are not officially dependent of any parties or blocs) and second with the list of parties and blocs (one common list of parties and blocs for the whole country, every party or bloc or bloc put in this ballot own name and only 3 leading persons from own list of candidates).

The party size for each political party according to each party's share of the vote in the national legislative election of 30 of October in 2007 that were taking into the survey of EVS 2008 are the following Party of regions - 34.37%, Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko - 30.71%, Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense Bloc (People's Self-Defence Bloc, Our Ukraine Bloc, "United Center" party) -14.15%, Communist Party of Ukraine - 5,39%, Lytvyn Bloc - 3.96%, The Socialist Party of Ukraine - 2.86%, The Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine - 1.32%, All-Ukrainian Union "Freedom" - 0,76%. The question for our variable political parties of Ukraine (variable v264 (Q75a) is the following:

“Which political party would you vote for?” (Communist party of Ukraine, Progressive Socialist party of Ukraine, Socialist party of Ukraine, Party of Regions, Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, People's Self-Defense Bloc, Lytvyn Bloc, United Centre party, Our Ukraine Bloc, All Ukrainian Union 'Freedom', other).

6.7- The Left-Right Placement of the Individuals in Ukraine

Our variable that reflects the left right placement of Ukrainian voters is taken from the European Values Study and is variable V264_LR (Q75a) and the question to this value is the following:

“Which political party would you vote for on the left/right scale where 1 represents the more left position and 10 the more right?”

Mentioned above political parties of Ukraine have the position in the survey of EVS in relation to each other on a 10 point left-right scale starting from 1 as The Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, 2 -Communist Party of Ukraine, 3-The Socialist Party of Ukraine, 4-Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko, 5-Lytvyn Bloc, 6-Party of regions, 7- People's Self-Defence, 8-"United Center" Party, 9-Our Ukraine Bloc and 10 -All-Ukrainian Union "Freedom". On other hand, the same variable on the left right placement in European Social Survey is coded as Block of Lytvyn and Block of Yulia Tymoshenko are the left center, Block 'Our Ukraine - People's self-defense' – right center, Party of regions – center, Progressive socialist party of Ukraine, Socialist party of Ukraine, Communist party of Ukraine are left parties.

6.8- Democratic Values of Ukrainians

Democratic values of people are measured in the survey as democracy is the best form; political system: democratic; democracy produces bad economy. The questions to these variables are asked as: “I’m going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly that in democracy, the economic system runs badly? So far, the variables that define the democratic values of Ukrainians are taken from the European Values Study. Meanwhile for all mentioned before variables that we have defined as the indicators of the democratic values of Ukrainians we have 1211 valid answers and 296 missing values where 286 of people have answered that they ‘don’t know’ and 10 ‘no answer’.

The following variable as v228 that characterizes weather political system is democratic (Q66D):

“Having a democratic political system” (very good (1), fairly good (2), fairly bad (3), very bad (4))

As we would like to follow how increase our dependent variable that is satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine depending on the change of the independent variables, we have recoded this variable where the highest index mean the highest indicator of the variable as:

“Having a democratic political system” (very bad (1), fairly bad (2), fairly good (3), very good (4))

Another variable that define the democratic values of Ukrainians is v229 and is weather democracy is the best political system (Q67A):

“Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government” (agree strongly (1), agree (2), disagree (3), disagree strongly (4))

This variable as all our previous variables where recoded into the following manner:

“Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government” (disagree strongly (1), disagree (2), agree (3), agree strongly (4))

To continue, our last variable that was depict to check the level of the democratic variables within Ukrainians is variable v230 and is weather democracy: causes bad economy (Q67B):

“In democracy, the economic system runs badly” (agree strongly (1), agree (2), disagree (3), disagree strongly (4))

This variable was recoded as all our previous variables in order to obtain the highest result for the positive answer:

“In democracy, the economic system runs bad” (disagree strongly (1), disagree (2) agree, agree strongly (3))

6.9- Political Efficacy of the Voters in Ukraine, the Interest in Politics and Education

6.9.1- Interest in Politics within Ukrainians

The variable that corresponds to the interest in politics within Ukrainians is variable v186 and is available in European Values Study and the question to it sounds as following:

“How interested are you in politics?”(very interested (1), somewhat interested (2), not very interested (3), not at all interested (4))

We have recoded this variable into 1 is not at all interested, 2 is not very interested, 3 is somewhat interested and 4 is very interested in order to obtain the results for our data where the highest index mean the highest indicator of our research variable. So far, the recoded answers for our question “*How interested are you in politics?*” are: not at all interested (1), not very interested (2), somewhat interested (3), very interested (4)

6.9.2- Education in Ukraine

The variable that corresponds to educational level of the individuals in Ukraine is variable v336 (Q110) and taken from the European Values Study and the question is the following:

“What is the highest level you have completed in your education?” (Pre-primary education or none education (0), Primary education or first stage of basic education (1), Lower secondary or second stage of basic education(2), (Upper) secondary education (3), Post-secondary non-tertiary education (4),First stage of tertiary education (5),Second stage of tertiary education (6))

As we have already seen the variable education level of respondents in Ukraine in EVS has the following parameters on the scale from 1 till 10 where 1 is Incomplete primary education meaning less than 3/4 classes then 2-Primary education is 3/4 classes, 3- Basic (incomplete) high education that is 4/5-9 classes then 4- Completed general high education that is 10-12 classes, 5 is Vocational technical training that is trained man, 6 is Vocational technical training without completed high education, 7 is Basic higher education meaning junior specialist, bachelor, where 8 is Completed higher education and is specialist and 9-Completed higher education that is master and 10 is Academic degree in Ukraine that is candidate, doctor, PhD.

To continue, most of people in Ukraine after 9 years of study in "middle" school either go to a technical school known as PTU within Ukrainians or technical college that is technicum in Ukrainian or stay in the "middle" school for 2 more years to get general secondary education. After this some people are going to a college that is institute, university or academy in Ukraine for 4-6 years of study to receive bachelor that is 4 years, specialist is 5 years or master 5-6 years degree. After this some people are also going for about 3 years of study to get PhD in Ukraine.

6.10- Civil Society in Ukraine

In order to check the influence of the interaction with politics on the satisfaction with democracy we have selected the variable that corresponds to political interaction from the European Social Survey and the question is:

“There are different ways of trying to improve things in Ukraine or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following?”

B13 ...contacted a politician, government or local government official? B14 ...worked in a political party or action group? B15...worked in another organization or association? B16 ...worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker? B17 ...signed a petition? B18 ... took part in a lawful public demonstration? B19...boycotted certain products? (The answers are: Yes (1) No (2), Don't know (8))

6.11- Trust in Institutions

6.11.1 - Trust in Political Parties within Ukrainians

This variable is available was taken from the European Values Study and is variable v222 (Q63R) and the question is the following:

“How much confidence in political parties ? ” (A great deal (1), Quite a lot (2), Not very much (3), None at all (4))

As with our previous variables we have recoded this one as 1 is note at all, 2 – not very much, 3-quite a lot and 4 – a great deal in order to follow in the analysis how this variable increase. So far, the recoded variable has the following parameters: (None at all (1), Not very much (2), Quite a lot (3), A great deal (4))

6.11.2- Confidence in Ukrainian Legal System

As the previous variable this one was also withdrawn from the European Values Study and is v219 (Q63N):

“How much confidence in justice system ? ” (A great deal (1), Quite a lot (2), Not very much (3), None at all (4). To continue, this variable was also recoded as: None at all (1), Not very much (2), Quite a lot (3), A great deal (4))

6.12- Economic Variables

6.12.1 - Income Level of Ukrainians

To continue, the income level of Ukrainians, this variable is measured in European Values Study by the variable v353M_cs: (Q125). So far, the question for the monthly income of Ukrainians is the following:

“Here is a list of incomes and we would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, after taxes and other deductions.”

(The answers are coded as following: (1) Less than €150, (2) €150 to under €300, (3) €300 to under €500, (4) €500 to under €1000, (5) €1000 to under €1500, (6) €1500 to under €2000, (7) €2000 to under €2500, (8) €2500 to under €3000, (9) €3000 to under €5000, (10) €5000 to under €7500, (11) €7500 to under €10000, (12) €10000 or more.)

6.12.2 - Satisfaction with Economy in Ukraine

In order to check the impact of the satisfaction with economy on the satisfaction with democracy we have taken this variable from the European Social Survey as it is available in this survey and the question is the following:

“On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in Ukraine?” On the scale from 0 till 10, where: (0)-is extremely dissatisfied, (10) - extremely satisfied, (88)- Don't know

6.13 - Contextual Variables

6.13.1- Human Development Index of Regions

Is taken from Institute of Demographic and Statistic Research and includes education, job, welfare, comfort life, social environment, and population renewal.

6.13.2- Ethnic Population of Ukraine

Is taken from Census Ukraine2001 where Ukrainians consist 78% (37541.7) of national structure, where 17% are Russians (8334.1).

CHAPTER 7

7. DATA AND METHODS

7.1- DATA FOR OUR RESEARCH OF THE POLITICAL SUPPORT IN UKRAINE

7.1.1 - The Data from European Values Study for Political Support in Ukraine

European Values Study (EVS) is the research project on human values in Europe. As it is informed on their website and by GESIS (GESIS – Leibniz-Institute for the Social Sciences is the largest infrastructure institution for the Social Sciences in Germany), the EVS is a large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal survey research program on how Europeans think about family, work, religion, politics and society.

Free of charge data and documentation download is provided by the GESIS Data Archive for the Social Sciences in Cologne. GESIS Data Catalogue supports direct access to data and documentation for download. Repeated every nine years in an increasing number of countries, the survey provides insights into the ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes, values, and opinions of citizens all over Europe. The research program was initiated by the European Value System Study Group (EVSSG) in the late 1970s and has emerged as a well-established network of social and political scientists aiming at high standards in data creation and processing. It is now carried out under the responsibility of the EVS Foundation. From 1981 to 2008 four waves of survey were conducted in European and other countries. These surveys explore value differences, similarities, and value changes among citizens of the EVS member countries. The extended study description for the EVS 2008 provides country-specific information on the origin and outcomes of the national surveys.

The data for all researched variables that were mentioned above has been taken from the last wave of available data base for Ukraine of the European Values Study (EVS), 2008. The fieldwork period of data from European Values Study was carried on in Ukraine during the 12 of August 2008 till the 9 of October 2008. The obtained number of variables is 442 and the number of units consist 1507. The Fieldwork organization in Ukraine is Kiev International Institute of Sociology, LTD

that is in Kiev 8/5 Voloska St., 04070. The interviews were carried out in Ukrainian and Russian languages. The Translation was done from English to Ukrainian and Russian using the Web Trans system. The staff of the Institute for Economy and Forecasting National Academy of Science of Ukraine from the Department for Monitoring of the Social-Economic Process made the translation during the period of May till July 2008. Translations were required for Ukrainian and Russian languages. It should be noticed that in the beginning as country that participated in the 1999 wave Ukraine reviewed the translation of all the questions that were used in the 1999 EVS wave and that became the part of the 2008 questionnaire. The main purpose of the review procedure was to check quality of the questions used in the 1999 EVS wave and, if necessary, correct mistakes. After reviewing and translation of new questions from 2008 English Master Questionnaire into Ukrainian language the Kiev International Institute of Sociology started adaptation of 2008 Russian Questionnaire, where each expression that is not familiar or used in the given language/cultural context was replaced by an expression that is suitable. The questions regarding education, political parties, religion, income distribution is completed with Ukrainian classifications in both questionnaires. According to translation guidelines during reviewing and adaptation procedures Kiev International Institute of Sociology was aware of the importance of comparability of EVS questions over time (between waves). The sampling procedure involved the population of Ukraine aged 18 years and above, based on the 2001 Census. Kiev International Institute of Sociology select settlements (for urban population) and administrative districts (for rural population) using PPS (Probability Proportional to Size) method. As it is informed they use computerized procedure for select settlements, they have developed their own software for sample design. The starting points were selected within each settlement / administrative district a list of residential postal districts is constructed. Then certain number of postal districts are randomly chosen taking into account number of residential routes, which is proportional to the number of apartments. The number of selected postal units depends on the size of the ultimate clusters that Kiev International Institute of Sociology chose. Once the postal districts are selected, a rule for designating the first household is developed, which randomly selects a carrier route (if there is more

than one), a street on the route, a building on the street, and an apartment in that building.

7.1.2- Measuring Support for the Performance of Democracy in Ukraine with the European Social Survey (ESS)

The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academically-driven multi-country survey covering over 20 nations. According to their report, its three aims are to monitor and interpret changing public attitudes and values within Europe and to investigate how they interact with Europe's changing institutions and to advance and consolidate improved methods of cross-national survey measurement in Europe and beyond, and to develop a series of European social indicators, including attitudinal indicators. To add the survey covers over 30 nations. It is funded via the European Commission's 5th Framework Programme, the European Science Foundation, and national funding bodies in each country, in Ukraine they are the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and International Renaissance Foundation. As it is informed in the report of the European Values Study the strict random probability sampling is involved and a minimum target response rate of 70% and rigorous translation protocols. The hour-long face-to-face interview includes (amongst others) questions on variety of topics. The main themes are the following: media; social trust; political interest and participation; socio-political orientations; social exclusion; national, ethnic and religious allegiances; trust in the police and courts; demographics and socioeconomics; work, family and wellbeing. In our research we focus on the political questions. The unit of analysis is individuals. All persons aged 15 and over resident within private households, regardless of their nationality, citizenship, language or legal status, in the following participating countries: European Union countries - Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK; non-European Union countries - Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine. The Distributor of the data of European Social Survey is Norwegian Social Science Data

Services with the following address Harald Hårfagresgt. 29 , N-5007 Bergen, Norway. The data are available without restrictions, for not-for-profit purposes.

To continue, in our research we use also available data from the European Social Survey. The data collectors in Ukraine are Center for Social and Marketing Research SOCIS and Research & Branding Group. As was already mentioned the funding agencies of the ESS in Ukraine are the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and International Reinessance Foundation. National Coordinator i.e. the depositor is Andrii Gorbachyk. The field work period for the ESS (2010) was carried for Ukraine since 13 of May 2011 till 30 of June 2011. On the other hand the field work period for the European Social Survey 2008, was carried in Ukraine since the 1 of March 2009 till the 2 of April 2009. To continue, the data of ESS for 2006 in Ukraine corresponds to the period of data collection from the 6 of December 2006 till 12 of the January 2007. And field work period of the European Social Survey 2004 is from the 28 of January 2005 till the 10 of March 2005. Number of valid interviews for the data of ESS (2010) for Ukraine is 1931. For the data of 2008 this number is 1845 of valid interviews and for the data of European Social Survey (2006) is 2002. The Number of achieved interviews for the 2004 wave data collection for Ukraine is 2031.

7.2- METHODS FOR DATA ANALYSIS

Having revised the great part of the literature on statistical analysis, we will follow in our research traditional or classical methodology of the econometrics. As it is known, econometrics is concerned with the empirical determination of economic laws (Theil, 1971:1). So far, as social science researchers we will try to determine satisfaction with democracy in Ukrainian society with empirical tools that are using econometricians in their research. Econometric research aims, essentially, at a conjunction of economic theory and actual measurements, using the theory and technique of statistical inference as a bridge pier. We will try to do the same but with social science theory and the statistical techniques for our analysis. So far, we will try to find the set of assumptions that are both sufficiently specific and sufficiently realistic that will allow us to take the best possible advantage of the data available for our research. That is that Malinvaud (1976:514) said about the art of the econometrician research. On this background, in our research we follow traditional econometric methodology. So far, our methodology of the research will consist of the following parts: (1) Statement of theory and our hypothesis; then we will specify the mathematical model of our theory (2). Afterwards we define our statistical model; then we have to check our data; secondly we estimate the parameters of our model; finally we test our hypothesis; we will also try to forecast and predict satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine and be able to use our model for control or policy purposes.

As it is known, mathematical economics express economic theory in mathematical formulas, without measuring or empirical verification of the theory. On the other hand, econometrics is mainly interested in the empirical verification of economic theory, Gujarati (2004). We will try to use the mathematical equations proposed by the mathematical economist and to put these equations in such a form that they can bring us to empirical testing of our hypothesis. So far, we social scientist will try to express the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine in the period of transition in mathematical equations and its empirical implementation. However,

as it is stated by many researchers this conversion of mathematical into econometric equations requires a great deal of ingenuity and practical skill (Fox, 1997; Gufarati, 1988; Tufte, 2001).


We can generally said that it is all about the analysis of the dependence of one variable that is satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine in the period of transition on our explanatory variables that in order to be able to predict population mean of the our dependent variable, basing on already known, fixed values. So far, we are trying to predict the average score on the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine by knowing explanatory variables. In literature we have found different names of dependent and explanatory variables. The dependent variable, for example, can be called as explained, predicted, regressed, response, endogenous, outcome or controlled variable. In our empirical analysis we will use different terms already mentioned in order to describe our dependent variable that is satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine. On the other hand, the explanatory variables can be seen in the literature mentioned as independent, predictor, repressor, stimulus, exogenous, covariate or control variable.

