Palestinians in Lebanon: Identity and Agency

By Aitor Bikandi Eskutza

Supervised by Dr. Iziar Basterretxea

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

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List of acronyms

AI: Amnesty International

DFLP: Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

ESCWA: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia

EU: European Union

HRW: Humans Rights Watch

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross

IMF: International Monetary Fund

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

UDHR: Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UN: United Nations

UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNGA: United Nations General Assembly

UNICEF: United Nations International Children´s Emergency Fund

UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is a United Nations

UN DPPA: United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs

PA: Palestinian Authority

PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PFLP-GC: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command

PLF: Palestinian Liberation Front

PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization

USA: United States of America

Glossary of Arabic terms

a´ileh (عائلة): family, nuclear family

a´ayan (أَعْيَان): notables

bass (بس): but

Bilad as-Sham (بلاد الشام): Syria, in the times when it comprised a wider area, including the areas known nowadays as Palestine and Jordan

effendi (افندي): member of high strata, nobility

eh (أيه): yes

fa (فا): so

Falasteen (فلسطين): Palestine

feda´ (فداء): redemption or sacrifice

feda´i / fedayi (فدائي): warrior, "one who sacrifices himself"

feda´iah / fedaya (فدائية): warrior, "one who sacrifices herself"

feda´een / fedayeen (فدائيّين): warriors, "those who sacrifice themselves"

fellah (فلاح): male peasant

Fellaha (فلاحة): female peasant

fellaheen (فلاحين): peasantry

halla (حالا): now

hamuleh: family, extended or political family, clan

intifada (انتفاضة): uprising

kaman (كمان): also

kaza (كذا): "and the like", "et cetera" (colloquial)

khalit (خليط): mixture, blending, combination

laja´a (لجأ): to take refuge

lajee´ (لاجئ): male refugee (لاجئ

lajee´ah (لاجئة): female refugee

lajee'een (لاجئين): refugees

mukhtar (مختار): village chief

musha'(مشع): undivided common land, crop rotation system for the usufruct of the land

uan (لون): colour

ya'ni (يعني): "I mean", "that is" (colloquial)

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Introduction

A common standpoint when speaking of identity, an immediate insight of a person, ties the individual with a specific nation or country, a language, and, sometimes, a religion. From these coordinates, a whole set of features can be deduced, among them, the tendency to act in certain ways, their agency. This could be the case in past times, when societies where homogeneous and the differentiation of the individuals depended on the mentioned triad of nation, language, and religion. With modernity however, division of labour, industrialisation, and progressively different economic, cultural, political, and social positions in society, this approach lost what little explaining power it might have had.

This thesis is an attempt to relate the identity and agency of the Palestinians in Lebanon, a task for which philosophical, anthropological, sociological, psychological, and legal considerations will be examined. It has been written in English, as it is the language I am competent enough with; and at the same time, the language some of the subjects of this dissertation can understand; these linguistic common grounds, are also the result of cultural hegemony, a consequence of colonialism. For more than 70 years, Palestinians have kept a steadfast stance regarding their identity, inexorably associating it with their claiming of rights. How did they manage to survive in the face of constant adversity? Not only that, how did they establish themselves as the symbolic representation of relentlessness and rebellion? In light of these questions, how do they define themselves, and which are the parameters they use to produce this description of their own selves? Does a particular understanding of a shared identity exist among them? How are they defined by others? Do any of these definitions affect them, and if so, how? Does any of this relate to what they do, how they do it, or perceive themselves as capable of doing it?

To answer these questions, we bring the very lives of the subjects to the forefront. Acknowledging that the subjective realm affects the surrounding of the individual entails the need of having their perception of reality in mind. For this reason, a set of Palestinians from different positions in different (economic, cultural, and social) fields were interviewed. The names of the participants are fake, together with some of the pieces of information that could give away their individual identity, for the sake of their anonymity. Additionally, two different field journals supplement and reflect the participant observation carried out during the stays in Lebanon. These add information and nuances, based on the observation of everyday life in the camps; meetings, encounters and events, mostly related to the Palestinians in Lebanon, were annotated, for their use in the chapter on the findings of the dissertation.

Subjective and objective realities seem to overlap in a whole, the social world. The complexity of the matter requires delving into the interaction between the different dimensions composing it. In addition to the result of the interviews, that is, the phenomenological (subjective) dimension, we will have in mind the socially constructed (objective), as well as the legally sanctioned (institutional) one, all of which overlap and interact in ways oftentimes hardly perceivable. In addition, the reality of Palestinians oftentimes does not adequately fit in conventional theoretical accounts. Some of these have had in mind the political elements involved as autonomous realities; others, fixing on a more technical-economic view, exhibit the material realities lived by the Palestinians separated from social, political and psychological implications; psychological lenses have also been applied, although overlooking the weight of historical events. Despite valuable, these descriptions and interpretations offer only a partial perspective of a complex reality, therefore providing an incomplete and necessarily distorted analytical frame.

Due to this difficulty of comprehension, looking at the matter through a critical realist lens fits a frame where relational and causal mechanisms play a key role in the analysis. Moreover, the unitary category of "Palestinians" will be put into questions, as well as other categories, which will accordingly be problematised. As some authors point out, the problematisation of the Palestinian issue has not always been adequately framed. Besides, "Palestinians", as a unitary category might have been abused, bringing a complex reality to reductionist explanations.

A popular fixation involves what could be thought of as a Western bias. Palestinians have been frequently seen as representatives of clearly distinct and separate categories, from which their agency has been deduced. Of these categories, predetermined constructs like "refugee", "Arab", or "Muslim" have taken the floor, as if their legal, ethnic, or spiritual statuses on their own would hold the analytical potential of making sense of any given situation. For instance, one might ask why religion has not been specifically taken into consideration, as it is an element that, from a Western perspective, marks a difference.

This predilection could have introduced a double distortion. On one hand, it would have pre-established an object of thought, feasibly inducing the interviewees to develop based on religion, potentially articulating their whole discourse around spirituality, religion and their correlatives. On the other hand, a particular vision of the configuration of identity, particularly one pertaining to the subjective domain, would have taken an assuming colonialist scent, possibly even influencing the stance of the interviewees. These are two good examples of why I believed that a phenomenological approach would be an adequate tool for coming closer to the elements the interviewees themselves grant explanatory power to: So as to avoid the pitfalls of an apparent ideologic (religious or not)

reality, and with the idea of possibly reaching the practical reason underlying it. I engaged in this approximation as a means to avoid the influence of my own interests, even though the very act of my approach, from an academic milieu would itself serves as reason enough for prompting a predetermined stance.

Lebanon is but only one of the destinations for Palestinians around the world. The reason for having chosen this fraction of the total population are many. The sociohistorical setting in which this particular population developed offer a wide arrange of (historical, legal, phenomenological, psychological, economic, and political) factors, transpiring the lives of the current day Palestinians in Lebanon. This might offer a correspondingly wide understanding of the configuration of the factors at play. Broadening the attention of the research to fit a comparative framework would have overflowed the time span of the PhD programme, as well as dissolved the singularity of this specific population. In addition, I am most acquainted with the reality of Palestinians in the West Bank and Lebanon, which implies a starting point with some previous knowledge, advantageous for the timeline, albeit a potential risk involving preconceptions (tackled via the implementation of phenomenology).

We will try to unveil the elements related to these topics: the perceived reality of the self, as an actor with a set of abilities; and the objectivised reality, manifested in the material conditions, symbols and discourses, produced and reproduced in a dialectic involving individuals, groups, and social structures. The latter, at times taken for granted, seem to determine their ways of feeling, thinking, and acting. However, these dispositions might not be determined by socialisation (habitus), nor individual qualities (reflexive deliberation) alone. They appear to respond to a dialectic, within which complex entities intertwine, constructing relational networks where identities constitute a developing entity.

Having this is mind, this dissertation will to answer these specific research questions (properly and comprehensively addressed in the second chapter):

- In the occurrence of subjective deliberative reflexivity, contingent on the overcoming of habitus detaching their conditions of existence from their needs, how is identity related to the agency of Palestinians in Lebanon?
- Is causality a real possibility for the correlation between subjective identity matrixes and deployed agency?

For this endeavour, the relational and causal aspect will address both the diachronic and synchronic aspects. This thesis is divided in two main sections: a theoretical framework, encompassing chapters one to four, relying on desk research, that is, literature review; and a technical framework, ranging

from chapter five to seven. This dissertation will start off with a brief exposition of the historical context, the complex chronicle appears to be a key component of identity and the development of the story of the subjects of the study in Lebanon in different ways. The second chapter will offer the standpoint of this dissertation regarding methodology, epistemology, as well as a reflexive account concerning research itself, having in mind the specific topic of the project. The third chapter will attempt to clear out the intricacies of "identity" and "agency", since common everyday-life concepts serve poorly in an analytical context. The fourth chapter consists of a review of the application of three fields of identification, over the concrete case of the Palestinians. The fifth chapter will expose the research techniques used throughout the process, as well as offer an account of the inward elements affecting the thesis. The sixth chapter will offer the categorised contribution of the participants of the dissertation, in a classification stemming from the prior theoretical account, as well as their own input. The seventh chapter will offer a discussion, seeking to conciliate the theoretical domain with the results of the field work exposed in the previous chapter. Finally, the seventh chapter will try to synthesise, in a series of concluding remarks and opened paths, the project´s reach.

1. Historical context. Palestinians in Lebanon

Some Palestinians in Lebanon evoke their homeland regularly; others find the reference necessary when referring to the cause of their current situation. But what is Palestine and what are the historical grounds of these references? Why and how did Palestinians end up in Lebanon? What are the reasons for their actual situation? Were always Palestinians seen the same way, by others and by themselves? What did they do, and how did they do it?

Answering these questions requires a historical contextualisation. Since the rationale of this dissertation is not offering a historiographic report, a comprehensive recounting of the events, with detailed descriptions of the agents involved, would overflow its motive, and turn out to be redundant. That task has been carried by many authors, some of which, those contained in the bibliography, are but some good examples. Alternatively, the purpose of this chapter is to offer a compact image that can make for a canvas in which the later theoretical concepts will be spread and, hopefully, offer a coherent interwoven account that might shed a light in the issue at hand.

Therefore, despite not being an extensive portrayal of the history related to the Palestinians in Lebanon, this chapter unfolds in the hopes of providing a synthetic story, focused on the elements that contribute to the understanding of identity, the set of features that make Palestinians in Lebanon distinguishable; and agency, their ability of having an effect in their conditions of existence.

Kramer (2008, p. 176) highlights that «there has been growing emphasis on history as "relational," urging historians to consider individuals, groups, and societies not in isolation, but in their manifold interactions». As she points out, the history of Palestine, and Palestinians, needs necessarily to be considered as "relational" and "entangled". Seemingly distant events, dating back to the Ottoman empire, can be set as an analytical starting point. Considering that events involved in the string of causalities that would envelope later stages still contain the seeds of the events and the genealogy of the agents contained in the diachronic development, and its consequences. The aspiration is not to provide a history of the ideas, but of practices.

1.1. Ottoman Palestine

1.1.a. Fellaheen: family and loyalty

The term "Palestine" derives from the ancient Philistines, the "Sea Peoples" from the Aegean. From this name derived the Latinism "*Palaestina*", adopted to appoint the locals of the land at the age of the Roman and Byzantine rule (Krämer, 2008, p. 4; Lewis, 1995, p. 31). Even if at some points in history, specific territories like Jerusalem were established as administrative units, Palestine was

divided differently under different empires (Krämer, 2008, pp. 12-16; Lewis, 1995, pp. 195, 236). Under the Ottoman Empire, lasting from 1516 to 1918, administrative units were organised according to the needs of the empire itself. Changes in needs and conditions would bring changes in administrative boundaries (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 24, 40; Pappé, 2006, p. 14; Krämer, 2008, p. 41), mainly due to tax collection.

Figure 1 Map of the Ottoman Empire in 1914, in 1899 CE (1317 Hijri). Work reproduced from https://nzhistory.govt.nz/media/photo/map-ottoman-empire-1914, produced by Geographx with research assistance from Damien Fenton and Caroline Lord (New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage).

In spite of this vagueness regarding official political boundaries, the absence of an integrated infrastructure, and the lack of natural borders (apart from the Mediterranean Sea), the term "Palestine" was, in fact, a term used to indicate the identity of an existing entity (Krämer, 2008, p. 16). A population for whom administrative implications had not as much relevance as their local family, clan, village ties, as well as their ethno-cultural frame and economic associations (Krämer, 2008, p. 41).

From an estimate of 400.000 people in Ottoman rural Palestine, the majority were *fellaheen*[1], Palestinian peasants. This class identification implied «hereditary occupation, place of residence, social status and way of life» (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 5), along with agriculture as the foundation around which life, society, economy, and culture revolved.

The basic social unit was constituted by the individual family, the *a´ileh*, followed by the *hamuleh*, a "family of families" or "clan", formed in a patrilineal manner. Villages were comprised of up to three clans, with an economically predominant clan on top, which was headed by a *mukhtar*, who acted as the head of the village, economic capital thus translated to socio-political capital. Socio-economic ties bound *a´ileh*, *hamuleh* and villages in socially, economically, and politically self-contained units (Morris, 2004, p. 19), with kinship structures as the main link between them.

These kinship structures affected everyday life in different ways. The physical closeness of the families, as well as the social closeness of the villages, fused private spaces into public spaces, depriving the *fellaheen* of a degree of privacy, balanced out by the mutual protection and solidarity enacted in these spaces (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 19). Women played an important role in everyday life, occasionally they owned and managed land, even though the grip of patriarchal family was ever present (Pappé, 2006, p. 17; Swedenburg, 1995, pp. 78-79). This was so especially, although not exclusively, in the form of social sanctioning, gossip, a powerful enough event in village life as to ensure the observance of the hegemonic cultural values, reproduced through children, a cornerstone of the peasant family. Likewise, strife in the narrower or wider scopes of village life was curbed and the situation reverted to "peace-creating mechanisms", with women at the forefront (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 14-19). This role was confined to areas of caretaking, for instance, women were set aside in the field of education, as it was perceived to be a potential cause for shame and slander (Sayigh R. , 2007).

Cultural values seemed to direct loyalty towards family, clan, and village, in that order, producing and reproducing their form of life, revolving around the production of their material conditions of existence, depended on the sternly obtained yield of the soil. Due to the oftentimes harsh conditions of work, the *fellaheen* employed the *musha´* system, a local custom and method of not so much "owning" plots of land (Pappé, 2006, p. 15; Morris, 2004, p. 19), but rotating their farming at regular intervals, so the yield coming from the more fertile parcels could be evenly distributed in the

[1] The term "*fellaheen*"/"فلاحين", the plural of "*fellah*"/"فلاح" ("tiller of the soil", "husbandman" "peasant", "farmer"), for the masculine form and "*fellaha*"/"فلاحلة" for the feminine one ("peasant woman"), stems from "*filaha*"/"فلاحلة", "cultivation" or "agriculture", and is possibly related to "*falah*"/"فلاح", meaning "thriving", "prosperity", "salvation", "welfare", "success" (Wehr, 1976, p. 726).

collective (Krämer, 2008, pp. 46-47, 49; Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 30). Private property was not legally recognised in the Ottoman Empire; however, rights of tenure and usufruct were acknowledged (Krämer, 2008, p. 48).

A similar redistributive dynamic was put forth on the occasion of marriages. Lavish feasting and week-long celebrations of weddings were a means of redistributing surplus. Villagers occupying a lower position in the economic field would participate in the tradition of hospitality, certain that when the positions shifted, the same precept would prevail (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 13-14). This practice would intergenerationally repeat the same customs and form of life, reproducing the same identities.

Both the *musha´* systems and wedding celebration illustrate examples of the traditional resort to village cooperation and collective efforts of the *fellaheen*. Its origin can hardly be specified, but these kinship structures acted as a frame for social protection among them, as well as a network of solidarity (Krämer, 2008, p. 44; Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 15-16). Apart from the ecologic harshness, conscription by the Ottoman Empire, tax collection and the absence of state services caused the structuring of the "moral familism" culture as a social mechanism of survival and defence against oppression (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 14-15; Pappé, 2006, p. 14).

Palestinian *fellaheen* lived in a relatively homogeneous social environment, albeit not devoid of material inequality. Villages were interrelated by economic and kinship ties that also acted as a binding factor towards the administration of the Empire. Usually, the *mukhtar*, both village chief and official of the lowest level of the Ottoman administration, acted on behalf of it, a fact that did not seem to prevent that, when deemed necessary, village men used their weapons against tax collectors (Pappé, 2006, p. 14; Krämer, 2008, pp. 53-55).

Regardless, a minoritarian higher stratum was composed by the *a´ayan*, notables from a few families who filled the higher ranks (merchants, religious leaders, etc.). They followed the same cultural pattern regarding loyalty the *fellaheen* did (from family to village), but keeping a social distance from them. Albeit an oligarchy, their scope was limited to the local, regional at most. Nevertheless, Palestinians did not live isolated from the rest of the world. Palestine, Syria, and Mount Lebanon had been culturally and economically related for a long time, in some measure due to foodstuff, raw material and handicraft exchange networks (Krämer, 2008, p. 89; Traboulsi, 2012, p. 19)

The aforementioned tax-collection matter is a sign of the organisation of the communities in Palestine in a double fashion: horizontal ties, throughout kinship (family/*a´ileh*, clan/*hamuleh*, village); and vertical patronage connection, through which power and influence were transferred.

These two axes sometimes overlapped, but the historical emergence of Palestinians in higher positions in the political field was grounded in their co-option as intermediaries, first with the Ottoman Empire (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 41, 50; Krämer, 2008, pp. 43-44), for whom Palestine held a strategic value rather than an economic one (Krämer, 2008, p. 52). After a brief Egyptian occupation (Krämer, 2008, pp. 63-70), the reforms of the *Tanzimat*, instituted deep changes in the Palestinian socio-economic field, initiating changes in the ways identity would be shaped and agency displayed.

1.1.b. Tanzimat: integration into global economy

The global market economy grew, expanding its influence over the globe, along with its inclination toward the concentration of capital and privatisation of land. Its reflection in the Palestinian society, through the Land Code of 1858, via the *Tanzimat* reform, had deep consequences for the population. Overall, the reforms imposed a census, mandatory military service, direct tax collection, and political institutions for the integration of local elites. The implementation of the reforms was executed over a period of decades (Khalidi, 2010, p. 94; Krämer, 2008, pp. 71-74), with a slower implementation in lands physically or socially more distant from the higher positions in the economic and political field, as such was the case with the Palestinian mountain areas.

In particular, the 1858 Land Code, devised to «regulate and formalize the acquisition, tenure, and transfer of state land in order to create clearly defined individual legal titles» (Krämer, 2008, p. 81). It laid the legal foundation for private ownership of soil, an absent notion in *fellaheen* culture (just as much as that of "rights") they struggled to understand (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 27). For Palestinians, social, economic, moral, and religious tenets blended in the same cultural body, as a taken-for-granted worldview and a predefined set of dispositions, acquired through socialisation. These would be shaken by the consequences of the new legal settings, as well as the intervention of European stakeholders, who sought to disband collective-based forms of use of land for the sake of privatisation (Krämer, 2008, pp. 71-100; Pappé, 2006, pp. 21,41), seeking to economically and politically invest in the land.

Although these set of shifts brought improvement in health and education systems (the latter considerably restricted to the male population), the socioeconomic position of the *fellaheen* declined. Instead of grain, the empire´s taxes were to be paid in currency, an asset peasants generally lacked. This created a handicap they could only solve via moneylenders, starting a process that caused inherited debt (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 25; Krämer, 2008, pp. 247-248).

By the end of the first decade of the XIX century, there were 95 primary schools, 3 secondary schools, and 379 private Islamic institutions, with a total of 8,250 students (Krämer, 2008, p. 76), for a total population of around 670,000 people. It could be considered that the improvement in the field of education would bring some leverage for the lower classes, boosting the deployment of a wider ranges of mechanisms through their agency. But education institutions, particularly in the villages, focused mainly on practical skills, abilities fit for manual work and keeping rural population in place, since there were barely higher education institutions for Arabic-speakers[2]. This implied that the choice of studying abroad, would be kept a privilege accessible only to the mainly male progeny of the higher classes (Krämer, 2008, pp. 180-181), a strategic point in consonance with the overall strategy of the elite, regardless of their ethnic identity.

Polarisation of wealth through the polarisation of soil ownership took place (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 28). For the *fellaheen*, land and its produce were bound not only to wealth, but to family honour and pride: the patriarchal structure rule meant that soil and woman were its main components for the production and reproduction of the form of life (Swedenburg, 1995, p. 79), the former providing the economic capital through its yield, while the latter delivered and maintained social capital via marriage and social bonds (Morris, 2004, p. 19). Nonetheless, this social capital did not entail eligibility to positions of decision-making, the Municipalities Law of 1867 established requirements for the participation in elections, making it mandatory for candidates, men aged 25 or older, to have a minimum annual payment of property tax, conditions only the elite qualified for (Yazbak, 2011, p. 37), quite similarly to the processes taking place in the XVIII-XIX centuries regarding enfranchisement. Thus, the *effendi* and the *a´ayan*, local landowners and notables, were the main beneficiaries of the parallel processes of integration of the territory into the global economy and the efforts of the Ottoman Empire (Khalidi, 2010, p. 95). Soon they would find out the usefulness of their local political-economic position in the global geopolitical scenery, as new stakeholders like Great Britain took interest in the newly found oil in the southwestern of what is nowadays known as Iran (Krämer, 2008, p. 142). It was in these settings of blooming capitalist accumulation that the Zionist colonisation commenced.

[2] Although Arabic and Farsi were widespread around the Empire, Turkish was the official language, which had many imports of the two languages. Eventually, French and English would make their way to higher-education fields, keeping the discriminative factor unaltered for the lower classes with no access to them.

1.1.c. Zionism: the new *Yishuv*

Jewish population had inhabited the land along with the Muslim and Christian one. Albeit a minoritarian community, coexistence engendered no structural conflict. The notion of *Eretz Israel* (Land of Israel), a land of asylum for the Jews, was developed during the second half of the XIX century in Europe, due to the understanding that the assimilation of the population by the European countries would not be possible (Gatrell, 2013, p. 120; Morris, 2004, p. 9; Thorleifsson, 2015, p. 21). Even though the location of Eretz Israel had not been defined in advance, the selection of the land of Palestine accrued from several factors. Parallel to the gradual development of the capitalist system, the paradigm shift in socioeconomic patterns, political logic and technological advancements (Rose, 2003, p. 140), the first Zionists landed in Palestine in their first *Aliya* in 1882 (Gresh & Vidal, 2003, pp. 46-49; Thorleifsson, 2015, pp. 21-25), imbued with religious imagery. However, tensions with native Jews, in addition to strife with the other local communities, displayed the different collective identity of the "new *Yishuv*", a different set of dispositions, interests and aims (Pappé, 2006, pp. 35-39, 53; Krämer, 2008, pp. 103-104).

The Zionist motto "a land without people for a people without a land" (Krämer, 2008, p. 128; Hirst, 1977, pp. 15-21) summarises the symbolic load of the movement, imbuing migration to Palestine with moral and religious connotations (Pappé, 2006, p. 38; Krämer, 2008, p. 104), as well as their perception of the land and their mission there. They settled in rural areas as well as urban centres, and soon organised their effort around the Zionist Organization for the Settlement of the Land of Palestine (Pappé, 2006, p. 39), as they soon convened that their colonisation would need a whole new arrangement regarding the institutionalisation of life in its different spheres, thus, they would initiate their endeavour by purchasing land (Krämer, 2008, pp. 113-114).

The Zionist settlers started acquiring land in Palestine, even though the Ottoman Empire did not promote their immigration (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 45). Foreign Western operations added to the same pattern and, thus Palestinian peasants saw themselves compelled to gradually move to less fertile land, reinforce their ethno-cultural identity through atavistic "familism" and early marriage, and, eventually, resort to sporadic violence (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 22-24, 46). By the end of the XIX century, Palestine had been "modernised" (Giddens, 1990) by the European standards (Khalidi, 2007, p. 150; Pappé, 2006, p. 43; Morris, 2004, pp. 17-18), its lower classes steadily shifting from their rural environment to an urban one, where their agency and social identity would shift, by means of a new standard of work distribution, towards a new proletarian mass.

In spite of the initial endogamic aspiration, Jewish landowners did not seem to have much of a problem with employing Palestinians, not because of solidarity, but in view of the fact that they were

not organised, cheaper than their fellow settlers, familiar with the land (Krämer, 2008, p. 116) and, most of all, had no other means nor assets, but their own workforce. The *fellah´*s loyalty kept tied to land, family, village and clan (Khalidi, 2010, p. 21; Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 5) while new kinds of interrelations and dynamics were being engendered, which, together with the transformation of property, use and management of means of production, progressively induced, unbeknownst at the time, changes in their abilities to act upon their conditions of existence.

The colonialists´ perception of the indigenous identity was that of a "primitive" one. European and Jewish settlers saw rural Palestinians as a nuisance, an element to deal with, not by integration but by exclusion of their interests and participation in innovative technique and technologies (Pappé, 2006, p. 41). These technological advancements only made it to the higher social stratum of the Palestinians, who made use of them for their own benefit, in addition to not having objections to the import of the cheap equivalent of local produce, instead of promoting the exportation (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 26), obstructing a potential means of profit for the peasantry, and its potential improvement of control over their material conditions of existence.

1.2. British Mandate Palestine

1.2.a. Mandate: new colonial order

This polarising trend would intensify with the fall of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War (Lewis, 1995, p. 342). While the war was still going on, the British State carried out a "double game", promising independence to the local Arab population in what they called "Middle East"[3], despite taking steps towards their own interest in the European power play against the alliance formed by the Central Powers and the Ottoman Empire (Krämer, 2008, pp. 141-142).

The interests of Great Britain and France would prevail in the new political configuration of the Fertile Crescent, as secretly accorded in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 (Gresh & Vidal, 2003, pp. 502-504; Khalidi, 2007, pp. 75-76; Khalidi, 2010, p. 160; Khan, 2016, pp. 56-62) by the British, French, and Russian states, prior to the end of the war. The Middle East would be roughly comprised of two segments under the influence or direct control of Britain or France. The French State´s aspirations of influencing what would eventually come to be the Syrian hinterland, as well as what

[3] From the viewpoint of Great Britain, this land was in the East. Having in mind the reference of the "Far East", it made sense to call it "middle" or "near" East. However, from a local perspective, the region used to be named "Levant" or "Mashreq", before the colonist concept of Middle East made it into the Arabic language.

would turn into Lebanon, mirrored the British Empire´s intention of stretching out their economic interests from the Mediterranean as far as what later got to be Iran (Krämer, 2008, p. 147). Jerusalem fell into a distinct regime, under international control, whereas the rest of Palestine, as part of the southern segment of the Middle East (Traboulsi, 2012, pp. 86-87), started a new era under the British Mandate.

Figure 2 Map of the Sykes-Picot Agreement 1916. Work reproduced from http://www.passia.org, licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license, produced by Mahmoud Abu Rumieleh.

Shortly after, and likewise hidden from the Arab population (Hirst, 1977, pp. 37-42), especially the Palestinians, the British State stated in the Balfour Declaration of 1917 its favour to «the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities» (Jeffries, 1967; Schneer, 2010; Regan, 2017). The Mandate´s nominal purpose was the intervention aimed at establishing autonomous institutions for the local population, although its content referred to a "Jewish Agency" intended for the interest of the Jewish community (Krämer, 2008, p. 169), leaving out the specificities of other communities in this respect.

Despite the formal content of the declaration, the inception of the assignment of rights over the land caused mistrust and resentment. Much like the unfulfillment of the general tenets proclaimed by the British and French among the Arab population in the Middle East, the Palestinians increasingly perceived the Jews and the British Mandate as the source of their problems. As a reaction to this, the first steps of the Palestinian national movement, primarily amid the urban higher classes (Morris, 2004, p. 18). Analogously, by 1925 the first workers union was organised, feeding on the awareness the novel proletarian position and character (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 56; Morris, 2004, p. 18), and gradually altering their capability of altering their conditions of existence. The relevance of "nation" was not widespread among the indigenous rural population (Gatrell, 2013, p. 119; Morris, 2004, p. 19), but some started detecting a pattern in the course of action of the colonisers (Krämer, 2008, pp. 164, 236). The steady purchase of land by the Zionist population (Swedenburg, 1995, pp. 98-100), the fact that they were gradually being cut off from a stable income because of the Zionist boycott of Palestinian workforce (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 20-21), added to the direct aggression by the new settlers, caused outbreaks like the riots of Jaffa in 1921 (Hirst, 1977, pp. 45-48) and Jerusalem in 1929 (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 43; Hirst, 1977, pp. 62-71).

1.2.b. Riot: tensions on the rise

Both clashes, just like the ones during Ottoman rule (Krämer, 2008, p. 82), had in common that it was mainly the *fellaheen* and working-class Palestinians who had the leading role, since it was them, in their more vulnerable social position, who had been pushed back both socially and economically. Along the lines of what the Ottoman Empire had done before, the British Mandate carried out a policy of co-optation of the local social elites, making sure the contingency of armed action was kept to a minimum, promoting conflict between rival Palestinian communities while simultaneously establishing patron-client ties, stemming from "vertical coalitions" (Krämer, 2008, pp. 74, 85; Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 40-41; Morris, 2004, p. 20).

By the mid-30s, urbanisation had taken root in Palestine (Krämer, 2008, pp. 92, 185), demographically, politically, and economically. While the Palestinian bourgeoisie´s identification was tied to the urban environment, its form of life and its corresponding disposition towards the accumulation of capital, little was being done for the improvement of the material conditions of the peasantry, isolating it economically and socially, while subordinating it to the city (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 26; Gatrell, 2013, p. 85).

As Kramer (2008, p. 93) points out, making a caricature out of patron-client relationship between rural and urban Palestinians does not provide an accurate image. The principles of solidarity and vertical coalitions still drew from principles based on the reciprocity stemmed from their common in some degree of autonomy. Even so, derived from the same set of common principles, particularly those linked with loyalty, honour and authority based on family affiliation, emerges a habitus where social, economic and cultural capital exert a degree of power over expectations and behaviours, in spite of which, the Palestinian elite´s position was put into question, as Palestinian cities grew and the indigenous solidarity declined (Krämer, 2008, p. 253; Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 55).

Higher stratum Palestinians did little for the improvement of the *fellaheen´*s situation. Focused on private property, individual freedom, and the development of economy through accumulation of capital, as social advancement, they regarded the lower strata´s "inferiority" as natural difference (Seikaly, 2016). Land purchase had become a strategic asset on the hands of the colonialists, which contributed to the destitution of a traditional form of life, in exchange of likewise poor social and material conditions on an environment alien to them (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 38, 60), along with a gradually cornered agency. Even if most of the purchased land came from major, predominantly absentee, landowners (Hirst, 1977, p. 29; Krämer, 2008, p. 245; Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 38-39), the fact that part of it was sold by Palestinian elite members increased the peasantry´s mistrust.

Confronted with the increasing presence of Zionism, along with the support provided by the British occupation, the idea of "nation" started to become established in rural and urban areas of Palestine. Parallelly, gender identity became increasingly important, as early as 1929, with the institution of the Arab Women´s Congress, and the Arab Women´s Association (later Arab Women´s Union) (Krämer, 2008, pp. 123, 254). However, there was a vacuum regarding social or political initiative. The Palestinian ruling class had no experience in mass leadership (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 51), a pattern that was strengthened by the Mandate´s mechanisms of influencing it, handling their ties towards the *effendi* and *a´ayan* in favour of individual interests, prioritising them instead of community-interests, based on collective ethno-cultural identities, drawing a thicker line between the lower masses and the landowners and prospering bourgeoisie (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 27, 42; Krämer, 2008, p. 200).

It was in this context that the bond with the land gave way to a more complex identity-matrix. A higher educational level, subsequent politicisation and spread of new ideas, along with the maturation of the idea of a Palestinian nation, merged with "Arabness" (Khalidi, 2010, pp. 149-150, 173; Krämer, 2008, p. 265). This budding paradigm did not pervade every stratum of the Palestinian community equally, in addition, the lack of an organisational or ideological vanguard (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 48,

51; Pappé, 2006, p. 103) and the increasing pressure over the subaltern classes (Kanafani, 1972, pp. 14-17) contributed to the outburst of the 1936 rebellion.

1.2.c. Uprising: colonial class struggle

1935 saw a peak in Jewish migration to Palestine. Both the Palestinian indigenous community and the Jewish immigration were self-centred, knowledge about each other scant, cultural backgrounds differing. Efforts aimed at class solidarity within the labour movement had little to no success (Krämer, 2008, p. 177).

It was not only Jewish settlers arriving, arms smuggling was also taking place, providing yet another reason for fearing the Jewish settlers (Krämer, 2008, p. 264; Hirst, 1977, p. 75), added to the policy of training Zionist paramilitary factions by the British army (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 59). Most of the Palestinian population revolted against the Mandate and the Jewish presence with a threefold demand: the stop of Jewish immigration, prohibition of the transfer of land to colonists, and the establishment of a democratic government in accordance to the higher number of Palestinian inhabitants (Kanafani, 1972, p. 36). British authorities turned a blind eye on these requests.

During the increasingly tense period before the 1936 insurrection, and even though not completely known, a noteworthy and highly symbolic figure transpired, one that would fill the leadership of subaltern Palestinians (Pappé, 2006, p. 103; Kanafani, 1972, p. 37; Krämer, 2008, pp. 261-262). In reference to identity, the figure of Muslim preacher Izz al-Din al-Qassam embodied the values present from that moment on in the Palestinian struggle. Qassam and his followers, in many cases Palestinians dispossessed by Zionists (Khalidi, 2010, p. 115), engaged in armed struggle against the Zionist and British forces (Krämer, 2008, p. 268; Hirst, 1977, pp. 76-77), in the first guerrilla warfare movement. Qassam managed to challenge the traditional Palestinian leadership, reaching the lower social strata through a religious albeit political discourse, appealing to a national sentiment. However, its mobilisation power was limited, reaching mostly the Palestinians displaced to urban areas, as among the *fellaheen* custom had a bigger impact than religion regarding behaviour and morality (Pappé, 2006, p. 104). As Sayigh states (2007, p. 45), religion was at that time not a major factor concerning the organisational capabilities, nor the most important moral compass.

The death of *sheikh* Qassam, at the hands of the British army in 1935, made him a martyr, the "first commander of the Palestinian revolution" (Krämer, 2008, p. 263). It substantiated a symbol closer to the peoples than that of the image of the leadership of the elite (Khalidi, 2010, p. 189; Kanafani, 1972, p. 37), soaking through the cultural identity archetypes and establishing the basis of the role of the

fedayee, incarnating sacrifice, heroism, and nation. He also exemplified and popularised a different type of agency, one of resistance, which the Palestinian elite feared to an extent (Hirst, 1977, p. 78) but could not ignore, since his funeral preceded a mass demonstration, consecutively followed by the general strike and insurrection of 1936 (Khalidi, 2010, p. 115; Kanafani, 1972, pp. 38-39).

A six-month general strike took place, along with a boycott, and armed uprisings originated in the mountainous areas, where the lower strata had been relegated to, with the newly created Arab Higher Committee (AHC) as the leadership (Swedenburg, 1995, p. 122; Kanafani, 1972, p. 42). The nascent Palestinian nation was an important albeit not exclusive stimulating factors (Krämer, 2008, p. 270) in this multi-layered conflict. The organisational capabilities of the Palestinian nationalist movement were lacking and controlled by the ruling families; in spite of the diverse political groups, the *fellaheen* and Palestinian working class, still the majority of the population, were underrepresented (Kanafani, 1972, pp. 40-41; Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 56). Urban Palestinians of higher strata engaged in the general strike, but most of them avoided participation in the rebellion, thus the lack of the more educated social classes hindered the organisational development (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 55, 61; Kanafani, 1972, pp. 47-48; Morris, 2004, p. 21).

Furthermore, some *mujahedeen*[4] accused the elite of fleeing instead of fighting, introducing what Swedenburg (1995, pp. 114-115) refers to as "negative class consciousness", that is, the identification of the own social class as the reversed image of the rejected social identity (the *effendi*, the *a´ayan*, in short, the Palestinian higher social class) instead of one based on their own socioeconomic conditions, hopes and expectations. This scorn came to pass as a result of the combination of different elements in the Palestinian identity matrix, in which Arabness interlaced in the cultural field with the nationalist discourse, kinship-based tradition, and religious interpretation. When the AHC withdrew its support of the strike (Kanafani, 1972, pp. 45-47), it crippled the «Palestinian nationalist leadership´s tendency to look outwards for Arab support» as much as this perceived Arab component of their identity, linked to their commitment to struggle (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 47, 61).

Significatively, in a movement that would get embedded in the Palestinian identity, its culture and folklore, during 1938, with the resistance at its peak in spite of the Mandate´s repressive reaction, the leadership of the resistance called the Palestinian men to discard the *tarbush* and wear the *keffiyeh* or

[4] "*Mujahedeen*"/ "مجاهدين", the plural form of "m*ujahed*"/ "مجاهد" (f. "*mujahedah*" / "مجاهدة"), meaning "fighter", stems from "*jihad"/* "جهاد", "fight", "struggle", or "battle", therefore, towards an externality; however, in its verb form, "*jihad*"/"جهد" can also mean "to strive", "to endeavour", hence referring to the inner sphere of the individual (Wehr, 1976, pp. 142-143).

hatta (Kanafani, 1972, p. 49; Swedenburg, 1995, pp. 32, 121). By that moment, the insurrection was comprised mostly by peasants, who commonly wore the *keffiyeh*, a white cloth fastened around their heads with the *ʻiqal*, a black cord. Conversely, the *tarbush*, the maroon hat introduced by the Ottomans (Swedenburg, 1995, p. 31), was donned by the higher strata. Due to the military pressure of the British army on the subjects in peasant outfit, the rebels took advantage of everyone looking the same to carry out their operations, with the *keffiyeh* wrapped around their heads. This singular piece of apparel would become, particularly after World War II, the most popular symbol of the Palestinian resistance (Krämer, 2008, p. 290), and, afterwards, a distinctive folkloric identity marker.

Regarding women, the rebel command asked that they dress and behave "modestly" (Swedenburg, 1995, p. 183). This reactionary drift among the revolutionary men saw Palestinian women, particularly in the urban areas, wearing Western style clothes like dresses and high heels, too close to the social and cultural model of their enemy. Some Palestinian Muslim, Christian and Druze had an opposing attitude towards new trends in the social, cultural, religious, and political fields, in an attempt to safeguard their identities against the Zionist and British colonisers´ influence (Krämer, 2008, p. 239). They praised the traditional *fellahaʻ*s attitude, their role as supporters of their families or male fighters, also as social intermediaries in village life. They did this also by imposing the *hijab*, inscribing political meaning to a garment, while hinting at moral significance based on identity and a tradition that was «less uniform than is often assumed» (Krämer, 2008, p. 289).

These measures caused the withdrawal of women active in the struggle (Swedenburg, 1995, pp. 181-183), in spite of their political activity in organisation like the Arab Women´s Association (Krämer, 2008, pp. 254, 265, 271). Even though this association was excluded by the rest of the parties who articulated the AHC with the rest of the parties (Krämer, 2008, p. 272), these instances of gender oppression could not displace Palestinian women from active roles in the insurrection. They would conduct weapon, food, and information deliveries easier than men, «hidden under the cloak of a conservative code of conduct» (Krämer, 2008, p. 286), which involved a utilitarian employment of gender. However, they also engaged in combat, as the existence of the *rafiqat al-Qassam* (Qassam Sisters) implies (Krämer, 2008, p. 276).

Despite all the efforts, sacrifices, and accomplishments (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 41), by the end of the rebellion in 1939, the Palestinian community was much weaker than in the beginning (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 61; Khalidi, 2010, p. 190; Krämer, 2008, pp. 271, 294-295; Morris, 2004, p. 23). Human loss, with 5,000 killed and 10,000 wounded, was a significant toll for a population of a million inhabitants. Economic loss, after the strikes, boycotts, and retaliations, was at an all-time low. Political loss, aside from the fact that any measure aimed at limiting Jewish immigration would not take place, political

organisational movement did not effectively expand among Palestinians, bound locally and disarmed, thus defenceless against the Zionist threat and its deeply organised society, as well as the expanding capitalist scope, bound to finance the occupying economy (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 20, 60; Pappé, 2006, p. 104; Morris, 2004, p. 23). The tide would turn for the Mandate too, due to the conclusion of the Second World War in the global scale, and the reinforced and emboldened Zionist camp finally taking

1.3. Nakba

In defiance of all the setbacks, still in 1945, half of the villages in Palestine held to one of the elements that shaped their identity and marked one of its most representative and symbolic customs: the usufructuary employment of land, the *musha´*, outliving its abolition by the Mandate (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 30; Pappé, 2006, p. 24).

Notwithstanding, the weakness and shortcomings of the Palestinian community stemmed partially from a lack of Palestinian self-governing institutions (Morris, 2004, pp. 26-27), particularly at a national level. Reason for this being that political consciousness did not develop, determined by the insularity of its different strata, grounded on disunity as a method of preserving traditional hierarchy, privileges and power-quotas; failing to adapt to the shifts in circumstances and paradigms. Palestinians considered themselves to be members of a specific village, hardly as inhabitants of wider nation. After decades of "systematically produced inequality", year after year of failures, divided leadership, limited economic, political and military capabilities, and no allies (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 61; Khalidi, 2010, pp. 190-191), the Palestinian community faced a centralised and resolved Zionist society with a complete set of civilian, economic, and military institutions (Morris, 2004, pp. 14-17).

By 1946, the harrying by Jewish paramilitaries overwhelmed the British Mandate. This was so to the extent that their efforts where mainly directed to defending their own forces rather than interceding in favour of the Palestinians (Gatrell, 2013, p. 125; Pappé, 2006, pp. 107-108), thus setting the major hallmark of its exclusive demographic and territorial policy, a method based on violence and ethnic cleansing (Pappé, 2006, pp. 22-23; 2007).

Following the disclosure of the Nazi Holocaust, the existential threat of the Jewish outshined the rest of the circumstances, particularly those of the Palestinians. Thus the "redemption" for the events of the Second World War was established as a major justification (Alexander, 2004b, p. 220; Krämer, 2008, p. 296). Great Britain was significantly weakened after the war, a circumstance paramilitary groups like Hagana, Irgun, Palmach and Lehi took advantage of, attacking the Mandate´s military and civil institutions (Krämer, 2008, p. 309).

This is the circumstances in which the *Nakba*, the "catastrophe", befell (Khalidi, 2010, pp. 190-191; Pappé, 2007; Hirst, 1977, pp. 97-143; Abdo & Masalha, 2018). To mark the exit of Great Britain from the land, the United Nations General Assembly approved Resolution 181, laying down the basis for the partition plan of the land, announcing the Mandate would be over on May 14th 1948, with no understanding regarding what competences would be handed over, nor how or whom to (Krämer, 2008, p. 306). Attack began soon after the resolution was revealed (Krämer, 2008, p. 309). Modern military groups like Palmach, Irgun, Lehi and Hagana, which would eventually constitute the official army of the Israeli State, faced the poorly brought together troops of the Arab League for a disorderly Palestinian society (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 64-65; Morris, 2004, pp. 17-28, 34-35). The ensuing operations led to the destruction of the Arab villages (Krämer, 2008, p. 322; Gatrell, 2013, p. 142), and the massive exodus and expulsion of half of the Palestinian population (Morris, 2004, pp. 65-265, 414-536).

While higher class Palestinians, the *effendi*, *a´ayan* and those with higher economic capital, left Palestine early in 1948, anticipating the epitome of the ongoing violence, the ones left with little or no choice, around 750,000 people, were forcibly displaced from their land (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 62-97, 100-101; Gatrell, 2013, p. 125; Morris, 2004, pp. 99-133), of which over 100,000 finally arrived at an impoverished South Lebanon. Even though the Lebanese army had barely taken part in the war, Lebanese southerners, the ones who had not left because of high unemployment rates, were forced to displacement as Israel occupied the border (Sayigh R. , 1994, pp. 17-18).

The newly arrived Palestinians were considered stateless "foreigners" in Lebanon, although some exceptions were made, contingent on religious confession (Palestinian Christians received Lebanese citizenship on arrival) and class (Gatrell, 2013, p. 136; Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 23; Ghandour, 2017, pp. 65-67). The Israeli State prevented their return by, among other means, occupying their towns (Gatrell, 2013, p. 127).

Although nowadays widely used, the term "Nakba", along with the awareness of the depth of the event, was not devised until the late 50s (Gatrell, 2013, p. 119). Serving as a measure of the intensity of the shock for the Palestinians, displaced in 1948 or not, it symbolises loss and unity, past and future. As Khalidi (2010, p. 193) points out, the dispossession and displacement, the trauma, ironically contributed to the process of a collective Palestinian identity. From then on, displaced Palestinians would still identify with a specific village, but the notion of Palestine would start to have the leading role in their identification.

1.4. Lebanon: permanent temporary station

1.4.a. Greater Lebanon: dissolution of the old order

Parallel to the history of Palestine under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, Mount Lebanon, the precursor entity of the Lebanese State, had been for a long time an emirate, with a feudal class living on the taxes and rent, the product of the peasants´ work. It also reproduced similar patterns of "vertical coalitions", violently reflected in clashes between sects, as well as the effects of the Land Code of 1858, with the added effect of the disruption of local artisan production with its inclusion in the global market. Foreign institutions provided education, which in turn caused the generation of a population ready for the expansion of capitalism in the land (Gaspard, 2004, pp. 42-47).

The State of Greater Lebanon was one of the results of the decomposition of the Ottoman Empire, following the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916 (Bezhani, 2009), for the reshaping of region before the end of the armed conflict (Salibi, 1989, pp. 19-37). In 1919, the Administrative Council in Lebanon declared unilaterally the independence of the state, under the principles of a "democratic system", based on the ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Still, French pressure managed to subdue the revolt, and imposed the declaration of Greater Lebanon under French administration in 1920 (Salibi, 1989, p. 131).

Much like the rest of the newly-created states, the formation of the Lebanese State pertains to the Western, mainly French, projection and strategies of organising public life, under precepts alien to the local inhabitants (Salibi, 1989, pp. 60, 70-71; Traboulsi, 2012, pp. 75-87; Makdisi, 2000). Still under French mandate, Greater Lebanon was officially designated "Lebanese Republic", as it was the name adopted by the 1926 Constitution, although it did not delimitate its borders (Traboulsi, 2012, pp. 75-109; Salibi, 1989, p. 180). An increasingly modern state, with an increasing sectarian imprint on its institutions, which would condition its very weakness in the face of mercantile interests (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 22).

Tensions introduced by this fact caused that, similarly and parallelly to the events in Palestine, the Lebanese had had their share of popular revolts, caused by the opposed needs of the local elites and foreign forces and interests (Traboulsi, 2012, pp. 24-51). Traditional local and regional networks, like the one formed by Palestine, Mount Lebanon and Syria, would be embedded and framed under the world economy (Traboulsi, 2012, pp. 19, 75-88; Khalidi, 2007, p. 50; Krämer, 2008, p. 89; Gaspard, 2004, p. 56).

In light of a historical development that revolves around the realisation of a multiplicity of ethnic and national identities (Salibi, 1989, pp. 182-187), the Lebanese elites put forth mechanisms of

containment of the potential risks, trying to reach a balance between the different confessions. The Republic of Lebanon was on its way to becoming a "consociational democracy", a model of government that deviates from majority rule, with the features Lijphart (1977, pp. 25-52) confers them: a coalition of the elites, established to govern the state; the existence of mutual veto, or "negative minority rule", that is, the capacity of each minority to dispute and even block decisions contrary to their interests; proportionality, regarding the allocation of administrative and financial resources, as well as proportional influence over decisions depending on numerical strength; and segmental autonomy, the capacity to rule the minority´s "exclusive concern" on their own.

Added to the nominal independence of the State of Lebanon in 1943, the institutionalisation of one of these features came hand in hand with the National Pact, an unwritten "gentlemen´s agreement" on the distribution of power between the different institutionalised religious identities, which also implied an attempt at ending the dispute over the state´s identity (Traboulsi, 2012, pp. 111-112; Salibi, 1989, pp. 185-187; Sayigh R. , 1994, pp. 22-23). An established proportion between the 18 different sects [5] would be put forth concerning state administration (Nucho, 2017, pp. 127-129), institutionalising difference, and "recodifying" it for the sake of the accumulation of capital (Deleuze & Guattari, 2002, pp. 459-460). It is in this context that the Lebanese fear of *tawteen*, or naturalisation of the Sunni Muslim Palestinian population[6], took root (Ghandour, 2017; Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 17; Wadie, 2001; Gatrell, 2013, p. 137).

1.4.b. Republic of Lebanon: permanent temporary station

After the arrival of the Palestinian refugees at Lebanese soil, and over a span of days that became months, shock and uncertainty held sway over the lives of the newly created Palestinian refugees. Due to their proximity to the border, most of them remained in the southern territory of Lebanon, where the Israeli State pursued a policy of "border cleaning" (Morris, 2004, pp. 505-536), and most of the villages were even poorer than their own towns. They resorted to living with relatives before moving into refugee camps, since, most of them, long after the Armistice Agreements with Israel in

[5] This proportion was set based on the only official census of the State (so far, till 2022), carried out in 1932 (LIC, 2013).

[6] Sunna and Shi´a (genitives: Sunni and Shi´ite), the main subgroups of Islam, share the same major principles: following the Qur´an; the adherence to the five pillars of Islam (*shahda*, *salat*, *zakat*, *sawm* and *hajj*), observation of the prophet´s sunnah and hadith (traditions and sayings, although with some differences). They differ in matters of political leadership, jurisprudence, and some religious practices. Globally, Sunni Muslims are roughly 85%, while Shi´a are 15%.