According to our hypothesis, the econometric satisfaction with democracy function hypothesizes that the dependent variable Y (satisfaction with democracy) is linearly related to the explanatory variable X (satisfaction with economy). By this way, we will check the relation between our researched variables. In our methodology we are mostly working with linear models, so it should be explained the meaning of linearity. So far, this is the conditional expectation of Y is a linear function of X_i . If we put this function geometrically, with our researched variables, the regression curve will be a straight line.

It should be mentioned that in classical linear regression model number of observations n must be greater than the number of parameters to be estimated. As we deal with big samples of observation from EVS, ESS, WVS in our research multicollinearity should not be a problem in our models. In our sample of EVS and ESS, we have a big number of observations more than one thousand.

In CLRM, X values that are our explanatory variables of the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine in our data must not all be the same, $\text{var}(X)$ must be a finite positive number. In regression analysis should be no perfect linear relationships among the explanatory variables that is that there is no perfect multicollinearity. One of the assumptions of the correct regression model is that the least-squares estimates possess some ideal or optimum properties. For this, we will address Gauss-Markow on the least-squares estimators that in the class of unbiased linear estimators, have minimum variance, that is, they are BLUE. So far, the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) means that this estimator is linear (linear function, such as our dependent variable Y , satisfaction with democracy) in the regression model. On other hand, it should be unbiased that is, its average or expected value, $E(\hat{\beta}_2)$, is equal to the true value, β_2 .

Figure 7.1- The Distribution of our Dependent Variable



Source: European Values Study (2008)

Before we test our hypothesis, we should be sure that our model chosen for empirical analysis is correct, meaning that it preserves all the assumptions of classical normal linear regression model that were mentioned before. So far, the test that measures the model adequacy is normality test, this test will help us to find out whether the error term follows the normal distribution. As it is known the t , F ,

and chi-square tests require the normality assumption and it is important that this test is checked formally.


There are a lot of test to check the normality, for example the Jarque-Bera test (1987), normal probability plot, histogram of residuals. In our analysis will use the last one. It is always a good practice to plot the histogram of the residuals as a rough and ready method of testing for the normality assumption (Gujarati 2004). For example, in this graph we can see that distribution of the residuals of our model is normal. On the other hand, not normal distribution of the residuals can be seen on this graph that we made with some of our researched variables (that was the influence of regions and languages but as we haven't omitted one category for the variable regions and haven't transformed them into a dummy ones it gives us such picture of the distribution of residuals).

The multiple regression analysis is regression analysis conditional upon the fixed values of the regressors, and what we obtain is the average or mean value of Y or the mean response of Y for the given values of the regressors (Gujarati 2004). In our analysis we broadly use the multiple regression analysis. So far, having examined all the assumptions of the classical regression model, if we take the conditional expectation of Y on both sides of $E(u_i | X_{2i}, X_{3i}) = 0$, we obtain $E(Y_i | X_{2i}, X_{3i}) = \beta_1 + \beta_2 X_{2i} + \beta_3 X_{3i}$. It can be said that it means that this formula gives the expected value of Y conditional upon the given or fixed values of X_2 and X_3 (Gujarati 2004). It should be noticed that \hat{R}^2 and r^2 lies between 0 and 1 the fitted regression line explains 100 percent of the variation in Y (Gujarati 2004, Fox 1997). When R^2 is 0 then there is no variation of dependent variable due to this model. Usually the R^2 is between 0 and 1. The closer is R^2 to 1, the better is a model.

To come back for testing our hypothesis, in our research we will use the method of test-of-significance. This method was developed by Fisher, Neyman and Pearson (Lehman, 1956). This method lies in verifying the truth or falsity of a null hypothesis. So far, within this test, we test estimator and to know the sampling distribution of such a statistic under the null hypothesis. The key idea behind tests

example, since the qualitative variable “region” has twenty four categories, we introduced only twenty tree dummies. If the researchers do not follow this rule, you can face the dummy variable trap that is the mentioned already the perfect collinearity or perfect multicollinearity, more than one exact relationship among the variables.

Figure 7.2- Identification of the Reference Category for the Variable Regions (Hat Values)



Source: European Values Study (2008)

Our variable regions of Ukraine have more than one category and according to the literature the choice of reference category is the decision of the researcher. When the comparison category is chosen, we should remember that all comparisons are made in relation this category, in our case this is Ivano-Frankivsk region and will explain letter why we have chosen this base category. According to the statistic rule that for each qualitative regressor the number of dummy variables introduced must be one less than the categories of that variable (Gujarati 1988, Fox 1997) that is why we have chosen our reference category for regions of Ukraine and have excluded this region from our analysis.

In our case with regions we apply a reference category, meaning that all comparisons are made in relation to this category. In the literature you can find different names for category for which no dummy variable is assigned as the base, benchmark, control, comparison, reference, or omitted category (Gujarati 1988). So

far, in order to avoid the perfect multicollinearity, we should make all comparisons in relation to control category. In our analysis this is Ivano-Frankivsk region because of the tests that we have conducted in R in order to find the omitted category. It is also should be noticed that the coefficients that are attached to our dummy variables are known as differential intercept coefficients. With help of this intercepts we can know the value of the intercept that receives the value of 1 differs from the intercept that receives the value of 1 differs from the intercept coefficient of the benchmark category.

To follow, we will also explain the reference category for the geographical parts in Ukraine. Has to be mentioned that Central regions are the reference category for the Western, Northern, Eastern and Southern part of Ukraine and are not included in the model as it is usually has mixed tendency to be pro Russian or pro European orientated regions and was taken out from the model. So far, we are measuring the distribution of the political support within the Western, Northern, Eastern and Southern part of Ukraine. To continue, the reference category for the pro European and Pro Russian orientated part of Ukraine remain the Kirovograd and Poltava from the Central part of Ukraine because of the mixed tendency of the pro European and Pro Russian orientated attitudes.


As in the case with regions we have chosen a reference category in order to obtain significant results of the analysis. As we have one of our explanatory variables the voted parties of Ukraine. So far, in order to avoid the perfect collinearity that is among our variables of parties, we have to do as we did before with the regions of Ukraine. We have nine main parties voted by Ukrainians, so we need to exclude one in order to obtain significant results. We can see it symbolically below, where D is a dummy variable for every party voted.

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 D_{1i} + \beta_2 D_{2i} + \beta_3 D_{3i} + \beta_4 D_{4i} + \beta_5 D_{5i} + \beta_6 D_{6i} + \beta_7 D_{7i} + \beta_8 D_{8i} + \beta_9 D_{9i} + u_i$$

We cannot consider the model just written as a correct one because we have the dummy for every category that are our parties. In order to avoid a perfect linear

relation among the party variables, we will make a dummy variable for every party voted in Ukraine, taking a reference category of one party that will be outlier, will have the higher leverage within all party voted. As was previously described for the regions variables that if we add a D1 our first party voted that takes the value of 1 for this party and 0 for other parties. Afterwards if we add and put our 9 columns horizontally, we will obtain the column with all ones. As the value of the intercept α is (implicitly) 1 for each observation, we will have a column that also contains all ones. So far, as for the regions variables this means that the sum of the twenty four (regions) D columns will simply made the intercept column that will lead us directly to perfect colliniarity and such model cannot be estimated. According to the literature in order to avoid this situation, we need to have a reference category. So far, we have carried the analysis in order to find out the outlier, the influential case for our variable parties. The reference category for party variable in the European Values Study was chosen the Party of Yulia Tymoshenko because according to the calculated Cook's Distance this variable is an influential case above horizontal line that represents the critical level in Cook's and has the high leverage. We can see it on the graph, the number 804005 corresponds to the voted Party of Yulia Tymoshenko and it falls far beyond tall other variables that correspond to parties voted in Ukraine. The values -1 and -3 are the missing data (don't know, no answer) and are excluded from the following analysis.

Figure 7.3- Identification of Reference Category for the Variable Parties by the Cook's Distance



Source: European Values Study (2008)

Appears that the variable that those who have voted for the Party of Yulia Tymoshenko is statistically significant meaning that the satisfaction with democracy is much more higher for those people who have voted this party then others. This variable represents the highest satisfaction with democracy within all parties that is why it falls far beyond the critical line. On the other hand, for our second regression model carried with the data from the European Social Survey according to the explained tests above, the reference category for the parties in Ukraine is the Party of regions. We continue with reference category for pro European and Pro Russian orientated Parties in Ukraine. So far, Pro European Parties includes the Block Yulia Tumoshenko and Our Ukraine while the Pro Russian orientated Parties are Communist Party and Party of Regions. The reference category is the Progressive Socialist Party and Socialist Party that nowadays are not in the Parliament.

On the other hand, the reference category for the age groups is also explained forward. The age was recoded into five groups from 15 till 21 one group, from 26 till 35 second group, from 35 till 50 third, from 50 till 70 forth and from 70 till 90 fifth. The reference category was chosen the fifth group as we are interested in the

effect of young generation on the support for the performance of democracy in Ukraine. We also use the reference category for the educational level in Ukraine. We have recoded the variable for the education in three categories: individuals without education; with secondary education and higher education. The reference category was chosen that group of people who do not have any education.

So far, we are using the regression analysis with our variables in order to get the information of the effect that produce individual variables on our dependent variable, support for the performance of democracy. We have applied the regression analysis with the regions of Ukraine. Then we have recoded the regions into the geographical parts as the Western, Eastern, Northern and Southern part, making the Central regions the reference category. Afterwards we have recoded the Western and Northern regions into the pro European and the Eastern and Southern into the Pro Russian orientated. The regions as Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Kherson and Odessa go to the Pro Russian orientated part of Ukraine as we can usually observe the vote for the pro Russian candidate. To sum up, we have regressed the mentioned parts on the political support in Ukraine in order to follow the effect of the mentioned regions on the support for the performance of democracy. To continue, we use the regression analysis to assess the impact of the political parties in Ukraine on the satisfaction with the way democracy is functioning in the country. We have recoded the political parties of Ukraine as pro European and Pro Russian orientated parties. So far, the Yulia Tymoshenko party and Our Ukraine goes to pro European parties while the Party of Regions and the Communist one are the Pro Russian orientated parties. To add, we apply regression analysis to follow the impact of the left-right placement of the individuals. We also measure the effect of political efficacy and trust in institutions with the regression analysis. To follow, the effect of the satisfaction with economy on the political support in Ukraine is also measured by regression analysis. Furthermore, we have recoded the age calculated into five groups and have made one group as the reference category. So far, with regression analysis we also measure the influence of different age groups on the support for the performance of democracy.

On the other hand, during the research we apply, using the mean and the confidence interval of the researched values. With correlation we measure the relation between our dependent variable that is satisfaction with democracy and our independent variables, usually correlations measure the relation between the two variables. With correlation analysis we check whether it is perfect negative correlation between our variables or positive one. We use frequencies in order to get the information of our data. With frequency table we can examine how our variables are distributed in the survey. This method represents the simplest analysis of categorical variables, a lot of our variables are nominal ones (categorical), and we use this method to obtain its distribution. As the crosstabulation is the combination of two or more frequency tables. With this method, we observe the frequencies of observation that belong to specific categories on more than one variable. With this analysis we obtain the relation between the crosstabulated variables.

In summary, we apply the multilevel analysis to measure the effect of the researched variables on the individual and macro level. We use the multilevel model in order to check the impact of the variables in both levels. In level 2 we have 24 regions of Ukraine, according to the rules of good multilevel model it has to be no less than 20 groups and on the level 1 we more than thousand observations on the individual level. The units of analysis of our multilevel model are individuals in Ukraine at a lower level who are nested within contextual aggregate units, at a higher regional level. So far, at aggregative level we operate with the Ukrainian ethnic population that was obtained for every region of the country from the Ukraine Census 2001. The Human Development Index of the regions was taken from Institute of Demographic and Statistic Research and includes education, job, welfare, comfort life, social environment, and population renewal. So far, on the macro level we measure the impact of the ethnicity and the development index of the regions. On the other hand, at the level 1 we measure the distribution of the effect of the pro European and Pro Russian orientated Ukraine and we measure the impact of speaking Ukrainian on the support for the performance of democracy. On the individual level we also measure the influence of the pro European and Pro Russian orientated parties on the political support of the individuals and the impact


of the ideology on our main object of research. To continue, the model also measures the influence of political efficacy as the effect of political interest and education on the satisfaction with democracy. The trust in public institutions is also included on the level 1 the same as the effect of satisfaction with economy, age and gender. To conclude, in multilevel model we measure the effect of both levels on the political support in Ukraine.

PART III
RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION

CHAPTER 8

THE EFFECT OF THE PRO EUROPEAN THE PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED REGIONS IN UKRAINE ON THE SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

Figure 8.1- Presidential Election Vote in Ukraine (2010)




Source: Centanni “How Sharply Divided is Ukraine, Really? Honest Maps of Language and Elections” (2014)

8.1. – Political Support in Western and Eastern Ukraine

The Eastern part of Ukraine that is usually characterized as Pro Russian orientated territory of Ukraine will have less political support than the Pro European orientated Western regions. To start, we examine the distribution of political support within Western part of Ukraine that includes Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil and Chernivtsi oblast where region is “oblast” in Ukrainian. The highest satisfaction with democracy within mentioned regions was found in Rivne oblast and the lowest in Zakarpattia oblast, then goes Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil with, Lviv oblast, Chernivtsi and Volyn (note: $\chi^2=30.27$ and $p < 0.001$).

Figure 8.2-Political Support within the Western and Eastern Regions in Ukraine



Source: European Values Study (2008)

On the other hand, in Eastern regions the greatest dissatisfaction with democracy is in Donetsk and Luhansk i.e., people who live here do not have any political support According to the data of European Social Survey and European Values Study. On the other hand, in Krarkiv oblast and Dnipropetrovsk oblast people are dissatisfied with this factor but still they have a little bit more satisfaction with democracy than Donetsk and Luhansk. The same percentage that of Krarkiv oblast and Dnipropetrovsk of the satisfaction was found in the western

regions, in Zakarpattia oblast and it was the lowest satisfaction with democracy in this part. Meanwhile, in Zaporizhia oblast (Eastern regions) was observed the highest satisfaction with democracy for the eastern part. The data for the capitals of the regions were also obtained from the analysis. So far, Kharkiv city, the capital of the Kharkiv region and Donetsk city, the capital of Donetsk region also depicts very low satisfaction with democracy, almost all the residences of these cities are dissatisfied with democracy. To sum up, it can be said that indicators for the satisfaction with democracy in Eastern regions are very low and almost the majority of people who residence there are dissatisfied with democracy.

We can observe that in the Eastern regions of Ukraine the political support is twice lower than in Western ones. The average of the satisfaction with democracy is only 12 percents while in the Western regions as was previously mentioned it consists 29 percents, these indicators are still very small in Ukraine regions. On the following table we can observe the political support within just mentioned parts of Ukraine (see table 8.1).

Table 8.1- Political Support in the Western and Eastern Part of Ukraine (%)

	HIGH	LOW
WESTERN REGIONS	24	76
EASTERN REGIONS	12	88

Source: European Values Study (2008)

Note: $\chi^2=30.27$ and $p<0.001$


8.2- Support for the Performance of Democracy in Central, Northern and Southern Part of Ukraine

The data for Central, Northern and Southern part of Ukraine were also obtained by the analysis and it found out that there is different satisfaction with democracy. For example, the highest level of this factor within all regions of Ukraine was found in the Northern part, not in Kyiv oblast as it can be supposed but in Chernihiv oblast. Almost the half of the residences of this region is satisfied with democracy. This is the highest indicator for political support in all Ukraine. The Northern part of Ukraine includes five regions Zhytomyr , Kyiv , Sumy and Chernihiv oblast. To explain, in Zhytomyr Oblast almost all residences of this region do not have any political support. Sumy oblast also expresses quite low satisfaction with mentioned factor. On the other hand, in Kyiv oblast people are quite satisfied with democracy. Eventually, this part depicts very interesting picture of political support, here was found the highest indicator for the satisfaction with democracy (in Chernigiv region) but also a big dissatisfaction was also observed in other regions. According to the results, the average of the satisfaction with democracy in the northern part is even a little bit more than in western Ukraine.

So far, the obtained results the highest satisfaction was observed in the Northern part of Ukraine while the lowest one was observed in the South part that includes Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Mykolaiv, Odessa and Kherson oblast. According to the data, almost all population of the mentioned regions does not have any political support only with exception for Mykolaiv region where people are quite satisfied with the way democracy is working. Consequently, the Southern and Eastern parts of Ukraine depict the lowest political support in this country. On the other hand, the Central part of Ukraine that is Vinnytsya, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Khmelnytskyi and Cherkasy oblast depicts also very interesting picture. For example, in Kirovograd oblast all habitants have absolutely no political support is that they are totally dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Ukraine. Khmelnytskyi oblast also expresses no political support. Meanwhile, Poltava oblast and Vinnytsia oblast was found quite high satisfaction with democracy for Ukraine, then goes Cherkasy oblast.

To continue, we have also used descriptive statistic in our analysis with the data of European Social Survey in order to check the data. So far, this cross tabulation summaries our data on the regional distribution of the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine into contingency table and we can observe the similar results as was described previously (note: $\chi^2=30.27$ and $p < 0.001$). This cross tab, a table in a matrix format displays the multivariate frequency distribution of our just mentioned variables of research.