1949, believed they would soon go home (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 107, 110). Convinced of this fact, many kept their houses´ deeds and keys (Fisk, 2001, pp. 14-44), an object than would become the symbol of the right of *al-´Awda*, the return. As a matter of fact, the UN had passed Resolution 194 (UNGA, 1948), in favour of the return of the Palestinian displaced population to their homes. A resolution that failed to be carried out.

Thinking of the closeness of the time to go back, some Palestinians also resisted being transferred to other areas, in order to avoid being dragged farther from their land, in anticipation of their return (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 36; 2007, pp. 108, 136), but eventually started settling in the first camps to be established in the South, two of which were Ain el-Hilweh, originally managed by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); and el-Buss, formerly established for Armenian refugees during the French mandate (Gatrell, 2013, p. 136). Even then, they insisted in the temporary nature of their stay, by word, and by refusing to install equipment they might have perceived as signifying resettlement, such as ovens (Gatrell, 2013, p. 133). Separation from land, and all the elements surrounding it, carved a deep wound in the individual personalities, along with the alteration of the self and the collective identity (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 109).

This separation, however, would prove lengthier than what they desired. The very displaced, as well as the Arab states host of the intake of refugees, began demanding the return. But soon enough, the Israeli State decided against it. Not only that, but also resolved in favour of preventing it, by destroying houses, occupying villages, establishing settlements to ensure the Palestinians would have nowhere to return to (Morris, 2004, pp. 309-334, 341-395; Thorleifsson, 2015, pp. 39-47).

The Security Council of the newly created United Nations (UN) reacted to the situation in December 1949 with the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The agency, reflecting its temporary vocation, was outfitted with the responsibility of assisting in relief and development of Palestinian refugees in the Middle East (Gatrell, 2013, p. 130). The Lebanese State argued that the United Nations (UN) was to be hold accountable for the refugees and their upkeep, due to the role it attributed to the agency regarding the creation of the State of Israel (Gatrell, 2013, p. 133). One of UNRWA´s initial roles, apart from the provision of basic services (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 23), was to purchase or lease the lands where the camps were to be located, as well as managing the permits for residency transfers (al-Natour, 1997).

Still temporary encampments, canvas tents and makeshift alternatives put together families that gathered around spaces that grew to accommodate the symbolical function of the regrouping of the members of the villages in the same areas, reinforcing group memory and affiliation to ancestral lands

(Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 2, 136; Gatrell, 2013, p. 136; Peteet, 2007) as well as practical old relationship networks.

Generational differences arose amid the Palestinian refugees, as the people who had experienced the life of hard work in Palestine became practically unemployable. Nevertheless, the first generations to be educated in school brought back to life occupations and services (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 119). Those who saw themselves in a helpless situation regarding employment reacted negatively to UNRWA, as they perceived it as the manifestation of their becoming into people with no agency, no ability to take care of their own selves. Some even ripped the registration cards to pieces, as a display of their discontent and rejection (Gatrell, 2013, p. 131). Generational differences mixed with gender, as Palestinian refugee men sent women or children to collect the rations, deeming it too humiliating to do it themselves (Peteet, 2005, pp. 73-77; Gatrell, 2013, p. 132).

The fact that UNRWA was created with the exclusive task of assisting the Palestinian refugees was consolidated when the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was created. Along the same line, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees excluded Palestinian refugees, with the intention of avoiding duplicities (UNHCR, 1951,1967).

Soon enough, Palestinians in Lebanon grasped the connection between education and their victimhood. Their exclusion from knowledge had led them to be oppressed and dispossessed (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 33), such was the case particularly for the lower strata who ended up in the camps. Consequently, they took a special interest and eagerness in the field of education, now offered by UNRWA.

Lack of development of the Lebanese school system, compared to the bursting and free provision of education by UNRWA lead to tension (Gatrell, 2013, p. 137). It was especially the Lebanese Maronite Christian camp that expressed unrest at the sight of this fact, as well as at the growth of the camps, as they vertically expanded and fit the increasing numbers of inhabitants, overcoming the curbing intentions of the Lebanese authorities (Gatrell, 2013, p. 136).

1.4.c. State of Lebanon: Exclusion and Nakba continued

The security policy of the Lebanese State concerning the refugee camps entered a stage of acute repression in the late 50s. Tagged as “refugees” legally, albeit not officially recognised as such by the state, the Palestinians found themselves entangled in a precarious crossroads, involving different dimensions of local, regional, and global frames of significance and power mongering.

Regarding the local sociocultural dimension, life in refugee camps implied an ambiguous and adverse situation, with limited rights and meaningful restrictions, resulting in an altered sense of collective identity for the Palestinians, as well as the readjustment of their agency. The forced withdrawal from their land meant a rather newfound ethnic identity determined by their flight; but also a painful acknowledgement in the sociocultural aspect, regarding their Arabness, in sight of the lack of support from the Arab countries they had put their hopes on. Such was the case for the higher-class Palestinians, with a different and more cosmopolitan experience (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 102-105). Especially in Lebanon, Palestinian presence was perceived as jeopardising the confessional balance of the country and, subsequently, the potential to destabilise a particular distribution of state power. Thus, the rejection of the *tawteen* (Ghandour, 2017), the naturalisation of Palestinians as Lebanese citizens.

This fact motivated an assortment of constraints by the authorities apart from *tawteen* itself, which rendered Palestinian refugees as a "special kind of foreigners" (Al-Natour, 1997; Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 115-117). Ranging from employment to restriction of movement, the Lebanese State aimed at limiting their agency, in particular the political one. This course of action was put forth, especially during the decades of the 50s and 60s, through surveillance and control. As a result, the effective exclusion of the Palestinian population in Lebanon took place.

Concerning the economic-political dimension, far from performing the sympathy for the Palestinians some Lebanese officials claimed, the idea of not assuming the economic costs of supporting them prevailed (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 111). Thus, they entrusted the care of refugees to UNRWA. What ensued was the production of the camps as spaces of exclusion, separating the refugees in different geographical areas, enclosed and controllable. Even if initially the state avoided the establishment of the camps close to the cities, the Lebanese industry eventually relaxed the labour guidelines (Sayigh Y. , 1997a, p. 45; Pappé, 2006, p. 144), engendering "poverty belts" (Traboulsi, 2012, p. 162) and, along with them, what could be considered a "reserve army of labour" (Marx, 1867/1990, pp. 781-794; Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 24; De Bel-Air, 2012, p. 16), source of cheap workforce. Additionally, the social image of the Palestinian refugee was that of the marginalised Other (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 132-139).

From the legal perspective, in keeping with the confined nature of the camp, the identity and agency of the refugees would likewise respond to a logic of constriction. While UNRWA´s charitable approach ensured that camp dwellers could be educated, this service was quantitatively limited. The Lebanese government blocked any chances of making it farther than low-income jobs, effectively keeping them dependent on UNRWA´s services. It was women who initially brought the first salaries

easier. Not because the hegemonic socio-cultural standards had been altered, as women were still seen mostly as traditional housewives, but because they were paid less than men (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 117-119). This entailed a partial eroding of patriarchal authority, as exploitation was made into a commonplace choice.

The socioeconomic conditions pushed Palestinian refugees to either job migration, or political activism. The former being a possible option only for those setting off from a more privileged position, thus reproducing the difference stemming from the days of the Mandate in Palestine (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 125-129). As for the latter, political militancy prevailed among the younger generations, as the joint result of lacking economic opportunities, the humiliation of having their collective identity deprecated, and the drive for the recovery of their homeland, setting their agency in motion.

This militancy did not escape the attention of the *Deuxième Bureau*. The Lebanese Army´s intelligence office, created in 1959, had among its top priorities guarding against Palestinian "subversion" (De Bel-Air, 2012, p. 17). They tightened surveillance, control and harassment of the camps dwellers, setting sights specifically on the politically active (Sayigh R. , 1994, pp. 68-70; 2007, pp. 141-144; Hirst, 1977, p. 78). Since there was no need to justify it, the DB did not hesitate to ban meetings, frisk individuals and search houses, supress the promotion of the Palestinian identity, and even extort, persecuting individuals for private gain (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 139-146; Winslow, 2005, p. 107).

Paradoxically, the refugee camps, designed to be spaces of exclusion, setting aside the unwanted consequences of regional and global policy-making, would gradually be transformed into spaces of subversion, as a direct effect of the very exclusion they were subjected to. What could be considered as open-air prisons, bound to surveillance, monitorisation and persecution, engendered the conditions for the development and empowerment of both their self-image (in its ethnic and social aspects) and ability to affect their conditions of existence in radically different directions.

1.5. Palestinian resistance: rise and fall

1.5.a. Cold War: scourge of the Middle East

In 1958, fifteen years after its political independence, and ten after the onset of the Palestinian predicament, and two after the Suez Crisis, Lebanon´s internal circumstances were increasingly tied to the actors shaping the events at a regional and global scale. Initially, the identitarian quandary of the state took a turn towards aligning with the United Arab Republic (UAR), at the time the vanguard and driving force of Arab matters. This meant disposing of the Eisenhower Doctrine (Gerges, 1997,

pp. 90-91), an offer to the countries of the Middle East by the United States of America, involving economic and military aid, to be used in case of threat of armed aggression, «to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism» (Eisenhower, 1957).

Ethnical and political Arabness was once again at the crossroads. The mainly Maronite Christian camp hoped for closeness towards the West and expressed fear of the Egyptian State´s affinity to the Soviet Union; while the predominantly Muslim camp looked to the UAR for keeping a precarious social peace. Change in the presidency of Lebanon tilted in favour of the West and the Eisenhower Doctrine, leading to a three-week armed conflict that involved the direct intervention of the US Sixth Fleet and its nuclear warheads in the coasts of Lebanon. The parameters were set for the budding greater confrontation of the civil war, framed under the Cold War (Gerges, 1997, pp. 80-81), and it´s web of interconnected domestic, regional, and international elements. Lebanon would be restated as a stage for international tensions, tightly associated with the internal fragmentation and the structural weakness of the Lebanese State. The Israeli army was also involved, as a supplier of military material and artillery support in the South (Hirst, 2010, pp. 69-71), seeing the Christian Maronite predominance as beneficial factor, due to their alignment under the same political coordinates, and their enmity towards the Palestinians.

In the end, the military confrontations costed 2,500 lives, the fragile sectarian balance was restored, but material scarcity remained for the lower classes. This deficiency, along with the neglect by the Lebanese State co-determined the ties of the Palestinian Revolutionary Movement (PRM) and Lebanese groups representing the subaltern classes, mainly the ones organised around the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 30; Laffin, 1985, pp. 9-10). The socio-political crisis in Lebanon contributed to the alliances that partially overcame identitarian lines.

The social atmosphere of the refugee camps, and the agency of its dwellers, put together the conditions for the development of the organisation of the Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM). The movement drew the interest of the dispossessed and the oppressed, gathering the subaltern classes, and rendering cultural, ethnic, or religious identity less relevant. Peoples from Lebanon itself and other geographic origins gathered physically around camps like Shatila (Sayigh R. , 1994, pp. 29-30; Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 150, 161-166), where the influence of the Palestinian revolutionaries overflew the camp itself into Lebanese schools and universities. This influence spread also to the south; an area still neglected by the government. Awareness about class identity, and subsequently, class oppression grew parallelly to the revitalisation of the consciousness of the Palestinian national identity, as worker and student camp dwellers became *fedayeen*.

By that time, the militarisation of the Palestinian groups was advancing. With the financial resources of members in the diaspora, some Arab states, and Palestinian businesses of the regional economy (De Bel-Air, 2012, p. 14), the increasingly organised Palestinian Resistance Movement´s (PRM) two main Palestinian nationalist groups had been founded. The Arab Nationalists´ Movement (ANM, *Harakat al-Qawmiyeen*[7] *al-Arab*) in 1951-52, and the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah, *Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Falastini*) in 1958-59. They were both driven by the events unfolded from the *Nakba* on (Sayigh Y. , The Palestinians, 1997b). Fatah stood out as the organisationally most competent one building a social structure, based on a wider class support and a more charismatic appeal (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 29; Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 149).

In spite of this convergence, its opposing force was also on the rise, the Phalange or *Kataeb*, Christian right-wing militia, had been established during the 1958 crisis. On one hand, the comparison between the lagging Lebanese educational system and the one offered by UNRWA in the camps engendered resentment among some Lebanese. On the other hand, Palestinian strugglers´ operations against Israel and the resulting retaliations stirred the anger of the Lebanese, who already showed contempt (Gatrell, 2013, pp. 136-137) also in the South. This escalation came together with an upsurge of the oppression exercised by the *Deuxième Bureau* upon the camp dwellers.

Fear of the threatening presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon added to the dismay caused by the rise of pan-Arab trends (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 156). The main ideologies behind Palestinian activism were, at least theoretically, close to the ones posited by Nasserism and Ba´thism, even if the feeling among the Palestinian strugglers was one of neglect, if not suppression, by the Arab regimes. For this reason, the gun became a significant symbol, their lack of weaponry since 1948 represented their dispossession, and the abandonment of the Arab countries they had deemed allies (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 158; Laffin, 1985, p. 13). During the 60s, the armies of the Arab states were proving to be the protectors of the ruling classes (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 159).

In this context, the Arab League established the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1964, in a bid to contain and control the collective Palestinian political agency, through the institutionalisation of a representative body, followed by the creation of the Palestine National Council (PNC) (Khalidi, 2007, p. 138). The *muqawamah* (Wehr, 1976, p. 801) on the other hand, the

[7] Note about the polysemy of the translation of "national" into Arabic: while "*qawmiyeh*"/"قومية" indicates "nationalism", from "*qaum*"/"قوم", "nation" in the ethnic sense of "kin", "kindred", "tribe", "people", as in the pan-Arab sense; "*wataniyeh*"/"وطنية" stems from "*watan*" /"وطن", "home country", referred to specific countries or states (Wehr, 1976, pp. 800, 1079-1080).

Palestinian Resistance, now also named “Palestinian Armed Struggle”, stemmed from different social origins (Sayigh Y. , 1997a, p. 71; Khalidi, 2010, p. 182). It also responded to different needs and conditions, as it was mainly the result of the assembly of Palestinians who had joined the different Arab armies in 1948, in an attempt to repel the Israeli takeover (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 29). During this period, operations of the Israeli army inside Lebanese territory were periodic.

The inception of Lebanon as a crossroad of regional and global interests kept showing consequences in different levels. Economically, Intra Bank´s crash in 1966 was significant. The strongest Arab bank, founded and run by a Palestinian, owned major shares abroad and financed the Lebanese government´s infrastructure. But its splendour caused its demise, as capitalist speculation revealed the frailty of the intermediation of the Lebanese financial sector, amidst rumours of sabotage by “Western agents”. Politically, panic spread, with opposing stakeholders putting the blame on each other and avoiding responsibilities. Former partners in wealth, political turmoil triggered them to the point of questioning cornerstones of the state, such as the National Pact of 1943 (Traboulsi, 2012, pp. 150-153; Gaspard, 2004). But one of the peaks and turning points of Lebanon´s juncture-role would come to be in the wake of the Six-Day War.

Israel prevailed in the brief conflict against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan (Dawisha, 1997, pp. 34-37). Furthermore, the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, the Syrian Golan Heights and what was left of historic Palestine were occupied. Between 300,000 and 400,000 Palestinians (most of them already refugees) fled their homes, and a wave of 20,000 refugees was caused, a portion of which fled to Lebanon (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 19; Chomsky, 2007, p. xviii; Gatrell, 2013, p. 128).

Instead of daunting them, the grievance and loss of the Six Day War (named *al-Naksa*, or “setback” by the Palestinians) among the Arab population prompted the PRM´s activity, as well as its legitimacy in the eyes of Arab stakeholders (Pappé, 2006, p. 190; Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 148). Militarily, Lebanon was turned into the theatre of operations against Israel, a low- and high-profile confrontation arena, destabilising regional politics and its inward reflection in Lebanon (Gerges, 1997, pp. 91-93).

It is from the events of 1967 on, «in a moment of Arab defeat and disarray», that the Palestinian resistance is accounted for as a factor for policy-making in the Middle East, an external and an internal one (Sayigh R. , 1994, pp. 16, 28). Fatah, as the *de facto* leadership of PLO, perceived the military defeat as an opportunity to escape Arab control (Sayigh Y. , 1997a, p. 155). Not only did the refugee camps evolve toward a more coherent model of organisation, additionally, infrastructure was enhanced, transformers and water piping installed, social services provided and means of producing their own lives implemented and improved, to such an extent that non-Palestinians were dragged

around the camps, where alternative opportunities were to be found, in a state within the Lebanese State. The symbol of the resurgence was, once again, the gun, illustrating the importance of the struggle deep within their identity. Along with it, the *keffiyeh*, raised as a symbol and an identifier since the 1936 rebellion, took on the current day chequered pattern during the resurgence of the Palestinian resistant agency, as an icon of unity and national struggle (Swedenburg, 1995, p. 35; Khalidi, 2010, p. 106).

As Lebanon deepened its socioeconomic crisis (Traboulsi, 2012, pp. 157-177), the Lebanese army´s operations against the *fedayeen* fighting Israel in the South caused a stir among Lebanese. The operations carried out by the Palestinian resistance, such as the airplane hijacks by PFLP members (Sayigh Y. , 1997a, p. 213), motivated Israeli operations aimed at both retaliation against the Palestinian presence and the destabilisation of Lebanon´s communitarian balance. The destruction of eleven civilian aircrafts in the International Airport of Beirut put yet another stone in paving the way to the civil war (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 19; Sayigh R. , p. 103; Winslow, 2005, p. 167). While tension rose, Shi´ite clerics in the South asked for a political reform and arming the population of the southern towns to confront Israel. Still in January 1975 they were neglected by the government, whose decision to reject Libyan air defence equipment against Israeli air attacks, prompted PLO to build shelters in the refugee camps (Sayigh Y. , 1997a, pp. 359-360; Siklawi, 2017, p. 925).

On another front, the Lebanese army struggled to contain the aggression towards British and United States oil companies by the population in Beirut. The protests were fuelled by the death of Khalil Jamal in 1968, the first Lebanese *fedayee* to be killed in action and become a *shahid* ("martyr") (Traboulsi, 2012, p. 153). Consequently, not only the refugee camps, but also the Lebanese population, particularly the younger generations, raised against the state, objectified in the army, peaking in the episode of the siege of Bint Jbail and the confrontation of unarmed citizens and the Lebanese Security Forces (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 165-169; Traboulsi, 2012, pp. 154-155). The upheaval caused demonstrations all over the country as well as the rise of Palestinian refugees against the Security Forces and the *Deuxième Bureau* in 1969 (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 169-173). Eventually, the widespread disarray in Lebanon lead to the signing of the Cairo Agreement[8].

[8] There are no official records of the agreement, although some sources point to its unoficcial publication in An-Nahar newspaper. An equally unofficial text of the agreement can be found here: https://aramean-dem.org/English/Documents/The_Cairo_Agreement.htm [Last accessed on 2022/05/20]

1.5.b. Cairo Accords: Palestinian heterotopia

Acting upon their supremacy, Fatah had taken over the PLO early the same year, with Yasser Arafat as its chairman. A new political attitude was implemented, as it would be the PRM represented, and not an assortment of extraneous regional and social segments (Sayigh Y. , 1997b, p. 128; Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 149). Nevertheless, what members of Fatah appealed to as “the unity of the gun” was not a direct reflection of reality. Even if the liberation of Palestine was the common objective of all the groups comprised in the PRM, the deployment of agency differed, mainly due to the differences in the understanding of concepts like power, its limits and uses, and political attitudes towards its exercise in its different dimensions (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 162).

Figure 3 Two examples of the depiction of the "unity of the gun". On the left Fatah´s emblem; on the right PLF´s emblem. Work reproduced from FOTW Flags Of The World website at http://flagspot.net/flags/, produced by Eugene Ipavec.

Among these dimensions was international political influence. Fatah looked for regional status and international recognition (Sayigh Y. , 1997, p. 128), which they got from their hegemonic position in the PLO. But the potentially interested main actor, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), did not share the PLO´s goal of displacing Israel, a state they fully recognised (Sayigh Y. , 1997, p. 148). This resulted in an ambivalent relationship, periodically shifting depending on major external events, where both parties had, at times contradictory operational goals (Gerges, 1997, pp. 142-144; Sayigh Y. , 1997, pp. 132-133). In this scenario, the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, *al-Jabhah al-Sha´abiyah li-Tahrir Falasteen*) superseded the Palestinian component of the ANM in 1967, embraced a proletarian identity and Marxism-Leninism as their political tenet, standing by the idea of a unified communist party, as part of an Arab communist movement (Gerges, 1997, p. 146; Sayigh Y. , 1997, p. 147). Furthermore, the DFLP (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, *al-Jabhah al-Dimuqratiyah li-Tahrir Falasteen*), split from the PLFP, claiming the need to approach the USSR and distance from bourgeoise Arab stances (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 94; Sayigh Y. , 1997, p. 144).

The rampant turmoil in Lebanon, particularly the armed confrontations between the army and the Palestinian resistance in the South, eventually lead to the signing of the Cairo Accord in late 1969 (Winslow, 2005, pp. 155-158). The *de facto* presence of the PRM was turned *de jure*, the Palestinians would be granted with the following rights:

- employment, movement, and residence;
- forming of committees in the refugee camps;
- forming of security forces in the refugee camps;
- engaging in armed operation against Israel;
- securing the routes to the Arqub region in the South of Lebanon;
- release of prisoners and impounded weapons (Siklawi, 2017, p. 926)

During its period of institutionalised and relative autonomy, the PLO developed social, cultural, and economic institutions comparable to those of a state. It also provided a renewed sense of Palestinian identity, standing behind the longing of a structure that would open up a new horizon for their agency and embody their hopes. The area of the refugee camp had been originally devised as a zone of exclusion and discontinuation of citizenship and rights. A heterotopia, a space within a space that, albeit sharing the same geographical reality, formed a distinct reality in regards to the socioeconomic, political, and juridical dimensions (Foucault, 1994, pp. 175-185).

As a result of its internal politization, and subsequent reflection on Lebanese soil, the Palestinian refugee camps dwellers compelled the redefinition of its statutory identity and agency. Thus, the agents inhabiting the heterotopia put into effect a paradigm shift, a de-structuration of the out-space, shifting the identity of the camp itself (its self-concept and self-assessment as a self-shaping entity) from an enclosed exclusion zone, to an active enclave, reaching the ability to improve its own life conditions. These achievements brough a new phase on the PRM and PLO, as they would have to face three main sets of issues regarding their presence in Lebanon: Managing the structures and services related to the refugee camps and beyond; confronting the Israeli state in the military field; and keeping a balance and their own independence in front of the Arab stakeholders of the region, who contributed to the cause via financial resources[9], and composed an interested audience regarding their performance (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 173; Sayigh Y. , 1997a, p. 448).

Inwards, popular committees were created in the refugee camps. Their members were chosen by the different political factions, not by the inhabitants. The committees´ tasks consisted of managing

[9] Mainly Saudi Arabia (Laffin, 1985, pp. 13-14).

the public space in matters of security, administration, hygiene, and the cultural aspects of everyday life. (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 179-180). Social relations between the Palestinians and part of the Lebanese population were readjusted, as a result of the shift of the perception of their identity. Previously stigmatised, the deployment of their agency, in the form of institutions parallel to the ones of the Lebanese state, brought with it the perception of a rather vanguardist community Now fighters for the revolution, free to express a folklore that brought back the figure of the *fellah*, his modernised *keffiyeh* (Swedenburg, 1995, p. 95; Gatrell, 2013, p. 138), as a symbol of their folkloric roots, national struggle and icon of unity, along with the key symbolising return, and the weapon, as a tool for liberation.

However, and even if the Cairo Accords were meant to establish a ceasefire between the army and the PRM and its Lebanese allies, tension and clashes never stopped. The high level of success achieved by the PRM (Sayigh Y. , 1997a, p. 359) fed the feeling of sovereignty loss in certain sectors of the Lebanese society. Mistrust and suspicion were notable, particularly among Maronite-dominated rightist parties, who considered the refugees a security issue and a burden for the country (al-Natour & Dalal, 2007), which contributed to an increased animosity by the right-wing Phalangists. Israeli involvement was intensified, with the objective of destabilising Lebanon (Siklawi, 2017, p. 926). Likewise, the USA grew concerned with the achievements of the progress of the PRM and its Lebanese allies, offering political support for a harder position against them (Gerges, 1997, p. 94)

The main purpose of the different groups of the PRM was recruitment. Holding to the war operations was a priority in view of the opposing forces´ strength. Some of the factions offered incentives such as social benefits, but few tried to offer social projects to the overall population without the requirement of enlisting. (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 180). The *de facto* rule of the PLO was spread from West Beirut, where its core would reside, to the South of Lebanon; and from the sea to the Syrian border (Laffin, 1985, p. 13), thus the need for workforce was notable. As for the tools of the trade, from 1973 on, the USSR provided military and material support[10] to a force of 15,000 (Sayigh Y. , 1997a, pp. 144-147; Laffin, 1985, pp. 13-14).

Some accounts speak of a darker side of this Palestinian *de facto* rule. Accounts of blackmail, bribery, and threats of violence against politically non-complying Muslim population who demanded restoring the Lebanese authority (Laffin, 1985, p. 16). Within the Palestinian community, revolutionary consciousness and ambition did not run parallel to the degree of organisation, due to

[10] Mostly through the instrumental ties with the DFLP (Sayigh Y. , 1997a, pp. 144, 147), although the USSR saw Fatah as the main way of influencing the PLO (Sayigh Y. , 1997b, pp. 151-152).

the fragmentation of and competition between the different factions, according to Sayigh (2007, pp. 179, 181), due to «a multiplicity of authority centres [… and] an overemphasis on ideological differences which were often irrelevant to the real problems faced by the Palestinian people», thus support to the factions did not translate in capabilities relevant to the conditions of day-to-day life.

Under this scenario, armed confrontation did not cease. Israeli military operations continuously stroke Lebanon under the excuse of permitting the presence of the PRM, effectively carrying out a collective punishment, and even invading and occupying regions of Lebanon during 1972. The strategy paid off, as the PRM was branded an occupation army by a sector of the Lebanese Cabinet, specifically, a sector who could not adopt a hard stance opposed to Israel without triggering the resentment of the USA (Gerges, 1997, p. 93). A rise of the tension resulted in the signing of the Melkart Protocol in 1973, as a means of limiting the area of operation of the PRM (Siklawi, 2017, pp. 926-928).

However, the pragmatism of the PLO provided ambivalent results on the international field. From 1973 on, the objective was attaining self-determination (reference to statehood would come later, in 1977) for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For this goal, Fatah, as the hegemonic faction, saw the need of compelling the USA administration to accept the PLO´s as a party in the negotiation, with the recognition of the self-determination as a bargaining chip (Gerges, 1997, p. 134; Sayigh Y. , 1997b, p. 131). This caused criticism from the PLO parties closer to the USSR, who, in their normative view of political alliances, criticised the move. Internal disarray increased when the Fatah administration took stern measures against the dissidents (Sayigh Y. , 1997a, pp. 136-137). Stuck between the limited options of non-state actor in the geopolitical scenery, the PLO´s choices were restrained by the Cold War rivalry, the shifting priorities of the blocs, and the complex Arab political landscape (Sayigh Y. , 1997a, pp. 134-139, 153-154; 1997b, p. 153), the latter additionally complicated by the Arab-Israeli War in October 1973 (Dawisha, 1997; Sayigh Y. , 1997a, p. 140). Notwithstanding, soon after the conflict, the Arab Summit of November recognised the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians (Siklawi, 2017, p. 928). Shortly after, the UN admitted the PLO as an observer (UNGA, 3236 (XXIX). Question of Palestine, 1974).

Meanwhile, the potentiality of an open armed conflict in Lebanon, present for a long time, was reaching a peak point, influenced by «economic and social inequality between certain sectors and confessions within the population» (Wadie, 2001, p. 126), among which the Christians had held the upper hand, especially in the economic field, while the Muslims, particularly the Shiite community, lived in poorer conditions. The complex question of identity in Lebanon was about to take the shape of a callous armed conflict.

1.5.c. Civil War: new old order

Mounting since 1968, Israeli military meddling, along with Lebanon´s structural identity issues the rise to power of the PRM, and the instability owing to the shifting stages of the regional Cold War, induced that some groups organised around rightist Christian axes felt increasingly threatened by the perceived Muslim-leftist organisation (Laffin, 1985, p. 10). During this time, Lebanon was not exempt of its own brand of violence. For example, intra-Christian violence engendered assassinations, pitting political factions and militias against each other, adding to the tension confronting trans-communitarian camps.

The Civil War in Lebanon was actually a fifteen-year sequence of conflicts and civils wars (Fisk, 2001; Hirst, 2010, pp. 99-235; Traboulsi, 2012, pp. 193-245). The incidents of 13 April 1975 in Beirut neighbourhood Ain el-Remmeneh, the "Black Sunday", commonly thought of as the kick-start of the war (O´Ballance, 1998, pp. 1-17; Winslow, 2005, pp. 173-177, 181-193), involved unidentified gunmen shooting at a Phalange gathering, to which phalangist militia answered by shooting at a bus of Palestinians, killing 26 people and wounding 29. A day later, initially as a response to the massacre, the fronts started to solidify, as Palestinian militia and Lebanese parties (the soon to be Lebanese Nationalist Movement, LNM) started acting together, first politically and then militarily, among accusations of the CIA´s implication in the arming of Maronite militias (Sayigh Y. , 1997a, p. 361).

1.5.c.i. First phase, Syrian intervention

In 1976, the PLO-LNM had drove the Christian militias to the mountains. Initial efforts aimed at extinguishing confrontation were undermined by the very Lebanese president secret authorisation of the army´s assistance to Maronite militias; while the prime minister, compelled by the Phalange to resign, proposed measures for reform and national reconciliation (Sayigh Y. , 1997a, p. 362). Notwithstanding the attempts at convening a peaceful exit, internal struggle within both sides increased political fragmentation.

The first phase of the civil war mainly pitted Palestinian and left-wing forces against right-wing Christian Maronite militia (Traboulsi, 2012, pp. 193-210). The Syrian army was invited by part of the Lebanese government, to prevent the victory of the LNM and restore control over the country, siding with the Lebanese right-wing. This move was granted a reluctant blessing by the USA administration, its fears reassured, but seeing in the Syrian intervention a possible return to a stability of its liking (Gerges, 1997, p. 94; Winslow, 2005, pp. 211, 281). It also caused further division among the

Lebanese parties, and within the Palestinian community, which ultimately led to conflict within the PRM (Siklawi, 2017, p. 928; Sayigh Y. , 1997a, p. 366). During this time, as well as since the *fellaheen* period, women seemed to show unity among Palestinians as a priority value (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 219), representing a counterweight in the face of regional and international meddling.

Right wing Christian militias eliminated Palestinians in East Beirut and destroyed the three main camps in the area, massacres like Tel al-Za´tar refugee camp were ensued. Home to around 20,000 Palestinian refugees in East Beirut in 1976, Syrian government-supported Maronite militias subjected the camp to daily sniper fire, shelling, and deprivation of water and supplies for 55 days with the pretext of an increasing presence of Palestinian Resistance forces. As a result, 3,500 people were killed and the camp razed to the ground by bulldozers (Sayigh Y. , 1997a, pp. 395-403). A cycle of violent reprisals had just started. As a retaliation for East Beirut, Palestinians and members of the Leftist Alliance stormed Damour, a coastal village south of the city (Fisk, 2001, pp. 98-100).

1.5.c.ii. Second phase, proxies and internal fragmentation

By 1977, the first phase of the war had finished[11]. Not because armed confrontation had ceased, but because the military actors were not aiming at controlling the whole Lebanese territory, but regions of it, as proxies of a regional and/or global battlefield (Traboulsi, 2012, pp. 211-220). Despite the shock, or maybe because of it (Klein, 2007), the Lebanese banking sector took new actors in, due to Law 77/1977. Since 1977 until 1990, some banks underwent strong change, while new banks were created, mixing Lebanese businessmen linked to militias, transnational capital executives, or a "blend of both with no financial-sector experience (Goenaga Sánchez, 2016, p. 269).

There were different but tightly related categories of armed conflicts from 1977 on, ranging from turf battles to intercommunal and proxy wars (Winslow, 2005, pp. 205-210). Among the Palestinians too, a rift was created. A section of Fatah, closer to the Soviet geopolitical and ideological precepts, moved closer to and established a secret alliance with Soviet-connected regional stakeholders. PFLP and DFLP pushed towards a closer relation to Soviet grounds, noting their enmity with the "Palestinian right wing". (Sayigh Y. , 1997b, p. 151).

Nevertheless, the PRM remained steadfast in its offensive against Israel. Furthermore, an operation carried out inside Israeli territory (Siklawi, 2017, p. 929), put out an alert concerning the security

[11] It is significant that, at the time Rosemary Sayigh´s book "The Palestinians" was published, in 1979, she refers to it as the "end of the civil war".

concerns of the Israeli State. This, along with the widespread disarray in Lebanon (Gerges, 1997, p. 96), co-determined Operation Litani in 1978. The Israeli army occupied southern Lebanon, with the assistance of the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA), ultimately laying siege to Beirut, achieving the aim of pushing PLO out, and imposing Israel sympathizer Bashir Gemayel as president of Lebanon. Apart from getting rid of the PRM presence in the area, and additional objective consisted in the destabilisation of the sectarian balance in Lebanon (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 19). This operation triggered a response from the UN, in the form of the creation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), for the restoration of peace and Lebanese authority in the South (Laffin, 1985, p. 18; Winslow, 2005, p. 213). The involvement of the UN supposed the nominal end of the attempt of invasion by Israel.

The *fedayeen* withdrew from the South, but their operations did not stop and had an effect in the local inhabitants. As the southern Lebanese population´s perception shifted to seeing the PRM as one of the root causes of their problems, Amal, the main Lebanese Shi´ite movement saw the opportunity of drafting disaffected Shi´a PRM members, as well as capitalising on the fact that the PLO endorsed Saddam Hussein[12] (Siklawi, 2017, p. 930). The Egyptian and Israeli states reached a peace agreement (Karsh, 1997, pp. 181-184) in the Camp David Accords (1978), sponsored by the USA. In addition to their bidirectional matter, the agreement involved the issue of the occupation of the Palestinian territories, once more, without the participation of the Palestinians themselves. This triggered, once again, the intertwining of local, regional, and global political enmities, partially due and as a reaction to this accords, the Palestinian National Council and the USSR became officially allies in 1979 (Sayigh Y. , 1997b, pp. 146-151), forcing the PLO and all the forces contained within, to become clearly positioned in the Cold War scenario, although this partnership proved to be yet another knot in the already complicated regional balance of interests (Sayigh Y. , 1997a, pp. 140-142).

1.5.c.iii. Third phase, Sabra and Shatila massacre

In the peak of PLO´s military prowess (Laffin, 1985, pp. 28-33), by 1982, Fatah responded violently to the Shi´ite community´s rejection, even bombarding entire villages (Siklawi, 2017, p. 930). Now a “war for liberation for Palestinians”, who «rarely cared to debate the morality of what they were doing to the Lebanese» (Fisk, 2001, p. 75). While Beirut was the scenario of a shift in alliances (Winslow, 2005, p. 212), the Israeli state found in the situation confronting the Shi´ite

[12] Saddam Hussein, Sunni president of Iraq and member of the Arab Socialist Ba´ath party, was seen as an antagonist of the Shi´i majority in Iraq and beyond, due to the restraints placed by his government on the Shi´ite community.

community and the PRM in the South a context for opportunity (Traboulsi, 2012, pp. 214-219). “Peace for Galilee” operation counted on the support of the Phalange, bound for pushing away the Palestinians (Winslow, 2005, pp. 222-227; Siklawi, 2017, pp. 931-932). With the help of the Lebanese right-wing militias, Israeli forces reinforced their presence in East Beirut while laying siege to West Beirut. The Lebanese government called for the evacuation of the Palestinian *fedayeen*, with the assistance of a multinational forces (MNF) for the management of the retreat of the PLO. This international intervention was mixed with the ambition of some Lebanese parties´ intention of intermediating with the USA, offering their country as a connection to the Middle East (Gerges, 1997, pp. 96-97; Traboulsi, 2012, pp. 221-225). Only two days after the withdrawal of the PLO, a support of this project, head of the Lebanese right-wing Bashir Gemayel was elected president, encouraged and assisted by the MNF and the Israeli military presence (Siklawi, 2017, p. 933).

However, soon after his election, Gemayel and 18 phalangists were assassinated by a member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. Notwithstanding the details of the assassination[13], the event was a good enough excuse for the military alliance of the Phalange and the Israeli army to carry out the massacre of Palestinians and low-class Shi´ite Lebanese in Shatila refugee camp and surrounding poverty belt Sabra (al-Hout, 2004; Laffin, 1985, p. 170; Sayigh R. , 1994, pp. 117-122; Hirst, 2010, pp. 138-165), led by Elie Hobeika, Phalange leader, whose fiancée had been murdered in the massacre of Damour by Palestinians in 1976 (Fisk, 2001, p. 387); apart from other acts of destruction and murder (Fisk, 2001, pp. 341-466, 638-689), including, among others, the bombardment of Ain el-Hilweh refugee camp.

The Israeli occupation of South Lebanon did not put a total end to the PRM in Lebanon. However, internal disagreements increased among members of PLO, a fact capitalised mainly by Syrian actors, who gained enough influence in its structures as to challenge the official leadership of the organisation (Sayigh R. , 1994, pp. 31, 140-141; Siklawi, 2017, pp. 933-934).

1.5.c.iv. Fourth phase, War of the Camps

The remainder of the PRM members could not carry out activities like they used to since the signing of the Cairo Agreement. Prosecution and fear were back among the Palestinians in Lebanon. Those not afraid and in hiding, had been imprisoned or deported. Some of the camp dwellers saw that the PRM had forgotten the camps, to focus on the Lebanese political scene (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 218),

[13] The authorship of the assassination was disclosed later.

the open activity of the popular committees was out of the question. However, although under a different guise, Palestinians kept the fight going. Some retained organisational work in the camps, in alternate or clandestine ways (Hanafi & Long, 2010, p. 151); others joined the ranks of Lebanese militias in their fight against Israelis and the Lebanese right-wing in different fronts.

Nevertheless, the events of the confrontation all around Lebanon shifted the balance of power. Syria, at the peak of its hegemony in Lebanon (Gerges, 1997, p. 98), controlled the North of Lebanon and backed part of the Shi´ite Muslims of Lebanon, aligned with the Amal movement. In 1984, two years after the Israeli invasion, Amal took control of West Beirut (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 141), former stronghold of the PLO. The Shi´ite community had inhabited the surroundings of camps like Shatila since the rise in quantity and quality of the Israeli State´s attacks on the South in the beginning of the 70s. Sharing the same cultural and class background, they partook in the same civil and military structures. Nonetheless, the search for hegemony by Amal started shifting this relation, cultural-religious elements began to play a bigger role in differentiation, reinforced by the perceived injustice stemming from the exclusive assistance offered by UNRWA (Sayigh R. , 1994, pp. 221-222).

Eventually, those who had fought the same enemy and still shared the same socioeconomic position, ended up fighting each other for almost five years. In areas of the South, the Israeli army withdrew and handed over security to Amal (Traboulsi, 2012, p. 232). The confrontation for the control of the camps consisted not so much of direct confrontation as bombardment, which proved particularly destructive during the years of 1986 and 1987 (Winslow, 2005, pp. 249-255). Combat with the scattered PRM members burst out of the perimeters of Shatila and Bourj al-Barajne refugee camps, despite the former being the centre of attention, because of its historical importance as the nucleus of the *muqawamah*. The cramped and maze-like distribution of Shatila, which could have been thought of as a disadvantage, meant an edge that was however addressed by sniper fire from neighbouring Sabra. Snipers indiscriminately took the lives of women trying to get supplies, or UNRWA workers assisting the survivors (Winslow, 2005, p. 254; Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 265).

Overall, the war and sieges (Sayigh R. , 1994, pp. 231-319) costed around 2,500 lives, although no exact figures exist. The resistance carried out by the Palestinian camp dwellers lead to the partial rapprochement of the components of PLO. But with the abrogation of the Cairo Agreement by the Lebanese government in 1987, while the First *Intifada* was raging in Palestine, the situation of the Palestinians in Lebanon would be back to one of abandonment and desperation.

1.5.c.v. Ta´ef Agreement

No community in Lebanon endured the civil war without experiencing inter- and intracommunal violence and displacement (Traboulsi, 2012, pp. 244-245) Every party carried out acts of violence and revenge, based not only on physical but also emotional violence (Frijda, 2007, pp. 262-263; LAW, 2021). Destruction was not brought to a halt until the application of the Ta´ef agreement (UN DPPA, 1989), signed and ratified by the end of 1989, by the Lebanese Parliament (Winslow, 2005, pp. 264-266; Traboulsi, 2012, pp. 246-252). The provisions contained in this document for national reconciliation stated, among others, the freedom of the Lebanese State and its Arab identity; the principles for administrative decentralisation; and the arrangements for the relationships with the Syrian presence and the Israeli occupation of part of its territory.

The war period had left Lebanon in the brink of collapse. The state, whose *laissez-faire* had endowed Lebanon the "Switzerland of the Middle East" motto, proved incapable of recovery without an external support (Gaspard, 2004, p. 145; Traboulsi, 2012, pp. 238-243; Winslow, 2005, p. 2). The withdrawal of deposits, the destruction, and the dependence towards foreign capital, as well as the speculation and plundering by the militias and government officials left the Lebanese lira devaluated, a high inflation and a soaring public debt (Traboulsi, 2012, pp. 233-234).

Under the effective tutelage of the Syrian State, institutionalised as such in the Ta´ef Agreement, the Lebanese Republic´s refoundation aimed, again, at a fair balance of power distributed among the different communities. This would be carried out via the amendment of the constitution of 1926, while having in mind the unwritten National Pact of 1943. In virtue of this pact and in practice, the official aim of invalidating the political sectarianism remained a dead letter, proving the inadequacy of considering the Lebanese State a consociational democracy (Fakhoury, 2014, pp. 240-243), but actually stating the reconsolidation of the politics of sectarianism (Salloukh, Barakat, Al-Habbal, Khattab, & Mikaelian, 2015). The higher state positions were distributed along the same lines, that is, the prime minister would still need to be a Sunni Muslim, the president a Christian Maronite, and the speaker of Parliament a Shi´ite Muslim. Under the supervision of the Syrian State, Elias Hrawi became president, Rafik Hariri prime minister, and Nabih Berri speaker of Parliament.

The Palestinians in Lebanon also tried to reach an agreement regarding their presence in Lebanon. In an effort to regain a charter in the lines of the Cairo Agreement, Palestinian speakers called for refugee civic rights. Close to the end of 1991, they submitted a memorandum to the government, asking for the reopening of the offices of PLO in Beirut, basic labour rights, a certain degree of autonomy of the refugee camps, freedom of press, and a right to national struggle, to no avail (Sayigh

R. , 1994, pp. 325-326). In the name of a new order, an old order was established for the Palestinians in Lebanon. Their predicament had been dealt a setback, but more was yet to come, as ever, at the hands of the interdependence of regional and global issues.

1.6. Lingering Nakba, deepening catastrophe

1.6.a. Gulf War and isolation

The same period the Lebanese State was engaged in a process of national reconciliation the Iron Curtain fell. The USSR would not be, at least for some time, a force to reckon with. Even if feeble as it had been, the Soviet assistance to the Palestinian cause would be no more. Aside from that and the ostracising of Palestinians in Lebanon, a new setback came, originated in the regional-global geopolitical scene.

The PLO had previously sided with Iraq´s Saddam Hussein, who on the onset of 1991 faced Kuwait and the Gulf states, led by the USA, in the Gulf War. Palestinians employed in Kuwait and the Gulf were fired, therefore their refugee relatives saw that source of income, some of them relied upon (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 20), discontinued. In addition, the oil-rich Arab states saw in the Palestinian struggle a source of instability, it added volatility to their business with the Western countries, and therefore stopped financial aid to the PLO (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 326; AI, 2007, p. 6).

Parallelly, the beginning of the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, followed by the Oslo Accords in 1993 and 1995 (UN DPPA, 1993), settled the disavowal of the right of return of the Palestinian refugees, as well as the refocus of the attention, also by the PLO, in the affairs of the Palestinians inside the Occupied Territories.

Back in Lebanon, the Ta´ef agreement stated that Syrian presence would start to withdraw in 1992. However, tension kept rising, as its implicit presence and its ties with Amal, and increasingly Hezballah, the new hegemonic (and thoroughly religious) resistance, constituted a source of distress among the opposing side of the political spectrum. This fact peaked after the assassination of prime minister Rafik Hariri, one of the main representatives of the anti-Syrian stance. The homicide set off the mass protests of the Cedar´s Revolution in 2005, calling for a withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanese territory. Winslow (2005, p. 273) stated that Syria would not leave Lebanon, unless the occupation of the Golan Heights be resolved[14]. The pressure engendered within the Lebanese society

[14] His rationale for the statement was limited to the interpretation of the state of affairs till the publishing of his book, in 1996.

forced the withdrawal of the Syrian troops and personnel in 2005. Meanwhile, inhabitants of Shatila refugee camp, perceiving a severe neglect by the Popular Committee, intensified by clashes between Palestinian factions inside the camp. Protests led to the initiative to hold elections in the camp, with the aim of constituting a Civic Committee. This new institution was projected as composed exclusively by non-members of Palestinian factions, and coexisting with the Popular Committee. Although successful in fixing the issues that sparked its creation, it was not long lived. Its members resigned, due to pressures, as Issa (2014, pp. 18-28) indicates, owing to the ambiguous nature of faction membership.

1.6.b. July War and invasion of Nahr al-Bared

Israel withdrew completely from Lebanese soil in 2000, the year of the Second *Intifada*, which began with the visit of Ariel Sharon (Israeli minister of Defence during the time of the Shatila massacre) to the al-Aqsa compound in Jerusalem, deemed a provocation by the Palestinian population.

The withdrawal of the Israeli army happened six years before their next operation in Lebanese soil, in 2006, triggered by the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers by Hezballah (Chomsky, 2007, p. xiii), who still waged war against its sworn enemy. The ensuing offensive, focused on the South, laid waste to part of the infrastructure and the economy of Palestinians and southern Lebanese alike (AI, Exiled and Suffering: Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, 2007, p. 6). The Israeli defeat in what came to be called the "July War" offered an insight of the military expertise and technological ability of a newfound feature of Hezbollah, who shared the socioeconomic strata of the Palestinian refugees, as well as the enmity of these towards the State of Israel. By establishing this military milestone, the religious axis made up by the Islamic Republic of Iran, Lebanese Hezballah, and Palestinian Hamas, would now be seen as the opposing force by the Western stakeholders and Israeli State.

On the northern part of the Lebanese Republic however, the situation was different. A combination of official abandonment and disregard of the refugee camps by the Lebanese government, a peculiar residue of the times of the Cairo Agreement mixed with the newer resentment towards the Palestinian refugees, was the new normal in Lebanon. In addition, the fall from grace, favour and financial aid of the leftist organisations gave way to the rise of a more conservative Islamic environment. Nahr al-Bared refugee camp, home to around 30,000 people and close to Tripoli, in the North of Lebanon, was no exception. In 2006, Fatah al-Islam, an Islamic extremist group with ties with al-Qaeda, grew in numbers in the camp, initially with the consent of some of its inhabitants and, particularly, religious authorities (Hanafi & Long, 2010, p. 151).

Eventually, the numbers of Fatah al-Islam grew, and tried to impose its ideological views on the whole camp. Part of the population, and the remainder of the PLO, that is, Fatah[15], rebelled, and, when overwhelmed, asked the Lebanese government for help, who ignored the request (Ouassini, 2013, pp. 24-25). The control of the government was not effective over all its territory, as it excluded the Palestinian refugee camps. Eventually, after internal clashes and operations of Fatah al-Islam outside the camp, peaking with the robbery of a bank, moved the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to engage and sieged Nahr al-Bared camp (Abboud, 2009, pp. 35-36).

One of the biggest internal conflicts since the end of the civil war ensued, as the LAF indiscriminately bombed the camp (Ouassini, 2013, p. 28). After 15 weeks of armed conflict, after which the camp was almost entirely destroyed, around 30,000 Palestinians had to leave their houses, most of which were relocated to neighbouring Beddawi refugee camp (AI, 2007, p. 6). The refugee camp, as a space of exception, was at the crossroad of different security, judicial and political concerns, as its reconstruction put to the test the interests involved (Knudsen, 2018), as, after more than a decade, its completion has not taken place.

1.6.c. Collapse of the Lebanese State

1.6.c.i. Aftermath of the war in Syria

In the wake of the Arab Spring, and as a consequence of the war in neighbouring Syria, the period of 2011 to 2014 supposed a harsh strike of reality with the massive intake of Syrian displaced population. At its peak point, the intake of Syrian displaced people implied that one out of four people in Lebanon was a Syrian displaced person, roughly one million people. Part of the newcomer Syrian refugees managed rent private plots of land in informal tented settlements (ITS). In the midst of a political gridlock, the presence of opposed allegiances concerning, and concerns over security, the Lebanese government refused to arrange refugee camps, thus Syrian refugees had to improvise shelter anywhere, from rented rooms, to buildings under construction. Meanwhile, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), contended in the judicial and political field with the Lebanese government, to ensure a bare minimum of infrastructure to the vast set of requirements engendered.

[15] *Fatah al-Islam* had split from *Fatah al-Intifada*, which likewise had split from Fatah, and was composed of mainly non-Palestinians (Quilty, 2007)

Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) were also relocated to the camps in Lebanon, adding 29,000 people to the already strenuous conditions. Furthermore, the overall stress produced by the situation in the economic sphere, affects the reconfiguration of donations and the social bearings towards the refugees, deepening the effects of marginalisation (Fakhoury, 2017). Regional instability and inefficient government policy, a widespread reality in the region, added to the particularities of Lebanese policy-making, hindered the already worsening situation of every refugee in Lebanon.