Figure 8.3- Satisfaction with Democracy within the Regions of Ukraine



Source: European Values Study (2008)

On the following table, we can observe the distribution of political support within the regions of Ukraine through the years from 2004 till 2010 and its growth rate in compare to the previous year. It can be seen that the satisfaction with democracy in the Pro European orientated regions (the Western and Northern) through the years was higher than in the Pro Russian orientated regions (the Eastern and Southern) but in 2010 the index for the political support in Pro Russian orientated regions has significantly grow up, it can be explained that in 2010 the President of Ukraine become the Victor Yanukovich that is known as the Pro Russian candidate.



Table 8.2- Satisfaction with Democracy within the Regions of Ukraine from the 2004 till 2010 and its Growth Rate


SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY	2004		2006		2008		2010	
	MEAN	GROWTH RATE	MEAN	GROWTH RATE	MEAN	GROWTH RATE	MEAN	GROWTH RATE
CRIMEA, AUTONOMY REPUBLIC	2,90		1,77	0,61	1,85	1,04	3,73	2,02
VYNNYTSKA OBLAST	*		2,84	*	1,43	0,50	2,59	1,81
VOLYNSKA OBLAST	5,32		3,14	0,59	3,10	0,99	2,79	0,90
DNIPROPETROVSKA OBLAST	3,02		2,69	0,89	2,06	0,76	2,77	1,35
DONETSKA OBLAST	1,91		3,54	1,85	1,72	0,48	2,56	1,49
ZHYTOMYRSKA OBLAST	*		2,34	*	2,23	0,95	2,89	1,30
ZAKARPATSKA OBLAST	3,55		3,66	1,03	4,59	1,25	2,38	0,52
ZAPORIZSKA OBLAST	3,47		1,80	*	3,33	*	4,32	*
IVANO-FRANKIVSKA OBLAST	5,20		4,20	0,81	3,95	0,94	3,87	0,98
KIROVOGRADSKA OBLAST	3,99		2,15	0,54	1,32	0,61	2,59	1,96
LUGANSKA OBLAST	2,20		2,88	1,31	2,30	0,80	3,70	1,61
LVIVSKA OBLAST	5,49		3,27	0,60	3,23	0,99	2,44	0,27
MYKOLAIVSKA OBLAST	4,24		4,00	0,94	2,43	*	3,86	*
ODESSKA OBLAST	3,68		2,96	0,80	1,22	0,41	3,02	2,48
RIVENSKA OBLAST	5,35		3,44	0,64	2,90	0,84	2,86	0,99
SUMSKA OBLAST	5,27		2,77	0,53	1,65	0,60	1,65	1,00
TERNOPILSKA OBLAST	*		*	*	3,20	*	3,25	1,02
KHARKIVSKA OBLAST	3,50		2,91	0,83	2,23	0,76	*	*
KHERSONSKA OBLAST	3,53		2,93	0,83	2,69	0,92	3,76	1,40
CHERKASSKA OBLAST	*		5,02	*	2,5	0,50	2,41	0,96
CHERNIGIVSKA OBLAST	4,98		4,37	0,88	3,33	0,76	3,26	0,98
KYIV CITY	5,08		3,72	0,73	3,49	0,94	3,53	1,01

Source: European Social Survey (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010)

Just described data we have put graphically on the map of Ukrainian regions. So far, it can be observed the change in satisfaction with democracy from 2006 till 2010. As was already mentioned we can notice the change in political support in 2010 in the Eastern regions, so called pro Russian oriented part of Ukraine. This dramatic change in support for the performance of democracy in this part of Ukraine we explain by the winning of presidential election by Victor Yanukovitch the candidate that proceed from Donetsk, the Eastern region in Ukraine and was known as a politician who orientates in his politics on Russia. Consequently, as Pro European regions did not support such candidate, we can observe low political support in 2010 in the Western, Northern and Central Ukraine that indicate low satisfaction with the way democracy is working in the regions. Meanwhile in the previous years, after the Orange Revolution this indicator was much higher in the pro European orientated regions as the main course of the elected candidates was target on the European Integration.

Figure 8.4- Satisfaction with Democracy within the Regions of Ukraine from the 2006 till 2010





2010

Source: European Social Survey (2006, 2008, 2010)

8.3- The Impact of the Regions in Ukraine on the Satisfaction with Democracy. Explanatory Models

So far, in our explanatory model for the political support within the Pro European orientated and Pro Russian orientated parts of Ukraine, we have include all regions and variables that influence on the satisfaction with democracy in this country according to the scheme of the thesis and previously examined theoretical base. In order to obtain a statistically significant data for regions categories, we have to find out variable that falls above the critical line and have a potentially high leverage on the beta coefficients. So far, this variable will be our reference category for regions variables. According to Cook distance and Leverage test this variable that is far above the line is Ivano-Frankivsk region. To follow, we have recoded all the regions, taking the mentioned above variable as a reference category. As a result, we have obtain statistically significant data only for Vinnytsa Region, Poltava Region, Kirovograd Region that is Central part of Ukraine, then in Northern Ukraine in Zhytomur Region and Kyiv City. In Eastern Ukraine Donetsk City, Donetsk Region, Luhansk Region and in Southern Ukraine significant data was found for Odessa Region. Meaning that mentioned above regions produce impact on the satisfaction

with democracy. To add, according to our model strong, positive and significant effect on the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine produce the left-right political view, interest in politics within the individuals, their trust in parliament and police and age.

Table 8.3- The Effect of the Satisfaction with Democracy in the Regions of Ukraine

Model_Regions<-lm(stfdem ~ Volun Region+ Zakarpattia Region+ Lviv Region+ Rivne Region+ Ternopil Region+ Chernivtsi Region+ Vinnytsa Region+ Kirovograd Region+ Poltava Region+ Khmelnytskuy Region+ Cherkasy Region+ Zhytomur Region+ Kyiv City+ Kyiv Region+ Sumy Region+ Chernigiv Region+ Dnipropetrovsk City+ Dnipropetrovsk Region+ Zaporizhia City+ Zaporizhia Region+ Donetsk City+ Donetsk Region+ Kharkiv City+ Kharkiv Region+ Autonomic Republic of Crimea+ Mykolaiv Region+ Odessa City+ Odessa Region+ Kherson Region)

Multiple R-squared: 0.12

Adjusted R-squared: 0.10

	B
CONSTANT	2,19
VOLUN	-,134
ZAKARPATTIA	-,224
LVIV	-,224
RIVNE	,149
TERNOPIIL	-,047
CHERNIVTSI	-,118
VINNYTSAI	-,236
KIROVOGRAD	-,880***
POLTAVA	-,052
KHMELNYTSKUY	-,451**
CHERKASY	-,438**
ZHYTOMUR	-,649***
KYIV CITY	-,194
KYIV	-,137
SUMY	-,165
CHERNIGIV	,206
DNIPROPETROVSK CITY	-,257
DNIPROPETROVSK	-,372**
ZAPORIZHIA CITY	-,380**
ZAPORIZHIA REGION	-,280*
DONETSK CITY	-,961***
DONETSK	-,685***
LUHANSK	-,669***
KHARKIV CITY	-,238
KHARKIV	-,284**
AUTONOMIC REPUBLIC OF CRIMIA	-,547***
MYKOLAIV	-,484**
ODESSA CITY	-,623**
ODESSA	-,685***
KHERSON	-,480**


DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

Source: European Values Study (2008)

Note: Reference category for Regions is Ivano Frankivsk Region. According to Cook distance and Leverage test this variable is far above the line. Hat-value (Ivano-Frankivsk Region) falls above the critical line and have a potentially high leverage on the beta coefficients.

Consequently, it was found that the satisfaction with democracy is higher in Western Ukraine than in Eastern regions. But the interesting thing was observed, even within Western regions that consider to be more 'democratic' ones there are regions where political support is very low for example in Zakarpattia and vice versa significantly high as in Rivne oblast, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil and Lviv oblast. Eastern regions depict the similar model in Donetsk and Luhansk where observed no satisfaction with democracy and in Zaporizhzhya, Krakiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblast people have small but still political support. The same can be said for the Northern, Central and Southern part. Where in the Northern part in Chernigiv oblast was found the highest political support in Ukraine and in Zhytomyr Oblast in the same geographical part this indicator is quite low level. To conclude, within all parts of Ukraine (Western, Eastern, Northern and Southern) the differences in the satisfaction with democracy were observed. So far, the political support in Ukraine differs due to the regions but it also differs within the same geographical parts, within the West, East, Center, North and South of Ukraine. So, it can be said that satisfaction with democracy in every part is heterogenic, not homogenic i.e., almost in all parts where found regions where people are satisfied with democracy to some (small) extent and regions where they are not or totally dissatisfied.

Figure 8.5- The Distribution of the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine in 2008



2008

Source: European Values Study (2008)

To sum up, the obtained results the highest satisfaction was observed in the Northern part of Ukraine while the lowest one was observed in the South part that includes Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Mykolaiv, Odessa and Kherson oblast. According to the data, almost all population of the mentioned regions does not have any political support only with exception for Mykolaiv region where people are quite satisfied with the way democracy is working. Consequently, the Southern and Eastern parts of Ukraine depict the lowest political support in this country. On the other hand, the Central part of Ukraine that is Vinnytsya, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Khmelnytskyi and Cherkasy oblast depicts also very interesting picture. For example, in Kirovograd oblast all habitants have absolutely no political support is that they are totally dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Ukraine. Khmelnytskyi oblast also expresses no political support. Meanwhile, Poltava oblast and Vinnytsia oblast was found quite high satisfaction with democracy for Ukraine, then goes Cherkasy oblast.

On the following table, we can observe the distribution of the political support within the Western, Northern, Eastern and Southern part of Ukraine and the effect of all mentioned parts on the satisfaction with democracy is significant. This model explains around 50% of the impact of the geographical parts on the support for the performance of democracy. So far, the Western and Northern part have the positive influence on the satisfaction with the way democracy is working while the Eastern and Southern the negative one. To explain, people who live in the Western and Northern Ukraine have more support for the performance of democracy than individuals in the Eastern and Southern regions. Has to be mentioned that Central regions were not included in the model as it is usually has mixed tendency to be Pro Russian or Pro European orientated regions and was taken as a reference category.

Table 8.4- The Impact the Western, Northern, Eastern and Southern Part of Ukraine on the Satisfaction with Democracy

Multiple Regression Model

Model_Regions<-lm (stfdem ~ Western part + Northern part+ Eastern part +southern part)

Multiple R-squared: 0.51 Adjusted R-squared: 0.50

	B
CONSTANT	1,87
WESTERN PART	,202***
NORTHERN PART	,156**
EASTERN PART	-,178***
SOUTHERN PART	-,245***

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

Source: European Values Study (2008)

Note: Reference category is Central part of Ukraine as it is usually has mixed tendency to be Pro Russian or Pro European orientated regions.

Eventually, the distribution of the political support within Ukraine is the following. The Northern and Western part have the highest indicators for political

support in Ukraine. Meanwhile in the Southern and Eastern of Ukraine the majority of the residents are dissatisfied with the way democracy is working. To sum up, political support in Ukraine differs within mentioned geographical parts. We reconfirm that satisfaction with democracy is higher in the Western regions than in the Eastern ones, meaning that Pro European orientated part of Ukraine (Western regions and Northern regions) have more political support than Pro Russian orientated (Eastern and Southern regions).

Finally, we have made the model that explains the effect of the Pro European orientated part and Pro Russian orientated one. To specify, the Pro European orientated part includes the Western and Northern regions while the Pro Russian orientated part includes the Eastern and Southern regions. Central regions as in the previous analysis are not included and are taken as the reference category. These regions usually have mixed tendency to be Pro Russian or Pro European orientated. The model explains around the 50% of the effect on the political support. So far, we can observe that effect of both parts on the satisfaction with democracy is highly significant and that it is positive in the case of Pro European orientated and negative in the Pro Russian orientated part. In summary, we confirm with all our previous models and with this one that the political support is much higher in the Pro European orientated regions than in the Pro Russian orientated part.

Table 8.5- Influence of the Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Parts on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine

Multiple Regression Model

Model_Regions<-lm (stfdem ~Pro European orientated part + pro Russian part)

Multiple R-squared: 0.50 Adjusted R-squared: 0.49

	B
CONSTANT	1,87
PRO EUROPEAN ORIENTATED PART	,180***
PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED PART	-,199***

DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

Source: European Values Study (2008)

Note: Pro European orientated part includes the Western and Northern regions while the Pro Russian orientated part is the Eastern and Southern regions. The Kirovograd and Poltava (Central regions) are not included as the category of reference as it is usually has mixed tendency to be Pro Russian or Pro European orientated regions.

CHAPTER 9

THE IMPACT OF THE LANGUAGE AND ETHNIC POPULATION ON THE SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE

9.1. – Satisfaction with Democracy and Language Spoken in Ukraine

To follow, we can proceed with our hypothesis on the impact of the Pro European orientated and Pro Russian orientated parts of Ukraine on the political support. As we have just observed the Western and Northern regions are more satisfied with the performance of democracy in Ukraine while the Eastern and Southern regions express quite low satisfaction with the same factor in compare to the mentioned so called Pro European orientated regions. Now we will examine the specific factors that can influence on the political support in the mentioned geographical parts in Ukraine.

Table 9.1- Satisfaction with Democracy and Language Most Often Spoken at Home in Ukraine

	UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE	RUSSIAN LANGUAGE
NOT SATISFIED	58,4%	41,6%
SATISFIED	73,8%	26,2%
TOTAL	60,8%	39,2%


Source: European Social Survey (2010)

Note: $\chi^2 = 14.59$ and $p < 0.001$

As we have just noticed that exist a difference in the satisfaction with democracy between the Pro European orientated regions and Pro Russian orientated regions in Ukraine, we expect that Ukrainian language that are usually is more spoken in Western and Central and Northern part of Ukraine will positively impact on the political support in this regions while in the Eastern and Southern Ukraine where the Russian language is a dominant one it will have a negative effect. To continue, we have also provided the contingency table 2.1 in order to follow better the distribution of our independent variables (the language spoken at home)

and satisfaction with the way democracy is working in Ukraine, our dependent one. So far, it can be noticed that the political support is higher among those individuals who speak Ukrainian than Russian. On the following map you can observe the distribution of the Russian language through Ukrainian territory

Figure 9.1- Territorial Distribution of the Russian as Native Language in Ukraine



Source: Ukraine Census (2001)

On the following table, the results of the effect of the Ukrainian language are shown in this model. So far, we can observe that speaking Ukrainian has strong positive effect on the political support as the Pro European orientated regions while the Pro Russian orientated part has a negative impact on our dependent variable as was already confirmed with our analysis before. This model explains around the 60 per cent of the effect on the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine.

Table 9.2- The Effect of the Speaking Ukrainian on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine

Multiple Regression Model

Model_Parties<-lm (stfdem~ Pro European orientated parties+ pro Russian parties+ importspeakukr)

Multiple R-squared: 0.63 Adjusted R-squared: 0.61

	B
CONSTANT	,156
PRO EUROPEAN ORIENTATED PART	,151**
PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED PART	-,121*
IMPORTANT TO SPEAK UKRAINIAN	,095***

DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

Source: European Values Study (2008)


Note: Pro European orientated part includes the Western and Northern regions while the Pro Russian orientated part is the Eastern and Southern regions. The Kirovograd and Poltava (Central regions) are not included as the category of reference as it is usually has mixed tendency to be Pro Russian or Pro Europe orientated regions.

9.2. – Support for the Performance of Democracy and the Ethnicity in Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Regions of Ukraine

As it was just proved by our research the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine differs within the Pro European orientated regions and Pro Russian orientated regions of Ukraine, meaning that those people coming from Western part will have more political support then those who live in the Eastern Ukraine. To continue, we were also curious how it differs within the ethical composition in the regions meaning being Ukrainian or Russian, predicting that those who are Ukrainians will be more satisfied with the way democracy is working in Ukraine then Russians. To add, we have checked how the ethnicity is that being Ukrainian or Russian will influence on the support for the democracy in that or other region in Ukraine. We have checked the number of Ukrainians and Russians living in the

regions in Ukraine from the Census 2001 from Ukraine that was the last one carried on till now. The map (figure 2.2.) depicts the ethno-linguistic distribution in Ukraine.

Figure 9.2- Ethno-Linguistic Distribution in Ukraine



Source: Fisher "This one map helps explain Ukraine's protests" (2013)

To follow with our hypothesis of the impact of the Pro European orientated and Pro Russian orientated regions on the political support in Ukraine we will examine this factors in our multilevel model, expecting that those individuals that identify themselves as Ukrainians will be more satisfied with the performance of democracy than those people who considered themselves to be Russian ethnicity.

9.3- The Effect of the Ukrainian Ethnic Population and Speaking Ukrainian on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine

Multilevel Analysis

Model 1 <-lm (stfdem~proeurop part+pro russian part+ Ingu)

Model 2 <-lm (stfdem~proeurop part+pro russian part+ Ingu+ ukrpopul)
/random=CONSTANT |subject (regionua)

	MODEL 0	MODEL1	MODEL 2
		ESTIMATE	ESTIMATE
LEVEL 2/REGIONS OF UKRAINE			
UKRAINIAN ETHNIC POPULATION			-0.0001
LEVEL 1/INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES			
PRO EUROPEAN ORIENTATED PART		1,057***	1,057***
PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED PART		,081	,081
SPEAKING UKRAINIAN		,229	,229
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY			
INTERCEPT 0,00			
TOTAL VARIANCE OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE 5,53			
INTERCALS CORRELATIONCOEFFIECIENT (ICC) 0,12			

Source: European Social Survey (2010), Ukraine Census (2001)


Note: Units included: regionua (number of regions) = 21, ESS, (number of individuals). Data of ethnic population is taken from Census Ukraine2001 where Ukrainians consist 78% (37541.7 thous.) of national structure, where 17% are Russians (8334.1).

So far, we can observe that on the regional level, being Ukrainian does not produce strong effect on the political support but proceed from the Pro European orientated more Pro Ukrainian part of the country is that from the Western or Northern part of Ukraine does effect on the support for the performance of democracy. Meanwhile being from the Pro Russian orientated regions does not make any significant positive effect on the political support.

CHAPTER 10

THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRO EUROPEAN ORIENTATED AND PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED POLITICAL PARTIES ON THE SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE

Figure 10.1- Pro Russian Speaking East and EU-Orientated West



Source: Ukraine's Central Electoral Commission (2010)

10.1. Support for the Performance of Democracy within the Party of Yulia Tymoshenko and the Party of Regions

To continue with the impact of the Pro European orientated and Pro Russian orientated part of Ukraine on the individual's satisfaction with the performance of democracy we expect that people who have voted the Pro European orientated party (Yulia Tymoshenko) have more political support than those who have voted the Pro Russian party (Yanukovitch). To follow, we have made a contingency table with our variables, the satisfaction with democracy and the vote for the political party. On the table below, we can see that individuals that have voted the Party of Regions have the lowest satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine. On the other hand Ukrainians that have voted the Party of Yulia Tymoshenko are quite satisfied with the way democracy is working in their country.

Table 10.1- Satisfaction with Democracy and Political Parties of Ukraine

VOTE FOR THE PARTY	SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY			
	NOT SATISFIED	NOT VERY SATISFIED	RATHER SATISFIED	VERY SATISFIED
COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE	58,2%	34,3%	3,0%	4,5%
PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY OF UKRAINE	71,4%	28,6%	*	*
SOCIALIST PARTY OF UKRAINE	16,7%	75,0%	8,3%	*
PARTY OF REGIONS	42,4%	47,1%	9,1%	1,4%
YULIA TYMOSHENKO BLOC	15,2%	55,3%	26,8%	2,7%
PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE BLOC	11,1%	55,6%	27,8%	5,6%
LYTVYN BLOC	25,0%	59,1%	13,6%	2,3%
UNITED CENTRE PARTY	75,0%	*	25,0%	*
OUR UKRAINE BLOC	12,8%	48,9%	34,0%	4,3%
ALL UKRAINIAN UNION 'FREEDOM'	10,0%	70,0%	20,0%	*
OTHER	66,7%	16,7%	16,7%	*
TOTAL	30,6%	49,9%	17,1%	2,4%

Source: European Values Study (2008)

Note $\chi^2=128.69$ and $p<0.001$

In order to observe the distribution of the growth of political support within the voters of the Pro European orientated and Pro Russian orientated parties in Ukraine, we have made a following table, where we can examine the mean of the satisfaction with democracy in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010 and its growth rates within these periods. So far, we have found that support for the performance of democracy within the Pro European orientated parties (Yulia Tymoshenko and

Victor Yushchenko) was much more higher in the years of 2004, 2006 and 2008 than the political support of the voters of the Pro Russian orientated Parties (Party of Regions and Communist Party). But has to be mentioned that the situation have changed in 2010 this is when the Pro Russian orientated parties have obtained the power in Ukraine, Victor Yanukovich was elected as the president of the state.

Table 10.2- Satisfaction with Democracy within the Political Parties in Ukraine during 2004-2010

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY	2004	2006	2008		2010		
	MEAN	MEAN	GROWTH RATE	MEAN	GROWTH RATE	MEAN	GROWTH RATE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE	2,88	2,43	0,84	1,96	0,81	3,25	1,66
VICTOR YUSHCHENKO BLOC	5,10	3,63	0,71	2,99	0,82	2,66	0,89
JULIA TYMOSHENKO	5,93	3,28	0,55	3,08	0,94	2,80	0,91
PARTY OF REGIONS	*	2,94	*	2,03	0,69	3,57	1,76

Source: European Social Survey (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010)

10.2. Satisfaction with Democracy and Political Parties in Ukraine. Explanatory Models

In order to check the effect of the political parties on the political support in Ukraine, we have carried the multiple regression analysis. Specifically making focus on the Pro European orientated and Pro Russian orientation within the parties. Our multiple regression model confirms the results described before. Appears that that those who have voted for the Party of Yulia Tymoshenko is statistically significant meaning that the satisfaction with democracy is much higher for those people who have voted this party than others. This variable represents the highest satisfaction with democracy within all parties that is why it falls far beyond the critical line. To follow, we can observe that people who have voted the Party of Regions have the tendency to have less support for the political performance than go those who prefer to vote the Communist Party. These variables are strongly significant. To sum

up, those people who have voted the Pro European orientated party in Ukraine tend to be more satisfied with the way democracy is working in their country and consequently this voters will have more political support.

Table 10.3- The Effect of the Political Parties on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine

Multiple Regression Model

Model_Parties<-lm (stfdem~ Communist Party+ Progressive Socialist Party + Socialist Party+ Party of Regions Peoples Self Defence Lytvyn Bloc United Center Party Our Ukraine Bloc)

Multiple R-squared: 0.12 Adjusted R-squared: 0.11

	B
CONSTANT	2,10
COMMUNIST PARTY	-,370**
PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY	-,719**
SOCIALIST PARTY	-,160
PARTY OF REGIONS	-,299***
PEOPLES SELF DEFENCE	,242
LYTVYN BLOC	-,079
UNITED CENTER PARTY	-,186
OUR UKRAINE BLOC	,068

DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

Source: European Values Study (2008)

Note: Reference category for Parties –was chosen the Party of Yulia Tymoshenko according to the calculated Cook’s Distance this variable is an influential case, above horizontal line that represents the critical level in Cook’s and Leverage test.

In our regression model for the political parties in Ukraine that was made with the data from the European Social Survey, the reference category is the Party of Regions according to the Cook’s and Leverage test. So far, we have obtained the following results. As in the previous model, we have found statistically significant effect of the ideological placement, trust in political parties and the effect of language. On the other hand, in this model education produce positive impact on political support in Ukraine. Has to be mentioned that very strong effect in Ukraine on the support for the performance of democracy has the economic factor, the

satisfaction with the way economy is functioning in the state. Those people who vote the Yulia Tymoshenko Party have much more political support than other voters in Ukraine.

Table 10.4- Impact of the Political Parties on the Support for the Performance of Democracy in Ukraine

Multiple Regression Model

Model: $\ln(\text{stfdem} \sim \text{Lytvyn} + \text{Bloc} + \text{Block Yulia Tumoshenko} + \text{Our Ukraine} + \text{Communist Party} + \text{Progressive Socialist Party} + \text{Socialist Party})$

Multiple R-squared: 0.54 Adjusted R-squared: 0.49

	B
CONSTANT	2,65
BLOCK LUTVUN	,229
BLOCK YULIA TUMOSHENKO	,214**
OUR UKRAINE	,114
COMMUNIST PARTY	-,173**
PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY	-,255**
SOCIALIST PARTY	-,253***

DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

Source: European Social Survey (2008)

Note: Reference category for Parties –was chosen the Party of Regions according to the calculated Cook's Distance this variable is an influential case, above horizontal line that represents the critical level in Cook's and Leverage test.

In summary, we have made the following model of the effect of the Pro European orientated and Pro Russian orientated parties on the political support in Ukraine. Pro European orientated Parties include the Block Yulia Tumoshenko and Our Ukraine while the Pro Russian orientated Parties are Communist Party and Party of Regions. The reference category is the Progressive Socialist Party and Socialist Party that nowadays are not in the Ukrainian Parliament. So far, we can observe that the division for the Pro European orientated parties and Pro Russian orientated parties in Ukraine has significant effect on the political support in this state. But the

Pro European orientated parties as the Pro European orientated regions have positive impact on the support for the performance of democracy when the Pro Russian orientated parties and Pro Russian orientated regions have the negative one.

Table 10.5- Influence of the Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Parties on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine

Multiple Regression Model

Model_Parties<-lm (stfdem~ Pro European orientated parties+ pro Russian parties)

Multiple R-squared: 0.10 Adjusted R-squared: 0.10

	B
CONSTANT	1,94
PRO EUROPEAN ORIENTATED PARTIES	,243***
PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED PARTIES	-,283***

DENDENT VARIABLE:
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY


Source: European Values Study (2008)

Note: Pro European orientated Parties includes the Block Yulia Tymoshenko and Our Ukraine while the Pro Russian orientated Parties are Communist Party and Party of Regions. The reference category is the Progressive Socialist Party and Socialist Party that nowadays are not in the Parliament.

To sum up, those people who have voted the Pro European orientated party (Yulia Tymoshenko) have more political support then those who have voted the Pro Russian orientated party (Yanukovitch). On the following map, we can observe that those people who have voted the Tymoshenko Party (Pro European orientated) are mostly from the Western, Central and Northern Ukraine and those who have voted Yanukovitch Party (Pro Russian) are generally from the Eastern and Southern part of Ukraine. So far, we confirm that political support in Ukraine differs between the Pro European orientated part of Ukraine and Pro Russian orientated part and the electorate data coincide with it meaning that those people who are from Western

Ukraine will vote the Pro European orientated party and will have more political support then those who are from the Eastern Ukraine and have voted the Pro Russian orientated party. On the following map the territorial distribution of the vote for Pro European orientated and Pro Russian orientated party can be seen.

Figure 10.2- Geographical Distribution of the Vote for Yulia Tymoshenko and Victor Yanukovich




Source: Fisher "This one map helps explain Ukraine's protests" (2013)

10.3. The Effect Ideology of the Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Parts of Ukraine on the Satisfaction with Democracy

To continue, with our hypothesis of the effect of the Pro European orientated and Pro Russian orientated Ukraine on the individual's political support we expect that those individuals who proceed from the Western Ukraine and have voted the Pro European orientated party and on the left-right placement place themselves more to the right will be more satisfied with the performance of democracy than those individuals from the Eastern regions that have voted the Pro Russian orientated party and their ideology is more left orientated. So far, we suppose that the voters of Pro European orientated parties in Ukraine that are situated mostly on the right scale will have more political support than those people who have voted the Pro Russian/ as they are generally left parties I Ukraine.

According to our hypothesis support for the performance of democracy of voters will be more within the voters of Pro European orientated parties in Ukraine and mostly they tend to be more right orientated parties, so far we will find more political support within voters who place themselves on the right. So far, we have carried a dispersion analysis in order to follow the differences between our dependent variables, satisfaction with democracy and our independent variable the left right placement of the voters in Ukraine. During all our research we examine political support within western and eastern Ukraine that is why we have also included the territorial dimension here. To continue, we can observe a very interesting tendency of the distribution of these two variables within the regions of Ukraine. It should be mentioned that correlation between two variable is significant ($r=,511^{**}$). There is strong connection between the support for the performance of democracy and the ideology of voters (left-right placement).


Figure 10.3- Satisfaction with Democracy and the Ideology of Ukrainians within the Regions



Source: European Social Survey (2010)

It should be mentioned that very interesting data was observed for the Zakarpatya region that is in the Western part of the country, this case drops the attention because we have found here the highest support for the performance of the democracy within all regions but the ideology of the individuals was very left orientated. We can also see that this region in parliamentary and presidential elections always gives preference to the left orientated parties and candidates as Party of Regions and Victor Yanukovitch. Following the results of our analysis, we can state that regions where voters are more right orientated have more satisfactions with democracy and apparently those most are citizens from the Western regions of Ukraine (Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Lviv, Rivne oblast), Center Ukraine (Kyiv city) and Northern Ukraine (Chernigiv region). These regions usually vote the Pro European orientated parties. On the other hand, individuals in the Eastern, Southern regions of Ukraine are more eager to vote for left parties and pick up their ideology that are generally Pro Russian orientated parties. The distribution of the vote in Ukraine can be observed on the following map.


Figure 10.4- Presidential Election Vote Distribution in Ukraine (2010)



Source: Ukraine Central Election Commission (2010)

In order to get the general understanding of the distribution of the voters in Ukraine in their left right ideology of the voted party, we have carried out a descriptive analysis and the cross tabulation of our variables, satisfaction with democracy of voters and their and left right placement. Before we have made our contingency table, we have recoded our dependent variable into dichotomous one i.e. the individuals who are not satisfied (that include not satisfied and not at all satisfied) and those who are satisfied (rather satisfied and not at all satisfied). So far, we have obtained the following results and produce the next graph. To continue, we can observe that individuals that have define their placement on the right left scale are more satisfied with the way democracy is working in Ukraine then those who are center orientated or left (note $\chi^2 = 78.02$ and $p < 0.001$). It has to be noticed that those individuals who are left orientated has the lowest support for the performance of democracy in Ukraine and those in the center have the middle one.

Figure 10.5- Left-Right Distribution of Satisfaction of Democracy in Ukraine



Source: European Values Study (2008)

To sum up, we can state that the ideology of Ukrainians do have impact on the satisfaction with democracy and we can see its distribution within the regions of Ukraine. During all our research the red line of the difference of the support for the performance of democracy is seen within territorial distribution of Ukraine, especially between the Western and the Eastern part. Now we can also see that the correlation between the satisfaction with democracy and the left-right placement of the individuals is very strong but we can also observe this difference between the mentioned above geographical parts. So far, the more you are right orientated and have voted the Pro European orientated party, the more political support you have and vice versa if you have voted the Pro Russian orientated party and place yourself more in the left scale you will be not satisfied with the way democracy is working in your country.

On the following table, we can observe the impact of the political view, Pro European orientated and Pro Russian orientated parties on the satisfaction with the way democracy is working in Ukraine. The effect of left- right placement is significant. The results confirm that the ideology of the individuals that are more orientated to the right produce more positive effect on the political support then those people who place themselves more in the left ideological scale.

Table 10.5- The Impact of the Political View: Left-Right and the Pro European orientated and Pro Russian Orientated Parties on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine

Multiple Regression Model

Model_Parties<-lm (stfdem~ Pro European orientated parties+ pro Russian parties+ polview)

Multiple R-squared: 0.10 Adjusted R-squared: 0.10

	B
CONSTANT	1,79
PRO EUROPEAN ORIENTATED PARTIES	,132
PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED PARTIES	-,317***
POLITICAL VIEW: LEFT-RIGHT	,046***

DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

Source: European Values Study (2008)


Note: Pro European orientated Parties includes the Block Yulia Tymoshenko and Our Ukraine while the Pro Russian orientated Parties are Communist Party and Party of Regions. The reference category is the Progressive Socialist Party and Socialist Party that nowadays are not in the Parliament.

10.4. Satisfaction of Democracy and Democratic Values of the Voters for the Pro European (Yulia Tymoshenko) and Pro Russian (Yanukovitch) Orientated Parties

In order to have the general view of different components of political support within the voters of Pro European orientated parties and Pro Russian orientated parties in Ukraine, we have carried the following analysis. Firstly, we have checked if the voters can agree or disagree if democracy is the best form of governance in the state. We have obtained such results that those who appeal most to the Party of Regions strongly disagree with the statement mentioned above while voters who appeals most to the Yulia Tymoshenko Party strongly agree that democracy is the best form of governance (note: $\chi^2=33.00$ and $p<0.001$). Secondly, we observed that electorate of the Party of Regions also strongly agree that democracy causes bad economy in the sate while the voters of Yulia Tymoshenko

Party strongly disagree on this statement. To conclude, we have analyzed if democracy is indecisive for the party voter and we have found out that voters of Party of Regions totally agree with this statement while voters for the opposite party strongly disagree that democracy is indecisive.


Figure 10.6- Democracy is the Best Political System within Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Party



Source: European Values Study (2008)

Thirdly, we have observed that electorate of a Party of Regions strongly support an idea political system where experts make decisions while those who appeal most to the Yulia Tymoshenko Party support this idea fairly. On the other hand, 8,6 % of the electorate of the Party of Regions strongly supports the idea of political system where the army rules while 12, 5% of the voters who appeals to Yulia Tymoshenko Party fairly support this idea. Eventually, people who vote for the Party of Regions strongly agree that democracy cannot maintain order while the voters for the opposite party quite agree with this statement (note: $\chi^2=10.91$ and $p<0.001$). To continue, we have checked what they think about the idea of having a strong leader and we have found out that voters of the Party of Regions strongly support this idea while the others quite support the political system with a strong leader.


Figure 10.7- Democracy Cannot Maintain Order within the Voters for the Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Party



Source: European Values Study (2008)

It can be observed due to the analysis of EVS data for Ukraine that satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine within the voters for the Party Yulia Tymoshenko are much more higher then within the voters for the Party of Regions. This data also coincide with the data analysis mentioned above for the democracy is the best form of governance which the voters of the Party Yulia Tymoshenko also support strongly and on the other hand strongly disagree that democracy is indecisive and that democracy causes bad economy (note: $\chi^2=59.43$ and $p<0.001$). Consequently, we can assume that those who appeal more for the Party Yulia Tymoshenko are more democratically orientated then those of the Party of Regions.