1.6.c.ii. Civil disobedience, global pandemic and Beirut port blast

During October of 2019, part of the Lebanese inhabitants´ patience with the ruling class burst into the street. Tired of socio-economic and political neglect, and on account of new taxes announced by the government, masses of the Lebanese denizens took it to the streets, managed to topple Rafik Hariri´s son, Saad Hariri´s government, paralysed ordinary life, and brought the political scene to a halt. The deeply rooted communitarian interdependence dynamics obstructed each new assigned government´s independent procedure and overall practice. Daily life costs kept rising, as inflation and the devaluation of the Lebanese lira started soaring.

In the middle of the socio-political and economic turmoil, the worldwide SARS-CoV-2 pandemic of 2020 added an extra notch to the already serious quagmire. The closure of borders and practically paralysed economy meant even less opportunity for the lower strata of society. The less resources and mobility, the worse the options for a dignified confined life.

Contracting COVID19 was not on the top worries of the Palestinian population of Lebanon, as the ever-worsening conditions posed added strain in their every-day lives in the socioeconomic field. The globalised pandemic was just another disease to deal with, among the broad range of health issues they had been facing for the previous seven decades, living in an environment barely fit for human life. Across Lebanon either, coronavirus hardly made it out of the average conversation about the concerns of the outer world, as the price escalation of basic goods seized the attention. As a matter of fact, the infection levels were far from those in Europe or Asia. That is, before the blast in Beirut Port.

The August explosions in the government-owned Port of Beirut boosted all the previously noxious effects, along with claiming the lives of more than 200 people, injuring thousands, and devastating part of central Beirut. Officially, 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate[16], improperly stored in the port

[16] Until 2022, it has not yet been officially admitted that the equivalence of the explosion could have been due to a lower quantity (500 tons) of fertiliser (Naharnet, 2020).

for seven years, had been accidentally set off. One of the most powerful non-nuclear explosions in history, albeit not the first one in Lebanon (Hirst, 2010, pp. 193-194), deepened the misery of the inhabitants. An official investigation was initiated, but the first judge was dismissed, as he started involving high-ranking government officials in the investigation. A second judge proceeded with the court case, only to reach the same kind of obstructions by the same web of former and current government officials and *de facto* authorities.

Furthermore, the court case took a turn to a higher degree of politization. The Shi´ite block, composed by Amal and Hezballah, blocked the reestablishment of the government cabinet, under the condition that the court case stopped aiming at officials under their range of influence. Supporters of the Shi´ite block took the protest to the streets, prompting an armed conflict, pitting them against supporters of Christian Lebanese Forces political party. Even if the possibility of an armed conflict in the guise of a civil war seems improbable, political confrontation and dire social conditions caused the flight of refugees and Lebanese inhabitants alike.

Those of a higher stratum, with the option of resorting to foreign economic and social capital, left a country that could not meet their expectations; the lower strata, ranging from low-class Lebanese citizens to refugees of different origins, joined the ranks of the already infamous migration routes, taking risks and traversing the paths of inevitable suffering (Bou Mansour, 2020).

1.6.c.iii. The fall of the Lebanese State

Those who remained in Lebanon suffered the consequences of a state falling apart. The inaction of government authorities, repeated failures to form a government, a yet-to-be-approved 2022 budget, and incapability to guarantee services like the provision of water and electricity, proved to be farther-reaching than lower strata. Those supposed to guarantee administration and supply were deprived of them (Naharnet, 2022). What used to be daily life for the poor, had become the national standard for those who were not in the increasing 82% considered poor (ESCWA, 2021), probably higher in 2022.

Lebanon defaulted on its national debt in 2020. Its currency, at the times these lines were written, lost 90% of value (a dollar used to be worth 1,500 lira before the crisis; in 2022, 35,000 lira was equivalent to a dollar). The situation of the State of Lebanon has been branded by the World Bank (2021) as one of the «most severe crises episodes globally since the mid-nineteenth century». Seemingly incapable of overcoming its structural limitations regarding confessional balance, one partially advantageous change for Palestinians was announced in late 2021: prohibition to work in some regulated professions would be lifted for Palestinians, allowing them to legally work. The flight

of Lebanese professionals opening a new perspective in an otherwise uncertain and dark future in Lebanon (UN, 2021), and an even darker and unclear prospective for the Palestinian refugees (UNRWA, 2022).

The partial collapse of the Beirut Port silos, a symbol of the downfall of the Lebanese State, attests the inefficacy of a supposedly consociational system. Sectarianism, its power-sharing formula, and its integration in a global financial market, brought what seemed to be the ultimate of the "cyclical dilemmas and chronic tensions" (Fakhoury, 2019), marginalising even its citizens.

Continuous deadlocks, a bottleneck for the implementation of IMF funds; tension between Hezballah and the State of Israel, amid official negotiations, due to both claiming 860 square kilometres to the Mediterranean natural gas field; prisons overcrowded to 300% (Middle East Monitor, 2022); an army that cannot be paid; citizens reappropriating part of their deposits from authorities not held accountable, and occasionally occupying government offices. Part of the picture of modern-day Lebanon.

1.7. Summary

Pre-Mandate Palestinians needed not concepts like "nation" nor "state" for the development of their lives. Similarly to what happened to other communities around the globe, the anthropological grounds of the Palestinians who lived out of extracting value from the land revolved around family, clan and village, a concentric model of significance and affiliation, ranging from biological to political kinship.

Land defined the sense and organisation of these ties. Economy, politics, and demography set the range of possibilities regarding the usage (and later property) of soil. The ecological possibilities offered by soil established how these dimensions interdepended. Relationship towards land was primarily what identified one´s position in the community, somewhat social identity; while it also co-determined possibilities for action, the production of one´s conditions of existence; all in a cultural framework, a system of survival built up throughout time, tending towards the reproduction of ways of feeling, thinking, and doing.

The development of the institutionalisation of practice, ruled by the Ottoman Empire (a major actor in a specific position in a wider geopolitical landscape), aimed at the expansion of its reach, led to the privatisation of land. At a period when the materiality of land would be transposed to legal ownership and demarcation of nation-states, a shift regarding the relation between territoriality and identity took place.

Palestinians in need of dealing with the harsh materiality of extracting value from the soil for their own subsistence did not keep up with the paradigm shift. Palestinians who historically developed a relationship to land based on the revaluation of that extraction though, occupied social positions closer to the promoters of the transformation. The latter were permeated by notions such as "nation" earlier, while the former needed the shock of the intervention of extraneous elements, like the European and Zionist immigration (far more knowledgeable about the dynamics at play), bound to alter their relationship to the land, in order to keep the accumulation of capital going. Only then did the dawn of the idea of a unitarian Palestinian identity commence to bear political organisational fruit.

Zionist colonisation at large seemed to understand the nature and rationale behind the ongoing changes: nation, land, sovereignty, state. Meanwhile, the Palestinian higher class did not appear to consider them as different from the rest of the European immigrants. Only when the aggression to the traditional Palestinian way of life became evident did the awareness of the developing paradigm shift take place.

The succession of consequences of the delayed onset of this awareness went through different stages. Starting with the transition to modernity, urban displacement and proletarisation brought new perspectives and a glimpse of the future to come, as a marginalised community in the social periphery. The great exodus of the Nakba transformed this social marginalisation into a spatial one, once the refugees were confined to the territoriality of Lebanon, one of the new states, wired for intermediation and serfdom, for the sake of accumulation of capital, and ruled by the new patterns of exclusive institutionalised identities.

Terms used in politics and geography are no naïve innocent conceptions, but significant displays of cultural power. The emergence of the modern Palestinian national awareness mixed with old fashioned notions of honour and loyalty, as the adaption process developed into a renewed and empowered version of themselves, longing for the return to an idealised past territory, raised as a cultural and political bond. The defeat became the spark; the key: the objective; the weapon: the means; the peasant: the mythos.

Ways of feeling, thinking, and acting, come co-determined by the transpiration of history, its embodiment, residing in both individual and culture. A culture which, along with the social factors amongst others, affect the configuration of identity and agency. By means of cultural transmission, attachment to tradition got a symbolic function through the restoration of Palestinian self-awareness in the ethnic, social, and political identity fields. The collectivism of the *fellaheen*, as part of the cultural frame, shaped the standards for the adaptive ability for the transformation of their conditions

of existence, their agency. Steadfastness developed and remodelled the refugee camp as a space of creation, collaboration, and overcoming of exclusion. Yet, resort to this tradition came juxtaposed with a darker side. Patronising biases, founded on a male chauvinist heritage, contributed to fragmentation along the lines of ideology, making militancy more sensitive to doctrine than to material and social reality.

Moreover, power-play of regional and global actors meant for the Palestinian revolutionary movement, as a non-state player, an absence of leverage in the wider landscape, despite their rise to power for a brief period. Dramatic confrontations, collective traumas, and historical dispositions oftentimes consider the "Palestinian people" and their agency, although internal division seems to play an important role.

The accuracy and analytical capacity of conceiving a general category of "Palestinians" (or "Palestinian refugees", or "Palestinians in Lebanon") does not seem to adjust to the difference in understanding the varied degrees of competencies displayed regarding the transformation of their conditions of existence. On top of that, it is important to have in mind the possible effect of the narrative fallacy (Taleb, 2007, pp. 62-84, 100-121), that is, the bias of seeing in historicism and the highlighting of the agency of specific actors (factions, militias, political parties, etc.) a complete picture of causality, a delusion we tell ourselves, in order to understand (and reduce) the complexities of the matter. In addition, parts of the historical resources themselves are biased, as some archives have been dismantled (Gatrell, 2013, p. 119), and those that remain often give prominence to men, to the detriment of women (Krämer, 2008, p. 40). Diving deeper into the matter, via a multidimensional approach through the experience of the current day actors and actresses, might cast a light on the issue, concerning the relational underpinning of identity and agency.

2. Methodological approach

This thesis is of a qualitative nature. The historical contextualisation of the first chapter, comprised of the development through time of the conditions, the main events, and their agents have been briefly exposed. This constitutes the background against which the theoretical concepts will be confronted. As for the theoretical framework, the sequence of concepts, ideas and frames revolving around the integrative and relational nature of social causality points towards this very chapter, where the approach adopted will be specified, under the logic of epistemology and concrete techniques contained in the dissertation will be explained.

Human behaviour has been outlined in the previous chapter. A complex system where social causation sees the individual dispositions, acquired through social structures (in turn produced in a sociohistorical process) and subjectivised in agency, is confronted with reflexive deliberations, which take into account the capacity for introspection, that is, seeing the own self as a part of a whole.

This same principle can be applied to the researcher, who, far from being an abstract and neutral entity, has an own set of dispositions and biases. The very selection of the topic for research suggests social locatedness, as the gaze is directed towards a specific object and no other possible lines of exploration, encompassed in a specific approach.

"Approach", as a wider notion containing theory and methodology (Porta, della & Keating, 2008, p. 1) in scientific research, feeds from a broader perspective. In the case of this dissertation, the epistemological part has been partially and implicitly included in the exposition of the theoretical framework, departing from philosophical accounts, and arriving to the possibility of social causal explanation for the behaviour of agents; in the present case, the Palestinians in Lebanon.

As a first step in the methodological path, the guiding principles of this thesis, the objectives and research questions, will be exposed. In order to draw from the work already produced, as well as in search of valuable conceptual and theoretical inspiration (Bryman, 2012, pp. 4-5), the epistemological approach will be exhibited then, so the logic of the research can be explicitly located in the abstract (albeit hopefully clarifying) terms of the principles guiding the dissertation. In addition, a brief personal outline of the basis of the interest will be included, as personal experience also accounts for the research interest (Bryman, 2012, pp. 7, 19-20). At a later chapter (*Vid*. *Infra*, 5.), we will move to the concrete, revealing the specific techniques employed.

2.1. Objectives and research questions

Previous academic and personal experience has, to some extent, shaped the intellectual goals of this project (Maxwell, 2013, pp. 35-43, 54). My previous knowledge of the history and present circumstances of the Palestinian population in the Middle East conditioned my choice in the academic field. As a result of a longer process, the more basic and elementary notions gathered gave way to an interconnected and expanding set of interests, which gave free rein to an excessively wide range of questions. At the core of the internal conversation regarding the intellectual goal was the following question: how have the Palestinians been able, for more than 70 years, to keep a steadfast stance, regarding their identity and rights to be treated "better" (Khalidi, 2010; Sayigh R. , 2007; Said, 1999)? How did they manage to survive so many hardships, and even establish themselves as the image of relentlessness and rebellion (Sayigh R. , 1994; Sayigh Y. , 1997a), in the face of a manifold of obstacles?

From the focus adopted in the chapter concerning the historical account of the contemporary Palestinian presence in Lebanon, it is possible to draw the direction of the interest at the core of this dissertation. On the one hand, an apparently endless string of events seems to point out at the "fate" of the majority of Palestinians in Lebanon; however, since "fate" does not belong to our scientific toolset, we do not assume an irrevocable fatalistic determination of their future. On the other hand, the transition from different matrixes of identity seems to have correlated to varying degrees of agency. This would additionally invalidate any aforementioned fatalistic determination, as other paths have been proven possible, albeit in a different set of circumstances, but in dire conditions nonetheless. The literature review question, regarding the historical context, specifies as follows:

- What are the main events, developments, and actors involved in the timeline related to the contemporary Palestinian presence in Lebanon?

We will assume the possibility of the existence of reflexive agency (*Vid*. *Infra*, 3.4.c.), that is, the capability of individuals to decide to act upon their conditions of existence; overcoming habitus, as a historically transmitted set of subjectivised dispositions that might limit alternate individual assertion and collective ascriptions of identity. We are therefore addressing contingent causal power, or agency, a predominantly subjective quality, thus establishing the guidelines of the dissertation in that direction. At this point, detailing the research questions is due:

- In the occurrence of subjective deliberative reflexivity, contingent on the overcoming of habitus detaching their conditions of existence from their needs, how is identity related to the agency of Palestinians in Lebanon?

    - Is there a common set of assertions between the Palestinians?
    - Which are the most salient identity ascriptions?
    - What are the needs of the Palestinians in Lebanon, stated by themselves?
    - Can a habitus be identified among Palestinians in Lebanon?
        - If so, what are the main elements of the habitus of the Palestinians in Lebanon?
- Is causality a real possibility for the correlation between subjective identity matrixes and deployed agency?
    - If it is, what are the most salient fields in which this causality materialises?
        - Economic field – economic capital (assets, purchasing power)
        - Cultural field – cultural capital/identity capital (embodied, objectified, institutional; practical skills and features, material objects, qualifications, and credentials)
        - Social field – social capital (affiliation to norm circles, network membership, contacts)
        - Emotional attachment – symbolic capital/identity capital (spirituality, activism, caretaking)

2.2. Epistemology

As common as it might appear in everyday life, "knowing" or "knowledge" needs to be structured in order to qualify as "scientific". "Epistemology", a derivative of the Greek "episteme" (ἐπιστήμη) for "knowledge" or "science", can be understood as a theory of knowledge, different from an infused science, as spontaneous knowledge of the social world. It does not seem realistic to think that one single person, from their sole deliberative effort, can carry out from the ground up such an endeavour; in any case, it would not be possible to enact such an effort from an isolated position, as the person is inevitable a part of a whole social system of relationships.

A proposed ideal of scientific research consists in a horizon composed of five characteristics:

- The goal is inference: Making descriptive or explanatory inferences, based on empirical information, including descriptive inference, when unobserved facts are learnt through the observable fact; and causal inference, when causal effects are concluded from the observed facts.

- The procedures are public: In order to contribute to social science, the research needs to use explicit, codified and public methods, so the validity of the process and the results can be validated by the scientific community.
- The conclusions are uncertain: Due to the uncertain nature of knowledge, the conclusions of a research are necessarily an imperfect inference of reality or the causalities taking place in it.
- The content is the method: The validity of the research depends on rules of inference.
- Science is a social enterprise: Research takes place takes in society, placed under individual or collective limitations of knowledge or insight, mistakes and criticism are unavoidable (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, pp. 7-9)

According to Bryman, the criteria concerning social research, in the sense of publicness and evaluation suggested by King, Keohane and Verba (points two, four and five), is threefold, the study needs to be: reliable, concerning the consistency of the concepts; replicable, guaranteeing that the research can be repeated (an uncommon event); and valid, ensuring the integrity of the conclusions, concerning internal validity (valid or logical causality), and external validity (valid or logical generalisability) (Bryman, 2012, pp. 46-47, 389-398)

The approach taken for this dissertation sets aside the arguments posed by some postmodern accounts (Giddens, 1990, pp. 149-150) about the impossibility of the knowledgeability of reality, as well as the extreme claims of impossibility and futility of studying it. The whole endeavour of this thesis would make no sense, as Rosenau points out, oftentimes postmodernists fail to be reflexive enough as to be aware of the contradictions of their claims:

- Building theory from an anti-theoretical standpoint.
- Opposing reason, logic, and rationality as tools for knowledge in the grounds of the necessity of "deconstruction", a logic, rational and analytic tool itself.
- Claiming to avoid moral or preferential judgements, while opting to focus on the "forgotten and isolated", and de-centering social science theory, which reasonably presumes moral choice and preferences.
- Emphasising intertextuality, while treating texts in isolation.
- Opposing the idea of assessing theory, claiming it is an invalid way of judging, although such a statement implies criteria implying certainty.
- Rejecting being hold to consistency norms, while advising against modernity´s inconsistencies, denying any need to avoid self-contradiction.

- Asserting that their writings constitute a local narrative, and nevertheless seldom renounce to truth claims (Rosenau, 1992, pp. 176-177)

Not all authors considered postmodern fall into the same categorisation to the same degree. Some postmodern concepts, some of which are present in this dissertation, can be handled in a specific context, and can wield analytical strength. «We assume that it is possible to have some knowledge of the external world but that such knowledge is always uncertain» (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p. 6), however, some of the tendencies of postmodernism, such as the questioning of authority of hierarchical structures, the propensity to protect local collectives against foreign intervention, and the «renewed respect for the subjective and increased suspicion of reason and objectivity» (Rosenau, 1992, p. 7) might fit in the analytical frame used in this dissertation. Although highly relativist approaches are to be avoided, a pejorative "stigma" of postmodernism (in some cases, arguably ascribed due to lack of understanding) is not going to be taken in this thesis as an automatic motive for rejection. However, the employment of the term "postmodern", when referring to the historical period (Giddens, 1990, pp. 45-53), will be substituted by "later modern", as present-day characteristics do appear to be different from those of the early modern period of the XX century.

Authors with considerable weight in the history of epistemology, such as Kant, proposed transcendental idealism as a way of knowing, the exact opposite of postmodernism. This entails thinking of things-in-themselves, as objects independent of the observer's perception. This dissertation is far from such a perspective but, ironically, we will turn to a philosophy that does originate from the intention of going "back to the things themselves" (Husserl, 1900/2001, p. 168).

2.2.a. Phenomenology

2.2.a.i. Basic phenomenology

Phenomenology, from Greek *phainómenon* (φαινόμενον) and *lógos* (λόγος), as the study of the "phenomena", or objects of the senses and their logic, considers how objects appear to an agent. These objects are anything that can appear to conscious awareness in any of its modalities; therefore, the specifics objects taken into consideration in phenomenology range from real life material things to imaginary objects, concepts, and ideas.

Many of the thinkers included in this dissertation can be considered phenomenologists, as they studied not so much "what" appears to the agent, but "how" it appears to them, that is, what the experience of the "what" is. Descartes (1637/2006) doubted the very existence of the objects experienced, due to the characteristics of human perception; Hume (1739/2007) spoke of the

“impressions of the senses” and the abstract notions originating from “passions” and ideas; Kant´s thought (1781/1998; 1785/1997; 1788/2015) pointed towards the possibility of transcendent objects of though; Hegel (1807/2018) spoke of the “phenomenology of the spirit”, regarding the senses, certainty, understanding, and knowledge. They all put phenomenology to work in different directions. But it was Husserl who made phenomenology a school of though.

As a matter of fact, he reorganised Descartes´s contribution (Husserl, 1931/1960) to the possibility of access to transcendental experience, in the form of the phenomenological discipline, through self-experience and self-investigation:

> Daily practical living is naive. It is immersion in the already-given world, whether it be experiencing, or thinking, or valuing, or acting. Meanwhile all those productive intentional functions of experiencing, because of which physical things are simply there, go on anonymously. The experiencer knows nothing about them (Husserl, 1931/1960, pp. 152-153)

Husserl proposed a transcendental idealism that allowed knowing the sense and meaning of objects (Husserl, 1900/2001, pp. 232-233) through intentional consciousness, and not through metaphysical (Plato, Kant) or mystical (Hegel) assumptions. For this endeavour, he proposed being aware of the fact that awareness is always directed at an object (a material object, an idea, an imaginary concept), because of which, there is an intentionality. Intentionality entails a double aspect of the experience: *noesis* and *noema* (Husserl, 1931/1960, pp. 69-73).

Noema is the intentional (Husserl, 1931/1960, pp. 37-38; 1900/2001, pp. 188-189), the subjective mode of experiencing the object of thought, which includes its meaning or significance (Husserl, 1900/2001, pp. 183-233). Noesis is the real, the object to which the noema refers. In order to understand the significance of the immediate experience, which would ultimately lead to the structure of everyday experience, Husserl suggests the *epoché* (from Greek ἐποχή, for “suspension”) or “bracketing” of what and object “is” or “might be” in itself (Husserl, 1931/2012, pp. 56-60), suspending our assumptions and biases, focusing the attention on the significance of the immediate experience in its own terms:

> This universal depriving of acceptance, this “inhibiting” or “putting out of play” of all positions taken toward the already-given Objective world and, in the first place, all existential positions (those concerning being, illusion, possible being, being likely, probable, etc.), or, as it is also called, this "phenomenological epoché" and "parenthesizing" of the Objective world therefore does not leave us confronting

> nothing. On the contrary we gain possession of something by it; and what we (or, to speak more precisely, what I, the one who is meditating) acquire by it is my pure living, with all the pure subjective processes making this up, and everything meant in them (Husserl, 1931/1960, p. 20)

Taking the concrete immediate experience as a point of departure, phenomenology aims to understand the human experience, seeking to uncover the structures that explain and complete a description based solely on the senses. It is through bracketing, or suspension of the apparent and "natural attitude" (Husserl, 1900/2001, p. 169; 1931/1960, p. 37; 1931/2012, pp. 55-56), that the phenomenological reduction is carried out. The conscious discontinuing of our believes and biases in the natural world, physical and psychological, is conducive to a stage where the structure of these *a priori*s (Husserl, 1931/2012, pp. 110-121), in other words, the «patterns of experience, the attribution of meaning, and the cultural constitution of the life world» (Throop & Murphy, 2002) can be outlined, in a dialectic of internalisation and externalisation, through which what Bourdieu would call "practical sense" could be captured.

2.2.a.ii. Developments of phenomenology

Different kinds of phenomenology exist with different points of departure. They generally move within the spectrum of idealism in one point, and realism in the other, depending on the tendency to explain phenomena relying mostly on the mind, or on additional realities, a descriptive take on phenomenology that goes beyond the mind. One of the main proponents and examples of this end takes form under Beauvoir's feminist phenomenology.

In her phenomenological account of the social distinction of men and women, she describes the relation between the two categories as one constructed on the basis of the representation of myths (Beauvoir, de, 1949/1953, pp. 159-269), where the woman is an "object" to the "subject" of man. Because of the woman's biological ability to bear children, and defined by it, she is kept oppressed on the biological, economic, and psychological levels. She describes the process through which patriarchy was historically established (Beauvoir, de, 1949/1953, pp. 87-157), as a preparation for the phenomenological account (Beauvoir, de, 1949/1953, pp. 273-687), detailing the experiential modes through which, in Bourdieu's terms, could be named the habitus, that has constructed the apparently natural subordination of women, objectified in social structures where men and women partake, reproduced in psychological, practical, economical and moral practices:

> And she is simply what man decrees; thus she is called 'the sex', by which is meant that she appears essentially to the male as a sexual being. For him she is sex – absolute sex, no less. She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute – she is the Other (Beauvoir, de, 1949/1953, pp. 15-16)

By uncovering the underpinning of the discursive practices, she outlined, under the tenets of historical materialism (Beauvoir, de, 1949/1953, pp. 79-86), the meanings that lead to the oppression of patriarchy. As Hall states:

> the theoretical work cannot be fully accomplished without complementing the account of discursive and disciplinary regulation with an account of the practices of subjective self-constitution […] and account of how subjects are constituted […] in reference to historically-specific discursive practices, normative self-regulation] and technologies of the self […] The question which remains is whether we also require to, as it were, close the gap between the two: that is to say, a theory of what the mechanisms are by which individuals as subjects identify (or do not identify) with the `positions´ to which they are summoned; as well as how they fashion, stylize, produce and perform this positions […] In short, what remains is the requirement to think this relation of subject to discursive formations *as an articulation* […] a discursive *phenomenology* […] which is in danger of being overwhelmed by an overemphasis on intentionality – precisely because it cannot engage with the *unconscious* (Hall, 1996, p. 14)

For this endeavour, she distinguished the difference between man and woman in four different ways:

- An empirical category, for the phenomenologically recognisable differentiation between women and men (Beauvoir, de, 1949/1953, pp. 273-672);
- A biological category, for the distinction of male and female, considering in addition intersexuality (Beauvoir, de, 1949/1953, pp. 44-64);
- A psychological category, for the distinction of masculine and feminine (Beauvoir, de, 1949/1953, pp. 65-78);
- A historical category, detailing the historically and culturally constructed concepts (Beauvoir, de, 1949/1953, pp. 57-157).

Beauvoir´s critical phenomenology is an account that considers the realities beyond the mind. One of its sources lies within dialectical materialism, through which Marx, based on Hegel's idea of history as ongoing development process, exposed that it was not a string of ideas that made the world as it is, but the material conditions, as «the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in the mind of man, and translated into forms of thought» (Marx, 1976, p. 102). According to this idea, the way humans perceive and act in the world is determined by the physical and social reality. The force behind change in history is not grounded on the contradiction of ideas as a way of overcoming previous paradigms, but on the ones arising from nature and society, for instance, the contradictions between social relations and productive forces (Marx & Engels, 1846/1998, pp. 50-51, 90-96), which in turn is based on the division of labour, originated in the division of labour in family (Engels, 1884/2010).

One of these contradictions, the one between the labour and capital, and the resulting system of production and exchange of commodities, is considered by Marx and Engels as key for change in society (Marx & Engels, 1848/2002, p. 219). Tensions arise, originated in class antagonism: the owners of the means of production, on one hand, as the oppressors; and the working class, whose only property resides in their workforce, as the oppressed, on the other. Different social formations follow, until the capitalist stage is reached. The contradictions are contained within the basic productive forces and relations, constructed in a dialectical way around a substructure, containing the material social reality (environmental-ecological conditions; material and intellectual productive forces; and social production relations, that is, means of production and the social form of the property and distribution of means and commodities); and the superstructure, made up of the cultural institutions, ranging from Law to religion, with the purpose of obscuring the ideological nature of the system.

Godelier (1977), considered a Marxist structuralist anthropologist, sees the limitations of approaching the study of societies from the exclusive perspectives of philosophy or economy. From his standpoint, going beyond philosophy means having in account the experience of economic relations. On the other hand, economy focuses in positivist terms and fails to makes sense out of society in its whole range, dealing with economy as an autonomous subsystem and understanding other levels of society as "exogenous" variables (Izquieta Etulain, 1986, pp. 8-9).

In this sense, it is crucial to take into consideration the wider sense Marx applies to "mode of production". This would go beyond the acceptation of technical modes of production, and move toward the concept of technical and social conditions as a particular combination of material productive forces and specific social relations of production that constitute the structure of a

historically determined social process of production (Marx, 1932/1988; Marx & Engels, 1846/1998). In other words, production relations are not an abstract economic element, but an intrinsically social part of the infrastructure.

2.2.a.iii. Dialectical phenomenology

With the preceding in mind, shifting the focus to Bologh (1979), the method employed by Marx could be determined as "dialectical materialism". Her methodological commentary of Marx´s Grundrisse (Marx, 1939/1973) is a revision of the theoretical and analytical procedure. She denotes the theoretical effort of overcoming the dichotomy between phenomenological sociology (the consideration of the "micro" level, everyday life), and structural sociology (the "macro" level, regarding political and economic systems). Bologh highlights the scientific requirements of consciousness of the historical grounds, as opposed to the unself-conscious, which in reality is unconsciously historical, "ideological" in Marx's terms[17].

As for the analytical procedure, Bologh points, on one hand, to the interpretation of language, as a way of reproducing social life; and social life itself, in the other hand, as the objectified set of structures of day-to-day life. Regarding the interpretation of language, she proposes the utilisation of Wittgenstein´s concept of "form of life" (Wittgenstein, 1953/2009, pp. 5-13), to highlight the productive relation between subject and object. Even though total consensus around the concept of "form of life" does not exist, we will understand here that it refers to the set of dispositions, patterns, and overall cultural background that makes meanings shareable in a specific collective, configuring, through language, our experience of the world. As a matter of fact, this will be the objective in the next two chapters of this dissertation, and the reason for including the personal account of the interviewees.

Departing from Wittgenstein´s proposal that «to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life» (Wittgenstein, 1953/2009, p. 11e), Bologh (1979, pp. 46-69) associates the concept with the social production that expresses relations and intention, assimilating it to Marx´s "mode of production"

[17] "Ideology" for Marx, in *The German Ideology*, is the set of ideas of a society that correspond and serve the interests of the ruling class (Marx & Engels, 1846/1998, pp. 34-36, 41-43); in *Capital*, "ideology" is the reflection of the substructure, the mode of production (Marx, 1867/1990, pp. 164-167, 172-176; 1939/1973, p. 88). Although there is a difference in the acceptation and significance, both meanings refer to the obscure nature of the apparent, serving the interests of one social class over the other.

to fit it to a wider field, while having in mind phenomenology´s requirement of intentionality in the referral to objects.

If we consider that the meaning of an object is not internal to itself, nor externally produced by the ideation of a subject, then this significance must come from the dialectical and purposive relation between the object and the subject, in which the agent/subject (re)produces themselves in the appropriation and production of the object. This would entail a self-conscious form of life; instead of an unself-conscious form of life, where the object is treated as a "fetish", a value and meaning in itself, independent from the subject/agent. The reappropriation of the object happens only «to the extent that the rules and equipment are consciously re-worked by the players themselves, the players become free subjects of the process, free social individuals», in the likeness of Archer´s deliberative reflexivity.

Using this brand of phenomenology, Bologh proposes to unveil the apparently natural underlying assumptions, on which social objects, such as identity, might be based; considering them not a by-product or epiphenomenon of social structures, nor an autotelic consciousness produced at the core of the individual, but a continuous sociohistorical process (Bologh, 1979, p. xii). Bologh´s reformulation of Marx´s critique of the political economy (a phenomenological endeavour itself) employs phenomenology guided by a set of principles:

> The principle of analysis: Recognize and treat concepts as grounded in an historically specific form of life.
>
> The principle of action: Recognize and treat individuals as grounded in an historically specific form of life. Individuals both reproduce and are produced and limited by the totality of which they are a part.
>
> The principle of subjectivity: Recognize and treat a form of life as a totality of internal relations. That which enables one to see phenomena as internally related, that which makes them into a self-moving being or totality.
>
> The principle of growth: Recognize and treat a concrete form of life as contradictory. The contradictions are embodied in internal struggles of opposition (Bologh, 1979, pp. 30-31, 33-69)

The historical specificity of the account of the agents might be had in mind through the awareness of the historical context it takes place at (principles of analysis and action). Concerning the subjectivity, the phenomenological reduction, via *epoché*, can gather the phenomena as the

experiential object the agent reveals. Yet, recognising a form of life as contradictory might entail the relational nature of intention, as agency might not be the completely autonomous feature a reified account might offer. Would it be possible to trace the causality involved in intention and the production of meaning? The answer might lie within a critical realist version of the theory of emergence.

2.2.b. Critical realism and emergence

One of the general problems related to the connection between epistemology and methodology seems to reside in the perspective regarding science (Bryman, 2012). Positivism is one of the discarded options. Considering social science as the result of the perceivable via the senses, sieved through reason, does not seem to fit researching the object of this dissertation: the complexities introduced by the intentional and relational nature of identity and agency, along with the effects of social structures. Assuming that the human social world functions based on positivist laws would mean, for instance, turning a blind eye to the properties and effects of separate entities which, unbeknown to the senses and narrow reason, create meaning for individuals and collectives.

Among authors considered in this dissertation, we will find Hume (1739/2007) and Durkheim (1893/2013; 1897/2012; 1912/1995), who to an extent are considered positivists and empiricists. On top of forcing the limits of the tenets of empiricism and positivism, their thought contributed highly valuable ideas, some of which will be exhibited in this document. However, restraining our attention to what the senses and reason alone can apprehend, as a rule, will not be the perspective adopted in this thesis.

From empiricism and positivism other currents arose, for instance, the logical empiricism of authors like Wittgenstein (1921/2002; 1953/2009), who will also have a significant contribution to this text. From empiricist, positivist, and pragmatist approaches, postpositivist and postempiricist stances developed, paving the way for scientific disciplines, based on a scientific method. As self-restrained domains of knowledge, history, sociology, psychology, anthropology, linguistics, political science, among other disciplines, perform an attempt at understanding “wholes”, or fragments of a specific whole. Along with the process of the division of labour, the specialisation of sciences gave way to a plethora of disciplines, omitting that social structures and their resulting phenomena perpetuate and transform themselves undivided (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 26-35).

In order to understand the phenomena that escape the scope of human senses, perceptions, and narrow disciplines, the lens of this dissertation is based on critical realism. Having in mind that the

social world functions in relational terms, critical realism considers the possible existence of structures operating out of reach of the observable, which in turn affect the observable and possess causal power (Bhaskar, 1975/2008), the ability to affect the social reality.

Elder-Vass argues in favour of the realist considerations, and adds to it the concept of "emergence": the idea of an entity (a "whole") that can hold properties not possessed by the parts that compose it. Since the parts do not have the attributes of the whole, it is the "emergent properties", stemming from a specific form of organisation of its parts (not merely aggregative, which would result in "resultant properties") in a persistent way, that makes the whole have its properties or powers; being "property" or "power" an intrinsic aspect of an entity that can have a causal impact on the world (Elder-Vass, 2010, pp. 4-5, 16-17, 20-23).

Therefore, emergence is an inherently compositional concept, «a synchronic relation amongst the parts of an entity that gives the entity as a whole the ability to have a particular (diachronic) causal impact» (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 23). Any entity/whole can be seen as internally layered, which reminds of the three realms of representation and practice suggested by Scheper-Hughes and Lock. But, for Elder-Vass, emergence is more a relation between entities and their properties, than a relation between the different levels of an entity themselves. Differently from what Marx (1939/1973, p. 265) or Bhaskar (1998) would think of society, Elder-Vass argues that, even if relations make a difference regarding causality, «relations only have a causal impact when combined with the things that they relate» (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 23).

For the existence of an entity, the "compositional consistency" required by it depends on their "morphostasis", a particular set of relations between their parts, necessary to constitute the whole; causal factors that maintain its stability. Consequently,

> if we are to explain the possession of emergent properties we must be able to give, not only a synchronic explanation of how the parts that it has produce the properties concerned, but also a diachronic causal explanation of how the entity came to exist in this form (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 33)

Since an explanation derived from a single factor or state might be insufficient, the different states (the most relevant ones) of an entity would help explain its current conditions, the «processes which tend to elaborate or change a system's given form, structure, or state» (Buckley, 1967, p. 58), "morphogenesis". This process can cause the change the form or even end the existence of an entity, as it generates processes that both «contribute to the initial development or creation of any entity»

and «contribute to the subsequent modification of its form within the structural range of the entity type» (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 37).

Social structures are entities that can be included in this conception. If we consider that human agency is related to the structures contained within the environment of the agent, affecting their intention, then the understanding of the interaction between morphostatic and morphogenetic causes of these structures might shed light on the relation between identity and agency.

2.3. Reflection and reflexiveness

2.3.a. Position and emotion

Research about identity, agency, reflectivity, and the personal-social connection should not omit the fact that the same categories apply to the agent behind it. There is no possible neutral position from which to describe, interpret, explain, narrate, or relate. It is not only about the emotional side present in every human endeavour (*Vid*. *Infra*, 4.1.c.), but also about the specific implications of researching itself (Gilbert (Ed.), 2001; Darling, 2014) and addressing specific subjects.

In a disclosure I at least have not read in many occasions, Peteet writes that a «deep sadness comes from working in a community facing a bleak future» (Peteet, 2005, p. xii). I would add that it is not only sadness, but an indeterminate number of different states varying in intensity and frequency, across different spaces, situations, moments, and circumstances. Along with the intellectual exercise of self-appropriating, objectifying, and synthesising experiences and ideas, comes the emotional management of affection and feeling, as well as the administration of the energy engaged in a practice that comes in a seemingly integral torrent.

The reality approached as the subject of study might invoke feelings of sadness, as Peteet indicated, but also anger, distrust, disgust, pity at any or many of the situations and actors, not least of it, the researcher itself. Social capital might help in different and important ways; economic capital may decrease stress and anxiety in the related field; cultural capital can provide tools for intellectual and personal development; but it is *autognosis* in its most authentic, and sometimes most painful way, which offers the ability clear the path of the uncertainties that hinder your own agency.

In this sense, it is necessary to keep in mind the ethical implications of research. Aidani points out the “ethical linking of compassion and social justice”, recognising the political implications of suffering (Aidani, 2013). Moved by this impulse, however, we might forget that our own embodied dispositions might carry a load of partiality, prejudice, an inclination towards feeling, thinking, and doing in specific ways. Some of which might not always be the most ethical ones.

2.3.b. Position and habitus

Research is not carried out in a social void. Social categories of perception, thought and action are inscribed in the researcher´s body. From this standpoint, the attempt at inferencing information from research is necessarily mediated by a constructed subjectivity located in a specific position,

> By forcing one to discover externality at the heart of internality, banality in the illusion of rarity, the common in the pursuit of the unique, sociology does more than denounce all the impostures of egoistic narcissism; it offers perhaps the only means of contributing, if only through awareness of determinations, to the construction, otherwise abandoned to the forces of the world, of something like a subject (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 21)

This subject is the result not only of society, but also of a hierarchy in the cultural field. Seeing oneself as a researcher with a background, without resorting to personal facts, entails a non-narcissistic forewarning of the possible biases present in the research itself (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 46). The causal power of social structures cannot be verified nor falsified; thus, it is in a speculative manner that the habitus inscribed in the body of the researcher can be hinted at, unless a thorough examination of the structures they partake in is carried out. The relational aspect (personal-social interdependency) present throughout this dissertation (*Vid*. *Infra*, 3.3.b.) is effectively applicable to the researcher and his environment.

The illusion of intellectual disinterestedness and mastery of oneself (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 132; Bourdieu, 1992, pp. 99-134) must be shaken off if we are to honestly approach realities where we deal with fellow human beings. Accountability and responsibility (*Vid*. *Infra*, 3.3.a.iv.) apply here too. And with that, the masking of the intentional drive could be abandoned too, as well as that of the specific social location in a concrete field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 193). Social scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists deal with their own society and self as they study other societies and selves and expose their differences.

Rosemary Sayigh (1994, p. 6), referring to the case of the Palestinians, suggests that «how people tell history is necessarily shaped by culture: oral histories should not be read primarily as a source of historical “fact” but rather of historical experience and the cultural frameworks through which it is lived and recollected […] recollections of the past must be affected by the emotions of the moment in which they are recorded». I would say this also works the other way round, the way we tell our collective and personal history is shaped by normative social structures, but also via informal social

transmission of knowledge, styles of attachment, and emotional and affective transformation. Transmission and transformation are not necessarily one-sided, nor determined in any one exclusive way, but because identity and agentic capabilities are constructed within discourse, it is helpful to see them as products of specific social locatedness, in a network of practices, structures and strategies. The "sociology of sociology", raised in Bourdieu and Wacquant´s conversation (1992, p. 253), would entail being aware of one´s dispositions, as well the effects of social origins, academic background, and gender.

As a PhD candidate, I have been located in a specific position, with a set of rules, strategies, and dispositions. In my way to achieve an advantageous position in the cultural field. I implicitly agreed to play by the rules (Bourdieu, 1984), in a cultural field were, apart from intellectual endeavour, power play also transpires.

The irruption of habitus also takes places during fieldwork. Unacknowledged to our own selves, partiality, prejudice, bias, and even partisanship might get in the way, while conducting research. Taking into consideration the particularly vulnerable situations refugees endure (Block, Riggs, & Haslam (Eds.), 2013), it is of special importance to have in mind ethical research guidelines (RSC, 2007), and doing it before, during, and after fieldwork (Krause, 2017). Regarding the participants, these are the guidelines:

- Protecting research participants and honouring trust: Protect the well-being, rights, interest, sensitivities, and privacy of those the researcher studies;
- Anticipating harms: Sensitivity towards the possible consequences of the stud;
- Avoiding undue intrusions: Avoiding the intrusive potential of research and its methods;
- Negotiating informed consent: Truthful and respectful exchange between researcher and the people studied;
- Rights to confidentiality and anonymity: The right of participants to privacy, confidentiality and to remain anonymous;
- Fair return for assistance: No economic exploitation of participants or people involved in research;
- Participants´ intellectual property rights: Recognising contractual and/or legal, interests and rights in data, recordings, and publications;
- Participants´ involvement in research: As far as possible, involving the people being studied in the planning and execution of research projects (RSC, 2007, pp. 164-167)

The development of this dissertation had all these points in mind, except for the last one. Involvement of the participants and community members was restricted to the interviews, as transdisciplinary research would have required a longer amount of time, planning, prevision, and funding. These could have hardly fit within the frame of this thesis.

2.3.c. Position and Otherness

In an environment where severe poverty is the rule, the asymmetry of the capitals involved, more often than not, entail power relations. As Gatrell (2013, p. 294) warns, «Social scientists sometimes urge that refugees should be `subjects in their own enquiry´ rather than objects of study, but in practice scant attention has been paid to verbal exchanges between refugees, or to those between refugees and external agencies». Our preferences, the social field, the cultural field, and practical conditions sometimes make it difficult to transmute theory into practice.

Perfection can be one of the emotional factors to struggle with in the personal ego field, albeit a horizon to strive for. However, time management, as an objective structure imposed from the exterior, also implies obstacles. It is the responsibility of the researcher to govern their traits in the best manner.

On another note, even if the practice in field work entailed a somewhat asymmetrical interrelation with the member of the community, I attempted to gather the experience of those located in two coordinates: on one hand, I tried to collect the perspectives of unaffiliated (Issa, 2014), rank-and-file refugees (Gatrell, 2013, p. 296), although the contribution of individuals in positions higher up was also considered. On the other hand, I tried to keep in mind the problem of over-researched communities (Sukarieh & Tannock, 2013), as it is still a common practice to see in refugees passive and convenient docile objects, ripe with experience to extract and show to an academic audience, in exchange for some cultural capital. While trying to avoid the possible difference emphasising dispositions (*Vid*. *Infra*, 4.2.b.i.), I took it as my endeavour to explore the constitution of the agency of the Palestinian refugees, while trying to "do no harm" (Mackenzie, McDowell, & Pittaway, 2007; Krause, 2017).

2.4. Summary

Methodology entails a previous interest in a topic, a predisposition towards thinking in a specific manner, and a preferred set of intellectual and cognitive tools, as well as a motivation. The latter derived in my case from a perceived sense of injustice, but the objective of this dissertation is understanding the relationship between identity and agency in the specific case of the Palestinian

population of Lebanon; if such a relation exists, understanding how it works, and how the entailed elements work is the next question. These enquiries lead us to take the path of the subjective world, as lived by the subjects of the study themselves, as well as knowing about the historical precedents, and the theoretical concepts involved.

This subjectiveness, the lack of universal meaning of the objects involved (and a lack of interest in forcing them into discrete categories), means a qualitative approach is the best option. This is so because it is not so much the numerical representativeness of these subjectivities what I set to discover, but the intricacies engaged in the process of meaning production and reproduction, as well as the relational aspect of intersubjectivity. The decision to take into consideration three different dimensions (the individual, the social symbolic, and legal dimensions) (*Vid*. *Infra*, 3.4.b.) led me to adopt a phenomenological stance regarding the interviews; a historical perspective, as part of the dialectical characteristic of the specific kind of phenomenology I deemed suitable; as well as a set of philosophical, anthropological, sociological, and political and legal viewpoints.

The interdisciplinary approach adopted stems from the perceived need of complementing the gaps each of the domains seemed to overlook. Côté and Levine (2002, pp. 10-13) employ, as a justification of the necessity of their connection between psychology and sociology, the Hindu metaphor of the three blind individuals and the elephant. Each blind person approaches an object they are bound to identify from different sides; one of them touches the tail, deducing that the object must be a rope; the second person touches the trunk, identifying it as a snake; the third one touches a leg, concluding that what they are before must be a tree. Their tactile ability does not provide an inherently wrong experience, but it is an incomplete one in each of the cases.

The human world is composed of a complex assembly of subjective and objectified realities in constant mutual engagement and transformation. The idea that a single discipline can explain complex realities like identity and agency might resemble the Hindu metaphor. In this sense, each discipline might offer a valuable, albeit incomplete idea of an isolated set of components of these realities.

On another note, I refused to admit the most uncompromising sides of postmodernist approaches, which deny the possibility of knowledge, or propose a relativity that renders it futile. I also adopted the perspective of the critical realists, who regard the possibility of the causal power of structures functioning at a relational level, and thus passing undetected, as they cannot be directly observed. This matches the vision of several of the thinkers we engaged in the second chapter. A complex relational assembly of subjective structures, initiated by emotion and expressed through inherited social structures (among which we find the very language we use to communicate), puts us in an

interactive field where, often, the institutionalised normative structures, presented as natural, logic, and neutral, seem to serve the interests of specific groups of individuals. These have the power and resources to impel the reproduction of the values that impulse the energy contained within society as a whole, but reflexive deliberation triggered within some of the members of society breaks through the illusion, allowing for different patterns of behaviour.

This very brief outline applies to the researches of this thesis itself. Aware of my location in a specific historical moment, at a concrete set of social coordinates, I am aware of the possible biases that could end up reflected in this document. In my case, these biases might originate in my coming from a specific geographical and social background, where the reality of displacement is not a common daily life experience. Although aware of the presence of power structures, as well as the asymmetry introduced, due to my own role as a foreign scholar (PhD candidate), some of the effects might not be easily avoided. In addition, my own personal experience, expectations, hopes, and fears, could have contributed to approach specific kinds of individuals, due to the "ethical linking" driving me to translate the perception of injustice. Moreover, the interpretation of the results might still be driven by the same emotion, even though "tamed" by the requisites of the academic style, and the explicit aim of attaining a specific status in the field. Ideally, the assessment of these particulars would be best carried out externally.

But this awareness is not enough, as the personal configuration of belief systems, as much as I could intend to, does not allow me to leave my embodiment and enter an-Other´s embodiment. Nonetheless, I can provide a meta-account of the ways in which I approached this investigation, so its reliability, replicability, and validity can be assessed at a collective level.

3. Theoretical context. Being and acting

To be and to act are notions that, out of their everyday nature for the individual experience, we commonly take for granted. We engage in doubt about our own self, we think, therefore, to be able to do that, we have to be, to exist, following a Cartesian logic (Descartes, 1637/2006, pp. 28-34). Moreover, applying Descartes´ "methodical doubt" (Descartes, 1637/2006, pp. 12-20) to assumed claims might prove useful when thinking about the consequences of being itself. Then, if we *are*? *What* are we? What does this specifically entail for our existence, for its potentiality? What *is*, an entity, can become something else, or permanently stays the same? Can an entity act upon its own existence, or is it shaped (or even created) by an-other entity (as Descartes himself proposes, as a way of avoiding the subjectivity he was bound to doubt, and to avoid the solipsism of an entity that entails its own self)? This chapter will attempt to disassemble seemingly natural everyday-life notions related to acting and being, in order to reassemble them, under a logic formulation that keeps a logic string of causality.

To act implies *to be*, but not all entities *are* in the same way, identity, their distinct features, differentiates them. The identity of an object, inanimate or human, provides us with information as to what exactly we are considering, and its probable different states. When considering human entities, we acknowledge the potential for the alteration of the environment around them (including their own selves), in a set of different capacities stemming from them, in varied ways and dimensions. We assume their agency, their capacity to alter their conditions of existence.

Yet, where does this agency arise from? Does it originate in the individual? In a specific set of individuals? In a specific set of individuals arranged in a particular way? We have regarded a brief historical narration of a roughly specific human group throughout a given, and rather significant albeit limited, amount of time. This chapter will examine the foundation of the categories of identity and agency, first as a shared element of human beings; to, secondly, consider how they might be applied to this human group, the Palestinians in Lebanon.

This theoretical frame will focus on the concepts of "identity" and "agency". For the purpose of grounding the development of a framework for the thesis, the question posed are the following:

- What are the main elements defining "identity"?
    - What are the main axes of thought regarding identity?
    - Does identity relate to the subjective or the objective domain?
    - Is identity produced individually, or collectively?
    - What are the main elements affecting its development/formation/construction?

- What are the main elements defining “agency”?
    - What are the main axes of though regarding agency?
    - How does agency relate to the determination of free will?
    - Is the agent individual or collective?
    - What causes and limits agency?

3.1. Particularities of literature review

Before initiating our enquiry on the conceptual aspects, an important albeit brief notice is due, regarding the consistency and continuity of the content of this dissertation. It is significant to consider that, for the development of the first chapter of this dissertation, the synthesis of the historical context, the content has been drawn from a less-than-comprehensive, albeit careful, literature review. The aim of the historical analysis has been to «be analytical, seeking to evaluate alternative explanations through a process of valid causal inference» (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p. 5). “Alternative explanations”, because of the conceivable bias contained in the accounts of many of the authors. These often focus on the roles played by the major political agents, and neglect the part, function, and responsibility of the “ordinary” people, those who do not make it to positions of normative institutionalised power.