Figure 10.8- Satisfaction with Democracy within the Party of Regions and the Party of Yulia Tymoshenko



Source: European Values Study (2008)

In summary, we have made the regression model of the impact of democratic value and the Pro European orientated parties and Pro Russian. Remain the same tendency of the distribution of the effect of the Pro European orientated and Pro Russian orientated parties, the first one has positive influence on the political support meanwhile the Pro Russian orientated parties significantly strongly negative one. Those individuals who support that democracy is the best form of governance has more support for the performance of democracy.

Table 10.6- The Impact of the Democratic Value and Pro European and Pro Russian Parties Orientated Parties on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine

Multiple Regression Model

Model_Parties<-lm (stfdem~ Pro European orientated parties+ pro Russian parties+ dembestform)

Multiple R-squared: 0.13 Adjusted R-squared: 0.12

	B
CONSTANT	1,47
PRO EUROPEAN ORIENTATED PARTIES	,208**
PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED PARTIES	-,255***
DEMOCRACY: BEST POLITICAL FORM	,160***

DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

Source: European Values Study (2008)

Note: Pro European orientated Parties includes the Block Yulia Tymoshenko and Our Ukraine while the Pro Russian orientated Parties are Communist Party and Party of Regions. The reference category is the Progressive Socialist Party and Socialist Party that nowadays are not in the Parliament.

CHAPTER 11

THE EFFECT OF THE POLITICAL EFFICACY OF THE VOTERS FOR PRO EUROPEAN ORIENTATED AND PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED PARTIES ON THE SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

11.1. -Satisfaction with Democracy and the Political Interest within the Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Parties

To continue with the analysis of the impact of the Pro European orientated and Pro Russian orientated regions, we expect those people from Western Ukraine who have voted the Yulia Tymoshenko (Pro European orientated party) will have higher level of political efficacy then those individuals from the Eastern Ukraine who have voted the Yanukovitch (Pro Russian orientated party). To follow, we suppose that those individuals from the Western part of Ukraine that have voted the Pro European orientated party will be more interested in politics and will be more educated and as the result will have more political support then those people who have voted the Pro Russian party and proceed from Eastern Ukraine.

Table 11.1- Support for the Performance of Democracy and Political Interest in Ukraine

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY	INTEREST IN POLITICS WITHIN UKRAINIANS			
	NOT AT ALL INTERESTED	NOT VERY INTERESTED	SOMEWHAT INTERESTED	VERY INTERESTED
NOT SATISFIED	18,2%	32,4%	35,4%	14,0%
NOT VERY SATISFIED	9,7%	40,0%	38,7%	11,7%
RATHERSATISFIED	6,3%	36,1%	42,4%	15,2%
VERYSATISFIED	9,1%	30,3%	36,4%	24,2%
TOTAL	12,3%	36,5%	38,0%	13,3%

Source: European Values Study (2008)

Note: $\chi^2=35,50$ $p<0.001$

As it was previously theoretically proved in our work political efficacy produces influence on the political support. We can observe on our following contingency table, the frequency distribution of the political interest and satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine. So far, we can notice that those individuals who are somewhat interested in politics in Ukraine have the tendency to be more satisfied with the way democracy is working in their country than those who do not have any interest in it. Taking into account the influence of the political interest on the political support within Ukrainians, we have checked the level of political interest of the voters for this or that party in Ukraine. According to the analysis we can observe that generally people who vote political parties in Ukraine are interested in politics. As we are specifically focused on the distribution of these indicators within two main voted parties in Ukraine, the Pro European orientated one and Pro Russian orientated we have found that both voters for the Party of Regions and Yulia Tymoshenko Party are quite interested in politics. To sum up, it can be assumed that their choice is quite conscious.

Table 11.2- The Vote for the Political Parties and Voter's Interest in Politics in Ukraine

POLITICAL PARTY	HOW INTERESTED IN POLITICS			
	VERY INTERESTED	QUITE INTERESTED	HARDLY INTERESTED	NOT AT ALL INTERESTED
BLOCK OF LYTVYN	5%	54%	34%	7%
BLOCK OF YULIA TYMOSHENKO	13%	39%	38%	10%
BLOCK 'OUR UKRAINE - PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE'	13%	36%	44%	7%
COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE	22%	47%	31%	*
PARTY OF REGIONS	13%	41%	36%	10%
PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY OF UKRAINE	11%	33%	44%	11%
SOCIALIST PARTY OF UKRAINE	24%	59%	18%	*
OTHER	43%	36%	21%	*
AGAINST ALL	3%	28%	49%	20%

Source: European Values Study (2008).

Note: $\chi^2=34.46$ and $p > 0.1$

11.2. Political Support and the Educational Level of Individuals within the Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Regions in Ukraine

In order to check the political efficacy of the respondents in Ukraine for the following observation of its impact on the political support, we continue with measuring it by the education of the individuals from the Western and Eastern Ukraine who have voted the Pro European orientated or Pro Russian orientated party. In order to get the profile of the level of education of our respondents for Ukraine we have carried frequency, description and dispersion analysis with European Values Study and found out that distribution of education within Ukrainians is the following most of individuals have secondary (45%) and first stage of tertiary education (40%). According to our analysis, Western regions as usual express strong support for the democratic performance in Ukraine and have high level of education within its habitants (Volyn, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk) but at the same time people who live in Zakarpattia region that is also in the West of Ukraine are not very educated but the support for the democracy performance is at the same high level as for example in Lviv region where the education level within citizens is higher. Within Eastern regions Dnipropetrovsk has more educated citizens then in Zaporizhia but the level of satisfaction with democracy is not higher but lower. On the other hand, we always observe the highest level of the support for the performance of democracy in the Northern part in Chernihiv region and in Rivne region that is in the Western part but in both regions the education level is not as high as for example as in Donetsk, Kyiv city, Volyn region and others. So far we can observe specific distribution of interdependence of the satisfaction with democracy and education within all regions of Ukraine. For example, some regions in the Southern Ukraine (as Odessa, Mykolaiv oblast, Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Dnipropetrovsk) has the same high level of education as the mentioned before regions from Western and Northern Ukraine but the support for the performance of democracy remains at the low level.

Table 11.3- Satisfaction with Democracy and Education in Ukraine

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY WITHIN UKRAINIANS				
EDUCATION OF UKRAINIANS	NOT SATISFIED	NOT VERY SATISFIED	RATHERSATISFIED	VERY SATISFIED
0 : PRE- PRIMARY EDUCATION OR NONE EDUCATION	38,5%	53,8%	7,7%	*
1 : PRIMARY EDUCATION OR FIRST STAGE OF BASIC EDUCATION	30,8%	53,8%	15,4%	*
2 : LOWER SECONDARY OR SECOND STAGE OF BASIC EDUCATION	44,4%	39,7%	13,5%	2,4%
3 : (UPPER) SECONDARY EDUCATION	37,9%	45,4%	13,5%	3,2%
5 : FIRST STAGE OF TERTIARY EDUCATION	32,2%	51,7%	14,4%	1,7%
6 : SECOND STAGE OF TERTIARY EDUCATION	28,6%	28,6%	42,9%	*
TOTAL	36,0%	47,6%	14,0%	2,4%

Source: European Values Study (2008)

Note: $\chi^2=19.12$ and $p > 0.1$

However our multilevel analysis shows that does not matter from which region is the individual from the Pro European orientated or Pro Russian orientated, on the individual level the effect of having higher education do not produce strong impact on the political in Ukraine. To follow, we can observe on our contingency table, the frequency distribution of our researched variables. So far, we can see that individuals in Ukraine that are more educated have the tendency to be less satisfied with the way democracy is working in their country that we have just confirm with our data for the regions of Ukraine. Having obtained these results that educational level produce significant and interesting impact on the political support, we would like to examine the distribution of this indicator within the voters for Pro European orientated and Pro Russian orientated parties that can be observed on the following table.

Table 11.4- The Vote for the Political Parties and the Education Level of Voters

POLITICAL PARTIES	EDUCATIONAL LEVEL						
	GENERAL LOWER SECONDARY	GENERAL (UPPER) SECONDARY EDUCATION	PRE-TECHNICAL (UPPER) SECONDARY EDUCATION	TECHNICAL (UPPER) SECONDARY EDUCATION	FIRST STAGE OF TERTIARY EDUCATION	SECOND DEGREE : FIRST STAGE OF TERTIARY EDUCATION	THIRD DEGREE: FIRST STAGE OF TERTIARY EDUCATION
COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE	21%	14%	*	7%	36%	21%	*
PARTY OF REGIONS	2%	26%	7%	17%	26%	15%	4%
YULIA TYMOSHENKO BLOC	3%	16%	16%	23%	26%	1	*
PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE BLOC	*	*	33%	*	*	33%	*
LYTVYN BLOC	*	40%	30%	*	*	20%	10%
OUR UKRAINE BLOC	*	*	*	13%	38%	50%	*
ALL UKRAINIAN UNION 'FREEDOM'	*	*	*	*	33%	33%	33%

Source: European Values Study (2008)

Educational level partner: ISCED-code three digits.

Note: $\chi^2=72.06$ and $p < 0.01$.

To sum up the results, the voters of the Pro Russian orientated (Party of Regions, Communist Party) and Pro European orientated parties (Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, Our Ukraine Bloc, All Ukrainian Union 'Freedom') have higher education. To explain, we can't claim that those who have higher education will probably vote the Pro European orientated or Pro Russian orientated party and consequently will have more or less political support.

Table 11.5- The Effect of the Political Interest, Education, Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Parts and Political Parties on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine

Multiple Regression Model

Model_Parties<-lm (stfdem~ Pro European orientated part+ pro Russian part +Pro European orientated parties+ pro Russian parties pointr+edu)

Multiple R-squared: 0.14 Adjusted R-squared: 0.13

CONSTANT	1,70
PRO EUROPEAN ORIENTATED PART	,261***
PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED PART	-0,1
PRO EUROPEAN ORIENTATED PARTIES	-,166**
PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED PARTIES	,171***
POLITICAL INTEREST	,035
EDUCATION	,025

DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

Source: European Values Study (2008)

Note: Pro European orientated part includes the Western and Northern regions while the Pro Russian orientated part is the Eastern and Southern regions. The Kirovograd and Poltava (Central regions) are not included as the category of reference as it is usually has mixed tendency to be Pro Russian orientated or Pro Europe orientated regions. Pro European orientated Parties includes the Block Yulia Tymoshenko and Our Ukraine while the Pro Russian orientated Parties are Communist Party and Party of Regions. The reference category is the Progressive Socialist Party and Socialist Party that nowadays are not in the Parliament.

Finally, we have made the multiple regression analysis with the researched variables and we can observe that Pro European orientated regions and Pro European orientated parties have strong positive effect on the political support in Ukraine while the effect of the Pro Russian orientated regions and Pro Russian orientated parties is negative and is not as strongly significant as mentioned factors. Meanwhile it was found that political interest and education positively influence the

support with the performance of democracy in Ukraine but these indicators are not such significant as the factor of regions or political parties in this country.

11.3. Support for the Performance of Democracy and Civil Society in Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Ukraine

To continue with our hypothesis of the impact of the Pro European orientated and Pro Russian orientated regions on the political support we also expect that civil society will be weaker in the Pro communist Eastern part of Ukraine then it is the Pro European orientated. We carried analysis for the membership in the civil organizations within Ukrainians and have got the following results. The highest percent goes to the trade unions around 12,5%, then much more lower indicator is for the membership in political parties 2,7%, professional associations 2,6%, religious organizations 2,5%, cultural activities 1,7% and 1,2% goes to the membership in welfare organizations. So far, we find that Ukrainians are more active in taking part in trade unions.

Table 11.6- Membership of Ukrainians in following organizations

	Mentioned
Welfare organization	1,2
Religious organization	2,5
Cultural activities	1,7
Trade unions	12,5
Political parties/groups	2,7
Local community action	0,9
3w-development/human rights	0,3
Environment organization	0,5
Professional associations	2,6

Source: European Social Survey (2010)

In our research the civil society we have checked with the following variables as contacted a politician, government or local government official, worked in a political party or action group, worked in another organization or association, worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker, taken part in a lawful public demonstration,

boycotted certain products. These variables we have taken from the European Social Survey for Ukraine. We have carried the analysis for the researched variables and we can observe on the table that Ukrainians are not very politically active. Around 10,6% of the respondents has contacted politician, the low number maintains also other indicators as having been working in political party 3%, in organization and association 2,1% , signing petition around 4%. So far, we can state that during 2007 population in Ukraine was not very active in taking part in different civil actions but Ukrainians are more tend to contact politicians or official institutions.


Table 11.7- Civil activity of Ukrainians in percents

	YES
Contacted politician or government official last 12 months	10,6
Worked in political party or action group last 12 months	3
Worked in another organization or association last 12 months	2,1
Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker last 12 months	3,9
Signed petition last 12 months	4,3
Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months	4,5
Boycotted certain products last 12 months	0,7

Source: European Social Survey (2010)

To continue, the correlation of our chosen variable, contact politician in Ukraine and support for the performance of democracy was the most significant ($r=,608^{**}$) then the correlation of our dependent variables and other individual variables for civil activity that have been just mentioned. Through all our research we always examine the distribution of the variables through the regions of Ukraine as territorial dimension has very strong impact on the support for the performance of democracy.

Figure 11.1- Satisfaction with Democracy and Civil Society in Ukraine



Source: European Social Survey (2010)

We can examine on the graph that those regions where the civil society is less developed (haven't contacted politician, government or local official during the last 12 months) are situated on the left part of the graph and have less support for the performance of democracy in Ukraine, on the other hand, those regions where civil society is higher, we can also observe the higher satisfaction with democracy. To sum up, we can observe that Pro European orientated (Western, Northern regions) of Ukraine depict more active civil society than those individuals from the Pro Russian orientated part of Ukraine. As was proved before with our analysis citizens from the Pro European orientated regions of Ukraine are more satisfied with the way democracy is working than those who live in Pro Russian orientated part of the country.

Table 11.8- Effect of the Civil Activity and Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Parts and Political Parties on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine

Multiple Regression Model

Model_Parties<-lm (stfdem~ Pro European orientated part+ pro Russian part +Pro European orientated parties+ pro Russian parties + conpot+worpp+woror+stike+sinpet+tpdem+boyprod)

Multiple R-squared: 0.68 Adjusted R-squared: 0.61

CONSTANT	3,44
PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED PART	,130
PRO EUROPEAN ORIENTATED PART	1,03***
PRO EUROPEAN ORIENTATED PARTIES	,553***
PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED PARTIES	-,005
CONTACTED POLITICIAN	,278
WORKED IN PARTY	-,779**
WORKED IN ORGANISATION	-,050
WORN STICKER	,083
SIGNED PETITION	,248
TAKEN PART IN DEMONSTRATION	,066
BOYCOTTED PRODUCTS	,904

DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

Source: European Social Survey (2010)

Note: Pro European orientated part includes the Western and Northern regions while the Pro Russian orientated part is the Eastern and Southern regions. The Kirovograd and Poltava (Central regions) are not included as the category of reference as it is usually has mixed tendency to be Pro Russian orientated or Pro Europe orientated regions. Pro European orientated Parties includes the Block Yulia Tymoshenko and Our Ukraine while the Pro Russian orientated Parties are Communist Party and Party of Regions. The reference category is the Progressive Socialist Party and Socialist Party that nowadays are not in the Parliament.

To sum up the obtained results from the multiple regression model of the effect of civil activity, Pro European orientated and Pro Russian orientated parties and Pro European orientated and Pro Russian orientated regions in Ukraine it can be seen that very significant factors that impact on the political support in Ukraine remain the Pro European orientated part of Ukraine and Pro European orientated parties. On the other hand, within the indicators that measure civil activity in

Ukraine by the data from European Social Survey, the significant positive influence on the support for the performance of democracy produces having been working in the political party within the last twelve months.


CHAPTER 12

12. THE IMPACT OF THE TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS WITHIN THE PRO EUROPEAN ORIENTATED AND PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED REGIONS ON THE SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE

12. 1- Satisfaction with the Democracy and the Trust in Political Parties of the Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Regions in Ukraine

As it was previously proved the political support is higher in the Western regions and within the voters of Pro European orientated parties. So far, we expect that more trust in political parties will be observed within the voters of Pro European orientated parties then in the individuals who have voted the Pro Russian/ Communist Party. To start, we have carried a frequency analysis for our independent variable -trust in political parties, taking the data for Ukraine from the World Values Survey (1996, 2006), European Values Survey (2006, 2008) and European Social Survey (2009). So far, we can observe the dynamic of change of its characteristic through these years. To follow, we can see that the trust in political parties within Ukrainians was higher in 1996 then it start diminishing in 2006 and 2008 and the great fall down of the trust in political parties was in 2009.

Figure 12.1- Trust in Political Parties in Ukraine (1996-2009)




Source: World Values Survey (1996, 2006), European Values Study (2006, 2008) and European Social Survey (2010).

As was previously described in the theoretical part we have examined trust in political parties within the Ukrainians and its impact on the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine. We were curious about the trust in political parties within different age groups, gender and educational level of the citizens of Ukraine. To check the level of trust within the individuals of Ukraine we have run an analysis that we can observe on a diagram of available data set of WVS for the period since 2005 till 2007. We correlated the variable trust in political parties with the age group. According to the results obtained from analysis, people who are in the age groups from 30 till 49 years and from 50 till 98 trust more political parties than citizens from 15 till 29. So far, the young generation of Ukraine distrusts more political parties than the elder population of Ukraine. It can be said that decline in political support also came from a young people not only in industrial democracies as was proved by Dalton (1999) but also in a new emerging, democratic states as Ukraine. We were also curious if there is a difference between the trust in political parties among men and women in Ukraine. So, we run an analysis with the data of WVS and we find out that during the period from 2005 till 2007, Ukrainian men trusted more political parties than women. According to the analysis of a data set of EVS the situation had changed in 2008 and the number of women and men who distrust political parties was equal. Eventually, we can conclude that there is no big difference in the trust in political parties within the gender in Ukraine though men expressed a little bit more trust during the last decade in Ukraine. On the other hand, we have found that more educated individuals have the tendency to distrust more political parties in Ukraine than those who do not have proper education. But interesting data was found for people with incomplete primary school education, these individuals in Ukraine do not have any trust in political parties meanwhile those who have no formal education express the great trust in political parties of Ukraine.

To continue, we can observe the tendency of distribution of the support for the performance of democracy and trust in political parties (Note: $\chi^2=248.24$ and $p < 0.001$). To follow, we can see how the correlation of these two factors is increasing from the down left corner to the up right corner Starting with Donetsk city in

Eastern Ukraine we can see very low satisfaction with democracy but still remains some trust in political parties. On the other hand, voters in Kirovograd region (Central Ukraine), Zhutomur (Northern part), Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Southern Ukraine) and Khmelnytsk oblast (Center Ukraine) do not have at all trust in political parties. On the other hand, in Odessa city and Donetsk region we do find trust but the support remains on the same low level as through the voters of the mentioned regions. When we go up through our graphic, we can observe that Mykolaiv region in Southern Ukraine do have quite a lot of trust in political parties the same as citizens of Eastern Ukraine as Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhya regions, in Center Ukraine-Cherkasy region but the satisfaction with democracy is not more higher then mentioned before regions. However, those people who live in Western regions as Lviv, Volyn, Rivne region do express trust in political parties and more support for the performance of democracy in Ukraine.

Figure 12.2- Trust in Political Parties and its Regional Distribution in Ukraine




Source: European Values Study (2008)

On the other hand, there are individuals in the following regions that have middle trust in political parties but at the same time express strong support for the performance of democracy. So far, the satisfaction with democracy is increasing from the Eastern, Central, Northern and Western Ukraine where we find the highest indicators for mentioned above variables and mostly for all our researched variables. However, we can observe strong relation ($r=0.473^{**}$) between the support for the performance of democracy and trust in politicians. Individuals in Zakarpattia region and Ivano-Frankivsk region that are Western Ukraine have a lot support for

the performance of democracy and trust in politicians meanwhile in Zaporizhya that is Eastern Ukraine express the highest trust in politicians within all Ukraine in 2010 and the satisfaction with the way democracy is working is on the same high level as have the citizens of Ternopil, Lviv, Volyn (Western Ukraine), Chernigivska region (Northern Ukraine) and Kyiv city. However, in regions as Kirovograd, Odessa, Vynnytsya, Donetsk, and Autonomic Republic of Crimea we do notice low trust in politicians and no support for the performance of democracy in Ukraine. To sum up, we do observe the strong correlation between the satisfaction with democracy and trust in politicians in Ukraine and the tendency of the Pro European orientated regions to show more confidence in political leaders then individuals from the Pro Russian part of Ukraine.

Figure 12.3- Satisfaction with Democracy and Trust in Politicians within the regions of Ukraine



Source: European Social Survey (2010)

In our multiple regression analysis trust in political party do not produce any significant result on the political support, meaning that independently from what region the individual is whether it is Pro European orientated or Pro Russian orientated part of Ukraine. To sum up, we have checked how much confidence have people who vote for the Pro Russian orientated party (Party of Regions) and Pro

European orientated (Yulia Tymoshenko) and we have observed that according to our data from European Social Survey, those who appeal most to the Party of Regions distrust more the political parties while those who vote for the Yulia Tymoshenko Party do have more trust. To add, we have already proved that those who have voted for the Pro European orientated party in Ukraine have more political support than those who prefer to vote Pro Russian orientated party and as appears they also have much confidence in political parties in Ukraine.

Table 12.1- Trust in Political Parties and the Vote for the Pro European (Yulia Tymoshenko) and Pro Russian Orientated Parties (Party of Regions)

	NO TRUST IN POLITICAL PARTIES	TRUST IN POLITICAL PARTIES
PRO EUROPEAN ORIENTATED PARTY	42%	59%
PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED PARTY	58%	41%

Source: European Values Study (2008)

Note: $\chi^2=46.20$ and $p < 0.001$

Having checked the impact of the vote for Pro European orientated parties in Ukraine on the political support we would like to check the trust in political parties within Ukrainians in order to examine its impact on the political support, in order to obtain a broad picture of all possible indicators that can influence the vote and then the satisfaction with the democracy in Ukraine. On the following contingency table we can observe the matrix of frequencies of the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine and trust in political parties within Ukrainians. So far, we can see that those individuals who do not trust political parties are also not satisfied with the way democracy is working in Ukraine.

Table 12.2- Satisfaction with Democracy and Trust in Political Parties within Ukrainians

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE	TRUST POLITICAL PARTIES			
	NOT AT ALL	NOT VERY MUCH	QUIETE A LOT	A GREAT DEAL
NOT SATISFIED	59,1%	28,4%	10,8%	1,7%
NOT VERY SATISFIED	43,9%	39,0%	15,6%	1,4%
RATHERSATISFIED	37,0%	40,3%	21,0%	1,7%
VERYSATISFIED	38,7%	22,6%	38,7%	-
TOTAL	48,3%	35,0%	15,2%	1,5%

Source: European Values Study (2008)

Note: $\chi^2=52.95$ and $p > 0.1$

12.2- Political Support and Trust in Legal System

To follow with checking our hypothesis with the impact of the Pro European orientated the Pro Russian orientated parts of Ukraine we also expect that the trust in institutions will be higher in Western regions (Pro European orientated ones) then in Eastern regions known as more the Pro Communist ones. To explain, we suppose that trust in legal system and in police will be higher within the individuals of Pro European orientated region (Western part of Ukraine) then in the Eastern Pro Russian orientated regions. Our next contingency table shows the same tendency of the correlation between our indicators. Consequently, those individuals who appear to have the more trust in legal system, are more satisfied with the way democracy is working in Ukraine then those who do not trust in public institutions.

Table 12.3- Satisfaction with Democracy and Trust in Legal System


SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY	TRUST IN LEGAL SYSTEM			
	A GREAT DEAL	QUITE A LOT	NOT VERY MUCH	NONE AT ALL
VERY	6,9%	34,5%	17,2%	41,4%
RATHER	7,1%	32,2%	36,1%	24,6%
NOT VERY	4,8%	20,9%	40,9%	33,4%
NOT AT ALL	3,6%	11,6%	27,1%	57,7%
TOTAL	4,7%	19,5%	34,7%	41,1%

Source: European Values Study (2008)

Note: $\chi^2=108.56$ and $p < 0.001$

Our multilevel model also confirms that trust in legal system and in political parties significantly impacts on the support for the performance of democracy in Ukraine. To add, the correlation between the satisfaction with democracy and trust in legal system in Ukraine is also very strong ($r=,653^{**}$) and highly significant. Trust in justice system within Ukrainians influence the support for the democracy. On our graph we can see that remain the tendency of the distribution of our variables through all our research and support for the democratic performance and trust in legal system remains very high in Chernigiv oblast (Northern Ukraine), in Western Ukraine in Rivne region, Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn. So far, our hypotheses that trust in institutions will be higher in Pro European then in Pro Russian orientated regions is also confirmed.

Figure 12.4- Satisfaction with Democracy and Trust in Institutions in the Regions of Ukraine



Source: European Values Study (2008)

12.3- Support for the Performance of Democracy and Trust in Police

On the other hand, we have also observed that trust in police in Ukraine influence greatly the support for the performance of democracy, the correlation between this two variables is strongly significant ($r=,561^{**}$). So far, we can see that the more is the trust in police for example in Rivne, Chernigiv region, the more people support the performance of democracy. We have already seen that the pattern of the distribution of the satisfaction with democracy and the independent variables of our research is quite similar but with some peculiarities. The city Donetsk (Eastern Ukraine) and Kirovograd region in the Central part through all our research have the lowest indicators of the satisfaction with the way democracy works in Ukraine and all other factors that suppose to impact on our dependent variable. To follow, we always find more support for democracy performance in

Western regions and in this case we also see that regions as Rivne oblast, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil region has more trust in police. So far, we can observe while the trust is increasing within the individuals, the support for the performance of democracy also becomes more but the distribution still remains the same meaning that the trust in public institutions in Ukraine is higher in Pro European orientated regions (Western, Northern, Central ones) than in Pro Russian orientated territory (Eastern, Southern).

12.4- Satisfaction with Democracy and Trust in Press, Trust in Educational System and Trust in Civil Organizations

To continue with the influence of the Pro European orientated and Pro Russian orientated part on the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine, we follow with the analysis of the impact of the trust in public institutions in these parts. So far, we have also checked the effect of trust in press, trust in educational system and in non governmental organizations on the political support expecting that mentioned indicators will be higher in Western regions than in Eastern ones. Having examined their effect on the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine, we can say that the strongest correlation between the support for the performance of democracy was found with the trust then with legal system ($r=,653^{**}$), with the trust in police ($r=,561^{**}$) and on the other hand, with trust educational system ($r=,439^{**}$), with trust in press ($r=,399^{**}$) and less strong correlation was seen between the satisfaction with democracy and trust in civil organizations ($r=,211^{**}$). To sum up, we have observed that people have strong trust in mentioned public institutions and are more satisfied with the performance of democracy in Western part and Northern part, the regions that are more Pro European orientated than Pro Russian orientated as the Eastern and Southern Ukraine where the same indicators are much more lower.

Table 12.4- The Effect of the Trust in Institutions and the Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Parts and Parties on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine

Multiple Regression Model

Model_Parties<-lm (stfdem~ Pro European orientated part+ pro Russian part +Pro European orientated parties+ pro Russian parties+trsp+trpol+trsjus+trsprs+trsedu+trttun)

Multiple R-squared: 0.68 Adjusted R-squared: 0.61

CONSTANT	1,30
PRO EUROPEAN ORIENTATED PART	,195**
PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED PART	-,057
PRO EUROPEAN ORIENTATED PARTIES	,119
PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED PARTIES	-,177*
TRUST POLITICAL PARTIES	,162***
TRUST POLICE	,087***
TRUST JUSTICE	,055**
TRUST PRESS	,079***
TRUST EDUCATION	,002
TRUST TRADE UNIONS	-,037

DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

Source: European Values Study (2008)

Note: Note: Pro European orientated part includes the Western and Northern regions while the Pro Russian orientated part is the Eastern and Southern regions. The Kirovograd and Poltava (Central regions) are not included as the category of reference as it is usually has mixed tendency to be Pro Russian orientated or Pro Europe orientated regions. Pro European orientated Parties includes the Block Yulia Tymoshenko and Our Ukraine while the Pro Russian orientated Parties are Communist Party and Party of Regions. The reference category is the Progressive Socialist Party and Socialist Party that nowadays are not in the Parliament.

Finally, we have made the regression model with all our variables of trust. We can observe in our model that trust in political parties, trust in police, trust in justice and trust in press produce significant strong effect on the satisfaction with the way democracy is working in Ukraine while the effect of trust in education and trust in trade unions is insignificant on the support for the performance of

democracy. Meanwhile we always observe in our analysis that Pro European orientated regions and political parties during all our research have strong positive effect on the satisfaction with the way democracy is working in Ukraine.

CHAPTER 13

EFFECT OF SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS ON THE SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN THE PRO EUROPEAN ORIENTATED AND PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED REGIONS OF UKRAINE

13.1. Satisfaction with Democracy and Economic Development in Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Regions of Ukraine

To follow with our hypothesis of the impact of the Eastern regions the Pro Russian, Pro Communist territory and the effect of the Pro European orientated the Western part of Ukraine on the political support we expect that the economic development will differ within this two parts and will have positive effect on the satisfaction with democracy in last one while in Pro Russian orientated part this indicator will be not significant.

Table 13.1- Satisfaction with Democracy of Ukrainians and Their Monthly Income

MONTHLY INCOME OF UKRAINIANS	SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY WITHIN UKRAINIANS			
	NOT SATISFIED	NOT VERY SATISFIED	RATHER SATISFIED	VERY SATISFIED
LESS THAN €150	38,4%	45,9%	12,2%	3,5%
€150 TO UNDER €300	35,7%	48,9%	13,7%	1,8%
€300 TO UNDER €500	32,4%	51,3%	14,0%	2,3%
€500 TO UNDER €1000	31,7%	36,6%	29,3%	2,4%
€1000 TO UNDER €1500	38,5%	46,2%	15,4%	*
€1500 TO UNDER €2000	66,7%	33,3%	*	*
TOTAL	35,3%	47,9%	14,4%	2,4%

Source: European Values Study (2008)

Note: $\chi^2=25.23$ and $p < 0.01$

We have made analysis with our individual data in order to obtain a general view of the impact of the socio demographic data on the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine. According to our matrix of the frequencies of our

researched variables (Table 2.3.), Ukrainians who earn a small amount of money are totally dissatisfied with the way democracy is working in Ukraine. To proceed, we have measured the impact of the satisfaction with economy of Ukrainians on their support for the performance of democracy in their country. Appears that the political support will grow when the individuals are satisfied with the way economy is functioning in their country.

Table 13.2- Support for the Performance of Democracy of Ukrainians and the Satisfaction with Economy


SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY	NOT SATISFIED WITH ECONOMY	SATISFIED WITH ECONOMY
NOT SATISFIED WITH DEMOCRACY	97,5%	2,5%
SATISFIED WITH DEMOCRACY	89,8%	10,2%
TOTAL	96,3%	3,7%

Source: European Values Study (2008)

Note: $\chi^2=19.59$ and $p < 0.001$

On the following figure, we can see the distribution of our dependent variable satisfaction with democracy and the independent one, the satisfaction with economy within the regions of Ukraine. The $r=,708^{**}$ is very high, meaning that exist strong correlation between this two variables. To follow, on the figure, we can observe that regions from the Western (Ternopilska, Lvivska, Volynska, Ivano-Frankivska and Zakarpatska oblast) and Northern part (Chernigivska oblast and Kyiv) express more satisfaction with economy and have more political support then the regions from the Eastern (Donetsk and Kharkiv oblast), Southern Ukraine (Odessa oblast and Autonoma Republic of Crimea). So far, we can sum up that the Pro European orientated part of Ukraine are more satisfied with the way economy is working and support more the performance of the democracy in Ukraine then the Pro Russian orientated regions.

Figure 13.1- Political Support and Satisfaction with Economy in Ukrainian Regions



Source: European Values Study (2008)

On the following model, can be observed the effect of the satisfaction with economy on the political support that is strongly significant, the model explains around the 20 percent of the impact. The more there are satisfaction with the way economy is working in Ukraine, the more political support is observed in the state.

Table 13.3- The Impact of the Satisfaction with Economy, Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Part on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine

Multiple Regression Model

Model_Parties<-lm (stfdem~ Pro European orientated part+ pro Russian part + stfec0)

Multiple R-squared: 0.27 Adjusted R-squared: 0.26

	B
CONSTANT	1,01
PRO EUROPEAN ORIENTATED PART	0,18
PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED PART	0,956***
SATISFACTIOPN WITH ECONOMY	0,69***

DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

Source: European Social Survey (2010)

Note: Pro European orientated part includes the Western and Northern regions while the Pro Russian orientated part is the Eastern and Southern regions. The Kirovograd and Poltava (Central regions) are not included as the category of reference as it is usually has mixed tendency to be Pro Russian orientated or Pro European orientated regions

According to the results of multiple regression analysis, satisfaction with economy has very strong and positive effect on the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine. In this model the effect of the Pro Russian orientated and satisfaction with economy produce strong and positive impact on political support in Ukraine. Meaning while the economic situation is good in the state the Eastern regions of the country strongly support the performance of democracy in Ukraine meanwhile the influence of the Pro European orientated regions in Ukraine in this model is not significant. This can explain that the economic factor plays more important role in support for the democracy in the Eastern part of Ukraine while the Western regions it is not so important.

13.4. Support for the Performance of Democracy and the Generation Effect in the Pro European orientated and Pro Russian Orientated Ukraine

To proceed with the effect of the Pro European orientated and Pro Russian orientated regions of Ukraine on the satisfaction with the performance of democracy in the state, we suppose that younger generation in the Western part will have more political support than in the Eastern regions. As it was already mentioned, we supposed that age will effect the level of the satisfaction with democracy within Ukrainians. It was expected that younger generation in Pro European orientated part of Ukraine will be more satisfied with the performance of democracy than in the Pro Russian orientated part. To start, we have applied the descriptive statistic, the error bar graph and we can stated that according to our analysis the error term, the uncertainty of our measurement of our function of the just mentioned hypothesis is small.