The sources of information contain different authors, to whom we could ascribe each a specific academic habitus, as well as specific potential biases (Bryman, 2012, p. 123). This would contribute to a clearer understanding concerning the interest that initially brought them to write about the concrete objects in a specific way.

Considering that the reflexive tendency to disclose this matter is, as of yet, not a commonplace practice, my best effort consisted in, first, avoiding discrepancies as much as possible, checking and confirming certain historical objects, events, and accounts, from different sources. Second, whenever possible, the interpretation of certain traumatic events was treated in a way that avoided undue semantic emotional loads. Intuitively, from a reading of war operations, state- or non-state-actors alike, might come with overstatements, embellishments, in the form of predicates that add moral judgement. Seeing that moral judgement *per se* is not the object of this dissertation, it is up to the reader to evaluate these facts from their standpoint.

In this sense, the history of Palestinians does not count with the best possible narration of events, historical hindrances have bestowed an incomplete account. Regarding the sources, the Palestinian Research Centre in Beirut was dismantled by the Israeli army and, additionally, national cultural work

was hampered by Lebanese State surveillance (Gatrell, 2013, p. 119; Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 5). It is also necessary to be careful the documented records of governments and NGOs; valuable as they might be, «they testify to the power vested in departments of state and humanitarian bureaucracies» (Gatrell, 2013, p. 294), potentially biased by the privileged standpoint of the observer.

In any case, Khalidi and Rosemary Sayigh agree on the fact that, from the sources left, only a partial account can be gathered (Khalidi, 2010, p. 116; Sayigh R. , 1994, pp. 5-9). Much like what might happen with the history of other peoples, it is the written history that is valued above popular speech.

This history is very probably written by the leaderships, who explain causality from their perspective, and therefore constitutes the history according to those highly educated. As a result, for the "ordinary" people,

> It does not come easily to them to see their own lives as a part of history. This makes their accounts sometimes impersonal and anonymous, a tendency that is reinforced by the "collectivization of experience", the process through which members of small communities exchange fragments of individual experience (or, put differently, the domination of collective experience) is achieved, and how it is reflected differently in different social sectors (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 9)

As a consequence, sometimes, the discourse of some Palestinians becomes detached from the personal, and becomes historical-political, with no continuation linking to the person speaking. However, the reconstruction of the past, the narration of the present, and the hopes projected in the future might shed some light on the perspective of the "common" Palestinians, and "correct the biases of the official historians" (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 2), even though it might introduce different ones, for instance, the reification of the objects of the social world. However, this taken-for-grantedness is one of the raw materials that grounds social science, it is through reflexivity, regarding the researcher and the participants, that we can «move from the sense of something commonly experienced to the sense of strangeness that allows us to think sociologically» (Alexander, 2004a, p. 2).

In relation to sources of quantitative data, a different kind of hindrance comes to the foreground. Conceivably, because of the institutionalised identity politics in Lebanon, based on the fixed distribution of positions in the administration of the state, an interest seems to exist regarding its division among the different confessions. Even if the fixed proportion changed after the Ta'ef agreement, due to the conflicts around the share of political power, there has not been a population census in Lebanon since 1932.

A similar uncertainty exists regarding the population count of refugees in Lebanon. The use of the quantification of refugee population for institutional political purposes has generated a field for presumption and manipulation. This fact has sometimes been arguably based on the technical difficulties of the registry of a population that "escapes" the ordinary logic of population control, due to the legally unauthorised nature of their mobility. This happens to the extent that even UN agencies (UNRWA and UNHCR) admit to not having full control of the issue and handling estimates, which likewise have affected the economic budget they are entrusted with, bringing up suspicion as to how legitimate the counting is.

These facts lead to a vacuum regarding macro-sociological quantification, in spite of which, some organisations have undertaken their own attempts. Due to these reasons, we will deal with the quantitative data with special attention, as it is included as a description of the reality, but is additionally an object of research in this very dissertation. In view of the fact that census and counts might be arranged in a manner that makes it particularly sensible to population control, it makes this circumstance susceptible to varied interpretations, contingent on different interests, some of which might pertain to norm circles engaged in dynamics of obscurement of certain realities (Elder-Vass, 2010, pp. 122-138; 2012, pp. 56-60).

With the content of the next epigraphs, the possible biases previously included will encounter elucidating mechanisms. Concepts taken for granted in the first chapter will be unravelled, disassembled, questioned, in order to counterpoise the introduced proclivities towards reductionism.

3.2. Identity

Concerning the etymological root of the word "identity", we find that "*ĭdentĭtās*" in Latin, stemming from "*īdem*" (García de Diego & Mir, 1995, p. 229; Glare (Ed.), 2012, pp. 900-901), indicates "the same" or "sameness", therefore, the perception of uniformity, as opposed to difference. Trying to get to the core of the origin of the concept of identity brings uncertainty as of our knowledge of an element we might take for granted. Granted that identity has to do with sameness and difference, we could say that, in discrete terms, what is A, is not B, and therefore A will constitute its identity, while B will have a different one. Thus, we can set up the logical elements of the notion of identity: sameness and change; difference and repetition; permanence (or not) through time, grounded on spatiality.

3.2.a. Ontology and logic of identity

3.2.a.i. Metaphysics and materialism

Regarding temporariness and spatiality, classic Greek thinkers thought about the material origin of identity, establishing the grounds for materialist thought. Parmenides, reflected on the nature of being, stating that the perceivable *being* is a nominalisation of the objectively real, thus the search is not for "reality", but for the elements given in experience (Coxon & Parmenides, 2009, pp. 20-22, 313-347), as approximations to a substantial *being*. What is not (non-*being*) cannot be thought of (Anscombe, 1981, pp. 3-8).

Heraclitus would highlight through the classic metaphor of the river (Kahn & Heraclitus, 2004, pp. 52-53), the everchanging nature, and thus, non-permanence of identity. Although in the same terms of placing the topic of identity in the fields of inner perception and order of a "natural" universe, he placed both the individual and the universe in the same *logos*[18] (Kahn & Heraclitus, 2004, pp. 21, 130). He did not deny the persistent identity of an entity, despite its substance be everchanging, as its structure remains (Kahn & Heraclitus, 2004, pp. 165-170), and therefore can be seen as permanent.

Socrates reflected the need of self-reflection (*autognosis*) on the human capacity of perception and knowledge (Plato, Cooper, & Hutchinson, 1997, pp. 157-234). Based and influenced by Socrates´ considerations, his disciple Plato would establish, through the theory of Forms, the notion of ideal-forms. He claimed that the physical world (everchanging, following the thought of pre-Socratic thinkers) is a flawed reflection of the "real" world, the Realm of Forms, where perfect concepts transcend time and space, archetypes of the imperfect changing objects of our sensory world. It is because the objects we sense are instances of the Forms, that we can differentiate them, perceiving the Form they are modelled after (Plato, Cooper, & Hutchinson, 1997, pp. 1107-1132). This ontological dependence and, therefore the basis of binary thinking was established thus, and it was Aristotle, who instituted the categories of identity (Aristotle, Ackrill, & Judson, 2002, pp. 3-42), based on sameness and difference.

Ibn Sina developed Aristotle´s thought, and later engaged in the criticism of its practice (Reisman, 2013, p. 27). He argued that the phenomena we experience do exist, be them "normal" (everyday life entities) or "paranormal" (e.g., prophecy and miracles) (Gutas, 2013, pp. 33-34). The contingency of these phenomena is dependent on its cause. Therefore, knowing about these phenomena requires following the chain of causality, a path he proposes be made through syllogism, based on experience

[18] The Greek term "logos", refers to "reason", as a foundational base.

(sense perception and self-reflection) (Gutas, 2013, p. 39; Street, 2013), differentiating existence from essence in three different ways: essence «in itself, without respect to existence or non-existence, universality or particularity, unity or plurality, second, as existing in concrete particulars, and third, as existing in an intellect, that is, as conceptualized» (Hasse, 2013, p. 112). Hallevi, Ibn Daud, and Maimonides concur with Ibn Sina, and somewhat with the Aristotelian legacy, as, following the string of causality, and derive the existence by an un-caused entity (Davidson, 1992, pp. 127-219), an account nuanced later by Ibn Rushd (Davidson, 1992).

3.2.a.ii. Essence and consciousness

Descartes pondered the issue of perception and understanding of the self, through the relation between the self and thought, establishing the separation between the body and the mind (Descartes, 1637/2006, pp. 28-34), a new quandary in the consideration of identity. Leibniz´s notion of "identity of indiscernibles" (Strickland & Leibniz, 2014, pp. 58-60), established the logic grounds for the consideration of identity: an entity *equals* itself, and only itself. Therefore, if we are to say that two entities are equal, they must share the same configuration and properties. The same applying to *meaning*, which introduces the relation between not only identities themselves, but also the *signs* referring to entities, and the adequacy of the possible substitution of these signs, with predicates, synonyms, or names.

In that sense, Locke distinguished the essence of an entity and its nominal essence in a first moment. The nominal essences are human constructs, derived from observation. In a later moment, he explains identity as a result of a mechanistic account, as a sequence of causal connections between parts of the entity (Wilson, 2007, pp. 29-33). Hegel´s idealism (1807/2018; 1837/1991), prompted by Kant, envisioned human consciousness as the foundation of the individual´s self. Identity in his system of developing tensions, departed from a proposed thesis, its negation, forming an antithesis, and a resulting synthesis, as a conciliation of both, giving birth to a new thesis that would likewise start the same scheme[19].

Regarding permanence through time, Hume indicated, from an empiricist stance, the difficulty of addressing identity and «the nature of the uniting principle, which constitutes a person» (Hume, 1739/2007, p. 127). His empirical construction of the idea of identity departs from the basic elements obtained through human experience, impressions, and ideas. Impressions are perception derived from

[19] Although Hegel himself never used the terms, later developed by Fichte, it is generally accepted it was his method.

the sensitive experience, that is «sensations, passions and emotions», while ideas are perceptions drawn from thinking and reasoning.

Feeling and thinking, following Hume´s empiricist reduction, sometimes come not so clearly established (Hume, 1739/2007, p. 7). For example, when an impression stays in the mind, retaining its vivacity, it then becomes an idea through the faculty of memory; when it loses its vivacity, it is brought back via imagination, which might make use «of the liberty of imagination to transpose and change its ideas». The association of the ideas arise from three qualities: resemblance, contiguity (in time and space), and cause and effect (Hume, 1739/2007, pp. 11-13). The mental construction of identity is carried out through the processing of associations. Therefore, identity is not a fixed reality, but a necessary fiction put forth by the experience and perceptions (Hume, 1739/2007).

For Hume, this is as a required condition for the possibility of thinking of a unitary subject, taking place after, and not before, thought (Hume, 1739/2007, pp. 135, 169), via a synthetic judgement. A process which, according to Kant, needed categories grounding concepts. Since Hume´s impressions (of our senses), objectifiable categories (concepts) need to be put forth by surveying "all the kinds of *a priori* synthesis of the understanding", it is necessary to be aware of the thinker´s boundaries of cognition (Kant, 1781/1998, pp. 259-260, 652-671).

The account of identity, centred around sameness and difference, seems to arrive at the consequence of having to keep in mind the observer, the person, provided with an abstract identity, a human identity. Discernibility is then a relation between signs rather than objects, as Frege argued (Geach & Black, 1960, pp. 42-85), stating, in his theory of the signs, the difference between the sense and meaning of that which is referred to. But drawing discrete, finite signs comes with a degree of ambiguity. Russel and Wittgenstein engaged in the discussion about this vagueness, and the «intentional reference of falsehood» (Szałek, 2014, p. 265), the latter stating the limits of intelligible thought and language (Wittgenstein, 1921/2002). The need to partake in language, a semantic structure in constant change (Adler, 2014), is limited by the use of the rules that compose it, and oftentimes cannot fully grasp the object, mediated by knowledge and consciousness.

3.2.a.iii. Language and environment

From the different possible approaches to identity, empiricism, as a reduction to observable facts, disregards non-perceptible factors, such as change over time or interaction of elements; attempting to overcome this obstacle, essentialism alludes to a substance (mind, soul, god) that transcends time, an un-caused entity that sets off causality, introducing the mind-body problem; as an attempt to overcome

it, interactionism suggests mind and body as interdependent dimensions of the self, as a self-aware entity; which leads to the problem of representation of reality through language, a synchronic element (although diachronically evolving) that might project the idea of an ahistorical domain, like some postmodernist accounts postulate, detached from time and environment.

Focusing the attention on human identity, as part of a self-aware identity that lacks an autotelic[20] narrative, leads to consider it as a construct co-determined by biology, the social environment it is inserted in, and instantiations of agency stemming from its inside, as well as its outside (other entities). As an example of this, Foucault, himself suspicious of the comprehensiveness and interpretative capacity of language, points to the sociocultural location of systems of interpretation. Spanning from the ancient Greeks to the present, the possibilities of producing signs (referring to entities), depended on the particular configuration of the time. Thus a (social) structure allows certain interpretations, not in a vacuum, but in a specific set of relations of power, where material relations of production (Marx), moral (Nietzsche), and the unconscious (Freud) are put in a specific context, opening the doors to a new epistemology, free of the "essentialisation" of assumed matters (Foucault, 1998).

Before Foucault, Saussure, considered the precursor of modern linguistics, considered the social aspect of language, apart from the individual one. Thus, signs (signifier) employed in a language to refer to references (signified) are not universals, the rational product of a single mind, but socially established specific parts of a social system of communications, situated in a specific context. Therefore language, the tool used to communicate, is not given in isolation, but in a specific synchronic sociocultural context, with its structural constraints and conditions, partially produced diachronically (Saussure, de, 1916/1945, pp. 36-43, 91-93, 105-124). Following Appadurai, this matter could be summarised as what he states «could be roughly taken as the relationship between the word and the world» (Appadurai, 1996, p. 51), a sign, the object in reality, the processes and relations involving them; and a reference, all forms of expressing these realities.

Signs channelled through semantic and linguistical interpretation, human cognitive mechanisms (Chomsky, 2002, pp. 48-60). These are internalised individually but based on the cultural transmission of language, particularly during the early stages of life, through an emergent system of social structures (Vygotsky, 1934/1986). As a result, we differentiate ourselves and each other, individually and collectively. This means that identification, as an action, makes more sense than identity, as a given.

[20] "Autotelic" is formed by Greek root "auto" (αὐτός) as in "self-"; and "telos" (τέλος), as "aim", "purpose", or "end", hence meaning "relative or referring to itself".

3.2.b. Identification and subjectification

3.2.b.i. Identity or identification

Using a metaphor, identity can be seen as a map of the differences of the human world (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 2; Jenkins, 2008, p. 5), a picture of the state of affairs in a certain moment. Just like countries in a map, each identity is the transient result of a process. In this metaphor, identities are not derived from an absolute substance, like Plato´s Forms, but are the outcome of the multiplicity of factors that shaped it. Therefore, instead of thinking identity as a given by nature, it could be considered as consisting of a language construct, produced for the purpose of locating ourselves and others regarding a predefined set of criteria, following specific factors of interest.

Like Jenkins (Jenkins, 2008, pp. 26-27) argues, our human world is inconceivable without ways of knowing who we or the rest of the people we interact with are. Cues like "embodiment, clothing, language, answers to questions, incidental or accidental disclosures of information, and information from third parties" are but some of the elements we might use to identify, although they do not always reflect an absolute reality.

This would mean that it is people who *identify* people, producing identities. They (we) do it in order to be able to locate themselves in a network of status and relationships, to establish the possibility of different scenarios and act accordingly. Identification is a cognitive mechanism humans deploy to draft a degree of predictability. Identification might establish contingency, but it does not determine the object identified, the person addressed, nor their future actions. It rather predisposes the identifier with a specific disposition towards it. In this sense, ascription of identity does not necessarily mean that the sign attached to it will be fulfilled by the identified. In other words, assigning a certain identity to someone does not necessarily mean this person is going to act according to the predefined idea contained in this identity.

Due to the same need of locating oneself in the map, the person asserts one specific identity for theirself. However, similarly to what happens with ascription, this assertion might not be successful, due to different reasons. That is, one person might claim one specific identity for theirself, but this does not necessarily imply that other people agree with this assertion. Humans expect a certain degree of predictability in their lives, and consequently classify, identify, and categorise, according to their specific point of view, not devoid of particular interest, in an interacting and social manner.

Identity can then be thought of as both the result of a process, and a process in itself, since identification relies on points of view that demand adaptation to the changing circumstances (Jenkins,

2008, p. 13). Consequently, instead of "identity" as an object, we could speak of "identification", a process, mechanism, or tool, used to assess positioning in the human world. In addition, some authors contend the overutilisation of the term "identity", arguing the emptying of its meaning, confusing nature, and uselessness as an analytical concept.

Other authors declare the over usage of the term "identity", to the point it has become almost meaningless, a concept that tries to overarch a too wide variety of identification processes. It is for that reason that Brubaker and Cooper, who deem term "hopelessly ambiguous", present five widespread uses of "identity" as

- A ground or basis of social or political action;
- As a specifically collective phenomenon, denoting sameness;
- As a core aspect of individual or collective "selfhood";
- As processual, interactive development of the kind of collective action;
- As a product of multiple and competing discourses, and unstable, multiple, fluctuating, and fragmented "self" (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000, pp. 6-8)

They consider the constructivist acceptations (the last three) to be too "soft", in the sense that they rely too much on contingent realities. This way, although discharging essentialism, the term is not analytically suitable, as it might mean anything. They warn of how social analysis has become excessively permeated by identity "particularities" of different kinds, without distinguishing «between situations where they cohere around particular cultural symbols and situations where they are flexible, pragmatic, readily extendable» (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000, p. 35).

Malešević (2006), who speak mainly of ethnic identity, furthermore questions the usage of identity, due to its oftentimes illogical and unreasonable use, particularly in contemporary times for ideological purposes. The concept of "ethnicity" itself is a new term that refers to an old topic, he considers, just like Brubaker and Cooper, that "identity" as an analytical concept is ineffective (Malešević, 2004, pp. 13, 86-93), the result of the non-distinction of categories of practice and categories of analysis (Malešević, 2006, p. 20), ensuing vague conceptions, based on daily life self-evident notions (Malešević, 2006, pp. 13-80). Geertz (1973, pp. 193-233) had already addressed the issue of "ideology as a cultural system", a set of integrated aims and claims of a socio-political programme, with the main features of being biased, oversimplified, using emotive language, and adapting to public prejudice. Just like Geertz, Malešević warns of the "pronounced conceptual and operational weakness" and "ideological potency" of the idiom of "identity", oftentimes aimed at legitimising actions and political claims (Malešević, 2006, pp. 157-184), disguising them as identitarian or cultural claim. It

is in such a way that a fundamentally conflictual, particularistic, divisive, and normative concept is made to seem consensual and natural (Malešević, 2006, p. 228).

In his account, the reification and essentialisation of identity, from a fundamentally conflictive, intentional, and political act of identification, the modern nation-state goes hand in hand in the process, but is the reference of "identity" an exclusively modern one?

3.2.b.ii. Identity, a modern concept?

Bauman states that the concept of "identity" is modern, a sort of detachment from what used to be fixed. Now, according to him, in a postmodern world, the concept is open to new life strategies. These strategies, although present before (in modernity), escaped the marginality they used to live in, and are now applicable to wider numbers (Bauman, 2003, pp. 18-26).

From a different standpoint, Taylor (1989) argues that modern identity is characterised, on one hand, by the inward gaze of the human being, in search of a sense of self and connection to others. On the other hand, this subjective turn, rather than originating in the individual, is the result of an evaluation stemming from different frames of moral reference, as well as the politics of recognition and identity, based on difference and its recognition (Taylor, 1994). The moral references, developed throughout history, oftentimes involve what he calls "mutilation", "spiritual lobotomy", or "self-inflicted wounds", resulting from the opposed principles observed in (secular and non-secular) moral frames residing within the individual. Modern identity is, according to Taylor, marked by «the moral predicament of our time» (Taylor, 1989, p. 521), caught between different, sometimes opposed, moral tenets.

In a similar line, but far from Taylor's Hegelian stance, Bhabha (2003) points to an "anxious age of identity", the resignification of that which lies within "identity", resulting from a deep unease. This anxiety relates to the redefinition and resignifying of claims of "race" and "ethnicity", now revolving around not a democratic common culture, but around disparate "interest groups", where «solidarity may be *only* situational and strategic: commonality is often negotiated through the `contingency´ of social interests and political claims» (Bhabha, 2003, p. 59).

On the other hand, without forgetting the importance of Malešević´s reasoning about the contemporary and ideological connotation of "identity", it is also necessary to point out the need of clearing out a few elements. In this sense, instead of rejecting "identity" as a modern concept, Grossberg (1996), in line with Bhabha and Malešević, points to the *political* contemporary use of the concept, suggesting the need of rearticulation of the category of identity. He advocates for the

awareness of the articulation of identity in a sociohistorical frame, and therefore proposes to restate it in a frame where the construction of the concept draws upon historic agency, in a temporary sequence filled with the interaction of structures of power (Grossberg, 1996, pp. 87-89).

Grossberg denotes how modern discourses of identity fail to address the role of agency in its formation. He contests three fields or theoretical foundations where this logic takes place, and tries to overcome them by proposing alternatives (*Vid*. *Infra*, 4.2.b.):

- Logic of difference VS logic of otherness
- Logic of individuality VS logic of productivity
- Logic of temporality VS logic of spatiality

This standpoint surmises that the typically and traditionally ethnocentric notion of traditional "identity", framed as differentiated features in religion, language, and phenotype (commonly expressed as "race"), leads to a rather ambivalent analytical outcome, where heterogeneity cannot be handled by a limited understanding of uniformity and difference. This results in biased and interested interpretation of reality, similarly to what Brubaker and Cooper warn against. It allows inscribing rules and structures of perception belonging to a dominant group, addressing their "identity" as "human nature", as an unequivocal state. From the standpoint of these authors, this kind of acceptation of identity is an empty sign that has no inherent meaning and thereby can mean whatever suits best to the interests of those in the positions of dominance. In the political field, this mechanism can entail the reproduction of the current order. For those dominated, this interested and wilful omission constitutes the *misrecognition* of the properties of the social order (Bourdieu, 1977, pp. 16-22, 97, 163-164).

If identity, that is, human identification of human actors (assertion and ascription), depends on the interests, it might mean different things for different people. In this sense, Bourdieu´s view on "misrecognition" might be key for the understanding of the production of a social order that serves the interests of those in the upper positions in the social field. This involves symbolic violence, that is, the domination of individuals without their perception of coercion, which entails specific forms of identification that naturalise and reify certain identities by means of internalisation of universalised values in the very identity (Bourdieu, 1992, pp. 113-134; 1998, pp. 102-104).

"Identity" then can achieve a degree of analytical accuracy, if located in specific diachronic sociohistorical context, and a synchronically located account of the subjectivities at play. The limitations of both terms need to be considered, if we are to avoid errors concerning a supposed objective and neutral notion, as well as the reification of the term (Jenkins, 2008, p. 15). To avoid this

reification, as well as any possible naturalisation or idealisation of the term, the term "identity/identities" will in this dissertation generally refer to "identity assertion or ascription", with the purpose of highlighting its processual socially constructed nature.

3.2.b.iii. Subjectification and hierarchy

Owing to the impermanence of the social conditions, including the strategies (and underlying interests) of the individuals and groups involved, the result of identification, be it inward or outward, seldom results in unambiguous identities. Additionally, if ascription and assertion do not happen in a social vacuum, these specific sign/identities will rarely be clear clear-cut definitions, but rather a constant and interested negotiation, in the boundaries of "discontinued" identities (Barth, 1969, pp. 9-10), due to the ambiguous nature of cultural difference. All happening in a dynamic similar to Hegel´s thought: a synthesis, resulting from the formulation of a thesis, and its subsequent antithesis, in a sequential loop. But it would serve us well to, instead of avoiding the complexities by means of abstracting society, pay attention to the interdependence of the subjective dimension, as well as the non-discrete nature of the human world.

The identification of sameness and difference come bound to the subjective nature of individuals and groups of individuals. Identity would then be a subjective process of instituting sameness and difference through (and in) language and signs (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 24), a mechanism for the simplification of social relations (Hall, 1996, p. 2). It comes constructed in the interaction between humans, and inscribed in a specific set of structures, which might be thought of as objectified realities. These structures are not neutral manifestations, nor uninterested institutions.

As a matter of fact, these structures, and the subjectification of signs, come co-determined by what Deleuze and Guattari would call "the folding of the outside (social structures) in the (individual) body", integrated in it as stratum for the individual, part of their identity. The set of signs/significations resulting from the structures appear as objective, as the perception of the lived experience by the individual or group of individuals is of a subjective nature, but subordinate to the abstract systems of signification, produced by a specific part of society (Deleuze & Guattari, 2002, p. 85).

Considering that this interaction takes place in a frame structured in a specific manner, with a specific set of interests in mind, identification tends to classify identities in a hierarchy. Therefore, identifying is rarely uninterested, unbiased, or neutral. And thus, the process of identification is consolidated by constituting the inside, as opposed to the outside (Hall, 1996, p. 3). Identification

happens with a specific interest of social arrangement in mind, a strategy, deploying a "discursive practice" (Foucault, 2005). It is through agency that the discursive interaction, exchange, and production, on the base of a relational principle of difference, takes place.

"Discursive practice" does not indicate the practice of language itself. It is the practice of language, as a reflection of knowledge in specific ways in concrete social settings, attached to subjectivity and power relations. For Wittgenstein (1921/2002) the limits of language are problematic, but part of the language-game nonetheless (1953/2009), a set of rules, stemming from a social context, that need to be observed, and constitute a "form of life", a shared cultural frame where meanings are reproduced. Discursive practices take place in social contexts, where the potential to determine meaning comes determined by the agency, as «strategies and tactics of subjectification […] deployed in diverse practices at different moments and in relation to different classifications and differentiation of persons» (Rose, 2003, p. 142).

3.3. Agency

"Agency" is a derivation of the Latin word "agō", whose meanings might mean "to drive", "to set in motion", "to make, construct, produce", "to cause to move", or "to do, perform". Although many acceptations indicate different nuances, it generally signifies "to act", or "to cause", indicating the human capability of acting, affecting the self and the environment (Glare (Ed.), 2012, pp. 97-100).

This ability is not absolute though. The Stoics spoke of "things in our power" or "not in our power", that is, things we can act upon, and things out of our control. For Epictetus, things in our control where mainly our own acts (opinion, movement, desire, aversion), while things out of our control were whatever are not our acts (body, properties, reputation, institutions) (Epictetus, AD c. 125/1956, p. 169). Having been a slave, he knew some elements can be out of control, thus the element of limitation of freedom by the environment needs to be had in mind. Humans are then conscious individuals, conscious of their own self and their aptitudes, making agency an inherently human skill, but how much are they (we) capable of acting freely? And how much of this change is in our own interest and needs?

3.3.a. Agent, free subject?

3.3.a.i. Reason

In accordance with their tenets, the notions developed by the Aristotelian though, including those ranging from Aquinas to Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd, derived our human reality from an uncaused

substance, that of a higher entity, from which everything derived (Gutas, 2013; Davidson, 1992). Descartes thought of agency as a thought-action causal relation, therefore, it is the individual, conscious of the self and aptitudes, who thinks, and therefore, does. This notion manifests the inherent nature of agency to the human being. However, from his distinction of body and mind (soul), he also derived the existence of God, as the necessary perfection, as an uncaused substance, from which our human ideas originate (Descartes, 1637/2006, pp. 24, 28-34).

Similarities to these considerations can also be drawn from Spinoza, albeit in a different direction. He believed that substance, the uncaused entity, was the very essence (attribute) of reality, that is, the uncaused entity (God) and Nature, are the same thing (Spinoza, 1677/2009, pp. 4-67; Collingwood, 1945, p. 106). The reality humans live in emanates from this substance, and it is composed of thought and extension (physicality). Both thoughts and physical objects derived from Nature follow the same kind of causality, and are actually modes of the substance, causal relations derived from it. Consequently, only that which is uncaused is really free, the modalities of the substance are constrained, determined by the externalities affecting them. Although this means that human beings and actions are, by nature, constricted, Spinoza believes that the human faculty of intellectual insight allows for a certain degree of freedom (Spinoza, 1677/2009, pp. 349-396).

A later account on the idea of nature brings us to Collingwood (1945). When speaking of the sense of "nature" as source (*principium*), or quality/ies of an object, he tries to avoid the tautology (referring back to the same thing as an explanation) of explaining the attributes of an object by citing its "nature" (Collingwood, 1945, pp. 43-48), but by assigning causality to the events.

Aware of his own cognitive limits, his reasoning capacity, he suggests that nature, as the idea of "things contained in existence", «though it is a thing that really exists, is not a thing that exists in itself or in its own right, but a thing that depends of its existence on something else» (Collingwood, 1945, p. 175). This "something else" nature depends upon should be taken into consideration when thinking about it, he states as he suspects of the accuracy of "natural science", as a body of thought based on reason. According to him, knowing about nature requires being conscious of the historical framework it develops on, being aware of the accumulative effect of knowledge, as a "scientific fact" becomes a "historical fact" (Collingwood, 1945, pp. 176-177).

Thus, "nature" can be understood, as Kant could have put it, not as self-sustaining idea (an essence or substance in Platonian thought), but as a product of human rationality, one we can apprehend through synthesis and transcendental deduction (Kant, 1781/1998, pp. 236-241, 261-266), in simpler and reductionist terms, "reason", carried out through the subjectivity of human experience. According

to him, experience is «the first product that our understanding brings forth as it works on the raw material of sensible sensations» (Kant, 1781/1998, p. 127), although, if we were to remove the input of the senses, we would still keep a set of *a priori* transcendent concepts, beyond empirical cognition and independent of experience.

Hegel dismissed this idea of subjectivity and proposed "objective idealism" as a basis for thinking of the "Idea" (Hegel, 1807/2018, pp. 5-46), a self-created and self-sustained world of concepts, similar to the Platonic "world of Forms". The difference between these two worlds is that Hegel does not conceive it as a static domain, but one in constant change, a process in itself, which in turn is the source of change in the nature we humans perceive. This Idea is the source of mind, because it is the source of nature (Hegel, 1807/2018, pp. 151-158), therefore, dealing with "particular" or specific objects entails perceptions of the senses, as well as understanding, which reveals ordered patterns. This revelation comes with rational self-consciousness, as a vehicle to understanding (Hegel, 1807/2018, pp. 60-135), and acting.

Reasoning is for Hegel (1807/2018, pp. 136-213) a product of human actions, but is this action to be taken freely? Hegel speaks of "freedom of self-consciousness" referring to *Ataraxia*, the Stoic[21] self-sufficient consciousness, free of that which cannot be under our control (Hegel, 1807/2018, pp. 117-122; Epictetus, AD c. 125/1956; Marcus Aurelius, AD c. 180/1956), on what could be considered as "inner freedom". Regarding an "external freedom, for Hegel, the unwrapping of history itself is freedom. In his sequential reading of human history, he suggests «the possibility of a development of Reason and Freedom, and of their introduction into human relations; and Reason and the Divine commands are now synonymous» (Hegel G. W., 1837/1991, p. 442). The historical sequence has gradually lead humankind, from ancient times till the German period, to its fate: being freed from the constraints of nature (Hegel G. W., 1837/1991, pp. 430-477).

Despite that, the account of his own life suggests something else. Freedom from the immediate environment seemed to be different as Hegel himself, as well as other authors each in their period, had to deal with public accusations of atheism, which meant a real potential threat, in spite of the "inner liberation" of conscience by Protestantism in Germany; and the "outer liberation" of politics by the French Revolution. Reason seems to be insufficient for being a free agent. Before coming back to the situation of a social environment where normativity can affect reason (Barnes, 2000, pp. 47-

[21] Ataraxia was not an Stoic-exclusive concept, as the "freedom from disturbance" is also present in Cynicism, Skepticism, and Epicureanism.

63), another piece needs to be had in mind. Reason alone does not seem to cause action, human will, volition, seems to be necessary.

3.3.a.ii. Volition

Taking a step back in time, we find Spinoza´s thought, deducing that we can approach and act on reality, on practical terms, from (flawed) reason. Again, somehow close to what the Stoics could have suggested, the imperfect freedom achievable to human being is attainable through reason, self-awareness, and limiting the reason-deceiving passion (Kisner, 2011; Marcus Aurelius, AD c. 180/1956). Rejecting this end, Hume distrusted that reason alone was the cause for human will, as sometimes people act intentionally against their interest. Volition comes as causality derived from the prospect of action, in the form of emotions. Therefore, the origin of action is seldom reason, but emotion, or rather the perceived contingency of an outcome of "aversion or propensity" (Hume, 1739/2007, pp. 265-268). Passion prevails over reason, as it guides action, unless guided by false assumptions. Volition is then limited by the causality initiated by emotion.

If for Spinoza humans are causally dependent on their externality, but owning the knowledge about this externality (ultimately, God-Nature) makes them more able to act (Spinoza, 1677/2009, pp. 377-386); for Hume, it is the awareness of the "slavery to the passions", the prevalence of the "calm" ones, a faculty oftentimes considered to be "reason" (Hume, 1739/2007, pp. 268-271, 280-286). Speaking of reason, and on a similar note, for Kant, for whom the transcendental idea of freedom also lies on unconditioned causality (the cosmological sense) (Kant, 1781/1998, pp. 486-487); will, or human freedom, consists on the capacity for reason to transcend the "merely animal" choice for desire ("sensuous incentives"), represented by "the ideal of highest good" (Kant, 1781/1998, pp. 533-547, 673-684), namely, the categorical imperative (Kant, 1785/1997), a moral framework for action.

Schopenhauer, who also believed in the subjectiveness of the perception of reality attained through reason (Schopenhauer, 1818/2008, pp. 71-83), «the world is will´s self-cognizance» (Schopenhauer, 1818/2008, p. 476), it is through the subjective production of the reality, its representation, is presented to us. The objects of the world are the forms in which will is displayed to us (Schopenhauer, 1818/2008, pp. 32-129), and so, the same applies to the cognisant:

> If, then, every action of my body is a phenomenon of an act of will in which, under given motives, voice is yet again given to my will itself in general and as a whole, thus to my character, then that action must also have a phenomenon of will as its inescapable condition and presupposition. For will cannot makes [sic] its

> appearance in dependence upon something that would not exist immediately and solely through it, which would hence be only contingent with respect to it; thereby its appearing would itself be merely contingent. But that condition is the body itself as a whole. The latter itself must thus be a phenomenon of will, and must relate to my will as a whole (Schopenhauer, 1818/2008, p. 145)

Unlike Kant, who thought transcendental objects (things independent of the watcher´s eye) existed, for Schopenhauer it makes no sense to speak of such things, as the human experience cannot go beyond the phenomenon (Schopenhauer, 1818/2008, pp. 31-210). Thus, the task should be not to know the essence of objects, but to know the instrument through which we perceive and represent, the body, at the core of which lies the will, which is «not only free but even omnipotent: from it comes not only its action, but also its world; and just as it is, so appears its action, so appears its world» (Schopenhauer, 1818/2008, p. 323). The will to live, as the drive that pushes everything to its very reproduction, makes human beings not free, but chained to this force, manifested as the passions Hume referred to, particularised in the desires originating in never-ending lack (Schopenhauer, 1818/2008, pp. 240-254). Thus, having in mind this dynamic inevitably lead to suffering, he proposes ascetism, the denial of the will for life (Schopenhauer, 1818/2008, pp. 438-461), as the solution.

In these terms, the notion of agency can be considered as the «independent power the agent exercises over what is external to her […] a power of reason over and against causes» (Barnes, 2000, pp. 48-49), among which we could count Hume´s "slavery to passions". In any case, a free action happens when «there is nothing about the psychology of the agent in virtue of which they are distanced from what they want or think or do» (Pettit, 2001, p. 49).

Along those lines Frankfurt suggests that there is a structure in a person´s will. When an agent, via reason, wills something (having a desire to do or not do something), this constitutes a "first-order desire". Additionally, a "second-order desire" is formed when the agent wants to have a specific desire. The reflexivity contained in this second-order volition, only present in humans, makes free will possible, as the person seems to be free to have the will they want (Frankfurt, 1988/1998, pp. 11-25).

On the contrary, Pettit argues that the distinction between first- and second-order desires is vague. This "volitional control" intended extends "free action" to "free person", omitting the constraint of specific kinds of coercion, addressing them as second- or higher order desires of avoiding the loss of freedom occurring as a result of certain situations (Pettit, 2001, pp. 57-64). Bourdieu´s concept of "symbolic violence" (Bourdieu, 1991) seems particularly fitting to this scenario. A part of a larger frame of social interaction, symbolic violence is exercised as cultural domination by «specific groups

of people that have structural social power» (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 4), whose position in the economic, political or cultural fields allows them to influence a vast reach of people, by making their specific set of interests into the majoritarian shared values that ultimately shape social behaviour. Rose writes, inspired by Foucault,

> Our relation to ourselves, that is to say, has assumed the form it has because it has been the object of a whole variety of more or less rationalized schemes, which have sought to shape our ways of understanding and enacting our existence as human beings in the name of certain objectives – manliness, femininity, honour, modesty, property, civility, discipline, distinction, efficiency, harmony, fulfilment, virtue, pleasure – the list is as diverse and heterogeneous as it is interminable (Rose, 2003, p. 130)

These objectives, which could also be thought of as values, are based on shared meaning, which implies the existence of principles for human conduct. Bookchin (1982) would locate these principles not only in a contemporary period or synchronic terms, but, going farther than Bourdieu, in the "vast history of hierarchical society" from its origin, claiming it is subjectively internalised, inscribing hierarchy in our body and predisposing our psyche to domination. Some thinkers have tried to trace back these principles, values, delving into structures of morality.

3.3.a.iii. Morality

Hume regarded morality as a question related to impressions, in other words, sensitive experience: sensations, passions and emotions (Hume, 1739/2007, pp. 292-306). Consequent with his idea of human behaviour being guided by emotion rather than by reason, he suggested that moral sense was guided by how human actions affect others. The impression of pleasure ("agreeable") derives from virtue, while pain comes from vice ("uneasy") (Hume, 1739/2007, pp. 302-303), therefore,

> morality consists not in any relations, that are the objects of science […] which can be discover´d by the understanding […] morality is not an object of reason […] You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action […] So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar´d to sounds,

> colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind (Hume, 1739/2007, p. 301)

According to Hume, ruling passions are not inherently good nor evil, they exist as products of human habit, disposition, and interest; just like justice is not natural to the human species, but the product of reflection (Hume, 1739/2007, pp. 307-311). Hume, resonating with what centuries later Bourdieu too would suggest, implies that social customs are a result of different experiences in different social environments, where different people are likely to have different impressions, and use rationality as a mask, applied to justify deeds that are actually motivated by desire.

Kant tried to prove Hume wrong, negating the slavery of the human being to desires and dispositions, by way of asserting the necessarily transcendent nature of logic, tracing a line from the mind, towards the usage of reason and inevitably reaching a responsible and moral behaviour. He disputed Hume´s empiricism and undertook to the question regarding how agency should be deployed. After having dealt with how it can take place in The Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 1781/1998), The Critique of Practical Reason (Kant, 1788/2015) considers a frame for what is desirable, "virtue" as the highest good, possible through our will (Kant, 1788/2015, pp. 89-98). Being and acting free equals being and acting morally, assuming that the object of "pure practical reason" (the highest good) is deployed with a transcendent end in mind (justice) (Kant, 1788/2015, p. 99), and not bound to the contingency of desires. Kant introduces a caveat to this principle, stating that virtue does not unequivocally lead to "happiness" (which he relates to the highest good), since "speculative reason" (assuming an object beyond our experience) can lead to superstition or fanaticism (Kant, 1788/2015, p. 109).

Then, acting on reason leads to being moral, but being moral depends on the transcendence of actions, in other words, that justice is ensured; therefore, the existence of injustice leads Kant to think that there must exist a higher ground, «to presuppose the possibility of this highest good, which, since it is possible only under the condition of the existence of God, connects the presupposition of the existence of God inseparably with duty» (Kant, 1788/2015, p. 100). This is the reason why volition is to be determined by a categorical imperative; a moral maxim (rule for actions) that makes will truly autonomous:

> It is well to note here that this moral necessity is subjective, that is, a need, and not objective, that is, itself a duty; for, there can be no duty to assume the existence of anything (since this concerns only the theoretical use of reason). Moreover, it is not to be understood by this that it is necessary to assume the existence of God as

> a ground of all obligation in general (for this rests, as has been sufficiently shown, solely on the autonomy of reason itself). What belongs to duty here is only the striving to produce and promote the highest good in the world (Kant, 1788/2015, p. 101)

Nietzsche was sceptical of this idea of moral frameworks, to the extent of reproaching Kant´s categorical imperative as cruelty (Nietzsche, 1887/2007, p. 41). He also opposed Schopenhauer´s vision of the will, accusing him of emptying the word of sense (Nietzsche, 1901/2017, p. 394). Where the latter saw the source of misery in life, to which the only cure was ascetism (of which its origins shared the ones of monotheist religion (Nietzsche, 1901/2017, pp. 15-87)), the former saw the "will to power", the drive to not only life and survival, but the will exist and overcome, a primeval force in at the core of the eternal recurrence (Nietzsche, 1901/2017, pp. 579-586).

For him, moral frameworks throughout history descend from a long tradition of thought, dating back to Socrates and Plato. The binarism established since, with a metaphysical perfect world of Forms, a "backworld" (*hinterwelt*) on the one hand, and "our" sensitive world in the other, an imperfect copy modelled after the ideal one, paved the way for religion. Religion, and the promise of an afterlife in a perfect world (Kant´s possibility of the highest good), acts as a psychological mechanism, a construction to avoid the sensitive and real-world humans live in, full of hardships, and legitimise the state of affairs in the sensitive one (Nietzsche, 1887/2007) through the establishment of discursive practices on concepts as "debt and suffering".

But Nietzsche did not limit his criticism to religion, morality, or Kant (Nietzsche, 1901/2017, pp. 91-278). With the advent of science, the ideal bond of this world and the backworld got gradually severed, although dogmatism´s root was not. The comfort provided by religion was substituted by mass politics, erecting realities, such as nations, above humans, «in the service of a nihilistic devaluation of life as a whole» (Nietzsche, 1889/1997, pp. 43-63). Submission is produced then, by making obedience a variation of dogma for the dominated, through discursive practice constructed by the dominant (Foucault, 1998). This hierarchy, set by moral authority, seems for Durkheim an inherent quality of society:

> Society in general, simply by its effect on men's minds, undoubtedly has all that is required to arouse the sensation of the divine. A society is to its members what a god is to its faithful […] And so, at every instant, we must submit to rules of action and thought that we have neither made nor wanted and that sometimes are contrary to our inclinations and to our most basic instincts.

> If society could exact those concessions and sacrifices only by physical constraint, it could arouse in us only the sense o f a physical force to which we have no choice but to yield, and not that o f a moral power such as religions venerate. In reality, however, the hold society has over consciousness owes far less to the prerogative its physical superiority gives it than to the moral authority with which it is invested. We defer to society's orders not simply because it is equipped to overcome our resistance but, first and fore-most, because it is the object of genuine respect (Durkheim, 1912/1995, pp. 208-209)

Throughout history, many thinkers developed the idea of a transcendental domain (Plato, Cooper, & Hutchinson, 1997; Adamson, 2013; Aristotle, Ackrill, & Judson, 2002; Descartes, 1637/2006; Kant, 1788/2015) that, regardless of its ontology, bound them to a metaphysical order or frame that, in a variety of ways, framed their existence (Spinoza, 1677/2009) or determined it (Hegel, 1807/2018; Schopenhauer, 1818/2008). Notwithstanding the value of all their contributions, one factor seems to remain hidden within them. Thought does not take place in a social vacuum, in a context deprived of normative constraints of different intensity, some of which might not be felt as such (Bourdieu, 1977; 1991; 1992).

In this sense, Marx and Engels disputed Hegel´s perspective of history. Despite valuing his historical awareness, they doubted objective idealism (Hegel, 1807/2018, pp. 5-46) shaped human life:

> Hegel fell into the error, therefore, of considering the real as the result of self-coordinating, self-absorbed, and spontaneously operating thought, while the method of advancing from the abstract to the concrete is but a way of thinking by which the concrete is grasped and is reproduced in our mind as a concrete (Marx & Engels, 1846/1998, p. 16)

Marx noticed the importance of the missing elements of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption (Marx & Engels, 1846/1998, pp. 5-15), highlighting that it was this relation that shaped consciousness and society. Dissatisfied with Hegel´s idealist account, centred in the opposition and overcoming of ideas, Marx infused a materialist approach to his dialectics, point at the key role of the modes of material production and the relationships derived from them. Applying the synthesis scheme to the development of the economic forms of society, from which contradictions would arise in its later stage, the capitalist society.

To overcome objective idealism, they proposed historical materialism, which considered the material circumstances conditioning "ideology" (*Vid*. *Supra*, 2.2.a.ii.), that is, moral beliefs (apart from religious, social, political, and economical beliefs), and assuming that they are socially constructed after the specific status of certain people.

Considering conceptions, thoughts, and ideas as the "real chains" for human beings, as if their limitations would be a product of their own consciousness, means the deprivation of the chance to look at material reality as the origin of their constraints. Therefore, morality, as part of ideology in this sense, presented as a natural element, considered of as conceived for society as a whole, is «the distorted form in which the sanctimonious and hypocritical ideology of the bourgeoisie voices their particular interests as universal interests» (Marx & Engels, 1846/1998, pp. 34-36, 194). Or, as Beauvoir could put it, «the values invented by certain men in a passion of hatred, fear, or faith are thought and willed by others as given realities» (Beauvoir, de, 1948/2000).

Bhaskar (2008 [1993]) would, in the next century, attempt a deeper criticism of Hegel´s dialectic, concurring with Marx in the critique of the epistemic fallacy of the reduction of being to knowledge; and the speculative illusion of science to philosophy (Bhaskar, 2008 [1993], p. 87). Marx´s "hypocritical ideology of the bourgeoisie" echoes in Bhaskar´s idea of the devaluation of social life by moral irrealism (Bhaskar, 2008 [1993], p. 193), as opposed to a critical realist dialectic. Morality then, taken as a reified notion, naturalises forms of domination and makes alienated ways of feeling, thinking, and doing look apparently ordinary, thus serving as a limit to the freedom of individuals.

3.3.a.iv. Responsibility

Summarising the main ideas so far exhibited, we could start with suggesting that freedom as an absolute would require the entity (for which it is a predicate) to be uncaused, undetermined, and devoid of the necessity of externalities for its existence. Human beings are part of a finite reality, a system of causality that does not completely determine their actions, as they can be aware of the external and internal dynamics. Therefore, far from causal determinism, humans do have a degree of freedom, that is, causal power. They choose specific lines of action and discard others. Choosing implies responsibility for having acted in a specific manner (Kisner, 2011, pp. 57-71), sometimes curbing passions or desires. Humans do this through reason, based on the limits imposed by their biology, their physical and social environment, their needs, and their own internal thought-processes.

A requisite for this freedom then resides in reason, rational control (Pettit, 2001, pp. 32-48), this assumes that the person or group is an independent (utilitarian) rational agent (Sen, 1999, pp. 249-

281; Barnes, 2000, pp. 17-20). For Sen, this rationality must not be taken in a narrow sense, as the exclusive pursuit of personal advantage. Although warning against falling for the presumption of good-willed actions, he sees rationality does not necessarily exclude concerns of justice or ethics, as these might be instrumentally important for rational choice. It is, for him, a matter of balance in the behavioural assumptions (Sen, 1999, pp. 270-281), summarised in the importance of seeing human beings in a "broader perspective" (going beyond assuming them as "human capital"), and seeing the potential of the expansion of their capability and agency, as a drive in the path towards freedom. In addition, he points out the need of understanding the relational dynamic between institutions (from market-institutions and political parties, to the "community in general"), and that of human beings as "instruments of change", aiming to improve their conditions, regarding his proposed set of five types of (instrumental) freedoms: political freedom, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security, all of which contribute to the individual´s possibility of gaining higher shares of freedom (Sen, 1999, pp. 35-53).

Following this, we could conclude that reason on its own does not suffice, as a will to act is also necessary. However, this instance does not have in mind social causation, that is, the interaction/interdependence of actors, and the interplay of these with structures, as external causal powers (Barnes, 2000, pp. 21-24). Then, volition is not enough to understand agency as human freedom to act, as both reason and volition can be coerced by other agents, social constraints, or natural impediments (Pettit, 2001, pp. 49-64; Barnes, 2000, pp. 3-4). Consequently, if human freedom is understood as the capability of making decisions, free from others agents´ coercion, it consists in the ability to deploy one´s discourse, as an active entity, in the exchange with them and be held responsible for it (Pettit, 2001, pp. 65-111).

As humans, we put events against what we do (our agency), that is, we value the extent to which we can freely engage reality, and how responsible we are, or can be, of the circumstances surrounding us, which, might pose a contingent degree of freedom. "Responsibility requires freedom" (Sen, 1999, pp. 283-290), responsible action involves that people, as part of a social system, live in a(n internal) state capable of making choices based on reason and independent judgement. This in turn surmises a (social) status, and therefore a set of (external/social) expectations, oftentimes embodied in specific identities (Williams, 1993, pp. 103-129).

The internal and external dimensions interplay differently, depending on the specific cultural context agency takes places at, as well as the diverse ways four basic elements are combined: cause, intention, state, and response (Williams, 1993, pp. 50-74; Barnes, 2000, pp. 8-15). On the specific syntheses of these depend the understanding of elements ranging from moral responsibility to legal

responsibility. These syntheses compose the systems of responsibilities societies constitute (Barnes, 2000, pp. 6-8), in a play where status (as a specific social identity) does not originate in the individual, nor is an epiphenomenon of external forces, but an ongoing sociohistorical process (Bologh, 1979, p. xii), as emergent phenomena.