Table 13.4- Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine within the Younger and Older Generation

SATISFAWITH DEMOCRACY	RESPONDENTS AGE, YOUNGER OR OLDER THAN 30	
	29 OR UNDER	30 OR OLDER
NOT SATISFIED	22,7%	77,3%
SATISFIED	25,9%	74,1%
TOTAL	23,2%	76,8%

Source: European Social Survey (2010)

Note: $\chi^2=.83$ and $p > 0.1$

To follow, we have regressed the age calculated from the European Social Survey (2010), before having recoded the age into five groups (from 15 till 21 one group, from 26 till 35 second group, from 35 till 50 third, from 50 till 70 fourth and from 70 till 90 fifth). The reference category was chosen the fifth group. According to the analysis the positive effect on the political support produce the yonder generation than the elder, meaning that young people in Ukraine have more support for the performance of democracy than elder individuals. We have regressed the year birth on the satisfaction with democracy, the mentioned variables are statistically significant. We can observe that political support is decreasing with age

Table 13.5- The Impact of the Age Groups on the Political Support in Ukraine

Multiple Regression Model

Model_Parties<-lm (stfdem~age)

Multiple R-squared: 0.17 Adjusted R-squared: 0.14

	B
CONSTANT	2,425
AGE FROM 15 TILL 21	,825***
AGE FROM 26 TILL 35	,315**
AGE FROM 35 TILL 50	-,160
AGE FROM 50 TILL 70	-,253

DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

Source: European Social Survey (2010)

Note: The reference category is group age from 70 till 90

On the other hand, our multilevel analysis has shown that independently whether the young generation of Pro European orientated (Western Central, Northern part of Ukraine) or of the Pro Russian orientated part (Eastern, Southern regions), the age does not have strong impact on the political support in Ukraine.

To add to our analysis of the effect of the socio demographic data on the support for the performance of democracy in Ukraine, we will check the influence of the gender. Generally neither women nor men are satisfied with the way democracy is working in Ukraine but still women tend to have less support for the performance of democracy. The regression analysis and multilevel analysis confirm that gender does not have significant impact on the political support.

Table 13.6- Support for the Performance of Democracy and its Gender Distribution in Ukraine

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY	MALE	FEMALE
NOT SATISFIED	43,8%	56,2%
NOT VERY SATISFIED	36,2%	63,8%
RATHERSATISFIED	35,8%	64,2%
VERYSATISFIED	48,5%	51,5%
TOTAL	39,2%	60,8%

Source: European Values Study (2008)

Note: $\chi^2=9.12$ and $p < 0.01$

13.5-FINAL MODEL

Having analyzed all the obtained results we have made the final model with all our researched variables. So far, in our multilevel model is expected that satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine will differ within the regions of Ukraine especially making focus on the Pro European orientated and Pro Russian distribution of the political support. This model checks the territorial impact with its language and ethnic contributions on it. To follow, we have checked the number of Ukrainians and Russians living in the regions Ukraine from the Census 2001 that was the last one carried on till now. To check the effect of language mostly speaking in the regions we are also using individual data from the ESS 2010. It is the recent data available for Ukraine, from this survey variable language was obtained, meaning which language do people usually speak at home Ukrainian or Russian and how does this impact on their support for democracy.

So far, the model verify how the ethnicity is that being Ukrainian or Russian influence on the support for the democracy in that or other region in Ukraine and whether speaking Ukrainian or Russian language in specific regions of Ukraine produce the influence on the political support. In order to check our hypothesis on the multilevel effect of the of speaking Ukrainian and being Ukrainian on the political support in Ukraine, we have included on the first level the variable language, Ukrainian and Russian (available from the European Social Survey) and on the second level variable of ethnic population of the region being Ukrainian or Russian (Ukraine Census 2001). According to the analysis, speaking Ukrainian has very positive strong effect on the political support in Ukraine. On the other hand, trust in parliament, trust in police and political placement also produce positive impact on the satisfaction with the way democracy is working. However, education, the interest in politics, age and gender do not have strong influence on the support for the democracy in Ukraine in this model.

In our multilevel model, we can observe that being from the Pro European orientated part and speak Ukrainian language have very strong and positive effect

on the political support in the state. On the other hand, strong negative effect on the support for the performance of democracy produces the Pro Russian orientated parties. Positive impact on the satisfaction with the way democracy is working has trust in parliament and trust in police. Satisfaction with economy has strong positive impact on the political support in Ukraine. To continue, the model measures the impact of the economic development of the regions. So far, we have included the variable Integrative Index of Regional Human Development from the Demographic Institute of Social Science named by Ptyha. The item covers the parameters of the welfare, work, and comfort of life, social environment and education. As was just mentioned this factor checks the impact of regional human development on the political support. It is expected that the higher it is the more people will be satisfy with democracy in Ukraine. To remind, our dependent variable is political support in Ukraine that we measure with the item of the satisfaction with democracy available from the European Social Survey and European Values Study.

As was already mentioned in the chapter of data and method we apply the multilevel analysis to measure the effect of the researched variables on the individual and macro level. We use the multilevel model in order to check the impact of the variables in both levels. In level 2 we have 24 regions of Ukraine, according to the rules of good multilevel model it has to be no less than 20 groups and on the level 1 we more than thousand observations on the individual level. The units of analysis of our multilevel model are individuals in Ukraine at a lower level who are nested within contextual aggregate units, at a higher regional level. So far, at aggregative level we operate with the Ukrainian ethnic population that was obtained for every region of the country from the Ukraine Census 2001. The Human Development Index of the regions was taken from Institute of Demographic and Statistic Research and includes education, job, welfare, comfort life, social environment, and population renewal. So far, on the macro level we measure the impact of the ethnicity and the development index of the regions. On the other hand, at the level 1 we measure the distribution of the effect of the Pro European orientated and Pro Russian orientated Ukraine and we measure the impact of

speaking Ukrainian on the support for the performance of democracy. On the individual level we also measure the influence of the Pro European orientated and Pro Russian orientated parties on the political support of the individuals and the impact of the ideology on our main object of research. To continue, the model also measures the influence of political efficacy as the effect of political interest and education on the satisfaction with democracy. The trust in public institutions is also included on the level 1 the same as the effect of satisfaction with economy, age and gender. To conclude, in multilevel model we measure the effect of both levels on the political support in Ukraine.

13.7- The Effect of All Researched Indicators of the Dissertation on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine

Multilevel Analysis

Model 1 <-lm (stfdem~proeurop part+pro russian part+ lngu+ pro russ pp+ pro europen pp+polview+ polintrs+edu+trstpl+trstjus+inc+age+sex)

Model 2 <-lm (stfdem~proeurop part+pro russian part+ lngu+ pro russ pp+ pro europen pp+polview+ polintrs+edu+trstpl+trstjus+inc+age+sex+ ukrpopul + intdevelindex /random=CONSTANT |subject(regionua)

	MODEL 0	MODEL1	MODEL 2
		ESTIMATE	ESTIMATE
Sigma Squared (R)	4,85	3,39	1,46 (30%)
Ro Squared (Uo)	0,67	0,23	0,44 (65%)
LEVEL 2/REGIONS OF UKRAINE			
UKRAINIAN ETHNIC POPULATION			-0.0002
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX OF REGIONS			1,2174***
LEVEL 1/INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES			
PRO EUROPEAN ORIENTATED PART		,870***	,870***
PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED PART		,375	,375
SPEAKING UKRAINIAN		,289***	,289***
PRO RUSSIAN ORIENTATED PARTIES		,068**	,068**
PRO EUROPEAN ORIENTATED PARTIES		,242***	,242***
POLITICAL VIEW: LEFT-RIGHT		,030***	,030***
POLITICAL INTEREST		-,020	-,020
SECONDARY EDUCATION		,206	,175
HIGHER EDUCATION		,027***	,027***
TRUST PARLIAMENT		,136***	,136***
TRUST JUSTICE		,103	,103
TRUST POLICE		,001**	,001**
SATISFACTION WITH ECONOMY		0,560***	0,560***
AGE			
FROM 15 TILL 21		,370	,370
FROM 26 TILL 35		,376***	,376***
FROM 35 TILL 50		-,017	-,017
FROM 50 TILL 70		-,121	-,121
GENDER		-,002	-,002
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY			
INTERCEPT 0,00			
TOTAL VARIANCE OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE 5,53			
INTERCALS CORRELATIONCOEFFIECIANT (ICC) 0,12			

Source: European Social Survey (2010), Ukraine Census (2011)

Note: Units included: regionua (number of regions) = 21, ESS, (number of individuals). Data of ethnic population is taken from Census Ukraine2001 where Ukrainians consist 78% (37541.7 thous.) of national structure, where 17% are Russians (8334.1). Human Development Index of Regions is taken from Institute of Demographic and Statistic Research and includes education, job, welfare, comfort life, social environment, population renewal.

According to our multilevel analysis we also reconfirm that satisfaction with economy has strong effect on the individual level on the satisfaction with the way democracy is working in Ukraine in any region. On the other hand, on the macro level the factor that significantly impact on the political support in Ukraine is the Human development index of the regions. This variable includes parameters of the welfare, work, comfort of life, social environment and education and was obtained from the Demographic institute and Social Science named by Ptyha. To sum up, independently from which part of Ukraine you proceed weather it is the Western region (the more Pro European orientated) or the Eastern region (Pro Russian orientated) the level of the human development index will have positive effect on the individuals political support. Meaning that the better are the indexes for of welfare, work, comfort of life, social environment and education both parts of Ukraine irrespectively from Pro European orientated or Pro Russian orientated region is the individual his/her satisfaction with the way democracy is working in Ukraine will be higher.

As was mentioned before in order to check the influence of the language on the macro level in Ukraine we have carried a multilevel analysis. For this aim we have used individual data from the ESS 2010, the last wave that includes Ukraine in its surveys, from this survey we have chosen the variable language, meaning which language do people usually speak at home Ukrainian or Russian and how does this impact on their support for democracy. According to our analysis on the individual level, we have found that speaking Ukrainian at home in any region in Ukraine has significant effect on the support for the performance of democracy. The regions that during history were more Pro Russian orientated orientated show less political support. On the other hand, the parts that are more “Ukrainian” in the sense of

speaking Ukrainian and being more free of the Russian influence are more satisfied with the way democracy is developing in Ukraine.

To conclude, our results of multilevel analysis on the impact of ethnicity on the satisfaction with democratic performance, on the macro level in all regions of Ukraine independently of which nationality you are Ukrainian or Russian you will still have little political support. But speaking Ukrainian does have positive effect on the satisfaction with democracy, meaning that those people who prefer to speak this language at home will have more political support than those who speak Russian language. We have to state that independently if it positive or negative impact, the Pro European orientated part and Pro European orientated parties produce much more significant and strong effect on the political support than the Pro Russian orientated regions and Pro Russian orientated parties. In summary, the Pro European orientated regions in Ukraine and Pro European orientated parties in Ukrainian Parliament create very positive and strong influence on the support for the performance of democracy.

CHAPTER 14

CONCLUSIONS

The dissertation analyzed the specific support of the citizens in Ukraine, the support for the performance of regime. As was explained by Easton (1975), Klingemann (1998) and Norris (2002) and proved in the chapter 1, the political support in Ukraine can be measured by satisfaction with democracy. In this research, the satisfaction with the way democracy works in Ukraine is an indicator of the support for the performance of a democratic regime that is an object of political support according to the Easton concept (1965, 1975).

Ukraine as a new democracy is a good testing ground for competing theories of learning and re-learning political support. Post-communist society of Ukraine perfectly represents citizens who have lived under two regimes, each of which has sought their support. This distribution can be perfectly noticed within the Pro European and Pro Russian orientated part of the country. In the chapter 1 and part III, it was confirmed that measuring the political support for Ukraine by the performance of regime is better indicator then by diffuse support that is support for the democracy as principle. Moreover, when analyzing support for democracy in Ukraine, a new democracy, it has to be realized that the support for democracy is measured as an ideal form of government and the support for the performance of the regime that was the main object of this research is understand as the support that has to do with what the regime delivers to its citizens and how the government of the day is capable of dealing with important issues. This is explained in the chapter 1 and chapter 6 where we address the work of Linde and Ekman (2003). Further, the research has studied the political support in Ukraine through the performance of the actual government that broadly can show the real support of the way democracy is working in the state. In Ukraine people do not have long experience of democracy as the principle but do have the experience with the working of the regime that is specific political support. So far, Ukrainians measure the political support assessing the current regime against the performance of the replaced regime that was experienced before. The satisfaction with regime in Ukraine measures the effectiveness of political regime in the country. The

effectiveness of Ukrainian regime does not involve the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society. Citizens in Ukraine are not satisfied with the regime, during the research was found low indicators of trust in institutions that also reconfirm the mentioned statement.

First, the research has confirmed the main hypotheses of the dissertation that was described in the chapter 6. To explain, the Eastern part of Ukraine that is usually characterized as Pro Russian orientated of Ukraine has less political support then the Pro European orientated Western regions. A difference in the satisfaction with democracy between the Pro European and Pro Russian orientated regions in Ukraine was found. So far, those regions that were during the history more Pro Russian orientated shows less political support while the parts that are more “Ukrainian” in the sense of speaking Ukrainian and being more freely of the Russian influence are more satisfied with the way democracy is developing in Ukraine. To follow, it was also confirmed that Ukrainian language positively impacts on the political support while the Russian language has a negative effect. On the other hand, it was not confirmed that those individuals that identify themselves as Ukrainians are more satisfied with the performance of democracy then those people who are Russian ethnicity. Meaning that independently which ethnicity you are in the regions of the Pro European and Pro Russian orientated part of Ukraine generally you will be not satisfied with the way democracy is functioning in the state.

According to the multilevel analysis that was made in part III of the thesis, it was found that speaking Ukrainian at home in any region in Ukraine has significant effect on the support for the performance of democracy. On the other hand, the impact of ethnicity on the satisfaction with democratic performance was checked by the same analysis and on the macro level in all regions independently of which nationality you are in Ukraine, the Ukrainian or Russian, the individual will still have little political support. To sum up, speaking Ukrainian does have positive effect on the satisfaction with democracy, meaning that those people who prefer to speak Ukrainian language at home have more political support in Ukraine then those who

speaks Russian language but ethnicity does not produce strong impact on the support for the performance of democracy, the results can be seen in the chapter 9.

During all our research the red line of the difference of the support for the performance of democracy is seen within territorial distribution of Ukraine, especially between the Western and the Eastern part of the country. We have confirmed that satisfaction with democracy is higher in the Western regions than in the Eastern ones. According to the analysis the Pro European part has more political support than the Pro Russian orientated regions of Ukraine.

Secondly, the analysis of the research has also proved the hypothesis of the dissertation on the effect of the Pro European and Pro Russian orientated parties on the individual's political support that was made through the main hypothesis of the dissertation. To explain, those individuals who proceed from the Western Ukraine and have voted the Pro European party and on the left-right placement place themselves more to the right are more satisfied with the performance of democracy than those individuals from the Eastern regions that have voted the Pro Russian party and their ideology is more left orientated. It was found that people who have voted the Pro European orientated party (Yulia Tymoshenko) have more political support than those who have voted the Pro Russian orientated party (Victor Yanukovitch).

To continue, it was found that those people who have voted the Pro European party have more political support than those who have voted the Pro Russian orientated party. Ukrainians who have chosen the Tymoshenko Party are mostly from the Western, Central and Northern Ukraine and those who usually vote Yanukovitch party are generally from the Eastern and Southern part of Ukraine. To sum up, the political support is higher in the Pro European part where people usually vote the Pro European party than in Pro Russian orientated part where the vote is mostly given to the Pro Russian orientated parties. It was confirmed that political support in Ukraine differs between the Pro European part of Ukraine and Pro Russian orientated part but it also differs within the vote of individuals. Those people who have voted the Pro European party in Ukraine tend

to be more satisfied with the way democracy is working in their country and consequently these voters will have more political support.

To follow, those individuals who appeal more for the Pro European party are more democratically orientated than those voters of the Pro Russian orientated party in Ukraine. For example, Ukrainians who have voted the Party of Regions strongly agree that democracy causes bad economy in the state and that democracy is indecisive while the voters of Yulia Tymoshenko Party strongly disagree on this statement. Consequently, it was proved by the analysis that the diffuse support of the voters of the Pro European orientated party is much higher than the same support of the Pro Russian orientated party. So far, the electorate of the Pro Russian party has less diffuse support as the voters of Pro European orientated party have.

During all elections that have been carried in Ukraine both presidential and parliamentary, the division of the vote for the Pro European and Pro Russian orientated party was observed. As was declared in the second hypothesis of the dissertation, those people who have voted the Yulia Tymoshenko Party will have more political support than those who have chosen the Party of Regions in the last elections. Furthermore, the research examined the impact of the ideology of the respondent, meaning that this factor can also have strong influence on the support for the performance of democracy in Ukraine. According to hypothesis those voters that place themselves on the right, as the Pro European orientated parties in Ukraine have the tendency to be more right orientated, they will be more satisfied with the developing of democracy than those who tend to be more left orientated. The Pro Russian orientated parties are mostly left orientated in Ukraine.