Human beings and their identities are not total captives of biology (Geertz, 1973) nor socialisation, but processes themselves, inserted in wider processes, systems that shape their dispositions. People are bound to certain rules and structures, but possibilities of action in dynamics of power exist (Grossberg, 1996, p. 99; Lindholm, 2007, p. 196). There is room for agency to, instead of reproduce, subvert the identities, conditions and structures that frame them.

Agency seems to be circumscribed in a historically developed frame, a structure that, far from being an external instance, monitoring and controlling identity and action shifts, resides within individuals and groups of individuals. These structures do not seem to be rationally built by the components of society, but guided by the specific interests of "normative circles". «The social power that tends to encourage us to conform to any given social norm is in fact an emergent causal power of a specific social entity, a specific group of people» (Elder-Vass, 2010, pp. 7, 122-133), contributing causally to the determination of how we see, feel and act, and increasing the conformity to patterns advantageous to the interest of the normative circles. The resulting conformity, for a period of history, took the shape of religious doctrines, like Nietzsche, among others, discuss. But religion does not seem to be the only kind of doctrine serving as a basis for conformity and social control.

In this sense, Taylor argues that "higher spiritual ideals", be them religious or atheist, carry within the potential to «threaten to lay the most crushing burdens on humankind» (Taylor, 1989, p. 519). These ideals sometimes demand "sacrifice", "mutilation", or "immolation" in order to please a higher good, or "hypergoods", that is, «ends or goods which are worthy or desirable in a way that cannot be measured on the same scale as our ordinary ends, goods» (Taylor, 1989, p. 20), that rule our "awe, respect, or admiration". Guiding our actions following a hypergood might put us in the path of overlooking other values, considered "lower", to the extent that their "sacrifice" (e.g., harm, torture, death) might be perceived as desirable, as they are executed in the name of a higher good.

Following Marx´s´ historical materialism, these ends would not be met exclusively circumscribed in the world of ideas. What Taylor (1989) encircles as happening in the ideal domain, binding agency to the development of this field, Marxist thought links to the acquisition of conscience over the material field. The relationships of material production shapes the ways in which we think of ourselves in society (social identity), and how capable we see ourselves to change our own conditions

of existence, having in mind mutual accountability. Religion might be one of the structures binding identity, or several kinds of identity in the same society, following Taylor's idea of «the moral predicament of our time» (Taylor, 1989, p. 521), These bonds might be associated to a corresponding kind of agency (or equivalent kinds of agency), limited by the ideological construct put forth by the elements of society with the power to influence. But it is possible that religion is not the only "opium of the people". Other (non-religious) moral frames also exhibit the capacity to devise identities that restrain reason, deny a significant extent of individual will, pushing agency towards Taylor´s idea of "self-mutilation".

Human agency is not free because of rational control, nor because of volitional control, but because the employment of both reason and volition to have discursive control in relation to others, in a way that it is free of coercion and other "intrusions" to perform an action and be held responsible for it (Pettit, 2001, pp. 65-103). Be that as it may, intrusion might come in different forms, sometimes subtle and imperceptible, felt as part of our own self. Before attempting to know what these "intrusions" or structures exactly are, the affected "self" needs to be examined: Is the agency a "self", and "individual", or is it "collective"?

3.3.b. Agent and self: Individual or collective?

3.3.b.i. Biology and consciousness

From his empiricist perspective, Locke saw the need of some kind of causal continuity for the existence of individual identity. He saw the "identity of man" as «nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body» (Locke, 1690/1999, p. 315). Thus, the identity of a person lies within biological continuity, the corporeality of

> a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking […]in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done (Locke, 1690/1999, pp. 318-319)

Hence, for Locke, it is consciousness, that is, psychological continuity (Strawson, 2011, pp. 88-92), for which biological continuity is necessary, that makes individual identity possible. Regarding this affirmation, an empiricist account we have already exposed, that of Hume´s, would refer to the need of "synthetic judgement". From his empiricist perspective, the fiction of unity in time and space might be applied to the individual, of which we might gather different impressions of, resulting in an assembly of indivisible parts into ideas (Hume, 1739/2007, pp. 27-47, 135, 169). But a person is never strictly the same, not regarding their biological composition, not concerning their thoughts, beliefs, hopes and perspectives; and neither when it comes to thinking an entity that stays the same throughout time.

Still connected to empirical thought, but a long time after Locke and Hume, other empiricists question the linear and binary nature of space and time when thinking of identity assertion and ascription. Rose, for instance, states that

> To the apparent linearity, unidirectionality and irreversibility of time, we can counterpose the multiplicity of places, planes and practices. And in each of these spaces, repertoires of conduct are activated that are not bounded by the enclosure formed by the human skin or carried in a stable form in the interior of an individual (Rose, 2003, p. 144)

But we do not necessarily need to jump to the last decades of the XXI century. Another example of this non-unitary approach to the individual is the statement of Durkheim, who suggested that the human being is double, biological, and social. The body is a vessel of emotions in constant tensions with the collectivity (Durkheim, 1912/1995, pp. 208-216) it is part of:

> Society also fosters in us the sense of perpetual dependence. Precisely because society has its own specific nature that is different from our nature as individuals, it pursues ends that are also specifically its own; but because it can achieve those ends only by working through us, it categorically demands our cooperation. Society requires us to make ourselves its servants, forgetful of our own interests. And it subjects us to all sorts of restraints, privations, and sacrifices without which social life would be impossible. And so, at every instant, we must submit to rules of action and thought that we have neither made nor wanted and that sometimes are contrary to our inclinations and to our most basic instincts (Durkheim, 1912/1995, p. 209)

A person, as an individual entity, seems then to be a biological body, «a conscious agent, having a unified personality, or being worthy of moral consideration» (Wilson, 2007, p. 118). These set

properties deal with the psychological aspect of "person", but it also has its limitations. "Persōna", as the Latin word meaning "mask" (Glare (Ed.), 2012, p. 1356), entails the social dimension of the biological entity, revealing that more than one identity, more than one "self", might be contained in the same individual.

3.3.b.ii. Consciousness and embodiment

Once more, the quality of selfhood, the seemingly ordinary topic of "I", becomes elusive. "Self", as a theoretical construct, has been an object of debate. The linguistic correlate is not present in every language and, therefore, some authors point out its weakness as an analytical category, especially in cross-cultural studies. Erikson (1968, pp. 216-221), who mentions the obfuscation stemming from "habits of syntax", departs from a social psychological perspective. He asserted that the "I" reflects the different preconscious selves, and their different roles, contained in an embodied and coherent "composite Self". Similar to Locke´s account, the "I" perceives itself as continuous in time and space. The "ego" (different from what Freud conceptualised), or ideal self, acts as an "inner agency" in a synthesising process filtering events, impressions, emotions, memories, and experiences. The "I" is conscious, whereas the "ego" is unconscious. However, we can be aware of its work: turning passive syntheses into active volition.

As a matter of fact, ego´s awareness of itself, is key for the understanding of the different identity domains, as it constitutes the first-order of reflexive consciousness. This level, along with second-order reflexivity, that is, the reflection on the differentiation of the self in social interaction, completes the relational deliberative capacity of the individual´s agency (Côté & Levine, 2002, pp. 91-118), *autognosis* in an inwards-outwards dialectical sense.

In this sense, for Mead (1934/1962, pp. 135-226), an important difference needs to be made between "I" and "me". From his symbolic interactionism standpoint, selfhood is dissimilar to the physiological embodiment. "Me", as a reflection of the environment, is the socialised self, the internalisation of the collective values, expectations, and practices. The "I" is the active reaction to the socialised self, the individual and reflexive impulse "responding to a social situation which is within the experience of the individual", self-conscious agency.

Erikson explains the interplay between the different elements of the inner workings of the self towards the exterior, while Mead highlights that exterior´s effect on the self, in an "internalised conversation" as a reaction to the social structures´ influence: «the relationship of a situation to the organism. The situation that presents the problem is intelligible to the organism that responds to it,

and fusion takes place in the act» (Mead, 1934/1962, p. 280). Erikson´s approach, although tendent to the psychological domain, has the sociological aspect in mind. That is the way Côté and Levine (2002) advocate for when addressing Erikson´s work; as well as for a multidimensional perspective that approaches identity as the result of "external (social) and internal (agentic) factors", therefore having in mind culture and agency, embodied actors in a society.

3.3.b.iii. Embodiment and society

The formation of "I", of identity, did not seem to be an overly complicated procedure in premodern societies. Identity «formation in late modernity is not as restricted by social ascription as it was in premodern society» (Côté & Levine, 2002, p. 5), as prescribed roles were assumed by the individual, who faced disapproval and rejection by the individuals in positions in authority, and society at large. Even though with modernity, as a general rule, this compulsion was replaced by the possibility of choice, premodern societies are still «crucial reference points or baselines from which we can understand emergent identity problems» (Côté & Levine, 2002, p. 1).

With the sociohistorical development in mind, Durkheim considered the social nature of the individual. Without negating the individuality of the person, he would nonetheless indicate the non-autonomous nature and inescapably collective orientation of their behaviour. Significantly, however, Durkheim died in 1917, in the brink of the collapse of the old regime and the birth of the state-nation, which would bring about a series of changes that affected the role of the individual in society.

Nevertheless, he was aware of the change taking place at that stage of modernity. "Mechanical solidarity", characteristic of simpler societies, where individuals engage in similar tasks, beliefs, and feelings, would be followed by "organic solidarity" (Durkheim, 1893/2013, pp. 101-102, 57-84). This type of solidarity is that of a heterogeneous industrialised society, in which interdependence arising from the specialised division of labour prevails. While mechanical solidarity entails a degree of absorption of the individual personality into the collective one; organic solidarity arises when labour is divided, and thus individuals depend on the cohesion and interdependence emerged (Durkheim, 1893/2013, pp. 88-155).

This distinction shows the overlapping of individual and collective change, in the manner Marx pointed out. Material change, most commonly the result of collective endeavours, leads to change in the conditions of the individual. This develops likewise in the overlapping of the psychological and sociological dimensions, in which identity is formed. Social structures fold over the individual, however, the individual is not a passive recipient, but an active agent. The possibility of resisting and

refusing external pressure coming from social structures was stated by Durkheim, who broadly focused on the externalities affecting the individual. He highlighted the double nature of the agent, as cause and effect, in relation to the structures (Durkheim, 1912/1995, pp. 15-16; 1897/2012, pp. 276-278), the human being is both a biological- and social-bound entity.

3.3.b.iv. Society and culture

We have previously cast aside the concept of "identity" as an irreducible, assumed (Jenkins, 2008, pp. 1-3), and implicit idea, more often than not coupled with political disputes pertaining to agency, ideology (Malešević, 2006), polity and «it´s pivotal relationship to a politics of location – but also the manifest difficulties and instabilities which have characteristically affected all contemporary forms of `identity politics´» (Hall, 1996, p. 2). Implicit in this assertion comes the fact that, even if the first idea that a taken-for-granted thinking might relate to identity as regarding to individuals, collectivity and history have a say, an important one, in the matter. Aside from that, Jenkins states that

> identity "in itself", independent of other considerations such as interest, may not be a plausible proposition […] As critical social scientists we, in fact, are obliged not to […] the extent to which collective or individual interests are subordinated to the categorial imperatives of "identity" should be a matter for empirical discovery, rather than *a priori* theoretical presumption (although there are epistemological issues here, since identifying the interests of an individual or a group is not a straightforward matter) (Jenkins, 2008, p. 8)

Despite the possible identification mechanisms (language, embodiment, behaviour), Hall (1996) draws the attention to how identities, as much as it could look like it, are never monolithic, but increasingly fragmented and in constant transformation. This transformation happens not by chance in a vacuum, but as an intersubjective practice in a cultural frame. Côte and Levine, summoning Geertz (1973) among others, regard the "culture-identity" framework, from what appears to be a poststructuralist perspective, as a «"toolkit" to solve various problems through "strategies of action"» (Côté & Levine, 2002, p. 122). This notion seems to conceive "culture" more as an external entity, a set of "symbolic vehicles of meaning" that can, consciously, strategically, and willingly be utilised by individuals for achieving their identities and aims.

However, this acceptation does not appear to fit with what Geertz, an admittedly implicit inspiration for the idea, seemed to think of about "culture". He cautioned against jumping to conclusions and indicated the need to

> trace out the sociological links between cultural themes and political developments, rather than to move deductively from one to the other. Ideas – religious, moral, practical, aesthetic – must, as Max Weber, among others, never tired of insisting, be carried by powerful social groups to have powerful social effects; someone must revere them, celebrate them, defend them, impose them. They have to be institutionalised in order to find not just an intellectual existence in society, but, so to speak, a material one as well (Geertz, 1973, p. 314)

In addition, a utilitarian notion of "culture" as a fundamentally external toolkit seems to assume a distinct, clear-cut basis of elements, reachable and deployable through will. Concerning this, Barth (1969) disputes the idea (according to him, entertained by traditional anthropology at the time) of the premise that cultural variation is discontinuous, that is, discrete cultural groups with clear boundaries. A general understanding of "ethnic group" would be a population that

1. Is largely biologically self-perpetuating;
2. Shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms;
3. Makes up a field of communication and interaction;
4. Has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order (Norrel, as cited in Barth, 1969)

Even if Barth does not object the conception itself, he does see that emphasising these guidelines might provide a preconceived idea, preventing the apprehension of important factors that escape the continuation of the ethnic group in temporary and spatial terms. Ethnic groups are socially effective objective realities that evolve through time, realities that exist in themselves and for themselves, through social structures that contain a set principles and goals. One of its most important goals is to guarantee survival in specific ecological, political, economic, structural, and technical constraints, reflecting expectations, desires and objectives present in a society.

Notwithstanding, Lindholm, considering Durkheim´s approach (1912/1995, pp. 208-209), notes that a cultural system is not only a reflection of

> human hopes and fears, but also an objective reality, an evolving collective entity […] providing its members with roles, identities, and morals that further the viability of the group as a whole. As Durkheim argued, culture exists in and for itself; Its principles and goals are carried by powerful institutions and structures, and are not necessarily beneficial or pleasant for its members […] society is not

> only adaptive and functional, but also necessarily full of coercion, imbalance, ambivalence, and conflict (Lindholm, 2007, p. 194)

Therefore, if culture is turned inwards, with the objective of perpetuating itself, its function of providing a frame for adaption to ecological, material, emotional, social, technical and political circumstances might, at some point, might become dysfunctional, as Taylor hints at, regarding some forms of consummation of the ideal of the "authenticity" of identity (Taylor, 1994, pp. 30-32). If institutions and normativity are aimed at a static configuration of the environment, the frame of purpose and symbolical meanings could manifest an inadequate adaptive consciousness. But since culture is not a sentient entity, what is the explanation for a certain set of allegedly adaptive structures enduring the passage of time or being discontinued?

3.3.b.v. Culture and structure

Before answering that question, it is interesting to reflect the comparison Geertz (1973) makes between different understandings of "culture" regarding the human being. On one hand, he points out what he considered at that time the commonplace "stratigraphic" approach. This designation refers to the understanding of the connection between different strata present in human life, one overlaying above the next:

> As one analyzes man [sic], one peels off layer after layer, each such layer being complete and irreducible in itself, revealing another, quite different sort of layer underneath. Strip off the motley forms of culture and one finds the structural and functional regularities of social organization. Peel off these in turn and one finds the underlying psychological factors – "basic needs" or what-have-you – that support and make them possible. Peel off psychological factors and one is left with the biological foundations – anatomical, physiological, neurological – of the whole edifice of human life (Geertz, 1973, p. 37)

He saw the usefulness of assuming this perspective in the fact that it guarantees the independence of academic disciplines, for the sake of granting one´s field its autonomous rationale. Aside from that, this hierarchical stratification meant for Geertz that cultural facts could be interpreted alongside non-cultural facts, without being melt together.

This meant that the endeavour of the study of cultures allowed for empirical universals, that is, cultural expressions ("religion", "property", "marriage", for instance) comprised of the same content,

resulting in either “highly circumstantial content”, or near-empty categories (Geertz, 1973, pp. 38-40), devoid of potential for explanation.

An example of this attempt can be found in Sapir (2004 [1921]), who showed his concern with describing culture as a frame not above the individual, but instead overlapping and merging with personality, to the point that he understood that it comprised a system of interconnected patterns through symbolic elements, permeated by meaning and intention. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Whorf, 1956 [1940]) went as far as understanding that language expressions reflected the features of the culture they are ingrained in, revealing cognitive patterns. Even if he admitted that archetypical features could exits cross-culturally, his argument does not explain the cohabitation of different kinds of individual identities under the same culture, therefore, his dialectical anthropology, connecting the cultural structure with individual agency, did not yield cohesive results.

Along the same lines as Geertz, Malešević (2004) states the difference between “culture” and “ethnicity”. He sees ethnicity, that which Geertz was referring to with “cultural expressions”, not an indeterminate “ethnic identity”, but

> politicised social action, a process whereby elements of real, actual, lived cultural differences are politicised in the context of intensive group interaction. Ethnicity is not a synonym for cultural diversity as a great majority of our cultural practices and beliefs are rarely if ever politicised. Whereas culture is about real, lived collective difference, ethnicity is often about segments of that broad cultural repertoire which does not have to be real or lived experience (Malešević, 2006, p. 29)

It is for a similar purpose in the anthropological analytical field that Geertz proposes the integration of theories and concepts “sequestered in separate fields of study”. Firstly, he suggests seeing culture «not as complexes of concrete behaviour patterns –customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters», but as a «set of control mechanisms – plans, recipes, instructions» (Geertz, 1973, p. 44) for governing behaviour. Secondly, he deems necessary to see the human being as depending on extragenetic (not innate to the species) control mechanisms for ordering behaviour. In other words, examining culture would imply less looking for empirical common elements in behaviour, but «rather the mechanisms by whose agency the breadth and indeterminateness of his [the individual´s] inherent capacities are reduced to the narrowness and specificity of his actual accomplishments» (Geertz, 1973, p. 45).

Among others, Jenkins (2008) and Brubaker (2004) agree with the idea that ethnicity conceived of as clearly bounded, internally homogenous groups, do not exist. What does exist is the interested

classification and categorisation of groups, it is therefore a cognitive matter. Malešević (2006), in addition, indicates that the attempts of institutionalisation of specific ethnicities have historically confirmed the frail boundary between the politisation of culture and violence. This reminisces Taylor´s idea of multinational societies breaking up, mainly due to a perceived or explicit lack of recognition of one group´s worth (Taylor, 1994, pp. 63-64) Similarly, regarding tendency to objectify identity into something stable and closed, and agreeing with Csordas (2002) among others, Lindholm understands culture as the "collective expression of our own ambivalence", instead of assuming it as a consistent symbolic whole with no internal tension (Lindholm, 2007, p. 193).

Bhabha, also convinced of the impossibility of the "containedness" of culture (2003), and breaking the simpler visions of Otherness, advocates for notions like "hybridisation" and "partial culture". By means of a poststructuralist approach (and a postcolonialist standpoint), he suggests that partial cultures, the result of the spatial displacement of groups, expose the "in-between" of culture; regarded as homogeneous, these minoritarian, originated from colonisation, are mistakenly taken as whole cultures of their own, a mistaken vision. These minorities, break the image of apparently and admittedly unitary cultures (Bhabha, 1994, pp. 212-235), but, as they blend, transform and even influence "wider" cultures in a relation of interdependence.

In spite of the exposed theoretical developments, and far from the transcendent or essentialist accounts that might justify likewise realities, the apparent existence of "unitary cultures" seems to have an effect in the identity and identification processes from the phenomenological standpoint of the individual. The subjective dimension of identity contrasts with the objective reality of the structures that partake in the acceptance of the existence of ethnic cultures, promoting them, or even enforcing them.

In this sense, Appadurai (1996, pp. 13-15, 139-157), aware of the importance of this argument, and having in mind the abundance of differences present in levels, intensities, and causal powers, proposes the usage of "culture" in different terms. Departing from a Saussurean linguistical standpoint, Appadurai establishes a difference between the noun "culture", associated to an essence that appears to "conceal more than reveal", «a pervasive dimension of human discourse that exploits difference to generate diverse conceptions of group identity»; and "cultural", as an adjective highlighting contrast, stressing the idea of a local, embodied, and significant reality, a "dimension of phenomena" (Appadurai, 1996, pp. 12-13).

In this sense, he suggests the use of "cultural" to refer to the conscious naturalisation of group identity in relation to the possession of specific attributes (material, linguistic, territorial, religious,

etc.). This would constitute the mobilisation of social structures, by specific norm circles (Elder-Vass, 2010) for the (re)production of a boundary of difference. This acceptation entails the conscious and imaginative (Anderson, 1983/2006) endeavour of constructing difference, equating ethnicity and culture.

From this perspective, Appadurai understands "culturalism" as identity politics organised around the nation-state, as the conscious mobilisation of cultural differences for national or transnational politics. This, he argues, is the reason why "culturalism" often comes with prefixes like "bi", "multi", or "inter", as different senses of the word might imply processes of conscious identity (re)production (Appadurai, 1996, pp. 139-144). In this sense, Grossberg questions the sense of trying to pinpoint who a "culture" belongs to: in historical terms, we would need to trace cultures back in time to a supposed root, ending up in "strongly conservative positions", as history in its own would reinforce "structures of racism, imperialism and ethnocentrism"; in ethnic terms, every society would need to be seen as "multicultural", as the chance of a territory holding a static human constituent base is highly unlikely; in spatial terms, «the problems of contemporary mobility appear insurmountable» (Grossberg, 1996, p. 88). From this standpoint, he suggests that the issue of multicultural societies is a normative ethical one. Appadurai highlights the significance of this fact, in light of his though about the political organisation around nation-states, underscoring the situations of refugeeness and exile, where ascription and recognition of identity by transnational structures acquires an important role regarding (extra)territoriality (Appadurai, 1996, pp. 144-177).

But transnational structures are not the only kind of constructions that affect the identity-agency-culture complex. Having (hopefully) cleared up what and how the relationship between identity, agency and culture is, what remains to be acknowledged is, precisely, the origin, location and function of "structures", and their relation to identity and agency.

3.4. Structure

3.4.a. Within or outside the agent

Frequently a concept of dissension, "structure" has been used to widely refer to recurring patterns of social behaviour, or organised interrelationship between elements of a social system. Dealing with the human world as we are, two general understandings of "social structure" can be emphasized. One could be specifically labelled as "institutional structure", for the case of normative (regulated) patterns, constructed in order to define the regulated statuses agents hold in their interactions, what Durkheim would have called "collective representations" (1912/1995, pp. 9-15) 9,15. The other one,

“relational structure”, relates to patterns of causal interaction and interdependence between the agents, “collective relationships” for Durkheim (1897/2012, p. 334) 334. López and Scott suggest the complementarity of both notions, and furthermore, going beyond these, as accounts from different disciplines have provided deeper insight (López & Scott, 2000, pp. 1-4).

The different structures permeate and affect the individual and collectives in different manners. This in turn means that identity assertion or ascription are affected by different factors. As Grossberg (1996, pp. 90-91) suggests, the challenge is being able to consider more than one difference at once, having in mind they do not come in clear-cut divisions. In other words, having in mind the effect of what he designates as the “fragmentation” of the multiplicity of identities, apparently assembled uniformly, but categorised under different structures.

Grossberg notes the reflection of the issue from a postmodernist lens, arguing that the struggle about identity in this sense becomes a matter or representation, even as an entirely linguistic construction. López and Scott highlight a specific development, concerning the linguistical approach to social structure, but in its analogy to grammatical construction, such as Chomsky´s (2002) development on the matter: «patterns of institutions and relations result from the actions of individuals who are endowed with the capacities or competencies that enable them to produce them by acting in organized ways» (López & Scott, 2000, p. 4). These capacities are necessarily embodied, contained within a biological frame, bearer of the dispositions caused by the institutional and relational structures, produced over the course of history.

That is at least how the structuralist account understands the issue. A post-structuralist account would point out the fact that structure exists outside the individual (Archer, 1996). A third path is proposed by Dave Elder-Vass, arguing that «instead of ascribing causal significance to an abstract notion of social structure or a monolithic concept of society, we must recognise that it is specific groups of people that have social structural power» (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 4). Since both structuralists and post-structuralists have been attributed different levels of abstraction, involving levels of abstraction that mislead the understanding, he suggests making use of the theory of emergence. This means identifying the interactions and emergent properties that arise from specific sets of relations (eventually composing social structures), without losing sight of the causal powers possessed by the parts that compose them (specific individuals, agents).

3.4.b. Three bodies

The abstraction of the term "structure" has led to different understandings of what exactly it refers to. Concepts involving different dimensions have been summoned to be interpreted under its light. "Social structure" might refer to specific organisations, strata of society, gender, or even the whole economic system, in other words, capitalism. Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Margaret Lock encountered the problem of this unspecificity and attributed it to the epistemological construction of the duality of the human being (Scheper-Hugues & Lock, 1987, p. 208).

In the line of acknowledging the complexities concerning identity, and especially regarding its relationship with culture, Scheper-Hughes and Lock distance themselves from the historically recurrent binary dichotomisation, originated more than 2,400 years ago, separating mind and body, settled by Cartesian dualism. This methodological construct, they saw, hindered whole dimensions pertaining to the object of research, obscuring important aspects of the reality observed, and tagging them as "foreign" to science.

In an attempt to put a solution to the problem, they suggest having in mind the reflection of the different selves reflected in the same body, as an entity in the intersection between being a physical body as well as a container of significance, constructed both naturally and culturally, and located in a historical background. Their account separates three "realms of representation and practice":

- The individual experienced body. A phenomenological experience of the self, in its aspects pertaining to the agent, their identity, culture, experience, and modes of feeling thinking and doing.
- The social symbolic body. A constructed meaningful object, as the symbolical experience, through which the individual and social connect, produce worldviews, always according to the historical circumstances, stemmed from the social experience of interaction and interdependence between the agents, constructing, reproducing, and subverting their environment.
- The body politic. A body as an object of control, as the experience related to the regulation, surveillance, and therefore control of individual and collective agents, mainly through the domain of normative and regulated institutions, located in an objective social organisation, subject to regulation of the social body and the disciplining of the individual one (Scheper-Hugues & Lock, 1987, pp. 209-219)

These realms resonate with three different albeit interconnected fields: the experienced body with the phenomenological field, where the experience of the individual acts as the raw material of

existence; the symbolic one in the sociological field, where objectification and subjectification processes take place through structures that produce symbolic meaning; and the normatively institutionalised political field, as accounted for in the political and legal fields. The convergence of the three fields, according to Scheper-Hughes and Lock, results in the production of the social identity.



Figure 4 Depiction of the theory of the "three bodies".

Similar to what later López and Scott would classify as the embodied, relational, and institutional typologies, these three “bodies” or dimensions consider a conceivable range of relational dimensions that avoid discarding the complexity of the relation between identity and agency. In like manner, Côté and Levine adopt a perspective more focused on Social Psychology. For their task of finding a unified taxonomy on identity formation, they suggest the personality and social structure perspective (PSSP). Having in mind the need of overcoming the isolation of sociology and psychology, and in order to be able to have a higher understanding of the mechanisms at play, they suggest through this perspective three levels of analysis: The level of personality, involving cognitive structures in the “intrapsychic domain of human functioning”; the level of interaction, specified in daily-life patterns of behaviour; the social structural level, defined in the normative structures, comprising the economic, political and legal fields (Côté & Levine, 2002, pp. 6-9).



Figure 5 The Personality and Social Structure Perspective (PSSP) model (Côté & Levine, 2002, p. 7).

According to this perspective, the social structures permeate daily-life interactions between individuals through socialisation. Interactions help internalise the values and norms stemming from the structures, assimilating them through the ego synthesis abilities (defining situations and developing an image of reality) into personality, which in turn executes behaviours in interactions, based on presentations of the self, to produce an adequate impression (Côté & Levine, 2002, pp. 7-9, 104). Consequently, social structures are reproduced and objectified, and through social constructions, performed and reproduced.

In this sense, they deem important to consider the ego´s (2.2.b.iii.) agentic capabilities as a regulator of behavioural, cognitive an emotional control:

> ego identity refers to a strength that the ego has in terms of a capacity to master and maintain a stable identity across situations and through time. Thus, for Erikson, temporal-spatial continuity had subjective and objective manifestations: as a sense of stability experienced by the person, and as a stability in behavior exhibited by the person in the presence of others, respectively. This stability is observable in terms of personal identity and social identity, two analytically distinct but interrelated forms of identity (Côté & Levine, 2002, p. 94)

This interrelation specifies in the fact that what they call ego "quality" or "strength" evolves on the grounds of effective and meaningful social functioning. Therefore, the higher the sense of ego identity of an individual; the more unified the personality; the more unified the personality is, the

higher the integration between personal life and social life; the higher the integration, the more consistent the person´s behaviour and their different selves.

The process takes places between individuals and normative social institutions, individual beliefs intermediate between these structures and individual behaviour. This process involves what Elder-Vass calls "norm circles", "overlapping or *cross-cutting* social groups" with a collective intention concerned with specific normative matters, with causal power to influence, therefore capable of increasing conformity to the norm, through their effect on beliefs (Elder-Vass, 2010, pp. 122-125). This is how, as seen in *Figure 2*,

> The effect of social institutions on behaviour is therefore a two-stage causal process – in the first stage the norm circle has a (downward) causal impact on the individual´s motivations and in the second these motivations affect their behaviour (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 125)

This process might suggest that our actions are determined through the dispositions produced diachronically throughout history, and synchronically via social interaction. There are different perspectives regarding how these dispositions unwrap in practice.

3.4.c. *Habitus* or reflexive deliberations

Marx observed that

> Man [sic] makes his own history, but he does not make it out of the whole cloth; he does not make it out of conditions chosen by himself, but out of such as he finds close at hand. The tradition of all past generations weighs like an alp upon the brain of the living (Marx, 1852/2003, p. 12)

These conditions consist not only on the material environment, but also on the mental confines and customs of the individual. Mauss coined the concept of *habitus* to refer to the acquired nature and meaning of "actions and rites" that he identified as "techniques of the body", which happen without conscious deliberation (Mauss, 1934). A further development of the concept was formulated by Bourdieu, who named Mauss´ specific notion of habitus as "body hexis" (Bourdieu, 1977, pp. 87-95), and grounded it within a wider theoretical construct.

On his "theory of fields", Bourdieu considers the differentiation Durkheim saw in the modern society (Durkheim, 1893/2013, pp. 116-155), with the division of labour as an ongoing reality in the

wider process of differentiation. He conceives the bidirectional nature of the relationship between agents and the social structures, or "social fields" where they act, not as that of a rigid hierarchy, but as one where the objectified structures are, to some extent, inscribed in the body of the agent.

The social fields consist of the differentiation of the integral "universes" of premodern societies, where rather homogeneous individuals occupied likewise homogeneous spaces with limited division of labour. In modernity, fields are "social universes", each with their own structured *nomos*, spaces functioning under a specific set of principles, rules, and interests (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 83). In his own words,

> a field may be defined as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential situation (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.) (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 83)

Unlike premodern societies, where every aspect of life tended to be blended in the same space, the economic, political, and cultural field are separate *nomos*. As different spaces under different rationales, each one functions under different values associated to different kinds of capital. Therefore, the distribution of the different kinds of capital (economic, social, cultural, and symbolic) will configure the field, and will correspondingly grant the agents specific positions in it.

Capital in this sense is not reduced to economic capital, as a mechanistic determinist interpretation of Marx would conceive of. Even though the different forms of capital (*Vid*. *Infra*, 3.4.d.) are based on the economic one, they are not determined by it. Bourdieu sees different forms of capital being deployed in different ways, in different fields, where different rules apply (Bourdieu, 1986).

It is through the combination of the forms of capital that habitus is produced. He uses it to refer to the "socialised subjectivity" of the individual, a set of dispositions put in practice reflecting historically constructed values. It is experienced as the spontaneous individual behaviour, but it is actually a system of internalised structures, ways of perceiving and envisioning reality and action in it; a world-view, «the precondition for all objectification and apperception: and the objective coordination of practices and the sharing of a world-view could be founded on the perfect impersonality and interchangeability of singular practices and views (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 86).

Habitus is not equivalent to the simpler notion of "habit", as a practice frequently repeated that becomes and automatised behaviour. Although this "automaticity" does take place in the habitus, its nature comes from the preponderance of socially constructed ways of interaction. Ways that might vary from field to field, but nonetheless rest on the distribution of power derived from the capital deployed by the interacting agents, who, through «these iterative processes, social structures are maintained or altered, interactions are normalized or disrupted, and personality is formed or transformed» (Côté & Levine, 2002, p. 8).

However, as authors like Elder-Vass point out, Bourdieu «frequently neglects the role of conscious thought in both the development and the operation of the habitus» (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 100). Although Bourdieu opposes the vision of social agents as mechanistically determined forces (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 108-109), and therefore sees them as capable of conscious deliberations, authors like Archer place the latter, reflexive deliberation, at the core of the agents' actions (Archer M. S., 2003). She thinks of the "internal conversation", as an irreducible personal property, a process through which we acquire personal identity, via monitoring and prioritising our concerns, specified in the stages of "discernment", "deliberation", and "dedication" (Archer, 2004, pp. 222-249). Based on Frankfurt´s second-order volitions, this process is the origin of the «first causal power, which stems from our reflexive first-person perspective; namely, that we can modify ourselves by reflecting upon what we most care about and how we must accommodate all our other concerns to it» (Archer M. S., 2003, p. 41).

Her idea of the realisation of reflexive deliberation entails awareness of the "stratification of the self". This in turn involves an internal conversation between the "I" and the "Me" (a personalised sediment, rather than a generalised other in Mead´s sense); and between the "I" and the "You", an enacted interpreter of my agency (Archer, 2003, pp. 53-92). Her notion of internal conversation sounds resembles a possible answer to the "information gap" Geertz referred to when he stated that «between what our body tells us and what we have to know in order to function, there is a vacuum we must fill ourselves, and we fill it with information (or misinformation) provided by our culture» (Geertz, 1973, p. 50).

Reflexivity is for Archer an "ineliminable" human property as well as the originator of the personal and social identity, although not in an isolated manner. The individual is capable of filling the "information gap", but social factors can affect the actor´s standpoint without them being aware of them (Archer, 2003, p. 52). As a matter of fact, she established a typology of four kinds of internal conversation, based on the type of reflexive deliberation put forth by the agent:

- Communicative reflexives: Agents who, before taking action, engage with other agents to complete their internal conversation, in search of completion.
- Autonomous reflexives: Agents who take action, stemming exclusively from the private domain of their internal conversation.
- Meta-reflexives: Agents who, before taking action, reflect on their own acts of reflexivity, engaging in critical internal conversation regarding their own self and the effectivity of potential actions.
- Fractured reflexives: Agents with "suspended powers" of reflexivity, unable to perform action, because of the distress originated by the internal conversation (Archer, 2003, pp. 167-341)

Elder-Vass, tried to "reconcile" the perspectives of Bourdieu and Archer (Elder-Vass, 2010, pp. 102-114). He rejects the "conflationist" account of agency, that is, the ontological inseparability of structure and agency. Even if Bourdieu´s account cannot be taken as a conflationist one (Bourdieu, 2000, pp. 136-137), he does see a tendency to disregard reflexivity, as stated before. Notwithstanding, he proposes this "reconciliation" on the base of the distinction of a metaphorical reading, against a literal reading of the "internalisation of the external", presupposed to Bourdieu, avoiding to distinguish between a thing and its causal consequences.

Some actions might be reflexively determined, while others are, to a higher extent, determined by habitus. History and everyday life hold examples of the diversity of possible responses by different individuals sharing similar properties and backgrounds. In regard to this dissertation, it will adopt Elder-Vass´ standpoint and thus, instead of speaking of "determination", "codetermination" will be presumed when predicated to an action. In accordance to this, concerning the relationship between structure and agency, this thesis embraces Elder-Vass´ emergentist synthesis of Bourdieu´s and Archer´s thought as follows:

1. Action is based on the dispositions, as a result of past experiences and subsequent reinforcement or weakening of the relevant synaptic connections (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 136).
2. Reflexive deliberation appears not during the action itself, but indirectly during the prior decision engagement, particularly when immediate dispositions do not assist in decision taking (Archer, 2003, pp. 12, 127).
3. During the «interaction between an emergent mental layer invoked in the process of decision-making and the underlying neural layer that translates our dispositions into actual behaviour» (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 109), consciousness is called forth, in order to produce a conscious decision.

Having in mind the variability of the contribution to reflexivity to the causation of human action, since, historical context, class, and individual experiences might affect it; would it be possible to know what and how influences the contribution of reflexivity and consciousness in a social environment? The notion of capital, in its dialectical sense, might prove useful for providing an answer to this question.

3.4.d. Fields and capitals

Capital might appear to the individual solely as an economic element, wealth, purchasing power, divisible and quantifiable, apt for exchange. However, Marx disputed the notion of capital as the reduction to this appearance (Marx, 1939/1973, p. 169), denouncing it as such. According to him, capital is not an exchange relation, but a relation of production. History is but the change in the forms of material production, and consequently the dominance of specific relations of production from which this appearance of capital, as an autonomous object, historically arises. It is through the intentional dissolution of the visibility of connection between the social and political structures with production that this concealment occurs. By means of the division of labour, accumulation of capital and subsequent creation of a specific order and organisation of society, capital is made to appear as an independent object, a natural form devoid of the class exploitation that lies within its foundation (Marx & Engels, 1846/1998; 1867/1990; 1939/1973).

According to Marxist theory, the apparent reality of capital as an object independent of the social circumstances, as well as the historic nature of its construction, lies at the core of the concealment of the social relations that make it possible. These relations are not abstract, but located spatiotemporally, in specific societies, that is, groups of people with a shared set of ecological, material, technical, and social conditions. However, the reproduction of the social conditions in which they live very rarely go in the interest of all of the members of a society.

Members of lower social classes sometimes seem to share the same type of interests, perspectives, and belief systems as the members in the higher classes. Marx and posterior Marxist perspectives envisioned that, due to the inherent contradiction of capital and capitalism, its collapse would be inevitable. It is in the core of capital that lie the conditions for its overcoming; in spite of it, history continued to be kept under the grip of those in positions to practice and impose the politics that reproduced the social conditions and ownership of the means of production that underpin them. The exploitation of the worker class by the bourgeoise, albeit in different forms, ensued till nowadays in an increasingly interdependent, globalised, and commoditised world.

Unlike Marx´s concept of capital, Bourdieu´s (1986) is divided in three different main types: economic, social, and cultural (with the addition of symbolic capital in rather special terms). Despite retaining its primacy, the usage of the concept of economic capital does not solve the problem of explaining why precapitalist societies or sectors of capitalist societies do not function according to the maximisation of economic benefit, nor the possibility of transubstantiation (the possibility of material economic capital presenting itself in immaterial forms), through processes engaged with more or less effort of transformation (Bourdieu, 1986, pp. 15-16; 1997, p. 160), leading to economicist interpretations of Marxism and society.

Each type of capital has its own "field", a concept Bourdieu uses to refer to the social spaces, objective structures. These are autonomous "universes" of practice, with their own regulations and interests, that arise with the development of society. A field is the nomos where the process of differentiation (Durkheim, 1893/2013, pp. 116-155) is reflected. The kind of interest present in one field might not make sense (or rather made to make no sense or irrelevant) in a different one, as each one deals with their own rationale (Bourdieu, 1997, pp. 144-155, 206-219).

For Bourdieu, like for Marx, capital remains «accumulated labor (in its materialized form or its "incorporated," embodied form) which, when appropriated on a private, i.e., exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labor» (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 15). In any of its shapes, its root is economic capital, it takes time to accumulate, produce profits and reproduce itself; and in its tendency to continue existing it reveals, through the distribution of its different forms, the structures underpinning the social world, and therefore the possibilities of success of the different practices present in a society.

These practices entail sometimes different types of capital in their corresponding field, increasingly separated in different nodes. This is the reason why what might be interpreted as disinterestedness, working under one logic in one field, might in reality be responding to a different logic, with a different interest of profit in mind. It is then, when fields, capitals and logics of practice appear to be disjointed, that the symbolic takes place. Symbolic capital is for Bourdieu perceptual cognitive-based knowledge and recognition of symbols as valuable in themselves, in other words,

> any kind of capital (economic, cultural, academic, or social) when it is perceived according to the categories of perception, the principles of vision and division, the systems of classification, the classificatory schemes, the cognitive schemata, which are, at least in part, the product of the embodiment of the objective structures of the

> field in consideration, that is, of the structure of the distribution of capital in the field being considered (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 85)

Relations of dominance are hidden behind the perception of a meaning that serves specific social positions, not only in a concrete field, but in society as a whole (Bourdieu, 1993, pp. 112-141). Cultural and social capital are contingent on the economic capital, but not determined by it. This is the reason why relations of power determine how the different kinds of capital are related to each other; and why and how this relationship is obscured, ensuing the reproduction of the contents of socialisation. But this does not happen mechanistically, the three types of capital blend and are embodied, resulting in the habitus, the set of predispositions passed on through socialisation, felt and perceived as "intuition" on the base of this socialisation and its correlates (Bourdieu, 1997, pp. 19-21). In this sense, habitus is embodied, but also produced and reproduced:

> Habitus are generative principles of distinct and distinctive practices - what the worker eats, and especially the way he eats it, the sport he practices and the way he practices it, his political opinions and the way he expresses them are systematically different from the industrial owner's corresponding activities. But habitus are also classificatory schemes, principles of classification, principles of vision and division, different tastes. They make distinctions between what is good and what is bad, between what is right and what is wrong, between what is distinguished and what is vulgar, and so forth, but the distinctions are not identical. Thus, for instance, the same behavior or even the same good can appear distinguished to one person, pretentious to someone else, and cheap or showy to yet another (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 8)

Perceived as such distinctive social categories of perception, symbolism is reflected in language. Similarly to what Wittgenstein[22] (1953/2009) meant with "form of life", habitus underlines the social locatedness of an individual, perceptible, and shareable through a common set of shared symbols, containing all sorts of socially sanctioned elements, convenient for identity ascription, and, as we shall soon see, manageable for projecting a specific assertion (2.3.d.iv.).

[22] Both Wittgenstein and Bourdieu employ the term of "game", to refer to shared rules under which social interaction takes place. The first one alludes to "language game" as the grounds where expressions are exchanged in human interaction, on the base of a shared set of rules for it; the second refers to "sense of the game" or "feel for the game", indicating the longitudinal development of adaptation to the rules (and regularities) of practice in the social world, stemming, to a high extent, from habitus.

The “economy of practices” posited by Bourdieu takes into consideration the strategies deployed regarding each type of capital, in its space in the human world, sometimes under the appearance of being detached from the rationale of the other fields and even society. It can be produced, reproduced, but also subverted, but each capital has its own characteristics.

3.4.d.i. Cultural capital

Three forms of cultural capital can be distinguished, according to Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1986, pp. 17-21). In its embodied state, it refers to the embodied dispositions of mind and body. To some extent, and depending on the social locatedness of the individual, the dispositions contained within the embodied cultural capital are not the result of an intentional effort, but an imprint of their social coordinates. These can be related to accent or the pronunciation of certain words, which can be characteristic of a concrete social class, or geographical location. Thus, although not necessarily permanent, it might reveal those coordinates. It oftentimes is the combination of inherited properties, as well as acquired properties, actively sought for by the individual for the development of their strategies. It is predisposed to function as symbolic capital, because its effects might be ascribed as derived from conditions other than economic capital and recognised as individual talent.

However, since not every person or family (Engels, 1884/2010) holds the economic and cultural capital (that is, the money and the predisposition to value education) to guarantee acquisitional properties, this seemingly innate individual talent is actually the result of the distribution of the structure of the field. In other words, the unequal distribution of economic capital might result in the unequal access to education, which closes the access to possibilities of appropriating the benefits of cultural capital, hindering any change in the cultural field itself. On the other side, individuals with an easier access to (accumulated) capital, have a faster and more effective path laid before them. This is why Bourdieu states that

> cultural capital is no doubt the best hidden form of hereditary transmission of capital, and it therefore receives proportionately greater weight in the system of reproduction strategies, as the direct, visible forms of transmission tend to be more strongly censored and controlled (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 19)

The objectified state of cultural capital is the form this kind of capital takes when referring to, mostly, material objects. The intervention of the embodied state is necessary for its production or appropriation. This appropriation can be both material and symbolic. Material, when the objectified cultural capital comes, for example, in the shape of an artistic creation that can be physically

exchanged, principally through economic capital; symbolical, when it is the recognition of the appropriation that makes for the meaningful base of its sense, as it could be the case when a group of people recognise the value of an act, and can therefore become “art”.

The institutionalised state of cultural capital comes mainly in the shape of academically sanctioned qualifications. It necessarily comes paired to an individual; thus, it is at the same time objectified and embodied capital. Its institutionalised property comes from the fact that it is issued by a regulated institution. Which means that cultural capital attained through autodidact means (asserted) is out of the field of the institutionally recognised one (ascribed), even though it might retain its value for the individual. Additionally, it will probably be related to economic capital directly, as it is

> possible to establish conversion rates between cultural capital and economic capital by guaranteeing the monetary value of a given academic capital. This product of the conversion of economic capital into cultural capital establishes the value, in terms of cultural capital, of the holder of a given qualification relative to other qualification holders and, by the same token, the monetary value for which it can be exchanged on the labor market (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 21)

3.4.d.ii. Social capital

Social capital is the «the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition» (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 21), that is, membership of an individual to a group, which entails the prospect of mobilising the different capitals possessed collectively or individually in the group.

The potential of the causal power of social capital depends on the extension and intension of the network of a specific individual. Put differently, the quantity of members of the groups and their individual, collective causal powers and, parallelly, how the two properties relate to each other (Elder-Vass, 2010, pp. 144-167). Social capital cannot be reduced to the economic and cultural capital of the individual, member of the group, as it is never independent; nor does it necessarily come contained in a physically enclosed space, nor to a social or economic space, as they can function under varying sets of rules.

However, its institutionalisation, be it a commercial association, a political party, or a hobby club, is based on the exchange of material, symbolic or cultural capital, involving some kind of profit,

which constituted its cohesive element. Social capital is the «product of investment strategies, individual or collective, consciously or unconsciously aimed at establishing or reproducing social relationships that are directly usable in the short or long term» (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 22). For which it proves necessary that the existence of a shared symbolic frame that involves mutual recognition and knowledge is guaranteed (Bourdieu, 1997, p. 151); a fact that reaffirms the boundaries of the group.

3.4.d.iii. Identity capital

Côté and Levine, in their attempt at explaining the formation of identity regarding social resources of daily life, and in line with their vision of a society dominantly led by image-oriented identity, suggest the adequacy of adding a new type of capital to the task. Agreeing with concepts the concept of cultural capital, but arguing that the theoretical frames involving it do not provide a sufficient satisfactory foundation for understanding the multidimensionality of late modern life, because

- «institutions can be poorly regulated and inadequately linked, in conjunction of the influence of
- persisting status differentiations based on class, race, gender, and age, along with
- the discrimination that these differentiations can produce» (Côté & Levine, 2002, p. 142)

Which is why they see the need of the concept of "identity capital", to include the varied resources deployed for identity assertion and ascription. Straying away from what Bourdieu would possibly assign as cultural capital turned symbolic, Côté and Levine dispute the fact that institutions like the educational ones provide the nomos for a comprehensive explanation. Additionally, the rejection or fall from grace of traditional forms of authority, the grounds for identity formation have become more complex.

In addition, they imply with "identity capital" a certain degree of reflexive deliberation: The individual employs the ability to outwards and reflexively "evaluate and maneuver" through different social contexts, and inwards employ both psychological resources. Pragmatic, symbolic, or emotional identity exchanges, if successful, involve mutual acceptance, and thus identity capital affects the social standing of the individual, projecting "who they are", and potentially gaining advantages. This way «Assuming that a certain segment of the population already engages in the active accrual of identity capital resources, we can study their initiatives and strategies to see which are most "adaptive" in face of the disjunctive conditions of late modern society» (Côté & Levine, 2002, p. 144).

The employment of this concept applies to normative institutions, not as an outcome derived from their structural functioning, but from the reflexive employment of the individual´s resources. This occurs via two types of resources, the socially visible "tangible" ones (practically a match for Bourdieu´s cultural capital), such as educational degrees, or memberships in the institutional field; and "intangible" resources, involving reflexive deliberative abilities (i.e., sense of purpose, critical thinking, self-esteem) in order to understand and negotiate interpersonal interactions. In this sense, Côté and Levine understand that, unlike what Bourdieu seemed to mainly assume, educational institutions can contribute the "growth and utilization" of these intangible resources (Côté & Levine, 2002, pp. 144-145). Although it is not clear how they see the function of this intangible resources, it is understandable that they stem from the adaptive needs of the individual, as a strategy for survival and thriving, rather than from the functional principles working on the institution itself.

In regards to how the ability to "invest" in identity capital is possible, they suggest that a stable sense of ego identity needs to be established first, an internal point of reference, followed by capabilities developing psychosocial attributes (Côté & Levine, 2002, p. 147), allowing the individual to adapt cultural schemes and institutional structures to their interest. Once again, a deep sense of *autognosis* arises as a pivotal factor.

3.5. Summary

The path of the disassembly of the concepts involved in this dissertation started with the ontology of being. The gradual complication of what identity entails brought forth its relation to agency. This in turn raised the question of acting in a social environment, the role and functions of its products, and the reflection of the identity of the producers in the production, social structures.

Identity is not an idea in the strict sense, but a processual reality in constant change. Its transformation into an idea, belonging to the domain of naturalised and reified entities we refer to in everyday life, reduces the analytical capacity of our discourse. With the appearance of a frugal concept, necessary to assign identities and anticipate the potential accountability and degree of responsibility of actions, the complex underpinnings of the identification process are concealed.

This concealment responds to a logic of causal power. Or rather to a long-lived dominant logic of guaranteeing persistence in the social world, by means of presenting the biased (and more often than not, unfair, regarding the distribution of resources) dominance of specific norm circles (groups of people with predominance over the different kinds of capital and their respective fields) over others. This is brought about and projected socially under the guise of auto-nomous spheres of life, according

to which reason prevails over everything else, and therefore, the actual state of affairs is the "best" or even only "possible" one. However, reason alone has proven to not be the core of agency, emotion seems to plays an important role, not only as a counterweight to reason, but also in the transfer of past experiences into the present.

The seemingly autonomous fields are combined under the historically transmitted transgenerational transmission of cultural values, predisposition towards feeling, thinking, and doing in specific way (habitus); in other words, a propensity towards employing emotional resources, deploying varying degrees of reflexivity, and affecting environmental conditions of existence, in a way that is felt as "normal", "intuitive", or "natural". Yet, emotional schemes, the accumulation of economic capital, the obstruction to gain positions of prevalence in the economic field, and lack of cultural, social, and symbolic capital hampers the subversion of the fields from which causal power is derived.

This reality reflects in the "forms of life" (the content and way of communicating meaning in social interactions). History shows us that the veil separating reason and will, as well as the difference between an ascribed social status (and its resulting expectations) and an embodied and asserted identity, might hide diachronic dynamics, resulting from a specific order of the socioeconomic and political fields.

Deliberative reflexive capabilities, stemming from an integral *autognosis* (knowing oneself, as a kind of outwards social proprioception, and a connected internal reflexive stance), appear as a valid alternative to adhering to habitus, that is, not even recognising (or actively denying) the existence of patterns of behaviour we have acquired through socialisation. Knowledge about the inner working of symbolic capital, and its relations to how causal power develops in the social and economic fields, can enable the "forging" of identities, an adaptive strategy, accordingly attuned to the alteration of the conditions of existence in late modernity.

We wrapped up this chapter referring to how fields and capitals are related to identity, and how though reflexive deliberation can structural limitations of social life and agency can be surpassed. This theoretical frame will act as the background against which we will contrast the empirical data gathered in field work. Having these concepts in mind, we now turn to pay attention to how identity comes to be in three dimensions (individual, social, legal), interwoven with the fields of practice. These fields consist of social spaces where individual features, social ascription and legal sanction interweave and result in seemingly unified identities, producing images to which specific types of agencies are associated with.

4. The formation and construction of Palestinian identity: scholar overview

We have already disassembled and reassembled some of the relevant conceptual and theoretical constructs pertaining to the relation between identity and agency. On the way, we had to take heed of the importance of culture and structure, and consequently add them to the disassembly chain, and reassemble them into the theoretical framework. This chapter will home in on the narrower theoretical outlook of the formation and construction of identity, additionally, attending to how this frame applies to the case of the Palestinians in Lebanon.

"Forming" and "constructing" might commonly have a similar meaning in everyday life, but due to methodological needs, it might be convenient to distinguish between two different analytical fields that, ironically, cannot be completely separated. We will generally refer to "forming" when speaking of the elements that conform to the domain of the individual; and "construct" will relate to the constituents of social structures, be them normative institutions, symbolic practices, customs, or dispositions.

In the previous chapter we have seen how identity and agency relate. In addition, we considered, from different perspectives (Bourdieu, 1998; Côté & Levine, 2002; Durkheim, 1912/1995; Elder-Vass, 2010; Marx, 1939/1973; Scheper-Hugues & Lock, 1987), how the subjective formation of identity comes inevitably connected with the constructed objective social reality: the cultural, social, economic, and political structures, among others. At the same time, this relation is not unilateral, as the subjects (individual or collective) living under these structures do possess causal power capable of affecting and even changing the structures that shaped their identity and agency in the first place.

Owing to this interdependence, the apparent unequivocal separation of academic disciplines appears in conflict with the relational nature of the personal subjective and the interpersonal objectified social structures. As Geertz would observe, «our ideas, our values, our acts, even our emotions, are, like our nervous system itself, cultural products – products manufactured, indeed, out of tendencies, capacities, and dispositions with which we were born, but manufactured nonetheless» (Geertz, 1973, p. 50). The produced subject appears as a producer in a system where deterministic approaches do not seem capable of providing satisfying explanations.

The relational aspect of this dynamic comes explained in various ways by different disciplines, narratives, and authors. Some emphasize the causal power of the structure, while others highlight the reflexive nature of everyday decisions. In any case, all tend to agree with the fact that the "manufacturing" Geertz referred to takes places in specific sociohistorical coordinates. With the onset of modernisation, previous structures transform in a process that comes in conjunction with the

consolidation of nations-states, the formation of territorial administrative units, and a tendency to intensify and institutionalise difference. More often than not, these differentiations come in the form of ethnic classification, reflected in the personal perceptions of individuals (their "form of life", or semantic approach to it); the symbolic social abstractions (ways of bestowing meaning to relations and each other in kinship, labour, leisure, etc.); and legal codes that constitute the backbone of the identity-citizenship-state complex (Czajka, 2008), circumscribing specific identities, meanings, consequences, and even agency, under state-frames that somehow try to congeal a unitary culture within a territory.

Even if it is not a novel nor an exclusively modern phenomenon, global migration seems to have raised awareness of ethnic identity in the last decades. Parallelly, exclusionist policies and discriminatory discourses appear to be commonplace. The reification of the categories implied seems to omit the social rather than natural quality of the perceived ethnic cultural distance and growing exclusiveness, not only in ordinary practice, but also legal discourse and procedures. This apparent forgetfulness of the transience of ethnic identity seems to be grounded on the active attempt at normalising cultural difference (Bhabha, 2003, p. 57). An endeavour that could only be strengthened by norm circles (Elder-Vass, 2010, pp. 122-125) with enough causal power in specific fields (Bourdieu, 1986).

This chapter will consist in the exposition of the various mechanisms, structures and elements involved in the identification process of individuals and collectives, as well as the different kinds and levels of agency correlated. Three general dimensions will divide the chapter, although, as previously stated, oftentimes a clear split between the individual, social, and even legal dimensions, is a question of academic nature, sometimes necessary for analytical purposes, but not fully reflecting reality in its integrated nature. «Palestinians do not fit easily into contemporary theoretical frameworks» (Peteet, 2007, p. 631), nor have the unique features of the Palestinian situation always been had in mind (Suleiman, 1997). This is an attempt at approaching the case of the Palestinians in Lebanon separated in three epigraphs, as a means of establishing feasible theoretical grounds for the eventual elaboration of the discussion. The contradiction of employing a seemingly unitary category of "Palestinians" appears as necessary for the sake of intelligibility, although further problematising of the category is to be expected throughout this chapter, as a previous step to presenting the results of the field work in this regard.

4.1. Personal identity formation

From the three dimensions we observed (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.4.b.), the individual, the social, and the legal one; this epigraph will bring to the fore the first one, based on the immediate personal perspective and experience of the individual. Far from thinking of it as a static domain, ruled by an inherent continuity, we will approach it as the subjective point from which the individual structures their embodied experience.

In the dialectical process of its continuous negotiation, structuring and adaptation, personal identity handles the interactions that shape but not determine its features. Phenomena are integrated in a process where diachronic development and synchronic relational networks influence the meaning construction and its integration in a whole. This whole makes sense for the individual in relation to its shared nature, as a system of survival and adaptation in specific conditions. It results from the dialectical nature of shared meaning, but it is not completely constrained by it, as continuous change demands the adaptation of schemes.

These adaptations come originated in different instances. Temporarily, we can outline some general principles or types, which manifest in consonance with the development of the collective effort to adapt to the surrounding circumstances in the ecological, material, technical, social, and political sense. Personal and collective conditions do not seem to be the only influences in the adaptive mechanisms though. Not every instance of human action is guided by reason, nor aligned with the interest of the individual, nor the collective (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.3.). Looking inwards into the sphere of emotions might shed some light regarding that matter.

Contrasting with the Palestinian identity formation will try to match some of the theoretical findings, reflecting the historical account offered in the first chapter.

4.1.a. Historical paradigm shifts

Specificities of concrete individuals and times cannot be framed into unique patterns, as human reality is more complex and does not reflect discrete and static models. Nevertheless, some significant regularities can be indicated, as many sources suggest that actual regularities might have been condensed in concrete paradigms of identification.

Rose points out that «subjectification has its own history» (Rose, 2003, p. 131) embedded in a succession of socio-historical periods. Côté and Levine (Côté & Levine, 2002, pp. 123-128), for example, summarise a typology of three historical periods, relating them to three general paradigms of identification and identity formation. Regarding personal identity, they indicate that it was

fundamentally heteronomous in premodern times; individuated during the early modern period; and image-oriented in the late modern stage.

The heteronomous identity, characteristic of premodern identity, is the rather irreflexive agreement with the ascription by others in the collective. Identity is ascribed from birth on, and possibly stays in the same shape for the rest of the individual´s life. In a time when society is a simpler system, with a low division of labour, individuals share similar tasks, ways of thinking, feeling, and doing, they reflect in the same form of life. Based on this similarity comes engendered what Durkheim called "mechanical solidarity" (Durkheim, 1893/2013), social cohesion originated in the analogous conditions of life of the individuals, who adapt to similar or nearly-same ecological, material, economic, emotional, and political circumstances; correspondingly identifying in similar ways, and applying the same kinds of agency, as the possible situations do not differ much from individual to individual.

To the early modern period Côté and Levine assign the individuated identity. The division of labour of industrialisation reaches new levels of differentiation, Durkheim´s "organic solidarity" arises, not as the outcome of similarity of the individuals, but as the consequence of their interconnection. The transition from a smaller, kinship-related, or simpler (mainly rural, "Gemeinschaft") political collectives, to more complex (mainly urban, "Gesellschaft"), differentiated, and interdependent communities (Tönnies, 1887/2001) meant deep changes for individual identity. The production of the means of life would not be isolated in units of biological or close political kinship, but become interconnected to a more complex system, where production does not take place in separate units, but gradually becomes part of a bigger whole, regularly dependent on different processes taking place in geographically distant territories (Giddens, 1990, pp. 17-29). The need to become integrated in this more complex and organic collective causes the individuated identity. A distinct personal way of handling differing roles becomes necessary, different selves still united under the same biography of the individual, a reflexive appropriation of knowledge (Giddens, 1990, pp. 36-45).

Nowadays, in late modernity, Côté and Levine argue, image-oriented identity is the paradigm. This period, appears defined by the shift from production as the ultimate defining feature of social relations, to consumption and information, and the raise of information technologies (Giddens, 1990, pp. 55-78; Côté & Levine, 2002, pp. 125-126), in an increasingly interconnected global network. The image-oriented identity seems to concur with the informational element, as it appears as based in the projection of a specific image of identity to the community, aligned with a specific strategy. In this sense, Appadurai (1996) warns about the "instability in the production of modern subjectivities, as information technology, along with mass migration, gets a more predominant position in life. This

predominance seems to impel the work of imagination. Together, information technologies, mass migration, and imagination, «they create specific irregularities because both viewers and images are in simultaneous circulation», while «neither images nor viewers fit into circuits or audiences that are easily bound within local, national, or regional spaces» (Appadurai, 1996, p. 4). This mixture of dislocated immediate information, imagination and compelled mobility might get to co-determine, not only identity formation strategies, but also the agency put forth in other aspects.

4.1.b. Identity formation strategies

Côté and Levine´s developed a classification of strategies related to identity formation in late modernity. Originally devised to refer to transition to adulthood, the interplay of internal conversation and social adaption might point towards a possible general classification of contribution of reflexive deliberation within dispositionally loaded social environment. Based on Erikson´s (1968) though, Côte and Levine relate these typologies with the concept of anomie, that is, the absence of social normative references, due to the lack of collective forces to regulate social life (Durkheim, 1897/2012, pp. 214-224, 330). Identity is not as determined by ascription as it used to be in premodern societies, as a matter of fact, Archer suggests, regarding Elder-Vass´s "reconciliation" proposal, that as change (division of labour, Durkheim could put it; and differentiation, as Bourdieu could state) «becomes more pronounced, so reflexivity becomes more extended» (Archer, 2010, p. 141). But reflexivity does not seem to function in the same way. All the more, just like Hume distrusted the idea of rationality being the engine of people´s behaviour, due to the fact that they sometimes act against their own interests; we can also suspect that, different contributions of reflexivity and awareness of social environment lead to different identity formation strategies.

It is in this sense that Côte and Levine synthesise in a social psychological perspective an attempt of an integration «of the levels of analysis involved in a comprehensive understanding of identity formation» (Côté & Levine, 2002, p. xiii). They propose the images of the "refuser", "drifter", "searcher", "guardian", and "resolver", in relation to backgrounds and adaptive behaviours.

"Refusers" develop defensive patterns, "self-defeating cognitive schema" that keeps them in behaviours of dependency on some externality (someone or something). During the formation of their character, they were presumably given little cognitive structure, encouragement, and guidance regarding their development inwards (their intellect, emotions, and vocations) and outwards (towards people). It can be taken as an "anomic consequence of the disjunctive socialisation process" (ACSP) (Côté & Levine, 2002, p. 3).

“Drifters” resemble Refusers in their anomic pattern, and although they rely on more personal resources, they do not employ them in a consistent way, displaying an inability or disinterest in doing so. This is prone to result in an ACSP, a behaviour of poor commitment, poor impulse control, and fragile interpersonal relationships (Côté & Levine, 2002, p. 4). Similar to Refusers, it is likely that little structure, encouragement, and guidance was provided to the Drifters.

“Searchers”, characterised and driven by a sense of dissatisfaction, do not seem to find a fitting social environment, due to their unrealistic high criteria of functioning towards themselves and others. This might be the result of poor guidance in terms of structure and encouragement in the social environment. This pattern, an ACSP too, seems to lead to frustration as, not inwards nor outwards, the search for perfection ends up in despair (Côté & Levine, 2002, p. 4).

“Guardians”, unlike the previous three types, presumably provided with structure and guidance, internalise the values to an extent that change is not easily possible. This rigidity and overidentification might incapacitate them to tolerate developmental experiences that might add to their personality and allow them to grow emotionally or intellectually. This inflexibility seems characteristic of the strategies adopted in premodern societies (Côté & Levine, 2002, pp. 4-5).

“Resolvers” actively engage in the process of forming their own identities. Probably based on the intellectual and emotional structures obtained during the formation of their character, they develop their skills with the growth of their potential in mind, despite the external obstacles (anomie of the very society they belong to) (Côté & Levine, 2002, p. 5), or the internal ones (sickness or disabilities).

Rose deems important to emphasize the fact that the «heterogeneity and specificity of the ideals or models of personhood deployed in different practices, and the ways in which they are articulated in relation to specific problems and solutions concerning human conduct» need to be had in mind as a presupposition of particular styles of agency, rather than characteristic of specific human cultures (Rose, 2003). The apparent homogeneity of the subjectification exposed by Côté and Levine makes more sense when understood under the light of an analytical poststructuralist lens (Archer, 1996; Archer, 2003) than from a more deterministic structuralist prism. In this sense, Archer´s classification of types of reflexives could be combined with Côté and Levine´s adaptive behaviour typology, an attempt of which is shown in figure 3.

formation of character		patterns of behaviour		archetype	reflexivity type	reflexivity style
little structure, encouragement, or guidance	poor development inwards and outwards	defensive pattern	"self-defeating cognitive schema"	dependency on externality (ACSP)	**refusers**		
little structure, encouragement, or guidance	poor development inwards and outwards	inconsistent personal resources (inability or disinterest)	poor commitment, poor impulse control	fragile interpersonal relationships (ACSP)	**drifters**	fractured reflexives	Agents with "suspended powers" of reflexivity, unable to perform action, because of the distress originated by the internal conversation
poor structure and encouragement	search for perfection: despair	dissatisfaction	unrealistically high criteria and expectations (own and others)	frustration (ACSP)	**searchers**	autonomous reflexiveness	take action, stemming exclusively from the private domain of their internal conversation
highly internalised structure and guidance	rigidity	overidentification	potential incapacitation to tolerate development	inflexibility	**guardians**	meta-reflexives	before taking action, reflect on their own acts of reflexivity, engaging in critical internal conversation regarding their own self and the effectivity of potential actions
intellectual and emotional structure		active engagement in formation of own identity	growth of potential in mind	drive to overcoming obstacles (internal and external)	**resolvers**	communicative reflexiveness	before taking action, engage with other agents to complete their internal conversation, in search of completion

ACSP: anomic consequence of the disjunctive socialisation process

Figure 6 Adaptive behaviour and matching type of reflexiveness, based on Côté, Levine and Archers´s theories.

It is convenient to have in mind that, as Côté and Levine indicate, the interiority presumed in this classification does not stem exclusively from a psychological system, but, as Rose suggests, drawing from Deleuze and Guattari´s (1983, pp. 139-184) vocabulary «a discontinuous surface, a kind of infolding of exteriority» (Rose, 2003, p. 149). In this sense, the non-essential interior (a non-transcendental identity) relates to the elements of the exterior, product of socialisation.

This logic of individuality gives way to the paradox of the individual, both subject and subjected, that is, both cause and effect. As Grossberg describes, this duality is identified in three planes that he identifies as three issues in the "map of identification and belonging": «(1) the subject as a position defining the possibility and the source of experience and, by extension, of knowledge; (2) the agent as a position of activity; and (3) the self as the mark of a social identity». This paradox reflects in language itself, as "subject", "agent", and "self" imply different meanings. However, for Grossberg, this acts as a possible disguise for the operation of power, and therefore, the «task is to locate the "machinery" by which each of these planes of identification and belonging is produced and subsequently articulated into structures of individuality» (1996, pp. 97-98). This idea highly resembles what Geertz referred to when speaking about «control mechanisms – plans, recipes, instructions» (Geertz, 1973, p. 44), what we could consider as "social structures", that he proposed to explain behaviour.

The way each one of these planes is produced and articulated into the self seems likely to compose the nature of subjectivity, triangulating the three angles, and composing "coordinates" that articulate particular individual positions, «each of which enables and constrains the possibilities of experience, of representing those experiences and of legitimizing those representations» (Grossberg, 1996, p. 99); this could mean that «the question of identity is one of social power and its articulation». In other terms, the resulting configuration of the position of the individual, by which they can operate agency to varying degrees.

However, excessively stressing the causality of the structures does not seem to fit well to reality. Some postmodern approaches, although bold in attitude, frequently neglect factors that ground theories and concepts in this respect. Hall, for instance, criticises Foucault´s contradiction when interpreting disciplinary power, which could be understood as the causal power stemming from disciplinary social structures (mainly law enforcement in its different shapes):

> Foucault steps too easily from describing disciplinary power as a *tendency* within modern forms of social control, to positing disciplinary power as a fully installed monolithic force which saturates all social relations […] this became

> obvious to Foucault […] he tacitly recognizes that it is not enough for the Law to summon, discipline, produce and regulate, but there must also be the corresponding production of a response (and thus the capacity and apparatus of subjectivity) from the side of the subject) (Hall, 1996, p. 12)

The fact of emphasising the structures of power in the production of subjectivities matches the considerations of authors previously exposed, and underscores the importance of having it in mind. However, the attempt of deconstructing prior concepts and narrations, and taking it as "subverting the subject" (Rosenau, 1992, pp. 44-61), eliminating almost any chance of causal power by agency deployment, does not seem to provide tools for the understanding of the transformation of identities.

4.1.c. Emotion, affect, imagination

4.1.c.i. Motion

Causal power does exist within the individual themself, therefore influencing the formation of personal identity. But in this movement from within, individual agency, lies another level of causation we did not pay too much attention to yet, at least since we last spoke of Hume´s empiricism. "Emotion"[23] implies movement, according to Hume (1739/2007, pp. 265-273), emotion (passion) rules over reason, guiding conduct and tendencies, providing the engine for mobilisation.

But it was Spinoza who had previously addressed the matter and established significant ideas:

> Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural phenomena following nature's general laws. They appear to conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions […] no one, so far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of the emotions, and the power of the mind against them for their restraint (Spinoza, 1677/2009, p. 148)

For him, emotion is «the modifications of the body, whereby the active power of the said body is increased or diminished, aided or constrained, and also the ideas of such modifications […] If we can

[23] The word "emotion" originates from the Latin "*mōtiō*", meaning "movement", "motion", from the conjunction of the prefix "*ex-/è-*", meaning "out of", "from within"; and the verb "*ēmoueō*", for "to remove (a thing) from its original position, shift, dislodge, or displace" (Glare (Ed.), 2012, pp. 665, 690-691, 1251).

be the adequate cause of any of these modifications, I then call the emotion an activity, otherwise I call it a passion, or state wherein the mind is passive» (Spinoza, 1677/2009, p. 151). Therefore, similarly to what Hume would say later, Spinoza thought that emotion is an embodied causal power, arising from within, that can be translated into action if externalised; or become a "passion or state", if this causal power is not actualised by the agent containing it (Spinoza, 1677/2009, pp. 151-171).

Emotions are part of nature, not only human nature, but, according to Spinoza, all-containing nature (God), therefore, they are contained in an interdependent system, caused and causing. Without attributing to the ultimate uncaused cause (God), he understands that «everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own being» (Spinoza, 1677/2009, p. 162), in other words, entities, including humans, seek to keep existing, similarly albeit not equally to Schopenhauer´s idea of "will to life". In this sense, humans are entities determined by the (causal) "power of the body", implying that the feeling arising within this power brings pleasure, whereas the decrease in power brings pain.

Understanding the causal powers exerted by emotions then, means understanding ourselves and causality itself, be it derived by internal or external factors (Spinoza, 1677/2009, pp. 148-249), a fact in itself that brings pleasure. Socrates´s *autognosis* comes into play, but the Stoics´ *ataraxia* is a matter Spinoza does not really rely on, as could be deduced from the first quote of this epigraph (Spinoza, 1677/2009, pp. 250-348). That emotion holds causal power is clear, according to what so far has been exposed, but what is its function?

4.1.c.ii. Adaption

Contemporary theorists (Frijda, 1986/2001; Averill, 1994; Levenson, 1994) of emotion agree on the fact that emotion is a functional quality, most of the time. Greenberg asserts that

> emotion is fundamentally adaptive in nature […] emotion helps the organism to process complex situational information rapidly and automatically, to produce action appropriate for meeting important basic needs (e.g., attachment, identity). Emotions provide rapid, automatic appraisals of the significance of situations to people´s well-being and therefore guide adaptive action (Greenberg, 2017, p. 31).

Jenkins assumes, with some reserves, that there must be some kind of relation between emotion and identity, as, after all, identification seems to be a matter of attachment, that is, an emotional matter, and therefore capable of influencing agency (Jenkins, 2008). Identification is for Freud «the earliest

expression of an emotional tie with another person» (Freud, 1949, p. 60), concurring with Jenkins´ guess.

From a dialectical constructivist standpoint, Greenberg (2017, pp. 46-55) sees individuals as interacting self-organising dynamic systems that produce action and experience, synthesising the latter and constructing meaningful wholes. The act of experiencing results in a complex internal field, with emotion-based schemes at the core, much like acting, that sees the affective and cognitive systems connected at different levels (Hohol & Urbańczyk, 2014). Maladaptive reaction to this core, when it comes to feelings of fear, sadness or shame, originated in past experience is a source of dysfunction (2017, pp. 55-64); as Spinoza would put it, "inadequate" (Spinoza, 1677/2009, pp. 160-164, 218), and as Hume hinted:

> ´Tis evident passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the disorder they occasion in the temper; but on the contrary, that when a passion has once become a settled principle of action, and is the predominant inclination of the soul, it commonly produces no longer any sensible agitation (Hume, 1739/2007, p. 268)

The limbic system of the human brain, responsible for basic emotions, is far from working like the cognitive component, the cortex and neocortex. Emotions have their own neurochemical and physiological grounds. Despite that, they are associated in the process of production of emotion in two specific ways. On one hand, a faster pathway, triggered by the older adaptive human limbic system through the amygdala, compelling brain and body to immediate call to action. On the other hand, a slower but more reflexive pathway, involving the neocortex for cognitive processing (LeDoux, 1999; Kleckner & Quigley, 2015). While different, both pathways involve the central nervous system, sensorial perception, contextual factors, expectations based on knowledge and previous experience, among others.

Coming back to Hume again, he suggested the contemporary connections contemporary psychological constructivist theory assesses:

> ´Tis remarkable, that the imagination and affections have a close union together, and that nothing, which affects the former, can be entirely indifferent to the latter. Wherever our ideas of good or evil acquire a new vivacity, the passions become more violent; and keep pace with the imagination in all its variations. Whether this proceeds from the principle above-mention´d, that any attendant emotion is easily

> converted into the predominant, I shall not determine. ´ Tis sufficient for my present purpose, that we have many instances to confirm this influence of the imagination upon the passions (Hume, 1739/2007, p. 272)

Frijda (1986/2001; 1988; 2007) made an attempt of determining a set of laws of emotion, the result of emotion mechanisms only partially under intentional control of the individual:

- The Law of Situational Meaning: Emotions arise in response to the meaning structures of given situations; different emotions arise in response to different meaning structures;
- The Law of Concern: Emotions arise in response to events that are important to the individual´s goals, motives, concerns;
- The Law of Apparent Reality: Emotions are elicited by events appraised as real, and their intensity corresponds to the degree to which this is the case;
- Law of Change: Emotions are elicited not so much by the presence of favorable or unfavorable conditions but by actual or expected changes in favorable or unfavorable conditions;
- Law of Habituation: Continued pressures wear off; continued hardships lose their poignancy;
- Law of Comparative Feeling: The intensity of emotion depends on the relationship between an event and some frame of reference against which the event is evaluated;
- The Law of Hedonic Asymmetry: Pleasure is always contingent upon change and disappears with continuous satisfaction. Pain may persist under persisting adverse conditions;
- The Law of Conservation of Momentum: Emotional events retain their power to elicit emotions indefinitely, unless counteracted by repetitive exposures that permit extinction or habituation, to the extent that these are possible;
- The Law of Closure: Emotions tend to be closed to judgments of relativity of impact and to the requirements of goals other than their own;
- The Law of Care for Consequence: Every emotional impulse elicits a secondary impulse that tends to modify it in view of its possible consequences;
- The Law of the Lightest Load: Whenever a situation can be viewed in alternative ways, a tendency exists to view it in a way that minimizes negative emotional load;
- The Law of the Greatest Gain: Whenever a situation can be viewed in alternative ways, a tendency exists to view it in a way that maximizes emotional gain (Frijda, 1988; 2007)

Although not laws in the strictest sense, these act as guidelines to how human emotion develops in relation to the individual´s cognitive capabilities. This means that identity formation strategies, as well as the wider identity assertion and ascriptions, are intermediated by the impact these rules might have in the process of meaning-construction. Social structures, their causality, either perceived or objective, might be co-determined by the emotional load they might be pervaded with. This capacity to pervade appears to entail an agentic element, as structures and relations, not being transcendent substances, need to be imbued with this potential emotional load somehow.

A proponent of a "religion of humanity", Nussbaum speaks of the function of specific emotions. According to her, "love" can function as the foundation of this "civil religion". Even though she proposes contextualisation, according to a nation´s "history, traditions, and current problems" (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 200), she does not seem to bear in mind the concrete conditions of development leading to these circumstances; nor the mechanisms at play in downward causation (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 125).

She states that nationalism is the proof that some people seem to be capable of transcending narrow self-concern (Nussbaum, 2013, pp. 72-73), even though she is aware of the "Janus-faced nature of patriotism" (Nussbaum, 2013, pp. 204-208). However, she speaks of "good political principles". In her "experimental approach to social problems" (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 200), she speaks of rights as a given, an absolute detached from any socioeconomic or political account, and subsequently, specific strategies with specific norm groups at the helm. In addition, this account might overlook the complex dynamics of the transubstantiation of capital (Bourdieu, 1986, pp. 15-16; 1997, p. 160), whereby the transcendance of self-concern in one field, apparently auto-nomous, might hide self-concern/self-interest in another one.

Her proposed "cultivation of public emotion", a contextual endeavour concerning the shaping of emotions toward their nation, seems to naturalise states and their formation (*Vid*. *Infra*, 4.3.a. & 4.3.c.), seemingly assuming "good political principles". In her approach, emotions like fear, envy, and shame, "threaten to derail admirable projects", and two specific emotions need to be had in mind: grief and disgust. The management of grief needs to be channelled through reciprocity and extended compassion; while disgust has to be curbed, lest it becomes a problem of general concern.

This account seems to clash with the consideration of notions such as "state" or "nation" as idioms, attached to identities. These concepts, based on its naturalised presumptions (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.2.b.i.), contain the causal potential to legitimise agency based on them, grounded on emotions related to what

Taylor (1989, p. 20) would address as “hypergoods”, concealing concrete and conflictual realities, infusing them with the features of consensus (Malešević, 2006, p. 228).

4.1.c.iii. Imagination

Frijda sees this process of emotion infusion as an act of imagination. Invoking Spinoza (1677/2009, p. 128), he states that the strength of an emotion depends on the strength of the involvement of the individual in a specific event and the magnitude of the external cause. This magnitude depends on the concurrence of Spinoza´s concepts of pleasure or pain, and this concurrence derives from the cognitive abilities of remembering, foreseeing, and imagining, associated to the event (Frijda, 1988, pp. 153-171). The emotional object´s representation might contain causal power, as, in Spinoza´s words:

> imagination is an idea, which indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature of the external body; not indeed distinctly, but confusedly; whence it comes to pass, that the mind is said to err (Spinoza, 1677/2009, p. 258).

Therefore, the idea of imagination proposed by Spinoza and Frijda somewhat resembles that of Bourdieu´s habitus, an embodied disposition towards representing meaning in a specific manner (Sayer, 2010, pp. 113-115). The psychological constructivist account keeps in mind the effects of socialisation might have on a transgenerational transfer of the cognitive operating involved in the emotional processes (Alexander, 2004b, p. 24).

Emotion, being also primary systems of (sometimes non-verbal) communication, signal intentions and affects. This expresses to a high extent who we are and how we guide our actions (Greenberg, 2017, p. 5). Our actions are guided by motivation, which, according to Greenberg, has affect regulation as a core aspect, since we tend to experience the emotions we want and avoid those we do not want. This is an evolutionary aspect, as it helps in surviving and growing, but motivation also seeks meaning (a feeling felt as positive), attachment, identity, which come in the interpersonal sphere, where we tend to look for connection, protection, being effective and valued (Greenberg, 2017, pp. 35-36; Alexander, 2004a, p. 10).

In this sense, the involvement of cognitive elements in emotion processes set a distinction. Primary emotions «are fundamental aspects of what constitutes experiencing», whereas secondary emotions are «responses to interceding thoughts – in other words, an emotion that is secondary to thought (e.g., feeling anxious because of an expectation of rejection)» (Greenberg, 2017, pp. 18, 46). The cognitive

abilities of remembering, foreseeing, and imagining can contribute to maladaptive emotional schemes. It is possible that this kind of scheme is caused by biological conditions, but more often they are learned in interpersonal situations. Some experience of the past that triggered an innate emotional reaction (for example, sadness because of the loss of a loved one, or fear because of a threat) can be triggered in the present, but ruled by the emotional scheme produced in former times (Spinoza, 1677/2009, p. 174). In a new situation, if a past experience´s emotional load is (re)triggered, remembering its circumstances, foreseeing a situation and/or imagining the outcome; if the details of the present are omitted; and if the individual´s emotional organisation is faulty, maladaptive emotional schemes occur, rendering emotion dysfunctional (Greenberg, 2017, pp. 57-59; Clark & Watson, 1994).

4.1.d. Palestinian personal identity formation

Palestinian individuals, regardless of their place of habitation or dwelling, lie within the intersection of cultural, political, economic, legal, and social frames, each configured in a particular way, depending on the specific situation. Regardless of these, they are oftentimes subjected to internal contradictions, and external conflict with a host state (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 10). This hints at the different dimensions they inhabit, apart from the strictly physical one.

Bauman (2003) synthesizes the theoretical question of identity by saying that, even if it is a modern invention, its issue existed previously. Yet its contemporary quandary is eminently different, highlighting its intrinsic "disembedded" (Giddens, 1990, pp. 21-29) feature in modernity and the effacement of, precisely, its past coordinates. "Disembeddedment" and "effacement" feel suitable for the Palestinian case. If we understand the first term refers to the locatedness of a collective, Palestinians in general, and the ones in Lebanon (be them originally displaced from Palestine, or from Syria in the last decade), have a rather ambivalent relation to space. It would be arguable that Bauman acceptation of "pilgrim" could be applied to a forcefully displaced collective, but somehow, the following paragraph matches the case:

> For pilgrims through time, the truth is elsewhere; the true place is always some distance, some time away. Wherever the pilgrim may be now, it is not where he ought to be, and not where he dreams of being. The distance between the true world and this world here and now is made of the mismatch between what is to be achieved and what has been. The glory and gravity of the future destination debases the present and makes light of it (Bauman, 2003, p. 20)

As a matter of fact, the idea behind Bauman´s pilgrim is that of a postmodern "unencumbered" identity, as an individual unbound by the traditional ways of thinking and living. However, the displacement of the Palestinians across the Middle East produced a scattered community that «demonstrated a remarkable political and cultural energy, albeit without surmounting political differences» (Gatrell, 2013, p. 119). Yet, for this community military antagonism in different fronts, internal unrest, and lack of economic possibilities, aggravated by the disregard of the Arab states has made the experience of, particularly, the lower strata of Palestinians a harsh one.

Palestinian identity is highly referenced to different spaces, both places of origin, of exile, and the right of return, all of which remain a common denominator of Palestinian politics. This does not always fit into contemporary theoretical frameworks, «in an era of postcolonial studies, they remain firmly in the grip of modern colonialism», a fact that is ever-present in the refugee camps, where images and icon of a past very present a «sense of temporariness, and concomitant insecurity, […] pervasive among Palestinian refugees» (Peteet, 2007; Khouri, 2014).

Irrespective of a common general origin, history and overall conditions, a preliminary insight of identity regarding "Palestinian refugees" does not yield a solid monolithic set of features. Apart from the common geographical genealogic origin, actively and socially reproduced throughout the years in the camps, the passage of time has seen a different ascription of multifaceted prisms of identification for Palestinians in Lebanon. Sayigh states that «Lebanon differed from the other two main host countries in several ways. Lebanon has a European as well as an Arab face; Palestinians were placed in an indeterminate category, neither `foreigners´ nor `nationals´» (2007, p. 115). This might lead to expect that, in the sociocultural field, the Lebanese Republic´s idiosyncrasy on one hand; and its legal field in the other, the reception of Palestinians in Lebanon was carried out under specific coordinates, as the chapter concerning the historical context exposed.

Both from inside the camps, as assertions by the refugees themselves; and from outside the camps, in the form of historical events, the changing interplay with the Lebanese citizens and transnational agents, to name a few, ascribed specific kinds of identities and agencies to Palestinians in Lebanon. Ascriptions are not innocuous. As a matter of fact, it results in specific conceptions of their agency. Particularly but not exclusively in the legal field, it results in an agency-deprived being, which ensued by objectified structure, as specific way of dealing with statelessness, by the Lebanese state and other transnational agents. The outcome, in most of the cases for the lower strata, consists of an almost complete exception of the community from public life. As a general rule, an almost linear transition of identities developed for the Palestinians displaced in Lebanon, starting from the premodern peasant, to the late modern refugee.

Regarding concrete Palestinian personal identity formation strategies, since identity as a natural given (essentialism) cannot explain the variation of the formation of personal identities (and, parallelly, different levels of agency and emotional schemes) of Palestinians in Lebanon, the only alternative would consist of trying to gather commonalities o regularities of individuals, for a comparison with the phenomenological report of the participants of this thesis.

However, literature indicates three general historical frames under which personal identity formation can be located. Despite the name they display, they do not constitute three archetypes, nor styles of personal identity formation, but temporal frames under which identity formation took and takes place, overlapping to a high extent with the three historical paradigms of identity formation suggested Côté and Levine.

4.1.d.i. Fellaheen, the frame of the premodern Palestinian

Premodern Palestine, as a territory under the Ottoman Empire, had the *fellaheen* as the majoritarian identification. Reflecting the homogeneity of the Palestinian population of the time, *fellah*/*fellaha* appointed a hereditary occupation, working the land; a place of residence, the rural area; a social status, peasantry; and a way of life, based on biological and close-political kinship (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 5). The adaptation to the conditions of existence in the territory had for a long time made it necessary to invest human power on the extraction of value from the land, for which an abundant workforce was needed. In turn, the land would provide them with what they needed (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 1-18; Morris, 2004, p. 19). For this reason, families were extensive, and an automatic ascription key to keeping the necessary demographical conditions for the prevailing way of life.

Although highly homogeneous, the *fellaheen* were not the only existing social segment in Palestine. There was a feudal class, landowners, merchants, and notables related to imperial authority. These took advantage of "vertical coalitions" (Krämer, 2008, pp. 74, 85; Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 40-41; Morris, 2004, p. 20), in order to keep their dominance in the economic and social fields.

Life was centred around family, in two general modalities. The biological family, called *a´ileh*; and the "extended" political family, the *hamuleh*, as a gathering of families, assembled mainly by direct kinship, proximity, or a mix of both and economic interest; such was the basis for the vertical coalitions to work. Identity was ascribed, as culture was an all-encompassing structure mixing, kinship, economy, politics, religion, down to the sphere of the ego, determined to a high degree by external structures beforehand. This identity ascription related to the village, if not the family; and

these networks were reproduced through intermarriage, with a low expectancy to migrate (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 6).

The *fellaheen* had relied on a collective assertion of identity and its assumed collective agency, such as the *musha´* system, the distribution of the usufruct of the land (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 30; Khalidi, 2010, p. 95; Krämer, 2008, pp. 46-47), for the adaption to their conditions. Before the British Mandate, the idea of the Palestinian national identity did exist (Khalidi, 2010, pp. 145-175), but it was present only as a minoritarian idea among the urban educated class.

It was not until the consequences of the actions by the Zionists and the British that a Palestinian perception of ethnic unity started to grow and assemble, and still overlapping with assertions linked to Arabness as well as local and family identities. "Palestinian" as a unitarian identity had just begun to take a modern shape, as a result of the shocks they withstood (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 41). On one hand, the ancestral heteronomous identity of the *fellah* of inland rural areas became one of the main symbols of the uprising against the extraneous forces; on the other hand, the Palestinian workers of the urban areas, exposed to labour differentiation, dislocated from village to city, and subject to an individuated identity, struggled to adapt to the organic nature of their role in a dislocated system of interests.

Premodern heteronomous identities and individuated ones coexisted in the same territory, albeit in significantly different areas. Modernity was present among the Palestinians, however, the predominant forces of modern times, norm circles aiming at advancing their position in the economic field, saw the presence of the indigenous people as an obstacle. Rural and urban Palestinian lower classes had in common the Arab identity, an emergent ethnic assertion, as well as the ascribed "backwardness" of the indigenous community, which was used as a justification for their displacement (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 198-199), mainly, but not exclusively, by the Zionist norm circles.

The Ottoman reforms of the mid-XIX century (Krämer, 2008, pp. 81-100), European and Zionist migration and investment (Pappé, 2006, pp. 72-121; Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 34-40), Arab states´ neglect (Kimmerling & Migdal, 2003, pp. 102-131; Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 64-67), British Mandate (Krämer, 2008, pp. 139-263), as well as the local indigenous upper classes (Krämer, 2008, pp. 74, 264-295; Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 40-61; Swedenburg, 1995, pp. 138-170), all contributed to the socioeconomic and politic paradigm shift, and eventual exodus of the Nakba (Pappé, 2007; Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 67-91).

After the exodus, uprooted and displaced, not only access to physical land, the possibility to live out of it, but also the core symbolic element of their identity assertion was ripped out. Half of the

population of Palestinians were displaced by 1948. The ones with a higher position in the economic field could take advantage of the possibility to transform their capital into suitable forms of relocation, reproducing in the new period the same class division present in Palestine before 1948 (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 101). As for the majority, the remainder of the *fellaheen* and urban proletariat, had not much of a choice but to take the shorter route to survival, as well as the dependency of the services of UNRWA, once they were provided with special identity cards (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 100), ascribing them legally as refugees.

4.1.d.ii. Dispossessed and displaced, the frame of the modern Palestinian

Khalidi (2010, pp. 177-209) refers to the years between the Nakba and the raise of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1964, as the "lost years". The articulation of the Palestinian nationalist movement could not effectively confront the gradual Zionist effort that peaked in 1948. After the separation of the Palestinian population throughout the region, it seemingly disappeared. However, the movement was reassembled clandestinely by elements educated during the British Mandate, later graduated in the universities of Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. Now scattered in different countries, but holding to their national identity, fuelled by the trauma of the Nakba, their reflexivity led them to discard the support of the former political Palestinian elites, who they blamed for their outcome.

From the original 100,000 displaced Palestinians in 1948 that made it to the south of Lebanon, different accounts exist as to how different individuals perceived their predicament at that moment (Sayigh R. , 2007; Peteet, 2005). Some of them regarded their situation as a temporary one, which would promptly be repaired, because of the outright injustice they perceived in being violently expelled from their land. Some others seemed to show early signs of trauma, as they felt that their ancient connection to land had been tragically severed, and this meant more than working then land, but losing part of their identity. The refusal to the humiliating act of getting rations from UNRWA (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.4.b.) , and men sending women to get them (Peteet, 2005, pp. 73-77; Gatrell, 2013, p. 132) reveals the type of self-imposed limits to agency, based on a sense of identity, as well as both the extent of the perceived humiliation, and the continuation of patriarchal values in exile.

This reproduction of family values, come with the recreation of Palestine through the oral account of the past memory, carried out mainly by women. Heteronomous identity was far from being reproduceable in exile, as their way of life had been rendered physically and legally impossible. Identity assertion remained in a state of shock, albeit legal ascription was clear, they were refugees.

Initially, some Palestinians disliked being tagged as refugees (Peteet, 2007, p. 636). A blend of Arabness (despite the failure of the Arab states to protect, defend and, in some cases, host them), traditional hierarchical family loyalty, and a newly discovered national identity that remained missing from the political map, constituted the identity matrix of the lower-class Palestinians in Lebanon.

The rejection of *tawteen* by the Lebanese State, that is, the naturalisation of Palestinians as Lebanese citizens, was the official reason why the Lebanese authorities rejected granting any rights to the displaced; they clung to the idea of temporary refuge and subsequent temporary expectation of their stay, as adding the Sunni Muslim number equivalent to Palestinians would sway the frail confessional balance. However, there was minority of Palestinians, Christians and Muslim positioned high in the economic field, who had not much trouble in being nationalised (Ghandour, 2017, pp. 65-67). Seemingly able to omit the principle applicable to the majority of poor Palestinians, it is possible that the Lebanese State and norm circles saw, just like the Ottoman Empire and the British Mandate before, the advantages of co-opting the segment with higher economic, social, and cultural capital; expecting that way to deactivate possible mobilisation capacities, and assimilating the agency of a collective that may prove useful for their strategies, especially the ones related to the revaluation of economic capital. Social identity seemed to differ, as much as cultural identity could be asserted to be the same, depending on the space of dwelling, particularly in the transmittable sense of economic and social capital.

As for the lower class Palestinian forced immigrants, UNRWA was established to assist them in their survival: food, health, education, and housing. Hierarchical family values were consciously preserved among the Palestinians in Lebanon, to the extent that refugee camps where spatially configured to reproduce the identities that mirrored the villages they had left in Palestine, reinforcing the ancestral ascription of family identity. Besides, agency based on *a´ileh* and *hamuleh* (biological and political family) solidarity persisted, salient in cases of sickness, unemployment, or lack of finances; some of them eve setting up collective funds (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. xxv, 18). The preservation of family identity and solidarity seemed to prove useful, and even necessary, as the Lebanese State´s official intention was to «erase the Palestinians´ sense of identity and connection with Palestine» (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 142). Regardless, the economic advantage of cheap labour induced the employment of Palestinians, who, conscious of the opportunities, gathered around both agricultural and urban areas (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 24; De Bel-Air, 2012, p. 13), in the hopes of getting a much-needed income, albeit the conditions of exploitation (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 118-119). In spite of this exploitation, and the cultural disapproval of women working outside the house, they started

getting jobs easier, because they were paid less, and a gradual influx of economic capital slowly started to make it inside the camps.

4.1.d.iii. Mujahedeen, fedayeen, the frame of the rebel Palestinian

Reflexion on their previous exclusion from education, particularised in the identity of the *fellaheen*, (but not reflected as such in oral history) thus depriving them of cultural capital, played a key role among Palestinian refugee camp dwellers in Lebanon. Their agency was directed at providing their children with education, as a solution to their predicament. However, there were «structural limits to changes through educational improvement alone» (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 123). The distance in the cultural field present in Palestine were reproduced to an extent in the refugee camps in Palestine, which caused class difference within them. On the other hand, children, educated in UNRWA schools, appeared to perceive the high cost relating to the working conditions their parents had to withstand, for them to be educated (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 121). With laws prohibiting the employment of Palestinians; and job migration being limited to highly educated individuals, these sacrifices seemed to be symbolic and emotional, rather than effective towards the acquisition of an employment and subsequent improvement of conditions.

This, among other factors related to the conditions of existence, sense of humiliation and perception of abandonment, seemed to encourage the participation in the budding Palestinian political mobilisation. Initially the product of minor clandestine groups from outside the camps, the Palestinians Resistance Movement (PRM) gained momentum, stimulating the resurgence of the Palestinian national identity.

The narrative of "failure as triumph", the survival against insurmountable odds, present since 1948, was stimulated by the budding Palestinian political movement in the 60s (Khalidi, 2010, p. 195). It became successful as a way of activating ascription to a Palestinian national identity, and mobilising the refugees. Increasingly harassed by the Deuxième Bureau until the 60s, the mobilisation of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon started involving bigger masses of people, a fact the Lebanese intelligence service was aware of, and used to increase operations against it (Sayigh R. , 1994, pp. 68-89; 2007, pp. 139-147). However, not political oppression, nor the attempts to capitalise the movement by the Arab League in 1964 (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 113), by means of founding and instrumentalising the PLO, could prevent the resurgence of the Palestinian mobilisation, based on the reactivation of their ethnic national identity.

Coinciding with the beginning of the second half of the XX century, the individuated identity, caught in the hiatus of the exodus, gave way to a different kind of identification. The need to adapt to the requirements of the modern industrialised differentiation trapped most refugee camps Palestinians in a loop of poverty. However, the latent potential, seemingly inert for a decade; along with the subjective mixture of despair and hope in their agency, gave way to a unique blend of identification strategy. From the refusal of being branded refugees during the previous years, the Palestinians in Lebanon, considering the socio-political mobilisation, referred to themselves as "revolutionaries", "militants", or "strugglers" (Peteet, 2007, p. 636).

Against the odds represented by the state apparatus, with the harassment of the Deuxième Bureau at its head at street level, the dislocation of the Palestinian in different states, the marginalisation and overall low position of the individuals in the economic field; the displaced, dispossessed, and refugees became mujahedeen and fedayeen[24]. The identity shift came together with yet another defeat, the Six Days War, which entailed the loss of land outside and inside the Palestinian territories (Dawisha, 1997, pp. 34-37). The raising self-consciousness, mobilised around ethnic identity, and tendency towards mobilisation increased after the war. The former clandestine groups, emboldened by the situation and (utilitarian) support of some Arab states, noticed the social conditions inside and outside Lebanon. Inwards, the Palestinian political groups promoted the organisation around the idea of the Palestinian identity, articulated as a political subject. This image-oriented identity, made possible due to the felt despair, and projected as a strategic assertive identification, set off the overturn of roles, sparked by an allegedly UNRWA-dependant collective.

The Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), originally built around «the writings of nineteenth-century European nationalism—romantic and absolutist— and contemporary Arab thinkers to formulate a pan-Arab nationalism with fascist undertones» (Sayigh Y. , 1997b, p. 127), would later split into PFLP and DFLP. Originating from a different social field, the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, Fatah, would come to be the predominant force, capitalising its social capital among the Palestinians and some Arab governments. Taking advantage of this, Fatah took over the PLO in 1969. This brought about the encouragement and strengthening of the Palestinian refugees´

[24] While term "*mujahed*"/"مجاهد" (f. "*mujahedah*"/"مجاهدة" pl. "*mujahedeen*"/"مجاهدين" stems from "*jihad*/جهاد", "struggle" in the inner sphere of the individual, as well as the outer one, meaning therefore "warrior" or "struggler"; "*feda´i*"/"فدائي" (f. "*feda´iah*"/"فدائية", which also means "spirit of self-sacrifice"; pl. "*feda´een*"/"فدائيّين") means "one who sacrifices himself", and originates from "*fida"*"/"فداء", meaning "redemption" or "sacrifice" (Wehr, 1976, pp. 142-143, 701).

agency. The measure of this being that the refugee camp, a mechanism originally thought of as a temporary exclusion zone, key for the marginalisation of a whole collective, ascribed under a specific ethnic identity, was turned by its dwellers into a space of subversion, overcoming of the obstacles that had hindered the improvements of their conditions of existence.

The agency deployed by the PRM, therefore not only the political organisations, but every person asserting their identity as a Palestinian and acting in support of the collective political strategies (at that moment composed of not only Palestinians, but also individuals of other nationalities), led to the signing of the Cairo Accord, to gaining legitimacy in front of the Lebanese government. Having overturned their conditions of existence, from underclass to that of a "struggler collective", their social identity shifted towards that of a subject of liberation. With structures parallel to those of the state in place, the identity of Palestinian in Lebanon, from an abandoned and hopeless state turned into strugglers, producers of their own fate. In the military field, Palestinian *mujahedeen* outnumbered the Lebanese Army (De Bel-Air, 2012, p. 14).