Consequently, it was found in the chapter 10 that the individuals that have defined their placement more on the right are more satisfied with the way democracy is working in Ukraine than those who are more left orientated. It has to be noticed that those Ukrainians who are left orientated has the lowest support for the performance of democracy in Ukraine and those in the center have the middle support. Research confirms that the ideology of Ukrainians impacts on their

satisfaction with democracy. So far, the more you are right orientated and have voted the Pro European orientated party, the more political support you have and vice versa if you have voted the Pro Russian orientated party and place yourself more on the left scale you will have less support for the performance of democracy in your country.

Third, the hypothesis of the effect of the trust in political parties, institutions and political efficacy was also proved by the analysis. The more trust in political parties is observed within the voters of Pro European orientated parties then within the individuals who have voted the Pro Russian orientated party. On the other hand, the trust in institutions is also higher in Western, Pro European orientated regions then in Eastern regions known as more Pro Russian orientated ones. It was proved that civil society is weaker in the Pro Russian orientated Eastern part of Ukraine then it is the Pro European orientated Western regions. Furthermore, it was confirmed that the voters of the Pro European party are more satisfied with the way democracy is working in Ukraine and have more political efficacy then those individuals who have elected the Pro Russian orientated party.

As it has been mentioned those who have voted for the Pro European orientated party in Ukraine have more political support then those who prefer to vote Pro Russian orientated party and as appears according to the analysis they have much confidence in political parties in Ukraine meaning that those who appeal most to the Party of Region distrust more the political parties while those who vote for the Yulia Tymoshenko Party do have more trust. Further, it was found that trust in political parties within Ukrainians was diminishing in 2006 and 2008 and the great fall down of the trust in political parties was in 2009. Moreover, the young generation of Ukraine distrusts more political parties then elder population of Ukraine. It can be said that decline in political support came from a young people in Ukraine. On the other hand, trust in political parties, trust in police and political placement also produce positive impact on the satisfaction with the way democracy is working.

To follow, those individuals who appear to have the more trust in legal system, are more satisfied with the way democracy is working in Ukraine than those who do not trust in public institutions. We have observed that while the trust is increasing within the individuals, the support for the performance of democracy also becomes more. Trust in legal system and in political parties significantly impacts on political in Ukraine. The distribution of trust within the regions of Ukraine maintains the same tendency meaning that trust in public institutions in Ukraine is higher in Pro European orientated regions. Trust in institutions is higher in Pro European than in Pro Russian orientated regions of Ukraine. On the other hand, we have also found that Pro European orientated part of Ukraine depicts more active civil society than those individuals from the Pro Russian orientated regions. To summarize, it was proved that those people from Pro European orientated regions of Ukraine who have voted the Pro European orientated party will have higher level of political efficacy than those individuals from the Pro Russian orientated regions of Ukraine and who have chosen the Pro Russian party. As it was previously stated that political support is higher in the Western regions than in the Eastern part and within the voters of Yulia Tymoshenko Party than those individuals who have appealed more to the Party of Regions.

On the other hand, it was found that those individuals who are interested in politics in Ukraine have the tendency to be more satisfied with the way democracy is working in their country than those who do not have any interest in politics. According to the analysis, voters for the Pro European and Pro Russian orientated parties are quite interested in politics and their choice is conscious. Generally, people who vote political parties in Ukraine are interested in politics. To continue, individuals in Ukraine that are more educated have less satisfaction with the way democracy is working in their country. However, education, the interest in politics, age and gender do not have strong influence on the support for the democracy in Ukraine in this model. The multilevel analysis has shown that does not matter from which region is the individual from Pro European or Pro Russian orientated in Ukraine as effect of having higher education do not produce strong impact on the political support.

Fourthly, our hypothesis on the economic development of the regions of the positive effect on the satisfaction with democracy of the individuals in Pro European and Pro Russian orientated parts of Ukraine was also proved by our multilevel analysis and it is one of the strongest indicators of the political support in Ukraine. On the other hand, the hypothesis of the effect of sociodemographic factors in Ukraine was not confirmed meaning that the younger generation in the Western part has more political support than in the Eastern regions. To explain, according to the multilevel analysis that was carried in our research, independently whether the individual is from Pro European or of the Pro Russian orientated part, the age does not have strong impact on the support for the performance of democracy in Ukraine and generally those who are dissatisfied with the way democracy is functioning in the state is young generation.

According to the multilevel analysis, regression analysis it was confirmed that satisfaction with economy has strong effect on the individual level on the satisfaction with the way democracy is working in Ukraine in any region. To follow, it was also found that in the Pro European part of Ukraine individuals are more satisfied with the way economy is working and support more the performance of the democracy than in the Pro Russian orientated regions. So far, remains quite the same territorial distribution of the indicators of the research through the whole work.

The multilevel analysis has shown that another factor that significantly impacts on the political support in Ukraine is the Human Development Index of the regions. To explain, independently from which part of Ukraine you proceed whether it is the Pro European or Pro Russian orientated, the level of the Human Development Index have positive effect on the individuals political support, meaning that the better are the indexes for welfare, work, comfort of life, social environment and education in Ukraine, independently whether it is the Pro European or Pro Russian orientated regions, the satisfaction with democracy will be higher. To add, it was found that Ukrainians who earn a small amount of money are totally dissatisfied with the way democracy is working in Ukraine. Appears that the political support will grow when the individuals are satisfied with the way economy

is functioning in their country. Satisfaction with economy in Ukraine has very strong positive effect on the political support of the individuals in all regions of the country.

Finally, it can be stated that political support in Ukraine differs within the Pro European and Pro Russian orientated part, that the support for the performance of democracy is higher in Western and Northern region of the country than in the Eastern and Southern ones. It was found that speaking Ukrainian language positively impacts on your political support meanwhile speaking Russian has negative effect on the same object. On the other hand, it was explored that ethical affiliation does not produce strong effect on the support for the performance of democracy in all regions of Ukraine those from the Pro European or Pro Russian orientated part. So far, being Ukrainian or Russian in Ukraine does not affect your political support but speaking Ukrainian does influence. It was also found that the vote for the Pro European party has a positive impact on the satisfaction with democracy meanwhile those individuals who prefer to vote the Pro Russian orientated parties are more dissatisfied with the way democracy is functioning in their state. Further, the trust in public institutions and democratic values are higher within the voters of the Pro European party than of the Pro Russian orientated parties. To add, the civil society is more active in the Pro European regions than in the Pro Russian orientated ones. However political efficacy of the citizens of the mentioned regions is quite the same, meaning that in all regions of Ukraine people are interested in politics and are quite educated. Nevertheless, those people who are better educated in the country have less political support. It was also observed that young generation has less support for the performance of democracy than the elder. It was found that economic factor have very strong positive effect in both Pro European and Pro Russian orientated part like as the Human Development Index in all regions in Ukraine. Meaning the more people in the regions from the Pro European and Pro Russian orientated parts are satisfied with the way economy is functioning in the state, the higher their political support will be.

The dissertation focuses on the effects of different factors that were defined through the thesis on the political support in Ukraine. The impact of the indicators

and its distribution within the Pro European and Pro Russian orientated part of Ukraine on the satisfaction with democracy with quantitative methods was analyzed. First of all, it is a study within the Ukraine, within the regions of the country and not a comparative study of political support within the countries. Secondly, it describe the effect of political parties, territorial dimension, political efficacy, trust in institutions and the impact of economy on the support of the performance of democracy in Ukraine. As a direct consequence of this methodology, the study encountered some limitations, which need to be mentioned. The indicators that we are analyzing are measured by the specific questions in the surveys that are available for our research of the political support in Ukraine. On the other hand, the data that is used is available for the years 2005 till 2011. So far, the research is focused on the influence of the mentioned factors through this period.

The research analyzed the actual performance of political regime in the eyes of Ukrainians. In Ukraine the expectations of the actual functioning of the democracy are not satisfied. But dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy in Ukraine does not imply dissatisfaction with democracy as such and Ukrainians do not prefer some authoritarian alternative but the democratic state. Respondents in Ukraine are strong supporters of democracy as the principally superior form of government. In Ukraine people do believe in democratic principles but as at the same time they are totally dissatisfied with the way democracy is working in their country. However, the research had found different perception of the political support, of the support for the performance of democracy within the Pro European and Pro Russian orientated part: there is more satisfaction with democracy in the Western Ukraine then in the Eastern part of the country. As a result, the recommendations can be made for the Ukrainian government policy. In order to obtain the homogenous political support within the whole Ukraine, the democratic way of governance should be applied but especially focusing on the Pro Russian orientated regions in order to get the satisfaction with the way democracy is functioning of the citizens from the Eastern and Southern Ukraine.

The study can be an example of the research of the political support in new democracies, especially in ex soviet countries. Therefore, the research opens different possibilities for the future research on the support for the performance of democracy in Ukraine and in the region. Furthermore, the comparative analysis of satisfaction with democracy can be carried within the ex communist countries. In addition, the study on the support for the performance of democracy in Ukraine can be compared to the satisfaction with democracy in Russia. In contrast to our analysis, the support for the democracy as the principle can be also researched and compared to the support for the performance of democracy in Ukraine. The democratic values of the emerging democracies in the region can be researched and compared.

Ukraine represents special distribution of the satisfaction with democracy through its territory. From studying this factor in this state we can learn the effect of different indicators on the political support in all regions of the country that are Pro European or Pro Russian orientated ones. To explain, the dissertation represents a unique study of the level of the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine from 2005 till 2011, analyzing this important factor through the impact of different indicators as regional dimension, political parties, political efficacy, trust in institutions and sociodemographic data. The research studies the effect of all mentioned factors on support for the performance of democracy in the Pro European and Pro Russian comparative perspective. Thesis represents the analysis of the data on the researched factors in all regions of Ukraine. The dissertation explains the effect of the Pro European and Pro Russian orientated regions on the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine. The research brings important evidences of the influence of the Pro European and pro Russian orientation of the regions and political parties on the political support in Ukraine. So far, the dissertation makes significant contribution of the study of the satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine. The reader can learn useful and interesting information on the support for the democracy in all regions in this country with special focus on the impact of the Pro European and Pro Russian orientation of the last ones. In our research we compare, analyze and study satisfaction with democracy within the regions, political parties,

political efficacy, trust in institutions in Pro European and Pro Russian comparative perspective in Ukraine.

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Центральна Виборча Комісія

CONTENTS OF TABLES

1.1	Model of Political Support Elaborated by David Easton.....	14
1.2	Taxonomy of Political Support Inputted by Dieter Fuchs.....	16
1.3	The Model of Political Support Contributed by Pippa Norris.....	17
1.4	Model of Political Support added by Russell Dalton.....	19
1.5	Model of Performance of Democracy by Dieter Fuchs and Edeltraud Roller.....	28
1.6	Model of Support for Democracy Presented by Fuchs.....	29
3.1	Political Parties in Ukraine, the Number of Seats in Parliament (2007).....	48
5.1	Los indicadores macroeconómicos de Ucrania.....	68
5.2	Datos del apoyo político y satisfacción con la economía de los países europeos del 2004 y 2006.....	70
5.3	Education level of the residences In the Western and Eastern Ukraine, EVS 2008 (%).....	74
5.4	Age structure of the population able to work in Ukraine.....	75
5.5.	The Age Structure of the Population.....	75
5.6.	Gender of the residences in the Western and Eastern Ukraine, EVS 2008(%).....	76
5.7.	Gender Structure of Population by Regions of Ukraine.....	76
5.8	Objects of Political Support Jonas by Linde and Joakim Ekman.....	91
8.1	Political support in the Western and Eastern part of Ukraine (%).....	122
8.2	Satisfaction with Democracy within the Regions of Ukraine from the 2004 till 2010 and its Growth Rate.....	125
8.3	The Effect of the Satisfaction with Democracy in the Regions of Ukraine.....	129
8.4	The Impact the Western, Northern, Eastern and Southern Part of Ukraine on the Satisfaction with Democracy.....	132
8.5	Influence of the Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Parts on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine.....	134
9.1	Satisfaction with Democracy and Language Most Often Spoken at Home in Ukraine.....	136
9.2	The Effect of the Speaking Ukrainian on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine.....	138
9.3	The Effect of the Ukrainian Ethnic Population and Speaking Ukrainian on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine.....	140
10.1	Satisfaction with Democracy and Political Parties of Ukraine.....	143
10.2	Satisfaction with Democracy within the Political Parties in Ukraine during 2004-2010.....	144
10.3	The Effect of the Political Parties on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine.....	145
10.4	Impact of the Political Parties on the Support for the Performance of Democracy in Ukraine.....	146
10.5	Influence of the Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Parties on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine.....	147

10.5	The Impact of the Political View: Left-Right and the Pro European orientated and Pro Russian Orientated Parties on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine.....	153
10.6	The Impact of the Democratic Value and Pro European and Pro Russian Parties Orientated Parties on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine....	157
11.1	Support for the Performance of Democracy and Political Interest in Ukraine.....	158
11.2	The Vote for the Political Parties and Voter's Interest in Politics in Ukraine....	159
11.3	Satisfaction with Democracy and Education in Ukraine.....	161
11.4	The Vote for the Political Parties and the Education Level of Voters.....	162
11.5	The Effect of the Political Interest, Education, Pro European orientated and Pro Russian Orientated Parts and Political Parties on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine.....	163
11.6	Membership of Ukrainians in following organizations	164
11.7	Civil activity of Ukrainians in percents	165
11.8	The Effect of the Civil Activity and Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Parts and Political Parties on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine.....	167
12.1	Trust in Political Parties and the Vote for the Pro European (Yulia Tymoshenko) and Pro Russian Orientated Parties (Party of Regions).....	175
12.2	Satisfaction with Democracy and Trust in Political Parties within Ukrainians.....	176
12.3	Satisfaction with Democracy and Trust in Legal System.....	178
12.4	The Effect of the Trust in Institutions and the Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Parts and Parties on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine	182
13.1	Satisfaction with Democracy of Ukrainians and Their Monthly Income.....	183
13.2	Support for the Performance of Democracy of Ukrainians and the Satisfaction with Economy.....	183
13.3	The Impact of the Satisfaction with Economy, Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Part on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine.....	185
13.4	Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine within the Younger and Older Generation.....	186
13.5	The Impact of the Age Groups on the Political Support in Ukraine.....	187
13.6	Support for the Performance of Democracy and its Gender Distribution in Ukraine.....	188
13.7	The Effect of All Researched Indicators of the Dissertation on the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine.....	193

CONTENTS OF FIGURES

1	El apoyo político en los países europeos	vii
4.1	Trust in political parties EVS, 2008.....	59
4.2	Trust Political Parties within age groups in Ukraine, WVS 2005-2010...	61
4.3	Trust Political Parties within gender in Ukraine, WVS 2005-2010.....	62
5.1	Satisfacción con la economía.	71
5.2	La interdependencia entre la satisfacción con la economía y la democracia de los países de Europa.....	72
6.1	The Impact of the Researched Indicators of the Thesis on the Political Support in Ukraine.....	86
6.2	Dispersion of the Residuals of our Dependent Variable, Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine.....	93
7.1	The Distribution of our Dependent Variable.....	108
7.2	Identification of Reference Category for the Regions (Hat Values).....	111
7.3	Identification of Reference Category for the Variable Parties by the Cook's Distance	114
8.1	Presidential Election Vote in Ukraine (2010).....	120
8.2	Political Support within the Pro European regions (Western part) and Pro Russian Eastern regions of Ukraine.....	121
8.3	Satisfaction with Democracy within the Regions of Ukraine.....	124
8.4	Satisfaction with Democracy within the Regions of Ukraine from the 2006 till 2010 2006.....	127
8.5	The Distribution of the Satisfaction with Democracy in Ukraine in 2008.....	131
9.1	Territorial Distribution of the Russian as Native Language in Ukraine.....	137
9.2	Ethno-Linguistic Distribution in Ukraine.....	139
10.1	Pro Russian Speaking East and EU-orientated West.....	142
10.2	Geographical Distribution of the Vote for Yulia Tymoshenko and Victor Yanukovich.....	148
10.3	Satisfaction with Democracy and the Ideology of Ukrainians within the Regions.....	150
10.4	Presidential Election Vote Distribution.....	151
10.5	Left-Right Distribution of Satisfaction of Democracy in Ukraine.....	152
10.6	Democracy is the Best Political System within Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Party.....	154
10.7	Democracy Cannot Maintain Order within the Voters for the Pro European and Pro Russian Orientated Party.....	155
10.8	Satisfaction with Democracy within the Party of Regions and the Party of Yulia Tymoshenko.....	156
11.1	Satisfaction with Democracy and Civil Society in Ukraine.....	166
12.1	Trust in Political Parties in Ukraine (1996-2009).....	170

12.2	Trust in Political Parties and its Regional Distribution in Ukraine.....	173
12.3	Satisfaction with Democracy and Trust in Politicians within the regions of Ukraine.....	174
12.4	Satisfaction with Democracy and Trust in institutions in Ukrainian regions.....	178
13.1	Political Support and Satisfaction with Economy in Ukrainian Regions.....	184