However, two important factors led to the dissolution of the Palestinian identity as it was constructed up till that point. On one hand, raising tensions and the involvement of the PRM in the civil war, as one of the many catalysts that brought the disdain of mainly a segment of the Christian Maronite camp (as well as the Shi´a later on). On the other, the neglect of the education and investment in the cultural field by the Palestinian norm circles inside the PRM, during the peak of the causal power of their structures, instead of military training, where the PLO focussed effort.

These two factors combined ensued that, with the withdrawal of the PLO in 1982, the causal power of the structures was emptied, as key figures had left or been killed in military action. Little to no separation was made within the structures, all tied to a vertical hierarchical structure that depended on PLO officials.

4.1.d.iv. Lajeen, the frame of the late modern Palestinian

After the Ta´ef Agreement, Palestinians in Lebanon were back to being refugees. Within the battle of identities put forth for 15 years, some Palestinian mujahedeen, now back to being refugees, had played a role during the bloody conflict, and had made more enemies than allies. The common identity ascribed by the Lebanese population to them was not that of the underclass from before the "golden era", but a guilt laden one, a potential danger (Meier, 2010) that was socially constructed by a big part of the Lebanese political class as a scapegoat to blame the problems of the state on.

Victimised, the undesirable burden (Arendt, 1973 [1951], p. 283; Agier, 2011), the push to assert their identity as the legal ascription of "refugee" was strong. Image-oriented identity was now meant, unlike the earlier period, to assess a situation of helplessness. Their social identity was back to being cast as in terms of long-term displacement, as the lived experience sank in the discourse, not as a willing ascription, but as a strategic need, due to material and political vulnerability, as, legally ascribed "refugees" have access to international aid (Peteet, 2007, pp. 639-640). Within the humanitarian frame, «neither refugees nor humanitarian organizations have any other recourse than to present refugees as "speechless emissaries"» (Latif, 2011, p. 60), as "beneficiaries", as the humanitarian jargon puts it.

Furthermore, the Oslo accords started a period of intensive negotiations, that regardless of what its developments were regarding the Occupied Territories, felt like abandonment for the Palestinian refugees out of them. Palestinian refugee camp dwellers were left with the legal ascription of *lajeen*[25], which they know appropriated and asserted as their identity. Even though Peteet was writing the following phrase in 2007, it suits the modern-day situation: «A foreboding sense of temporariness, and concomitant insecurity, is pervasive among Palestinian refugees. Even though many camps now resemble small towns or are vibrant extensions of urban centres, there is still an uneasiness over their future» (Peteet, 2007, p. 633).

What could be thought of as a strictly legal category, "refugee" implies more than just the receiving end of an international regime of aid and protection. The assertion of "refugee" to a Palestinian person in Lebanon comes with a social consideration, as well as an individual ascription of not just an identity, but, marking Peteet´s words, an individually felt sense of temporariness and insecurity, reflecting inwards and outwards.

4.2. Social identity construction

The second dimension we address now is the construction of identity, as well as its reproduction, which necessarily entails human agency. However, the process of constructing an identity is not necessarily a reality that occurs explicitly in a conscious level, nor in an isolated manner at the individual or collective dimensions (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.2.). The social construction of identity seems to be grounded on the construction of attachments and relations, reason (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.3.a.i. & 3.4.c.) and

[25] The term "*lajee´*"/"لاجئ" (f. "*lajee´a*"/"لاجئة", pl. "لاجئين"), "refugee" (etymologically also "emigrant" and "inmate of an asylum"), is derived from "*laja´a*"/"لجأ", "to take refuge", "to shelter", or "to flee" (Wehr, 1976, p. 858).

emotion (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.1.c.) as their motion generators, in a continuous development, an interaction between self-consciousness and social awareness. The relational symbolic constructs are founded on shared meaning, which constitute the base of groups, collectives, institutions, customs and a long et cetera (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.3.b.iv.) that would involve everything contained in a form of life.

Social identity is related to membership to collectives, but collectives can take different shapes, depending on the relational meaning of it for the individuals that compose it, organised vertically or horizontally in varying degrees. For the human being, everything ranging from the species itself, to a group of friends who gather to enjoy a common hobby, and countless configuration in between, can be considered a collective. Although not all of them are as meaningful. Some regularities refer to what seems to be commonplace collectives, sometimes referred to as "cultures", or more specifically, ethnic cultures, to avoid the ambiguities alluded to in the previous chapter (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.3.b.v.).

Ethnicity can therefore be said to be the legacy of the group into which the individual is born. Yet, changes and various degrees of affiliation are possible, there are no unequivocal and stable boundaries (Barth, 1969), and individuals´ and a group´s identity always unfolds in its relationship with other individuals or groups with varying degrees of intensity. In this sense, the causal power of specific cultural entities, that is, social structures, ascribe identities and circumscribe the possibility of their development and the agency assumedly contained therein.

Some of these structures are commonplace in different territorial areas. Some others are distinct adaptions to factors most salient among the ecological, spatial, technical, or social arrangement of the specific human space. Of all the possible structures with significant causal power, we will consider the ones that appear to have a higher causal power for the Palestinians in Lebanon. Trying to clear out the elements that characterise social identity in a cultural frame, implies not so much looking for empirical regularities within the sensitive realm, nor within the domain of behaviour, but, as Geertz (1973, p. 45), as well as the thinkers of the critical realist theory (Bhaskar, 1998; Elder-Vass, 2010; Archer, 1996), as well as other theorists (Durkheim, 1912/1995; Marx, 1939/1973; Bourdieu, 1998) suggest knowing about the social structures that possess most causal power, the mechanisms and sets of relations that (co)determine the development of forms of life, as ways of feeling, thinking and doing, among a specific collective.

4.2.a. The symbolic construction of identity

If identity, referred to human individuals or groups, is not a permanent, complete and unchanging reality; if race, as a genetic-biological factor is not applicable (at least not as a natural factor, but as a

socially constructed one, asserted or ascribed); if the traditional categories of language and religion, being the most salient criteria, are not limitless and static and, therefore, explain ethnic and cultural identities only to a narrow extent; and if identity is composed of semantically-negotiable elements, what is then social identity?

Social identity is associated with groups, but the structuring and meaningfulness of these groups has changed over time. In premodern societies, groups tended to be more homogenous. As discussed before, the differentiation and subsequent identification of social groups was simpler and more straightforward, as the continuation of ways of life did not offer much room to social transformation in the individual nor social levels. The gradual emergence of labour division and differentiation of roles in the production of the material conditions, as well as the increased variation and separation between groups, as a consequence, caused a change in how social arrangement would reflect in society as a whole.

Social class would replace premodern estates, as well as include an increasingly complex way of arranging the spheres of life. Although different thinkers approached this stage in different manners (Marx, 1867/1990; Weber, 1905/2001), all would agree on the fact that social class seemed to determine to a high extent the mobility of individuals. Albeit not in a completely permanent way, social ascription and belonging to a specific social class, especially the lower ones, meant a decreased mobility. The individual was bound to a limited social space, where most of the people would share social identity, habits, customs, ways of seeing, thinking, and doing.

But the individual is not necessarily the point of departure of social identity. The attribute that enables human being to live in social groups is not individual agency, but the collective one, therefore entailing interdependent individuals, affecting each other in their interaction (Barnes, 2000, pp. 47-77). Consequently, as we stated in the previous chapter (*Vid. Supra*, 3.3.a.i.), and against what the rational choice theory would say, suggesting that it is the individual who, using reason against any causality, deploys agency; everyday non-rational behaviour refuses this end, pointing towards an inevitable causality outside the individual, who

> does not remain unaffected by proximate others in her calculations and subsequent actions […] knowledge is a trans-individual resource, collectively generated, evaluated and standardised, and made available to individuals who for the most part take it on trust as the knowledge of "their society" (Barnes, 2000, p. 51)

Consequently, Bourdieu´s conception of habitus, binding individual mental structures to collective social structures fits into the frame. Symbolic interaction between individuals constitutes part of how they are, the ways they behave, relate to each other, expect from each other (Durkheim, 1912/1995). We seem to tend to assert and ascribe a specific social status, as a way of conceiving of a preproduced idea of what to expect from our social interactions, with a shared set of meanings and symbols. These symbols originate from shared "culture", as a set of adaptive principles to specific environmental circumstances, acting as a "toolkit", but also impelling us under concrete frames (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.3.b.iv. & 3.3.b.v.), in specific historical coordinates.

Accordingly, if individual agents are tied, affected, and bound to other individual agents, they are mutually susceptible. Barnes hints at a "deference-emotion system", whereby «feedback of deference moves the individual to and fro along a continuum of emotional states […] device whereby individual action is modulated by the evaluations of others implicit in their symbolic communications» (Barnes, 2000, p. 68). A regulator of emotional states, echoes the idea of responsibility (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.3.a.iv.), as well as Archer´s concept of the "You" (Archer, 2003, pp. 53-92), a being able to act freely who takes in consideration the specificities of the accountability in social interactions, that is, a bidirectional relational tie.

The two-way relation occurs between individuals, and between individuals and collectively produced structures and institutions. This entails a specific cultural background[26], which serves as a frame against which agents can ascribe a social status and anticipate expectations, degrees of accountability and responsibility. From social nature derives the agent´s ability to hold and be hold accountable for actions; from accountability stems the need of communicating what and why, resorting to shared sets of symbols. Likewise, from the symbolic nature of communication comes susceptibility, which implies the coordination, as the basis for social interaction. In this interaction, the social status is (at least preliminarily) ascribed, although this does not mean that ascription and its correlating aspects will be necessarily fulfilled (Barnes, 2000, pp. 74-77), social structures do contribute to this process.

Concerning these structures, Grossberg sees that the logic of modernity has blurred some important factors related to the relationship between identity, agency, and the structures whose effect has actually become naturalised. Unsatisfied with the conventional stances of cultural studies, he wonders

[26] Reminder: "cultural" in the sense of Appadurai´s idea of a construct of specific attributes (material, linguistic, territorial, etc.) stemming from the mobilisation of social structures for the reproduction of difference.

if it would be possible to displace the emphasis of models of oppression, in the struggle for change put forth by populations that poorly fit in these models:

> My feeling is that an answer depends upon rearticulating the question of identity into a question about the possibility of constructing historical agency, and giving up notions of resistance that assume a subject standing entirely outside of and against a well established structure of power (Grossberg, 1996, p. 88)

The rearticulation of the matter of identity he refers to revolves around the rethinking of the following rationales:

- Logic of difference VS logic of otherness
- Logic of individuality VS logic of productivity
- Logic of temporality VS logic of spatiality

Concerning the reassessment of difference to otherness, Grossberg understands that the study of culture has been focused on alterity as a subproduct of hegemonic identities, as established "within the strategic forms of modern logic: difference, individuality, and temporality" (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.3.b.v.). Regarding difference as the constitution of identity, he states that "the modern" hinders the construction of alternatives, as the strategy consists of designating the different, having itself as a reference and pre-given metric (ethnocentrism). Against this theory of difference, Grossberg proposes a theory of otherness that bears in mind that difference is historically produced and imposed by structures with causal power. Against taking the dominant identities as a reference, he suggests recognising otherness in its particular terms and context (Grossberg, 1996, pp. 93-97).

As for the shift from individuality to productivity, he considers that the image of the self-made modern individual has been generally defined in three axes: «(1) the subject as a position defining the possibility and the source of experience and, by extension, of knowledge; (2) the agent as a position of activity; and (3) the self as the mark of a social identity» (Grossberg, 1996, pp. 97-98). Critical of this conception, he suggests the need of pinpointing the structures that produce these axes, or planes of identification. Interdependence and the construction of identity comes to light under this claim, seeing individuality not as a naturally given, but as a category produced by specific norm circles, for specific purposes.

Regarding the reconsideration of temporality, as separable from space and more important than it, departing from Descartes´ (1637/2006) self-reflecting consciousness, Grossberg (1996, pp. 100-102) locates the origin of modern thinking within Kant´s (1781/1998, pp. 103, 162-171, 178-192) settling

down of this consciousness in the temporality of subjectivity (experience). As an alternative, Grossberg suggests considering spatiality as important as temporality regarding experience. Experiencing and acting «subjectivity describes the points of attachment from which one experiences the world» (Grossberg, 1996, p. 101), as "vectors of spatial existence" that relates different spaces, ways of belonging to them, styles of attachment to them, and the distribution of people within them.

Having these three alternate logics in mind, we will now try to position the case of the Palestinian population in Lebanon in the exposed coordinates. Having in mind the theoretical foundations lied before (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.2.b. & 3.3.b.), we will observe the emergence of the structures that appear as more salient in each of the sections.

4.2.b. Palestinian social identity construction

Religion, language, and phenotype, what in ethnocentric and racist terms is regarded to as "race", have for a long time been the most salient criteria of ethnic classification and identity. Being somewhat the features that sensorily might stand out the most, these criteria compose the easy method of differentiation. Following the previous theoretical development in this dissertation, we are in a position to understand that identification based on these guidelines is socially constructed, as well as serving specific interests (Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991), which are located in specific norm circles (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.3.b.v.).

Essentialised, as they might and actually have been made into, this triangle of identification produces an identity stuck in static features, symbolised and oftentimes organised hierarchically, which affects both assertion and ascription. Particularly the latter, assigning a preconceived identity, comes with an ascribed set of deduced features, among which agency can be found. As for the former, self-image in these terms can also become the factor that codetermines the worldview and subsequent meanings attached to the objects of the world, from a specific subjectivity.

However, religion, language, phenotype, as well as gender, among others, do not exist in a social vacuum. The question of identity cannot be separated from the worldview it is based on, and the objectives it seeks. These, and the types of labour division and social stratification and hierarchies stemming from them, are the result of particular strategies in specific contexts. The embodiment of the social identity is made to fit in pre-given, essentialised, and differentiated elements that fit standpoints interested in reproducing the existing relational basis of a society.

We will now present three epigraphs where we will attempt to constitute a different metric to address the specificities of the Palestinian population in Lebanon through the lens of otherness, as

opposed to difference; production of social identity, instead of subjectification as an individual matter; and spatial, rather than only temporal guide. These might all constitute a different metric when addressing the specificities of the Palestinian population in Lebanon.

4.2.b.i. Otherness as social identity

Otherness for Palestinians entails an image of concentric circles, constraining as smaller and the circle gets, an increasingly socially differentiated category, developed within the logic of modernity and capitalism. The widest ranging circle of identification in this sense could be started with Muslimanity and Arabness.

Although sceptical about it, quantification of Muslim and Arab population might help picturing the topic in proportions. Estimated data for 2022 states that Islam is the second largest religious group, with 24.9% of people. In absolute terms, 1.9 thousand million people distributed all over the planet, from a rough total of 8.0 thousand million people. Concerning Arab population, it was 436 million people, according to 2020 data (O´Neill, 2022). Even though Muslims are the majority in the Arab states, not every Muslim person is an Arab, just like not every Arab is a Muslim, nor every Arab or Muslim person lives in an Arab state.

Jabiri states that it was not till the mid XIX century that Arab lawmakers started writing about the caliphate (closest possible analogy to a state) through the *tadwin*, a process of registry originally devised as a way of keeping the record of oral tradition concerning political and social affairs. But it is before, during the X century, that the rule of *taqlid* is established, locking the discourse to recognised customs through emulation and tradition which, according to Jabiri, bestowed Arabic-Islamic discourse with a certain degree of ahistoricism. Following this current, some contrast positions took place, conferring reason a higher value, but the flow of time and history reinforced conservativism. This «left "Arab mentality" too dependent on *bayan* (linguistic and deductive logic) and *irfan* (gnostic knowledge), and this left its legacy in all of the subsequent Arab-Islamic intellectual production» (Al-Jabiri, 1996, pp. 26-31).

New structures of power and a public educational system were created during the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.1.b.). Although it cannot be clearly stated what the intention of these changes were, they were implemented by reformers concerned with the legitimisation of the state. The consequences of the reforms led to additional taxes and military recruitment. Even though the reforms put restraints to the arbitrary law to the rulers of the state, including the Ottoman constitution of 1876, they were also effective in hiding the fact that the causal power behind the construction of

law was norm circles in high positions in the economic and social fields, the socioeconomic elite. This in turn paved the way for liberal constitutionalism in the political field. Concurrently, this tendency was strengthened with the envisioning of the individual as outfitted with rational and responsible agency, along with the claim that the members of a nation[27] were the collective sovereign political power (Philipp, 2016). Although Arabness and Muslimanity are related, or rather juxtaposed in a historical development parallel to that of the construction of the political structures, they developed in different ways, particularly within the *Nahda*[28], the Arab cultural movement alongside the Tanzimat, although accounts about the cause of the start differ in this sense (some narratives translate it as "liberal age") (Hanssen & Weiss (Eds.), 2016).

The Nahda, the "cultural renaissance" in the Arab territories coincided in time with the increasing effects of modernity, capitalism, and globalisation. Some accounts envision it as the appropriation by Arab intellectuals of the social change taking place due to these effects. Some others see the seeds of the construction of contemporary social identity in what has come to be called the "Arab world" (which we will see in the next epigraph).

This Arab world was established as a territorial Other, also linguistically. It is not by chance that "Middle East" relates and denotes a geographical reference. It is the East and it is in the middle from a Western perspective. In it in this sense that Said (1978) was concerned about the construction of the "Orient" as an "Other", as one of the results of European exploration. Arabs were shown as devoid of agency, unregenerate savages that, in the particular case of Palestinians who resisted colonialism, were labelled as either poorly developed stupid savages, or a "negligible quantity, morally and even existentially" (Said, 1978, pp. 38, 306-308). Simplified biased identification, coupled with a reductionist account of a reduced agency.

This discursive practice about Palestinians seemed to originate from an essentialist understanding of their cultural customs and social organisation. It also related to an understanding of social and political life inevitably tied with religion, underpinned by conservativism (Said, 1978, p. 236), an image that has been dragged till contemporary times through: "popular images and social science representations", "cultural relations policy", the reduced capability of Muslim though processing, and

[27] Reminder: The term "nation" is employed here rather in the "*qaum*"/"قوم" sense, that is, a wide acceptation of what we could consider nation, but etymologically originated in the idea of "kinsfolk", "kindred", "tribe", "people", even "race" (Wehr, 1976, p. 800).

[28] The noun "*nahda*"/ "نهضة" means "awakening", "rise", "growth", "advancement", "progress", from the verb "nahd"/"نهض", meaning "to rise", "to raise" (Wehr, 1976, pp. 1003-1004).

the tendency to see East as an imitation of the West (Said, 1978, pp. 285-322). The Middle East, or "Orient" as Said put it, is a construction in specific terms, for specific purposes, such as the instrumentalization of local structures for the profit of colonialisation and exclusion of the potentially undesirable (Arendt, 1973 [1951], p. 283; Agier, 2011) part of the population.

Although tempting, establishing an alternative concept to the "Orient", the "Middle East", or even the "Arab" could be counter-productive, as we would find ourselves trying to establish a different logic, on the ground of, precisely an already established logic of difference. "Greater Syria", Bilad as-Sham, even the differentiation in terms of "nations", or states, would still contribute to the concealment of Otherness on different bases.

Examples like the revolt of 1936 in Palestine (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.2.b. & 1.2.c.) bear witness to the fact that, as Sayigh (2007, p. 45) points out, although religion was one of the grounds for the resistance movement, it did not seem to play the strongest role in the resistance of the peasants (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 45) to the effects of modernity, capitalism and colonialisation. The economic, political, and social fields in premodern Palestine answered to the same logic of the premodern in any other site of the planet. Cultural adaptation developed in the frame of ecologic, social, material, political conditions in an inward-outward dialectic for the sake of survival in conditions that shaped the habitus tied to the relational aspects of daily life.

Village life for the *fellahen* was guided by the social conventions that had proved to be profitable, particularly to a segment of the population. This segment was that of the male high in the economic field, but the derived habitus trickled down the field, permeating the disposition of the lower positions. This happened not only in the public sphere, although, as we saw, the private-public divide was not a clear-cut category (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 15). The domestic domain was permeated by habitus, and hierarchy reproduced in a narrower collective in the familial sphere.

Before the Nakba, only Palestinian boys went to school, as girls attending could potentially mean harm in the social field (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 13), that is, through social sanctioning aimed at preserving the values and predispositions inscribed as the guide for survival of the collective. That did not entail the marginalisation of women, since they fulfilled matters of the utmost importance in everyday life. They appeared to have a salient role in conflict-resolving situations inside and outside the household, and even if it was not commonplace, they could and did own and manage land (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 17-19), an element nonetheless ordinarily linked to male sustenance and pride.

After the Nakba, the gender division of labour and roles inevitably underwent important changes. Women would still be the principal conveyors of past experience, individual and collective alike,

particularly after the Nakba, and regarding the national experience. Although supported by the gender division of education envisioned by UNRWA, young women seemed to be mainly directed towards secretarial, childcare, hairdressing, or dressmaking qualifications in the educational field (Gatrell, 2013, p. 133). Women kept being the embodiment of the traditional image of honour, suffering and sacrifice (Peteet, 2005, p. 186).

Although paradoxical, «in spite of a strong dislike of women working outside the home» (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 119), Palestinian women in Lebanon were the ones who could first enter the Lebanese labour market, particularly in agriculture and domestic service. This initiated a slow but steady flow of economic capital inside the camps, which they would invest in cultural capital (Peteet, 2005, p. 87), as the experience appeared to have taught them that differential educational position in the education field was one of the major factors contributing to their situation of abandonment (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 33). Furthermore, with time,

> Patriarchal authority was also reduced by the greater earning power of the new educated generation, giving daughters as well as sons relatively more weight in family decisions […] still deeply entrenched obstacles to the political activity of women the majority do not dare to undertake political activity against the families´ wills, especially as they cannot feel confident of the respect of the male members of the organizations they join […] Most families argue that if girls want to help the Revolution, they must do it in traditionally female ways (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 193-194)

In spite of that disallowance, a few women might have made it into the PRM groups in Lebanon (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 106), following the model of famous Palestinian militia women. Even so, the national aspect of the resistance seems to outdo the class and gender oppression within the Palestinian collective in Lebanon (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 195). The gender issue appears as a sensitive one, «which is kept out of the arena of controversy by an array of ideological means» (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 5), a fact that does hinder the options and actual agencies of women to be deployed subverting this obstacle.

Despite the improvement of the general situation of women during the XX century, the role of Palestinian women is still subsumed and concealed. Notions like “struggle”, “nation”, “liberation”, or “freedom” still hold a significance higher than that of “oppression of the woman” (Bendt & Downing, 1980; Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 13-132; Kassem, 2011; Gatrell, 2013, pp. 145, 296). Often hidden behind ideological constructs, set up by specific (male) norm circles, a hierarchy of priorities

seems to transpire in practice. Kassem, a Palestinian woman herself, is particularly clear about this fact:

> the struggle for Palestinian liberation must also be a struggle against all forms of oppression and domination – imperialism, capitalism, racism and patriarchy. By focusing only on national liberation, the Palestinian struggle is reductionist. It consumes the energy of the masses in order to establish a state where the guarantee of liberation at its heart, based on human rights and citizenship, is doubtful (Kassem, 2011, p. 33)

Focusing on language, body, and home, Kassem (2011, pp. 82-236) highlights the deployment of agency by Palestinian women. Against the intellectual effort to erase Palestinian history, by means of (mainly) oral transmission of knowledge; but also against patriarchy, in the intersection of gender, history, memory, nationalism (Israeli and Palestinian), and citizenship. However, she also noticed the presence of the dominant discursive practice in the women she interviewed, taking place in "complex sites of resistance". Although aware of difference and the struggle to identify and resist it, habitus still holds a share of the narrative employed to explain the social lived experience.

Trying to distance the understanding of the construction of identity from the logic of difference does not mean omitting the objective tendencies for instituting difference and the logic of individuality by the structures. Additionally, difference does not appear solely as an externally imposed aspect, but also as the result of the reproduction of a habitus that seems to contain a degree of concern for the maintenance of reified values which, need be, can be reluctantly altered, for the sake of the principles culture is supposed to serve, survival and adaption to conditions of existence.

Otherness is located in a logic of production of a specific subject, inwards and outwards. Outwards, particularly Palestinian *fellaheen* and proletariat, had to hastily and unsteadily adapt to the varying conditions of modernity, peaking in the massive exclusion of the Nakba, new exigencies regarding agency, and a new alien identity ascription relocated them in an Otherness in dislocated spatial terms. They were the Palestinians unfit for the logic of modernity (and afterwards late modernity), produced under specific socioeconomic conditions. Conditions that assumedly placed value in the individuality stemming from the new era of opportunities, which would prove unreachable for the masses.

Inwards, the logic of the production of subjectivity entailed a different level of differentiation. Despite sharing language, "general contours of culture", a common regional history and development, religion, as well as other public expressions, Palestinians became the Other in Lebanon. With time, Palestinians would become less predisposed to trusting surface features and oversimplified

expectations, in light of the perception of abandonment and even betrayal of Arab states (Peteet, 2005, p. xii; 2007, p. 632)

4.2.b.ii. The production of social identity

The production of these conditions of existence was not the result of a natural, but a social development of the relational emergence of clashing rationales. On one hand, the habitus reproduced in the rural areas seemed to still adhere to the ideals of loyalty and tradition; on urban areas, groups with higher economic and cultural capital seemed to be on their way to attempt a transubstantiation into social capital.

This transformation of one capital into another one was based on the belief that modernity provided the chances for it. However, it would prove a more complicated mechanism for the Palestinians before the Nakba. The social identity ascribed by urban Palestinians in high positions in the economic and cultural fields, proved to be only one layer of Otherness, one laid out in respect to their rural compatriots. Another layer was being laid bare in the new dynamics, increasingly introduced by the European and Zionist migration, one that not necessarily considered their potential Palestinian counterpart as allies.

Historically, different stratification systems have been adapted, reflecting different categories pertaining to historical periods. Just as we pointed out before, the progression of history into modernity, capitalism and globalisation introduced major changes in the organisation of society. Labour division, differentiation, industrial technology, and bureaucracy made it possible to thrive for specific social strata, those in high positions in the economic, cultural, and social fields. Thus, feudal categories, with nobility, army officials and priests in the prominent positions, had to gradually give way to the merchants, who traded economic capital with political and cultural capital, and finally became the bourgeoisie. Individuals were dealt with as the personification of economic categories and holders of specific class-relations and interests (Marx, 1867/1990, p. 92), individualisation meant assuming that each one´s position was the result of their agency.

The decay of the Ottoman Empire occurred within the period when the world was increasingly turning into a progressively growing global-network of economic and social fields. With the fall of the empires after World War I, free trade, imperialist capitalism, and the dispositions being created, started setting the foundation of territorial boundaries, with the European states, mainly Great Britain and France, in the centre of its design. Along with it came the tendency to ascribe difference between

the norm circles of different territories. They would differentiate themselves from their own peoples, for the sake of binding social capital transnationally.

It was the case too for the groups in high positions in the cultural field in the Arab states (or would-be states), the intellectuals of the Nahda. A previous identification set a divide between Arab-Islamic culture and the influences coming from the West (Hill, 2019, pp. 79-100). After the Tanzimat, Arab elites became gradually closer to the influence of the logic of modernity under the precepts of foreign elements. Hill argues that Arab elites deployed their agency based on class differentiation and aimed at state-building, in order to fit into the global capitalist order, «while exercising power over and extracting resources from local subaltern groups (Hill, 2019, p. 250)

Palestinian elite was no exception to that tendency (Seikaly, 2016), as exposed in the first chapter (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.2.b.). Before the rising tension between Zionist settlers reached its peak during the 1936 rebellion, with calls to action in different fronts, a group in the Palestinian collective who defined itself as "men of capital" (Seikaly, 2016, p. 266), fit in Hill´s description of co-opted local elites. Palestinian nationalism was not prevalent yet, not even in the levels shown during the rebellion (and even less after the Nakba), the assertion of this "men of capital" was towards the Arab sphere, which was growing during the Nahda. They saw the need of a broad Arab commercial unity, as they saw the national Palestinian domain (barely perceived as existing) as neither natural nor viable, particularly for their interest in the advancement in the economic field:

> Private property and individual freedom were basic tenets for men of capital in Palestine. The proliferation of needs and commodities marked an evolutionary stage of progress and civilization. Throughout their visions and projects, there was an insistence on envisioning, securing and improving the future […] Economics for these men was a realm of production and exchange, a body of knowledge and a site of social management (Seikaly, 2016, p. 294)

They understood the "awakening" as an economic process, along with the separation of this field from the political one, which, as a consequence separated their economic ambitions from the political national-political ones. Socioeconomic stratification, based on the employment of the subaltern classes for the accumulation of capital, regardless of the socio-political developments, set the conditions for the ethnic stratification in the making. The active Zionist endeavour, with the sometimes active, some other times passive support of the British Mandate´s structures, resulted in the exodus of the Arab Palestinians, peaking in 1948 with the Nakba.

The ensuing refugee issue culminated a multifactorial and multiscale process of exception within the logic of modernity. The mid XX century, as a reflection of a future development in the next one, saw massive waves of migrating population, proving to be one of the major issues in different aspects of public life, especially relating to the field of human rights and reaching to the core of the perception of security in the states of what has come to be called the "first world". The common solution, ever since its inception, has been the containment, control, and exclusion of the displaced population (*Vid. Infra*, 4.3.b. & 4.3.d.), sometimes at the gates of the territories they used to inhabit, as the only plausible option for dealing with the unstoppable and recurring event. Sometimes reified, the structures seem oblivious of the production of this category. A category that, as a faithful reflection of modernity, comes individualised, as the refugee status determination, the bureaucratic procedure to state the legal ascription, is done on an individual basis. Additionally, «with little grasp of histories of conflict and dispossession on the part of officialdom, refugees meet with underlying suspicion and outright hostility» (Gatrell, 2013, p. 255), an ordinary experience, especially for those coming to Europe from the Middle East in late modernity. The case of the Palestinians entails not only the temporal logic and sequence of their displacement, but an important spatial attachment logic, actually, the primary defining both the production of the conditions of their existence, and the rationale of the Palestinian instances of agency and mobilisation.

4.2.b.iii. The spatiality of social identity

Palestinians from every position were eventually expelled from their land (*Vid. Supra*, 1.3.). Some of those with the economic and/or social capital, aware of the foreshadowing of the events, left before Zionist aggression reached its peak in 1948. Some stayed and became gradually relegated to a condition lower compared to that of a citizen in the newly created Israeli State. Half of the population was forced to displacement in desperate conditions.

From then on, temporality seemed to have frozen. The temporal divide, imposed violently, did not hinder the perception of the continuity in a unique manner, as a «relentless focus on the immediate present effectively denies Palestinians the right to a past that has an effect on the future» (Peteet, 2005, pp. 20-21), the conception of time becomes political (Agier, 2011, pp. 77-78). Spatiality gained a quality that, having been ingrained within their identity. Especially for those who worked the land, it was the loss of their way of life, the core of their identification with soil and village, the grounds of their culture. Having taking it for granted for a long time, the shock of the loss, nor the alternative of survival from what was perceived as charity, was not an easy task for many of the displaced (*Vid. Supra*, 1.4.b.), who had to deal with a whole new set of meanings and components of identity, which

they perceived as economic marginality, denativisation, and landlessness (Peteet, 2005, p. 81). A temporary station was becoming a permanent one, defined by the geographical proximity and political remoteness of a land, an absence (Darwish, 2011) that would long haunt the minds of the Palestinian refugees. The comeback and resignifying of the Palestinian identity were silently undergoing, parallel to the grief and predicament of the dispossessed:

> Palestine is exile, dispossession, the inaccurate memories of one place slipping into vague memories of another, a confused recovery of general wares, passive presences scattered around in the Arab environment. The story of Palestine cannot be told smoothly. Instead, the past, like the present, offers only occurrences and coincidences (Said, 1999, p. 30)

Meaning was reconstructed in the space of the camps. The loss appeared as inscribed in the building of the camps, the references of the names, originated from the original villages, gave way to a «landscape of imagination and anticipation, of intense hope» (Peteet, 2005, p. 130) and, gradually, an increasing mobilisation of agency towards improving their conditions through political and social efforts.

The "space of exception" of the refugee camps (Hanafi & Long, 2010), became territories where identity and the institutionalisation of marginalisation, its associated discursive practice, as well as past, future, and present would blend. The adaptive function of culture was, along with space, being constantly renegotiated, resignified, and rebuilt. Rebuilding took a physical turn too, as they became the military target of various battles (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.5.c. & 1.6.b.). The meaning and agency deployed in the camps turned into a threat for the Lebanese, Syrian and Israeli states. Political agency mobilised in the camps put into question the grounds of state sovereignty, its indivisibility, and its monopoly of violence and political agency, a disturbing fact for the region´s stakeholders in their race for control and political survival (Czajka, 2008, pp. 138-197). Space and territory appeared no more as the traditional land dominion issue, but a dislocated spatial challenging the logic of modernity.

The symmetry and linearity presupposed to the politics of territory became blurred. The dynamics of globalisation besieged the logic of the state in its supposed position of dominance over space, all the while an allegedly marginalised and agency-deprived refugee population managed to build a strong mobilisation around (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.5.b.), precisely, the conception of a state that never was, Palestine. «The irony of the refugees, excised from the nation, is that they become critics of the national at the same time as they strive for a national homeland of their own» (Peteet, 2005, pp. 215-216). Thus, space and identity became mutually affecting entities for Palestinians in Lebanon, a

paradoxical relation as, doubly excluded from land (by Israel first, Lebanon second) under the logic of the modern state, their identity and main factor for striving appeared to be rooted on the attainment of that which had triggered their exclusion in the first place, territory as a frame for national practice of power.

The resignification of the refugee camp was carried out through the reproduction of the culture the Palestinians felt as their own, based on the memories of their life in the villages (Peteet, 2005; Sayigh R. , 2007; Latif, 2011). This was the base of the subjective symbolic construction of a present, and the grounds for a future. On the other hand, this future proved to still be constrained by the objectified differentiating logic of modernity: the subject, the consolidated state formations, based on ethnonational criteria; the object, the refused population, displaced and dispossessed, now objects of intervention depending on the indulgence of host states, transnational entities, and the related interests; the alternative, the construction of meaning outside and against the constraining objectified logic of exclusion.

Durkheim, on the issue of collective action wrote:

> Apart from these passing or intermittent states, there are more lasting ones in which the fortifying action of society makes itself felt with longer-term consequences and often with more striking effect. Under the influence of some great collective shock in certain historical periods, social interactions become much more frequent and active. Individuals seek one another out and come together more. The result is the general effervescence that is characteristic of revolutionary or creative epochs (Durkheim, 1912/1995, pp. 212-213).

From a seemingly hopeless state (Said, 1999, p. 130), the refugees, saturated by the meaning of collective loss, managed to construct, out of the symbolism of time past (Peteet, 2007), an alternative for survival, out of the logic of temporality imposed by the logic of modernity, which protracts into late modernity. Above the logic of exclusion, they represent «a disquieting element in the order of the modern nation-state, this is above all because by breaking the continuity between man [sic] and citizen, *nativity* and *nationality*, they put the originary fiction of modern sovereignty in crisis» (Agamben, 1998, p. 131).

For Agamben, that which is marginal, the space of exception, is not an anomaly, but the «the hidden matrix and nomos of the political space» (Agamben, 1998, p. 166). Inspired by Arendt (1973 [1951]), he states a paradigm shift where “bare life”, the deprivation of the political quality of the person, takes place under the logic of the state and modernity, included in the legal sphere for the exclusive task of

their exclusion (Agamben, 1998; 2005). This exclusion entails not only the physical dispossession of land, but the constraints, put forth within the logic of modernity, that obstruct the reabsorption of the displaced migrant flows from the linear organisation of space within a frame of enclosed and exclusive territoriality, where the binding of bodies with rights take place.

Peteet argues that the inversion of the state of exception and inscription of bare life upon the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.5.b.) was carried out within the conditions and spatial boundaries of the camps, under the rule of Lebanese population control. Hinting at the raise of deliberative reflexion, she highlights the fact that identity can be constructed outside the strict logic and narrowness of nationalism, implying a notion, grounded on space, close to the image-oriented identity (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.1.b.) postulated by Côté and Levine (2002, pp. 119-171). For Appadurai, the lines of action within the Palestinian agency are not so much a matter of territory:

> In most cases of counternationalism, secession, supranationalism, or ethnic revival on a large scale, the common thread is self-determination rather than territorial sovereignty as such. Even in those cases where territory seems to be a fundamental issue, such as in Palestine, it could be argued that debates about land and territory are in fact functional spin-offs of arguments that are substantially about power, justice, and self-determination (Appadurai, 1996, p. 21)

According to him, the Palestinian culturalist (political) movement would entail, on one hand, the imagination stemmed from the fact or possibility of migrating back to the homeland; and, on the other, the deliberate and self-conscious discourse about identity, history (Gatrell, 2013, p. 146), and culture against the logic of other states (Appadurai, 1996, pp. 15, 178-199). This implies, from the subjective perspective, the implications of both the reflexive deliberation Peteet indicates, and the influence of a matrix of emotions, mediated by imagination (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.1.c.iii.); and from the objective perspective, the effect of the normative institutionalised structures, against which the struggle of Palestinians in Lebanon and beyond presents itself.

4.3. Legal identity ascription

The third dimension we direct our attention now consist of the legal identity ascription, originated in the objectified normative structures, inscribed in a various range of scopes, from the state level to the international level of organisation of rights and responsibilities.

The process of social construction reaches a different magnitude when it is transformed in the field of codified law. The development of history itself draws our attention to how this effort has shaped the progression of the organisation of societies. This entails it is the historical product of groups of people, norm circles of different magnitudes, with enough causal power to invest resources in the establishment of the normativisation of meaning, which entails, among others, the institutionalisation of identity, with the subsequent assumption of specific responsibilities and degrees of accountability

Institutionalised administrative classifications give identities (or rather their difference) salience, they are transformed into normative realities. This process cannot be coincidental, as not every group holds the capacity to invest resources, nor necessarily the interest to legislate in the same manner. Under this epigraph we will try to ponder the effect of the application of these mechanism regarding the regulation of individual and collective agents, which oftentimes comes attached to instruments of surveillance and control. The attempt of regulating the figure of the refugee, in particular consideration of its effects on the Palestinians in Lebanon will be encompassed with the corresponding epigraphs.

From the wider ranging Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the more specific Lebanese laws, we will attempt to address how subjection to legality causes legal ascription to reflect on the identity of Palestinians. Considering the salience of the legal ascription of Palestinians in Lebanon as refugees, that will constitute the point of departure.

4.3.a. Refuge

4.3.a.i. Ontology of asylum and refuge

Etymologically, the term "refugee" is derived from the Latin composition of the prefix "*re-*", indicating "withdrawal" or "reversal of a previous situation" (Glare (Ed.), 2012, p. 1738); and the root word "*fugio*" (Glare (Ed.), 2012, p. 815), "to run away", "to run or move fast from a place", "to fly the country, go into exile". Accordingly, "*refugiō*" takes the following definitions:

1. To turn back and flee, run away; to retrace one´s steps in fight. **b** to turn and run from;
2. To flee for safety or protection (to a person, place, etc.). **b** to have recourse (to);
3. To recede from sight, contact, etc., shrink back, recoil. **b** to recede, run back; to be set back;
4. To shrink or recoil from;
5. To shrink (from an action, situation, etc.);

6. To shun, avoid, keep away from (a course of action, situation, person in particular capacity, etc.) (Glare (Ed.), 2012, p. 1760)

Even with all the nuances, all the acceptations of "*refugere*" as the declension of "*refugio*", have in common the notion of "to run away back", similarly to what the phrasal verb in English "to pull back" reflects as withdrawal or retreat from something, subsequently, to a "*refugium*", «a place or means of shelter, refuge» (Glare (Ed.), 2012, pp. 1760-1761), thereby the act of "pulling back" and the place of "shelter" or "asylum", the destination of the one who seeks protection.

Compared to the salience of the term "refugee" nowadays, "asylum" might not be so frequent, but nonetheless essential to understand the whole account. "*Asȳlum*", originated in the Greek "asylon" (άσυλο), is defined as "a place affording sanctuary for criminals, etc., a refuge, asylum", "a place of relaxation or recuperation, a retreat" (Glare (Ed.), 2012, p. 212).

In Arabic, the concepts of "*lajee"*"/"لاجئ" (f. "*lajee´a*"/"لاجئة", pl. "*laj´een*"/"لاجئة"), "refugee", and "*malja"*"/asylum (ملجأ) share the same etymological root and can refer to the same reality. The idea of "*malja"*" can be found in Islamic teachings (Wehr, 1976, p. 858). The Qur´an and the Sunnah mention "*amaan*" (امان), a space any non-Muslim can enter and have their security guaranteed while they stay inside.

These etymological origins remain the same in English, both for "refuge"/"refugee" and "asylum". "Asylum" is also used to refer to a place holding criminals, the deranged or, generally speaking, people who are not considered fit for society. In any of the acceptations, population, territory, demography, and border seem to play a part.

Similarly, "asylum", a term apparently used first in XV century Europe, is the idea encompassing the protection of people, who in ancient times took protection in sacred sites. The institution of asylum overwent change and, nowadays, it implies not only a place of protection, but also the right to provide protection to exiles and refugees. This right comes as "discretionary power" regarding the application of asylum, and the manner the right is applied, as the states are free to prescribe the circumstances of the institution (Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, 2007, pp. 355-420).

The origin of the concepts of "refugee" and "asylum" seem to respond to the need of protecting people in danger, originated by acts of political subversion, or related to them, but also by the elemental need of being out of harm´s way, given the difficult circumstances in the place of origin. According to Advisory Opinion OC-25/18 of the 30th of May 2018, by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, «Asylum is the governing figure that includes all the institutions linked to the

international protection of people forced to flee from their country of nationality or habitual residence» (CIDH, 2018, p. 23). Despite this definition not being binding, especially for the case of UNHCR, it can be considered as a clear outlining of the relation between the concepts of asylum and refuge.

With the establishment of the nation-states, asylum would get to be a more concrete and normative idea of protection a state gives to a person for political reasons. Through the XX century, the new "sacred sites" would take the physical shape of embassies or ships, while the protected could be persons who, regarding a law not applicable to these spaces, could be considered criminals, either political or not (CIDH, 2018, pp. 25-29), in spite of the absence of a universal definition of what a political crime is, even though some states´ law include exceptions to this kind of protection.

While the concept of asylum comprehends a wider idea of protection by the grace of a political entity, "refugeeness" (Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, 2007, pp. 15-50) is scrupulously circumscribed to a fixed set of reasons for the originating "running away", as written down in the 1951 Convention. The result of a specific sociohistorical political development, now part of the international body of law, it holds a share of colonialism, determining to an extent the development of refugee and humanitarian government (Krause, 2021) (*Vid*. *Infra*, 4.3.c.iii.). Many states assumed the definition of refugee as a basis for the application of asylum. In spite of that, both concepts, and particularly the principle of *non-refoulement*, returning asylum seekers to their country of origin, and thus putting them in danger (Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, 2007, pp. 201-284), remain bound to the discretion of the definition of risk or "well-founded fear", core to the definition stated in the 1951 Convention.

4.3.a.ii. The creation of the refugee

Contemporary discourse seems to contain different connotations regarding the figure of the refugee. Possibly due to the frequency of mass migration episodes and their portrayal in mass media, a social conception of "refugee" seems to have developed, employed parallelly to the legal acceptation, albeit in different fields. What we have seen so far points out to the diachronic production of the refugee, unlike what a social definition might entail, the refugee is the outcome of a process.

The contemporary concept of "refugee" came to be after the dissolution of the empires. It is not by coincidence that the transnational institutions born after the great wars of the XX century, the League of Nations in 1920 and its successor, the United Nations, in 1945, came to fill in the problems and spaces caused by the aftermath of the armed conflicts and the following political quandaries and problems. The Security Council of the UN, owing to the events of the Nakba, created the UNRWA.

Along with it, the displaced Palestinians were recast as “refugees”. And, along with a new order born after the world wars,

> the emergence of the nation-state, wars, and the nationalist impulse that excludes particular groups on the one hand and, on the other, from the subsequent emergence of administrative regimes that observe, enumerate, manage, and govern the displaced and in so doing construct them as a legal category and subjects of intervention (Peteet, 2007, p. 636).

A new non-citizen category was established as a result. Out of the boundaries and jurisdictions of nation-states, unqualified for the protection of any legal body and their human consideration pending by a thread, kept tense by international intervention. At least until, in 1951, the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (UNCP, 1951) was written.

Even so, the refugee identity shifted over time, also in its legal aspect. The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was extended and saw its spatial and temporary restrictions removed with to the Protocol of 1967 (UNGA, 1966). Politically, what started as a troubling circumstance after the shocks of two world wars during the same half of a century, with empires crumbling down and a new geopolitical scenery rising, turned into a global phenomenon with crucial consequences, of which nowadays we are witnesses.

Not only transnational organisations like United Nations, but also states, NGOs and the refugees themselves adopted the “refugee” category, each in their own manner, as an identity ascription strategy for adaptation and survival. Biological survival for the refugees, political survival for the normative structures:

> The logic of exclusion and inclusion, or the zero-sum game whereby those who are excluded can be included elsewhere, and a remainder or excess need not exist, is a fiction of the discourse through which the nation-state, and the inter-national state order attempt to sustain and legitimate themselves (Czajka, 2008, p. 83)

In any case, the restriction of the legal identity of the refugee, stated in the 1951 Convention, limited its protection to a specific case of displacement. A physical displacement from a territory, and a political displacement of the human being´s traits and status. The refugees are not a reality on their own, but a symptom of a broader system where including and excluding is based on the needs of a higher entity, one whose interests are split among the lines of economics and geopolitics. They can be considered as the “surplus”, useless in the constitutive logic of the global economic political system,

grounded on the re-evaluation of capital (Osorio & Victoriano (Eds.), 2011; Osorio, 2012). The case of the Palestinians in Lebanon portrays that of a community in the middle of both a network of political meaning production, by which the Lebanese state refuses to legally acknowledge their existence, branding them as "guests"; and the engendering of a humanitarian regime, whose object of intervention is instituted in the "refugee" the state refuses to recognise (*Vid*. *Infra*, 4.3.d.ii.).

4.3.a.iii. State, citizenship, exclusion

The refugee, just like any other forced type of migration, entails and embodies the rejected part of a system of classification. Refugeeness involves, according to its official definition in the 1951 Convention (UNCP, 1951), a "well-founded fear" which pushes the individual outside their country, and is unwilling or uncapable of returning to it. Violence is therefore an intrinsic part of the fact that originates a refugee (Peteet, 2007). The paths, directions and routes refugee masses take are not random, but related to criteria relating to historic ties, prospects, and expectations. These do not originate in the moment of the flight, but are the result of historical developments (Gatrell, 2013, pp. vii, 288), as we saw in the historical context chapter of this dissertation.

The dissolution of the empires, during the first half of the XX century, consolidated the role of the nation-states as the organisational and administrative units of human beings. This shift did not evolve inwards for the Western states that overtook the endeavour, but also prescriptively impelled (if not compelled) the creation of new administrative units in lands under their influence. The nation-state, with its clearly defined borders, bound territory to people, nation, sovereignty, law (Arendt, 1973 [1951], pp. 267-302; Agamben, 1995; Czajka, 2008, pp. 141-142), to a specific parcel of land:

> The nation-state conducts throughout its territories the bizarrely contradictory project of creating a flat, contiguous, and homogeneous space of nationness and simultaneously a set of places and spaces (prisons, barracks, airports, radio stations, secretariats, parks, marching grounds, processional routes) calculated to create the internal distinctions and divisions necessary for state ceremony, surveillance, discipline, and mobilization. These latter are also the spaces and places that create and perpetuate the distinctions between rulers and ruled, criminals and officials, crowds and leaders, actors and observers (Appadurai, 1996, p. 189)

Legitimacy stemmed from the very subject that supposedly constructed the normative reality of the land, the state. The «territorially demarcated, bureaucratically administered and sovereign nation-state has been the prevailing norm of political organisation, while the politicisation of culture has

proven to be the essential source of its internal and external legitimacy» (Malešević, 2006, p. 228). When said culture is not perceived as shared with a specific collective, or there is no interest in asserting it, in spite of the common features they might share, the politisation of culture reveals what Appadurai and Malešević warn about, the exclusivisation of a project of belonging designed for the maintenance of difference and division.

Citizenship is bound to one imagined (Anderson, 1983/2006) nationality, cut along cultural lines specified by the norm circles (Malešević, 2006, p. 227; Appadurai, 1996, p. 146) with the causal power to invest their capital in the establishment of their interest in the field of law. This nationhood/statehood «is a modern ideological construct reinforced equally by the institutions of the modern state (education system, mass media, public culture) as well as by civil society and family and kinship networks» (Malešević, 2006, p. 28), permeating therefore the social world, where the process of reification consolidates in the different fields of everyday life (Rose, 2003, p. 134).

It is in this respect that Schmitt wrote the opening phrase, «Sovereign is he who decides on the exception», understanding "exception" as «any kind of severe economic or political disturbance that requires the application of extraordinary measures» (Schmitt, 1922/1985, p. 1). This in turn implies the existence of a previous order that has been altered, and the decision of excluding who fits in said order, or who is excluded. He alleges that all law is "situational law", and therefore it is up to the sovereign to decide, which «reveals the essence of the state´s authority», in the form of law (Schmitt, 1922/1985, p. 13).

Agamben highlighted the paradox of the sovereign, as residing inside and outside the juridical order (Agamben, 1998, pp. 15-29). He contributed to the question about the foundations of the state, indicating it is not established over a social tie, but over its separation (Agamben, 1998, pp. 39-48). Out of a constitutional order, devised for a specific territory, inevitably organised as a state, "sovereign violence" arrogates the right of the separation of life in two dimensions: *zoe* (ζωή), the embodied physical life; and *bios* (βίος), the agentic domain of the embodied life (Agamben, 1998, pp. 1-12). This "biopolitical fracture" renders human beings to "bare life", as ineffective for their inclusion as part of a constitutionalised order, outside human society, but still in need of biological reproduction, the function they are reduced to.

Concerning the application of this modern logic, Peteet states vehemently that «refugees are constituted through violent displacement and denativisation and the subsequent institutional and legal practices and discursivity of administrative bureaucracies» (Peteet, 2005, p. 50). The borders that separate states constitute a permanent and ubiquitous difficulty for refugees in general, and

Palestinian refugees in particular. Their legal identity, excluded from the normative field of the constitutional order of the states, «not only is subject to question by the powers that be; but also is in many contexts suspect almost by definition. As a result, at each of these barriers which most others take for granted, every Palestinian is exposed to the possibility of harassment, exclusion, and sometimes worse (Khalidi, 2010, p. 2). Almost as an institutionalised moratorium (Côté & Levine, 2002, p. 97), Palestinian refugees´ identity is bound to be incomplete, considered by the national and transnational structures alike as beings unfit for inclusion in any normative order, reduced to their biological embodiment, but approved for the status of a subject under control and yet, effectively deprived of rights (Bikandi Eskutza, 2020a).

4.3.b. Lebanese State, Palestinian nation

Space, or rather territory, is then divided into nation-states. These order the material flow of people and commodities, «generate nationalist sentiments, and apportion the accoutrements of national belonging and affiliation» (Peteet, 2005, p. 23), contributing to mass displacement and the production of the categories of citizen and refugee. Inwards, instead of paying heed to «the discontinuities, contingencies, and struggles that in fact generate particular moments and incarnations of sovereignty, state discourse conceals them beneath the facade of temporal and conceptual universality» (Czajka, 2008, p. 166), Therefore, the biopolitics Peteet mentions is an inherent part of sovereignty, as Schmitt, Arendt and Agamben implied, legitimising the embodiment of the state, implying the need for control by a "lawful biological nation" (Czajka, 2008, p. 174), equating state with nation.

Especially in contemporary times, the combination of mass migration and forceful displacement, as well as their reflection on mass media, seems to recall forgotten identities, reactivating the politics of remembering and forgetting. This in turn highlights the centrality of normativisation of space, originated in Schmitt´s original appropriation of land, now naturalised, for the sake of binding ethnicist arguments with nationalism (Appadurai, 1996, p. 156; Malešević, 2006).

It is no accident that Lebanon has been the objects of so many crises since its independence. Once officially the French Mandate was over, the state took a turn towards being transformed into a gear in a much bigger machinery. A machinery under constant stress, due to its exposure to internal shifts, because of its history and sectarian composition; but also because a regional and international frame ripe with opposing interest, and many proxies´ presence and meddling in internal affairs. The Palestinians have only been one of the elements (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 20), a cog, in the necessarily interdependent machinery of regional and international causal powers (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.4. & 1.5.)

The *laissez faire* policy of the Lebanese state, promoted by French causal powers, constituted a prime entry point for the raising social, economic, and military power of the USA after World War II. Its influence would only grow throughout the next decades. Events like the military intervention of 1958 would make it clear that the USA Administration´s interest in the Lebanese State was limited to the promotion of its regional influence and not democracy nor conflict resolution (Sayigh R. , 1994, pp. 21-22).

Appadurai draws the attention to the idea of "production fetishism":

> an illusion created by contemporary transnational production loci that masks translocal capital, transnational earning flows, global management, and often faraway workers (engaged in various kinds of high-tech putting-out operations) in the idiom and spectacle of local (sometimes even worker) control, national productivity, and territorial sovereignty (Appadurai, 1996, pp. 41-42)

Marx (1867/1990) coined the term for its usage in the reification of commodities; Appadurai applies the concept to the naturalisation apparent localisation of policy in a territory, while the real logic of modernity lies oftentimes not along linear spatial lines, but on cross-cutting fields where different types of capital coalesce and the local is a by-product of the process.

One of the outcomes might take the shape of competition for power in the local fields. A fact that has had destructive consequences in Lebanon, as well as set the foundation for the actual dire circumstances the state lives (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.6.c.). Fulfilling the idea of culturalist movements leading to violence between ethnic groups, Lebanon is a clear example of how high potential for violence gets to transpire in an era of mass displacement and mass media.

In the outset of the displacements caused in the Nakba, the League of Red Cross Societies proposed to the United Nations the exclusion of those Palestinians

> capable of supporting themselves and their families through family and business connections in host countries, savings, or professional skills. It further differentiated Palestinians of means, higher education, and professional training, who had managed to find suitable employment and accommodations abroad from their poor, more uneducated, usually rural compatriots. The latter, literally and symbolically, became the "Palestinian refugees" who are the focus of political rhetoric, journalistic coverage and academic attention (Latif, 2011, p. 60)

Lebanese legislation, known for its general absence in the economic field, constructed a set of constraints upon the arrival of the Palestinians in 1948. Defining them as foreigners with rights to indefinite residence, they were nonetheless treated very differently, obliged to apply for special work permissions; but nonetheless allowing them to fill positions worthy of Marx´s "reserve army" brand (Marx, 1867/1990, pp. 781-794; Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 24), as one of the mentioned by-products in the local. The resulting blending of Palestinian refugees in the Lebanese economy, due to the transgressions of law carried out, was put to a halt with Decree no. 17561, 18 September 1962: Palestinian refugees were strictly required a work permit; a preference for Lebanese workers was established; and the principle of reciprocity was established, requiring from the would-be worker´s origin state to reciprocally offer an equivalent labour law for the Lebanese, an impossible endeavour for Palestinian "nationals" without a state (Al-Natour, 1997; De Bel-Air, 2012, p. 16).

Exclusion and marginalisation did not stop there. A member of the Arab League, the Lebanese State has refused to apply the Protocol for the Treatment of Palestinians in Arab States of 1965 (Schulz & Hammer, 2003; De Bel-Air, 2012, p. 16). The Casablanca Protocol (League of Arab States, 1965) agreed on granting Palestinian refugees rights equal to those of a citizen of the hosting states. Still a signatory, the Lebanese State reserved the right to abstain from applying the resolution regarding work, making it conditional on the country´s economic situation; as well as introducing measures of control to the state´s entries and exists, making return to Lebanese soil harder and more complex. In addition, the 19 January 1969 citizenship law restricts normative belonging to the Lebanese State by blood ties (Czajka, 2008, p. 92).

1969 was a year of significant changes for both identity and agency in the Palestinian community in Lebanon. As a consequence of the causal power quotas reached by the Palestinian Resistance Movement, PLO representatives and the Lebanese government agreed, via the Cairo Agreement, civil rights, among which the right to work supposed an important cornerstone (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.5.b.). International recognition of the Palestinians and their struggle peaked in 1974, when the PLO was admitted as an observer in the United Nations (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 29). Conversely, after the withdrawal of PLO in 1982, the agreement was repealed in 1987. Previously, the Labour Ministry had issued decree 38/11 in 1983, prohibiting refugees from occupying positions in around 72 professions (De Bel-Air, 2012, p. 17). The legal instances of the Lebanese State not only recognised the agency of the Palestinian refugees, but also granted a special consideration to the identity of the community.

After a bloody multi-scalar conflict spanning 15 years (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.5.c.), and to avoid doubts about the integrity of the territory of Lebanon, seemingly in an attempt to make the most out of the

reconstruction, Lebanese historicism ventured the composition of a redefined history of the nation. Such an endeavour need entail a significative effort of oblivion for the sake of the production of a history omitting the recent events. A fictitious unity (Raymond, 2014) disregarding the opportunity to own responsibilities and account for a difference-aware reconciliation.

Instead, causes seemed to be pinned down on extraneous prompts, among which the Palestinians engendered the main scapegoat. As Sayigh (2007, p. 103) points out, feeling that the Palestinians in Lebanon threaten their Western connections, more because of their situation than because of their action, and based on an animosity barely concealed under the support of the Palestinians´ right of return, marginalisation stayed as a principle. As a member of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner´s Programme, the Lebanese State has applied the same basis for the UN´s Conventions, Protocols, and resolutions (*Vid*. *Infra*, 4.3.c.i.), as it did with the Casablanca Protocol (*Vid*. *Infra*, 4.3.c.iii.).

In any case, the Lebanese State´s discourse does not form an internally cohesive whole, but a contradictory and incoherent one regarding the Palestinian presence in its territory. It regards them at the same time as actors that created a state-within-a-state, now considered security "islands"; and as an unbearable burden for the state to cope with (Czajka, 2008, p. 109). The Palestinian collective in Lebanon is simultaneously treated as a burdensome vulnerable minority (refugees); a potential distortion as part of a majority (Sunni Muslims in Lebanon); and a potential threat for security (terrorists, criminals, unlawful fighters)[29].

The indeterminacy of the Palestinian legal identity in Lebanon reminisces Grossberg´s (based on Bhabha´s) concept of hybridity. He employs it to refer to the image of "border existence", subaltern identities of an "in-between" (Grossberg, 1996, pp. 91-92). The liminality of identification confines this image to that of the border, a unique spatial condition, neither coloniser, nor precolonial subject, nor (I would add) postcolonial subject. Its border existence, as a negation of these categories (Czajka, 2008, p. 155), at the same time constitutes the normative identities; citizen, foreigner, even refugee would constitute determinate categories (at least to a higher degree), compared to the legal ascription of Palestinians in Lebanon. It becomes a signifier for the multidimensional failures of the logic of

[29] A multifaceted image that has its reflection in the policies of other countries in the region and globally, with NATO at the front of the paradigmatic "Janus-faced" policy of treating migration as subjects of risk and subjects at risk, displayed in the projected connection of migration and terrorism, established as a direct link (NATO, 2016; 2016; 2018; 2021). A perspective that leads to the criminalisation of migration, as well as the increasing securitisation and militarisation of borders and beyond (Serra (Coord.), 2022).

modernity and the nation-state form, sentenced to walk the obscure limbo of socioeconomic, political, and legal rejection; displaced in space, time, and relational terms.

The possibility of moving somewhere else is virtually revoked for Palestinian refugees. The chance of going back to the land they are native to was rendered unachievable in 1954, «Zionist forces consistently prevented refugees from returning to their homes, and Jewish immigrants took their place in towns such as Haifa and Acre» (Gatrell, 2013, p. 127), a hindrance that was later embodied in the Israeli Prevention of Infiltration Law (5714-1954), which, among others, prevents any «Palestinian citizen or a Palestinian resident without nationality or citizenship or whose nationality or citizenship was doubtful and who, during the said period, left his ordinary place of residence in an area which has become a part of Israel for a place outside Israel» (Knesset, 2022).

Concerned with immigration from Africa this law was amended in 2013, expanding its subject range to African migrants, furthering the exclusionist intention of the Israeli State. Together with this come the difficulties inherent to the Palestinian passport, which makes their chances of moving elsewhere unmanageable and scarce, both for those whose residence was Palestine prior to the 1948 conflict and any of their descendants, who get the same treatment, if not fathered by a Lebanese citizen, the only case in which Lebanese citizenship would be granted to them.

After decades of marginalisation, two events brought some glimmer of hope in 2005: the opening of a PLO office, for the first time since 1982 (Czajka, 2008, p. 117); and the establishment of the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC). Unfortunately, in 2010 Hanafi and Long wrote:

> Over four years later, however, the LPDC appears to have made little progress on this front. The general dysfunction of the Lebanese state—which in these years has witnessed massive demonstrations and protests, a war with Israel, sectarian violence, a boycotted government, political infighting, a presidential vacuum, and two highly contentious cabinet formations—has prevented it from taking any initiative on the much needed reform of its policies. Instead, it has left the Palestinians to be fed by UNRWA and guarded by the army until such time as parliament—the only governmental body capable of licensing meaningful reform—sees fit to weigh in on the issue (Hanafi & Long, 2010, p. 156)

They continue prognosticating that in the foreseeable future the Lebanese State and overall situation would maintain the same patterns. Regrettably, this prediction fell short on the possibilities

for a bleaker situation. Over the years, presidential and governmental vacuums, infightings, and crises have multiplied, peaking between 2019-2020 with the socioeconomic crisis and the Beirut port blast.

For several years (approximately since 2014-2015), around one out of four people in Lebanon is a Syrian refugee, with an official estimate total of 1.5 million, 88% of which live in extreme poverty (UNHCR, 2021; 2022), out of total estimate of 5.4 million people. According to 2019 data, Lebanon hosts the highest ratio of refugees per capita in the planet, with 156 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants (McCarthy, 2019). As of 2022, UNRWA states an official estimate of 479,537 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon[30], 45% of which live in refugee camps. Added to the technical issues of counting refugee population come objections about refugees not declared as such, as some «prefer to take their chance in illegality and the informal economy rather than be enclosed in camps, others wandering for lack of official recognition of their refugee status» (Agier, 2002), because of legal impediments or other reasons, like some of the refugees of inhabiting "informal gatherings" across Lebanon (Ugland (Ed.), 2003).

However, the citizen – non-citizen divide began to blur in the social and economic fields after the events triggering the collapse of Lebanon (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.6.c.). The socioeconomic crisis, decades in the making, along with the incompetence of authorities and government officials, among which the 2020 Beirut Port blast can be counted, brought the country to a path of steep decline. The poverty rate doubled from 42% in 2019 to 82% in 2021, overlapping with 40% of extreme poverty (ESCWA, 2021).

Casas Sierra defined the components of the Lebanese "complex and multiple" identity as follows:

> 1. Community diversity.
>
> 2. The dynamics of isolation and rejection between them.
>
> 3. The role of leaders, which has exacerbated the differences in guaranteeing support and mechanisms for accessing/maintaining power.

[30] The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2022-2023 (authored by the Government of Lebanon, the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Lebanon, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the United Nations Development Programme) indicate 257,000 "Palestinian refugees". The reasons for this discrepancy between UN branches remain officially undisclosed

4. The role of the elites, the great Lebanese families that have developed dynamics of maintaining their socio-political-economic privileges rather than a search for the common good.

5. The interests of the great powers of the region and the world that have exacerbated on numerous occasions the differences and confrontations between communities for their own objectives and benefits.

6. The lack of a shared and motivating common project.

7. The process of expulsion of a large part of Lebanese society that, faced with the entrenched and cyclical conflict, has chosen to leave the country (Casas Sierra, 2013, p. 726)

From this account it can be concluded that Lebanese identity has been rather a means for instrumentalising difference (within Lebanese asserted identities; and beyond, in relation to ascribed outgroups) for the sake of an ulterior political project of latent social exclusion. As stated in the beginning of this epigraph, Lebanon is a good example of «the contradiction between the idea that each nation-sate can truly represent only one ethnos and the reality that all nation-states historically involve the amalgamation of many identities […] As these culturalisms compete for a piece of the nation (and of the resources of the state), they inevitably enter into the space of potential violence (Appadurai, 1996, p. 156)

Furthermore, the generalised "failed state" (Chomsky, 2006) behaviour of the Lebanese State can be «held accountable for the lack of security and for crumbling infrastructure […] entwined in the patronage networks of more powerful states, such as Syria, Saudi Arabia, France, the United States, and Iran) (Nucho, 2017, p. 129). The Lebanese State can barely hold its own territory under control, nor has the capability to impose accountability, considering every aspect related to the protection of its population, except for those in the highest position in the economic and political fields. The tendency to exploit the subaltern in its most vulnerable fields could be deemed as pathetic, in light of the decades-long relaxation of the authorities around circumstances like the Kafala system (Pande, 2013; Rak, 2021), the (vastly feminised) migrant domestic worker sponsorship, practically a system of modern day slavery; the blind eyes turned to systematic raping during and after the civil war (LAW, 2021), of which many of the god-praising self-righteous representatives in positions of authority today were responsible; apart from customary day-to-day practices stemmed for a seemingly

unwavering habitus, tending towards self-benefit in every regard, except for responsibility and accountability.

4.3.b.i. Administrative deprivation, foundation of exception

At the core of the exclusion of refugees from rights lies the deprivation of administrative rights, which acts as the foundation for a systematic exclusion. Following Arendt´s (1973 [1951], pp. 267-302) critique of universal rights, the abstract notion of "human being" collides with the absence of a frame of rights outside of specific states and the sphere of their constitutional governments. The notion of "inalienable rights", included in the UDHR, was rendered ineffectual, as loss of national rights means, in practice, loss of human rights. The human quality remains, but the lack of a political status renders the individual devoid of rights (Arendt, 1973 [1951], pp. 290-302).

Turning our attention to the refugee camp, we find a space configured as a territory where the rule of state law, rights and responsibilities is out of reach. However, the depiction of Agamben´s "state of exception" and "bare life" (Agamben, 1998; 2005) don not completely fit into the reality of the camps. Lebanon not being a party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees affects non-Palestinian refugees, since their situation is mediated by the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding (September 2003) signed by Lebanon and the UNHCR, for the sake of «effective protection of asylum seekers and refugees in Lebanon» (UNHCR, 2004), which excludes the receivers of aid of any other agency, that is, Palestinian refugees.

While the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015-2016 (December 15, 2015) stated «that Lebanon is neither a country of asylum, nor a final destination for refugees, let alone a country of resettlement» (Government of Lebanon & UN, 2015), the LCPR 2017-2020 (January 2017) still reaffirms its "old-new" fears by persevering in designating Syrians by "persons displaced from Syria", "displaced Syrians" or "persons registered as refugees by UNHCR" (Government of Lebanon & UN, 2017) avoiding branding them as fully-fledged refugees. This reflects the will of the Lebanese State to remodel the understanding of refugee policy and its role as a recipient of both refugees and refugee law (Fakhoury, 2021). Surprisingly to an extent, the terms used remain the same for the latest Crisis Response Plan for 2022-2023, speaking of "Syrians who have fled the conflict in Syria", "registered as refugees", but citing "Palestinian refugees".

While it is true that «Lebanon has signed a number of international human rights law instruments that constitutionally take precedence over national law, their principles are seldom practised in domestic courts» (Janmyr, 2017), it was as early as 1950 that Lebanese officials created the Central

Committee for Refugee Affairs, to cooperate with UNRWA «in defining the status of the Palestine refugees and the possibility of employing them in private sector businesses and enterprises».

In 1959, Decree 42 set up the Department of Palestine Refugee Affairs in Lebanon, stemming from the Ministry of Interior (Al-Natour, 1997). According to Decree No. 927, its tasks would be liaising with international relief agencies; receiving applications for passports; registering personal documents; processing applications for the reunion of dispersed families; as well as «siting the camps and undertaking necessary transactions for lease or purchase of the land» (Al-Natour, 1997), even if some exceptions exist regarding the last task, since Shatila, for example, was «secured by the same refugees that decided where to settle having found an empty spot of land not far from Beirut (Martin, 2012, p. 147), showing agency and initiative as early as 1948.

The creation of the Higher Authority for Palestinian Affairs in 1960, through Decree 3909 further addressed the presence of the Palestinian refugees (Al-Natour, 1997), but its configuration and the absence of Palestinian participation rather points to a biopolitics device than to a resolve aimed at orderly straightening out the refugee situation, as it was «responsible for gathering pertinent information on the Palestine problem in its political, military, economic and other dimensions and for studying all aspects of the Palestine Question, monitoring developments and drafting resolutions in response»

Despite these institutionalised attempts, the core legal element regarding the status of the Palestinians in Lebanon remains the same up to this day, «Lebanon does not accept responsibility for the refugees» (Turbi, 2002), in virtue of the aforementioned non-applicable clauses regarding international law, along with the still valid definition of "foreigner" as detailed in Law of July 1962 regulating the entry and stay of foreigners in Lebanon as well as their exit from this country, which in its first article states that «it is considered as a foreigner, within the framework of this law, any real person who is not of Lebanese nationality» (Parliament of Lebanon, 1962).

Far from being inconsequential, this means that no special category is set, apart from those resulting from the dichotomy national-foreigner, thus leaving refugees unprotected. Furthermore, the differentiation regarding Palestinians is affirmed and deepened with Order No. 319 of August 1962 regulating the status of foreign nationals in Lebanon, it specifically states in Article 1 a special category for «foreign nationals who do not hold identity papers from their country of origin and who reside in Lebanon pursuant to residence cards issued by the Direction de la Sûreté générale or to identity cards issued by the Direction générale de l'Administration des Affaires des réfugiés palestiniens au Liban» (Parliament of Lebanon, 1962). The principle of *Jus sanguini* of Lebanese

legislation sets the only exit for refugeeness on the marriage of the refugee woman to a Lebanese man, as only patrilineal ties can grant citizenship to foreigners´ ("special" or not) descendants.

The fact that the Internal Security Forces or the army do not enter the camps, derived from the different events triggered during the late sixties (*Vid. Supra*, 1.5.a. & 1.5.b.), when

> after the war just as before it, the Lebanese state formally recognized the relative autonomy of this and the other camps as Palestinian territory by tacitly agreeing, for example, to keep the Lebanese army or police outside the camps, except when Palestinian authorities failed to secure the interests of the Lebanese state (Schiocchet, 2014)

This implies that the state refuses to practice its monopoly on violence in specific places, which induces to think that doubtlessly these territories lack any law, regulation, or order. But far from reality, Agamben´s main principles concerning the "state of exception" falls short of describing the whole spectrum of reality in the camps. However, mechanisms of causal power operate within the camp, hybridizing (Bhabha, 1994; 2003; Grossberg, 1996) biopolitical devices with the vacuum of state-power. To a high extent, the causality of this situation stems from the projected advantageous proportion of confession-based distribution of administrative political power within the norm circles in Lebanon. In other words, the apprehension to demographic change by the inclusion of potential balance-breaking newcomers, reflected in the issue around *tawteen*.

4.3.b.ii. *Tawteen*

Tawteen[31], the naturalisation of the Palestinian population, is a strategically important element for the Lebanese State: for the internal Lebanese structural issue with identity, and for the external conflict with Israel, a country it is officially at war with. Besides, the Palestinians struggling to keep their identity and right of return reject *tawteen* too. But the term seems to have become polysemic (Meier, 2010), as it appears as a different concept, depending on the strategy of the collective using it.

[31] The term lends itself to ambivalence. It is derived from the noun "watan"/ "وطن", meaning specific "homeland" or "state" (Wehr, 1976, pp. 1079-1080) (different from "qawm"/ "قوم", denoting a wider ethnic "nation", such as the pan-Arab one (Wehr, 1976, p. 800)), but the verb "وطن" might mean "to reside", "to settle down", "to live permanently", or "to take root, become naturalised" (Wehr, 1976, p. 1079), which sets the grounds for the political usefulness of the polysemy of the word, pointed out by Meier (2010).

Ever since 1948, the Lebanese State´s stance on *tawteen* was configured around the first two elements stated. The first one involved the alleged correlation between accepting their naturalisation and the acceptance of Israel´s policy of expulsion of Palestinians, preventing the return to their land, a circumstance it claimed to be against. The second element, more pragmatic, entailed the confessional balance of the distribution of administrative state-power. The distribution of seats in the Lebanese Parliament would be disrupted with the inclusion of a number of Sunni Muslim Palestinians that differs, depending on the moment, the specific political party or group stating it, or the concrete interest of the discourse (De Bel-Air, 2012, pp. 12-13).

Tracing back the origin of this concern brings us to the Preamble of the 1926 Lebanese Constitution (amended September 21, 1990), Article I, «Lebanese territory is one for all Lebanese. Every Lebanese shall have the right to live in any part thereof and to enjoy the rule of law wherever he resides. There shall be no segregation of the people on the basis of any type of belonging, and no fragmentation, partition, or settlement of non-Lebanese in Lebanon» (Lebanese Parliament, 1926). It clearly establishes a restriction to settle in Lebanese soil, applied to any non-Lebanese person, while contradicting a previous provision specified in article B, «Lebanon is also a founding and active member of the United Nations Organization and abides by its covenants and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Government shall embody these principles in all fields and areas without exception» (Lebanese Parliament, 1926), having in mind the UDHR, in its fourteenth article declares «Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution», the statements appearing in the same page of the Constitution are at odds. This conflict sets the course of the Lebanese administration´s opaque stance towards the refugee issue up to this day. It is reinforced by the absence of a state-level legislation concerning the refugee matter, and mediated by the fear of the consequences of demographic imbalance, a possibly deliberate misinterpretation of the legal articulation and repercussions of international refugee regulation and the subrogation of the responsibility on transnational agencies.

UNRWA, since its establishment in 1949, advocated for the settlement of the refugees in Lebanon (and the rest of the states in the region), which kindled the fire of rejection by specific Lebanese norm circles, namely the Christian Maronite collective. They blamed the Palestinians for trying to establish their new homeland in Lebanese territory. The stigmatising became worse after the signing of the Cairo Agreement in 1969, at a time when pan-Arabism and pro-Western currents were polarising the Lebanese society.

Even if the (interested) perception of the Lebanese administration (and part of its population too) perceive granting refugees rights as opening the door to tawteen, permanent settlement and dramatic

change to the country, no disposition contained in the 1951 Convention or the UDHR grant these rights to the refugees. The 1951 Refugee Convention, in its 34th article proposes that «The Contracting states shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees» (UNHCR, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951,1967), likewise, the UDHR in its 14th article (nor any other article) forces the host state to grant permanent settlement rights to refugees.

Extraordinarily, foreigners who, residing in Lebanon for more than five consecutive years, and those who, according to the state, have provided exceptional services to the state, can be naturalised (Czajka, 2008, p. 92). It is perhaps in light of this apparent principle that, upon their arrival in 1948, some of the displaced Palestinians were treated differently:

> Naturalisation especially was made possible for some 30,000 Palestinian Christians, by a December 1949 decree allowing for the restitution of Lebanese nationality. Palestinians of Armenian and Lebanese descent (5% of the 130,000 registered refugees) benefitted from the measure. Yet later, well-to-do Palestinians property owners or Palestinians sharing kinship ties with Lebanese notables or Christian Palestinians could also be naturalised, alongside returned emigrants from Latin America, Africa and the rest of the Middle East. Naturalisation decrees demonstrate that Christians and persons of upper socio-economic status were more easily naturalised (Sfeir on Bel-Air, 2012)

A sectarian employment of naturalisation seemed to engender not much of a problem, as it appeared to be in accordance with the strategies of the norm circles in charge of social (in its political sphere) capital. In their eyes, granting any economic, civil, or political right seems inevitably merged with the threat of their resettlements, which has also triggered social panic (Czajka, 2008, p. 84), when attempts at enhancing any of the sphere of life regarding Palestinians have been carried out.

Tawteen became an important topic once the civil war was over in 1990. Seeking to stabilise the communitarian balance between the religious confessions, the rejection of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon was stated in the general principles of the Ta´ef Agreement (UN DPPA, 1989). The official stance of the Lebanese State regarding *tawteen* is the "support" of the Palestinians´ right of return and, consequently, Resolution 194 of the UNGA, at the same time declaring itself free from the responsibility of bearing with the consequences of Israel´s occupation of Palestine, relying on UNRWA´s role of assistance on the matter.

As Meier (2010, pp. 159-160) suggests, the different possible understandings of "*tawteen*" make it possible to reify the strategies of the various norm circles in Lebanon. Christian parties, seeing the

presence of Palestinians as a danger to territory integrity and a threat to the Lebanese identity, tend to project inflated numbers of Palestinian refugees, and understand *tawteen* as "naturalisation". The rest of the parties or coalitions tend to envision the issue as a communitarian matter, therefore a demographic issue, potentially harming the confessional balance. Although some are more inclined to support granting the Palestinians civil rights, they too are concerned about the possibility of having a destabilising new input into the "electoral or clientelist base". As a result, the dissociation of the right of return and the issue of rights (De Bel-Air, 2012, p. 15) was normalised in the debate around *tawteen*, apparently masking the structural weakness of the foundation of the Lebanese state, as a national administrative unit with a demography issue.

However, Palestinian refugees have also explicitly refused to be permanently settled. An example of this is the failed rehousing scheme approved by the Minister of the Displaced in 1976, aimed at the survivors of the siege of Tel al-Za´atar, who feared that taking residence permanently in the new allotment would mean refusing their right of return (Wadie, 2001, p. 140)[32]. What they most probably would never refuse taking though (Ghandour, 2017), that is, civil and employment rights for instance, does not seem to be distinguishable for Lebanese authorities.

4.3.c. International law

International law is important when dealing with groups of people who are no more citizens of a state. Deprived of rights and obligations and sentenced to walk the fine line of situational-based acceptance of transnational principles applied to non-citizens of a state, international law is supposed to provide a frame of protection. The very existence of this transnational legal framework and its difficult fitting under the different state-jurisdictions indicate the vagueness of the articulation of rights and the importance of the voids in the legal frameworks of the states.

Coming back to Schmitt´s perspective, he regards international law as constituted by land appropriation (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 80-83). This process of appropriation was carried out through the *nomos*, a twofold movement of division and distribution of the land: first internally, as the establishment of ownership within the appropriating group; second, as the confrontation of this group with other groups appropriating land, either acquitting land considered free (no owner recognised) or by "extracting" the land from an owner. Both movements settle the grounds for subsequent law, as well as the distinction between public and private law (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 45-46).

[32]Said, Wadie. *The Obligations of Host Countries under International Law: The Case of Lebanon*. p. 140 on Aruri, Naseer (ed.) (2001). *Palestinian refugees: the right of return*. London: Pluto Press.

He considers this process of land allocation as the (internal and external) constitutive legal process, present in the outset of every settled people, nation, state, or empire; the «reproductive root in the normative order of history» (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 48). Therefore, it was the nomos, the land appropriation by specific agents (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 86-138), what lies within the origin of the demarcation and distribution of land between modern states, some of which, like the land partition of the Middle East (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.2.a.), not so distant in time.

Turning our attention to the application of international law to the case of the Palestinians implies considering specific texts, of which we will expose the most pertinent, without losing sight of how they apply to the issue at hand.

4.3.c.i. Conventions, treaties, and protocols

As a first step in the analysis of the legal frames applicable to the situation of the Palestinians in Lebanon, it is pertinent to notice the specific laws and regulations involved[33]. Both the instances the Lebanese state is a member of and the ones it does not endorse hold meaning and consequences. These oftentimes consist of a limited capability to deploy agency, when legal texts and regulations are not observed; and a restricted sense of liberty, due to the lack of protection against certain forms of coercion and discrimination. Therefore, the specificities will be indicated in the following chronological listing. As the significance of the conventions related to refugees and statelessness are of special significance, we will reserve those for the next epigraph.

International Labour Organisation

Established in 1919, it has Lebanon as a member state. As a matter of fact, the regional office for the Arab states is located in Beirut, as well as the "Decent Work Technical Support Teams" subregional office. The ILO «brings together governments, employers and workers […] to set labour standards, develop policies and devise programmes promoting decent work for all women and men» (ILO, 2022). Member states are assumed to comply the following fundamental conventions of the ILO:

- Forced Labour Convention. The Lebanese government ratified this convention of 1930 in 1977.

[33] For a complete list of conventions related to Lebanon, visit: https://en.unesco.org/countries/lebanon/conventions.

- Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention. Lebanon did not endorse this 1948 Convention, but it did ratify the related Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention of 1949, in 1977.
- Convention concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value. Adopted in 1951, ratified by Lebanon in 1977.
- Abolition of Forced Labour Convention. Adopted in 1957, the Lebanese State ratified it in 1977.
- Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention. Adopted in 1958, Lebanon ratified it in 1977.
- Minimum Age Convention. Adopted in 1973, Lebanon ratified it in 2003.
- Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention. Adopted in 1999, the Lebanese State ratified it in 2001.

The regulations involved are not observed in the Republic of Lebanon. No freedom of association is granted to Palestinians; no equality is guaranteed regarding employment and occupation; and remuneration, in those jobs where Palestinians are illegally accepted, is lower, for instance. All of this results in a limited capability to earn an income in a dignified way.

Charter of the United Nations

The Lebanese Republic is one of the signatories of the founding document of the United Nations of 1945. Amended in 1963, 1965, and 1973, the Charter is «an instrument of international law, and UN Member States are bound by it» (UN, 2022). Despite that, several of the conventions, such as the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, have not been signed.

Geneva Conventions

Lebanon is a signatory of all four treaties and three protocols (1949, 1977, and 2005), that aim at regulating «the conduct or armed conflict and seeks to limit its effects», as well as protecting «people not taking part in hostilities and those who are no longer doing so» (ICRC, 2022).

Having in mind the example of the bombardment and destruction of Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in 2017, the content of the Geneva Conventions has been blatantly violated (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.6.b.).

Convention on the Political Rights of Women

Signed in 1952 in the United Nations General Assembly, adopted in 1953, Lebanon ratified it in 1956, it addresses the desire to «to equalize the status of men and women in the enjoyment and exercise of political rights, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights» (UNGA, 1953).

Women seem to be still trapped in a patriarchal system where it is still former warlords in charge of implementing measures for the effective equality of men and women. Not even female members of Parliament seem to be safe from its consequences, judging from blatant cases of harassment (Jabbour & Elzir, 2022; The New Arab, 2022), even after having passed Law No. 205, a law HRW denounced as lacking in prevention measures, monitoring, and labour law reforms (HRW, 2021). Worse is to be expected for subaltern, more vulnerable women, a point already proven during the civil war (LAW, 2021).

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1965 and affective as of 1969. Article 20.2 affirms that a «reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of this Convention shall not be permitted, nor shall a reservation the effect of which would inhibit the operation of any of the bodies established by this Convention be allowed». Despite having signed it, the Lebanese State (and other states) does not consider itself bound by Article 22, which states:

> Any dispute between two or more States Parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by negociation [sic] or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention, shall, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to another mode of settlement (UNGA, 1965)

Discrimination against Palestinians, on the grounds of ethnic difference is imprinted in Lebanese law (*Vid*. *Infra*, 4.3.c.ii.). Not only Palestinians, people from other origins are frequently, legally and socially, discriminated (Shebaya, 2017).

Convention against Discrimination in Education

Adopted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in 1960, ratified by the Lebanese State in 1964. The text of the convention seeks to tackle «any distinction, exclusion, limitation or preference which, being based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic condition or birth, has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing equality of treatment in education» (UNESCO, 1960). The Lebanese do allow Palestinians to enrol in educational institutions, but discrimination comes in a different shape (*Vid. Infra*, 4.3.c.ii.).

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Signed in the United Nations General Assembly in 1966, Lebanon ratified it in 1972. The covenant states that

> in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his [his] civil and political rights, as well as his [sic] economic, social and cultural rights (UNGA, 1966)

It points out the duty of individuals towards other individuals and the community they belong to, as well as their responsibility of observing the rights declared in the covenant. However, the agency of Palestinians in Lebanon is seriously limited when it comes to exercising their civil and political rights. Apart from the right to work, owning properties (including housing) and creating organisations is banned for them (Sewell, 2021).

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966, the Lebanese State ratified it in 1972. Along the same lines as the ICCPR, it declares that, if the ideal of "free human being" is to be achieved, the economic, social, and cultural rights contained within the covenant must be observed and promoted (UNGA, 1966). A similar account as the previous covenant arises in this case. Deprived, by law, of several rights, this covenant is dead paper.

Convention against Torture

Signed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1984, the Committee Against Torture (effective as of 1987), an international body of independent experts, is tasked with monitoring the implementations of the dispositions of the convention.

The text, owing to «article 5 of the universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both of which provide that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment», aspires to «to make more effective the struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment» (UNGA, 1984).

Lebanon ratified it in 2000, along with its Optional Protocols in 2000 and 2008. The Lebanese State is also one of the subjects of investigation by the CAT, initiated in 2014, with the release of an initial report (CAT, 2017) in 2016 (reissued in 2017 for technical reasons). Additionally, Legal Action Worldwide non-profit organisation published in 2021 a report (LAW, 2021) on gendered violence during the civil war of 1975-1990. These need to be taken in account under the light of the General Amnesty Law No. 84/94 issued by the Lebanese government, granting amnesty for crimes committed before 28 March 1991, and effectively freeing of responsibility, among others, for crimes committed against civilians. The vulnerability of Palestinians concerning this issue adds a degree of coercion, one which has a historical precedents.

Convention Against Corruption

Signed by the United Nations General Assembly in 2003, the Lebanese government ratified it in 2009. The UNCAC declares the concern «about the seriousness of problems and threats posed by corruption to the stability and security of societies, undermining the institutions and values of democracy, ethical values and justice and jeopardizing sustainable development and the rule of law», for which it requests addressing

> the criminalization of bribery of officials of public international organizations, including the United Nations, and related issues, taking into account questions of privileges and immunities, as well as of jurisdiction and the role of international organizations, by, inter alia, making recommendations regarding appropriate action in that regard (UNGA, 2004)

The recurrent political and electoral deadlocks are practically engraved in the style of the Lebanese State. Clientelist networks, grounded on the sectarian-based system of distribution of political power, entail the demotion of matters concerning rights and measures, with the ones involving the excluded in the last position (Coats, 2020).

Convention on the Rights of the Child

Signed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1989, not signed by the Lebanese State, the CRC proclaims the need of addressing the civil, political, economic, social, health, and cultural rights of children, since

> the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children, should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community (UNGA, 1989)

Falling under the category of "guests", the children of Palestinians in Lebanon do not enjoy the rights contained in this convention. Furthermore, not even full-fledged Lebanese citizens enjoy their rights, particularly after the economic meltdown of the state (UNICEF, 2022), affecting their odds.

Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development

An initiative signed in 2006 signed by 113 states, among which Lebanon is included, and addressed in the UN-Secretary General Report of 2009 (UNGA, 2009). It assumes the task of addressing the undermining of development and aid effectiveness by armed violence. The Core Group states that armed «violence destroys lives and livelihoods, breeds insecurity, fear and terror, and has a profoundly negative impact on human development. Whether in situations of conflict or crime, it imposes enormous costs on states, communities and individuals» (Core Group, 2006). For this reason, it commits to advocating, measuring, and programming the content of the declaration.

Having in mind the actual surge of violence all over the Lebanese territory, it seems the dispositions contained in this declaration are being neglected. This acts as an added difficulty to the development of agency of Palestinians, as well as the population at large (Vohra, 2021).

4.3.c.ii. Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its (un)observation by the Lebanese State

After the period of the world wars, and the production of vulnerable masses of the refugees, the League of Nations (later renamed United Nations) built the basic set of laws applicable to every human being. The horrors witnessed in the West seemed to impel the pledge to protect those left vulnerable in situations of turmoil, civil war, or unrest. However, the nature of this transnational charter seems to conflict with state laws. The Lebanese Constitution declares that the Lebanese State «is a founding active member of the United Nations Organization, committed to its Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNGA, 1948). The state embodies these principles in all sectors and scopes without exception». Therefore, the UDHR constitutes a reasonable background for contrasting different law spheres.

Following Arendt´s thought (1973 [1951]), it is nowadays, again, conspicuous that an individual can be rendered defenceless once they are not part of a nation-state, once they are forced to inadvertently leave. In this sense, the refugee is the paradigmatic figure that casts serious doubts about «the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of the members of the human family» (UNGA, 1948), the ambition of a supranational ethical order seems to have been discontinued, and the pretension of establishing a "natural order" from which no human being can be subtracted from, fails when contested both with the implicit interests of states, *realpolitik* and the uncertainty of the territorial border, a hiatus between the orders of different states. Below we will explore the apparent inconsistencies between international and Lebanese state law, regarding to the constrains actively or passively applied to the Palestinian refugees, often related to identity ascription.

Equality before the law. UDHR Article 7

All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination

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Equality before the law is one of the basic tenets of the UDHR. However, the Republic of Lebanon was born with a fundamental contradiction in its core, its two founding elements: the Constitution (1926) and the National Pact of 1943[34]. These enclose an intrinsic inconsistency regarding equality.

The Lebanese Constitution states some classical Western principles in its preamble, which, even after its amendment in 1990 after the end of the Civil War, makes sense for a text based on the French Magna Carta of 1875 (Corm, 2006) and promulgated in 1926, still under the French Mandate. In article B, it states that Lebanon, being one of the founding and active members of the UN,

> abides by its covenants and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Government shall embody these principles in all fields and areas without exception

The text proceeds with the following: «Lebanon is a parliamentary democratic republic based on respect for public liberties, especially the freedom of opinion and belief, and respect for social justice and equality of rights and duties among all citizens without discrimination», if put side to side with the previous article, a qualitative shift can be acknowledged between the subject of rights, while article B proclaims the abiding of the principles of the UDHR, which presupposes having in mind "all members of the human family", the next article sets "all citizens without discrimination" as the subjects of "public liberties, social justice and equality of rights and duties".

The next article adds yet another variable, stating that «The people are the source of authority and sovereignty; they shall exercise these powers through the constitutional institutions». Introducing the term "people", under the light of Agamben´s though (Agamben, 1998, pp. 144-153), as an uncertain addition to the semantics results in a trustworthy reflection of reality in Lebanon. The Constitution, in Article C of the preamble sets that

> Lebanon is a democratic parliamentary republic based upon the respect of public freedoms, freedom of opinion and freedom of belief; and of social justice and equality in rights and duties among all citizens, without distinction or preference

While Article 7 states that

[34] The pact was an unwritten agreement between the Maronite Christian and Shi´a and Sunna Muslim representatives high in the socioeconomic field. The purpose of the agreement consisted in settling political independence from the State of France; and the establishment of quotas of representation in the state´s administrative institutions, as well as the government and Parliament.

> All Lebanese are equal before the law. They equally enjoy civil and political rights, and assume obligations and public duties without any distinction among them

Equality of all citizens in the civil, political and judicial spheres is straightforward if these two articles are taken on their own. Nevertheless, Article 9 introduces «the obligations of glorifying God, the Most High, the State respects all religions and creeds […] also guarantees the respect of the system of personal status and religious interests of the people, regardless of their different creeds», implicitly setting boundaries to the freedom and equality upheld before. In addition, a similar fact can be understood from the convergence of the National Pact and Article 95, which declares

> The Chamber of Deputies, elected on the basis of half Moslems and half Christians, must take the appropriate measures to eliminate political sectarianism, according to an interim plan, and the formation of a National Council under the presidency of the President of the Republic consisting, in addition to the President of the Chamber of Deputies and the Prime Minister, political, intellectual and social notables

From its content, the article sets the principles for nullifying the political effects of sectarianism, but at the same time establishes the mechanisms for it through the National Council per the Presidency of the Republic, the Presidency of the Chamber and the Prime Minister, which are set to be named among specific confession belonging. Concurrently, the National Pact, an informal verbal arrangement established to «supplement and correct the constitution concerning essential questions of the country´s identity» (Traboulsi, 2012, p. 111), arranges the division of political power by the three main confessions in the country: the position of the President of the Lebanese Republic must be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shiite Muslim.

This separation was developed under French Mandate and counsel (afterwards replaced by the USA), allegedly due to the perceived need of keeping at bay imbalances between confessions and guaranteeing a certain egalitarian distribution of power, devised by the proportions ensued by the last official census, dated 1932 (Traboulsi, 2012, p. 269). Even though afterwards the original proportions were altered, the original problem remained: on one hand, the real demographic proportion was not reflected in the political quotas; in addition, the constrained static proportion of representatives would repeatedly cause stagnation in the political area, neglecting various field of the administration, with various political agents *de facto* settling down in long-term positions. The confluence of the precepts

of the Constitution and the National Pact leaves the balance of the power of the confessional groups in the hands of the confessional groups themselves, personified in the immovable positions of the leading figures of the higher institutionalised positions. These shaped public policy in attention to the localist principles that, eventually, led to the mechanisms of exclusion based on ethnic and social identity.

The right of freedom of movement. UDHR Article 13

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1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country

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According to the Law of 10 July 1962 Regulating the Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Lebanon and their Exit from the Country, «Foreigners can only enter Lebanon if they pass through one of the General Security posts, on the condition, however, that they have the regulatory documents and visas, as well as a passport on which is affixed a transit or stay by a representative of Lebanon abroad, or by an authority responsible for the interests of Lebanese abroad, or by General Security» (Parliament of Lebanon, 1962).

Upon the arrival of the Palestinian displaced masses in 1948, the Lebanese State «agreed to regulate the Palestinian presence in Lebanon as a special case separate from that of other foreign communities in the country» (Al-Natour, 1997), considering the sudden events, both the displaced and the host country took an initial comfort in thinking the situation was only temporary.

Through Order No. 319 of 2 August 1962, the Lebanese government added the following specification: «Foreign nationals who do not hold identity papers from their country of origin and who reside in Lebanon pursuant to residence cards issued by the Direction de la Sûreté générale or to identity cards issued by the Direction générale de l'Administration des Affaires des réfugiés palestiniens au Liban» (Parliament of Lebanon, 1962). The situation caused by these provisions was suspended during the period of validity of the Cairo Agreement in 1969, which granted Palestinian refugees a set of rights and responsibilities. In any case, after the repeal of the Agreement in 1987,

Palestinian refugees were left exposed to the vulnerabilities created by their state of uncertainty, namely regarding residency, labelled as "foreigners" for whom legislation concerning residency does not apply.

In regard to freedom of movement, the Ministry of Interior approved, in 1995, Decree No. 478, requiring that «every Palestinian refugee who came to Lebanon in 1948 and who wishes to leave it, must obtain an exit and return visa from the Sûreté Générale, and in exchange for the payment of fees». This affected every registered Palestinian refugee, especially the ones outside the country the moment the decree was implemented, which meant that around 100,000 Palestinians were evicted and left «not only stateless but also homeless» (Al-Natour, 1997). Four years later, in 1999, the Decree was annulled, thus facilitating the unification of families (UNHCR, 2004).

The right to own property. UDHR Article 17

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1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property

Closely related to the previous issue comes the situation caused by the restrictions in property ownership. Article F of the Preamble to the Lebanese Constitution guarantees free market and individual initiative: «The economic system is free, guaranteeing individual initiative and private ownership», and even if article 15 states that «The ownership is protected by the law. Ownership of any one cannot be expropriated except for reasons of public utility under the conditions prescribed by the law and upon fair compensation to him».

Decree No. 11614 of January 4, 1969, about the Acquisition of Real-Estate Rights by Foreigners in Lebanon, amended by law 296/2001 of April 3 2001, contradicts the constitutional disposition and provides the following: «No non-Lebanese person, whether natural or legal, and no Lebanese person deemed by this law as foreigner, shall be allowed to acquire, by contract or any other legal act, any real estate right on Lebanese territory or any other of the real rights specified by the present law, before obtaining a prior authorization issued by the Council of Ministers upon motion of the Minister of Finance. No exceptions shall be made to this law, unless in specific situations explicitly provided

for by this law or in a specific text. All forms of real estate rights are forbidden to any person who is not holding a nationality of a recognized state, or any person in general – should the ownership be nonconforming to the provisions of the Constitution in terms of rejecting permanent settlement (Tawteen)» (LPDC, 2020).

Thus, facing the futility of trying to own real estate, be it in the form of a commercial office or a house, refugees are left to deal with the good will of the Lebanese citizens. These, out of benevolence, might provide them mediation, but the agreement is personal, contrary to law, and therefore the possibility exists that it can be considered an illegal transaction. The uncertainty adds to the lack of security, both mental and physical, of not being able to rely on having a dignified life outside the refugee camps, thus leaving them with «little to no choice but to remain in the camps and gatherings» (AI, 2007), where all their rights are de facto discontinued. The 2003 "Property Ownership" law further deepens the disallowance of owning property for Palestinians, dispossessing them of assets they might have owned before 2001. Before this date, bound by Decree 11614 of January 1969,

Although it is not clear what the contingency might be relating to intellectual property, Lebanon signed the Universal Copyright Convention. Its first Protocol assimilates stateless persons and refugees with nationals, regarding the resolutions included about the « protection of the rights of authors and other copyright proprietors in literary, scientific and artistic works, including writings, musical, dramatic and cinematographic works, and paintings, engravings and sculpture» (UNGA, 1952).

The right to form associations. UDHR Article 20

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1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association

Article 13 of the Lebanese Constitution: «The freedom of opinion, expression through speech and writing, the freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly, and the freedom of association, are all guaranteed within the scope of the law». The Ministry of Interior deals with the formation of associations, according to Decree 4082. It is contingent on the discretion of the state to determine what the "scope of the law" refers to, therefore leaving ample room for the interpretation of law in a restrictive manner, along the lines of the previous hindering principles.

The right to work. UDHR Article 23

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1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.

3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.

4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests

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On account of Palestinian refugees being considered as "foreign nationals" by the Lebanese authorities, regarding labour we must pay attention to Decree No. 17561 of September 1964 regulating the work of foreigners (ILO, 1964). Prior legislation concerning employment of foreign nationals, in Article 25 of the already mentioned Order 319 of August 1962, stated that «no foreign national who is not an artist may work or practise a profession in Lebanon if he or she does not have a permit issued by the Ministère du Travail et des Affaires Sociales in accordance with the laws and regulations in effect» (Parliament of Lebanon, 1962). The same principle is mirrored in Decree No. 17561 of September 1964, Article 2, and a key component introduced in its Article 1, introducing the "principle of reciprocity", «whereby the laws pertaining to the treatment of Lebanese nationals in the expatriate's country of origin dictate the treatment he or she receives in Lebanon» (Al-Natour, 1997).

Palestinian are left in a limbo-like legal space concerning their right to work due to the impossibility of the principle of reciprocity to be accomplished, as a result of statelessness, the nonexistence of a Palestinian State as a legal frame of reference. From this circumstance can be deduced that Palestinians are excluded from the legal space of workforce in Lebanon and, furthermore, treated in a more restrictive manner if compared to individual from any other nationality, «while the Lebanese government has recognized the PLO as a political entity and granted it certain diplomatic

privileges at the level of the Arab League, they have not attached to these privileges the condition of reciprocal treatment for the Palestinian in the legal sense» (Al-Natour, 1997).

Concerning specific individual regulation, in virtue of the aforementioned Law Regulating the Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Lebanon and their Exit from the Country July 2 1962, just as any other foreigner, refugees are subject to the regulation established in Decree No. 1756 September 18 1964, establishing the requirement of a work permit issued by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, by assuring that: «He [sic] is a specialist or an expert who cannot be replaced by a Lebanese citizen; He has been residing in Lebanon before January 1st, 1954, and has been working in an institution for a period not less than 9 consecutive months; He is married to a Lebanese citizen or born to a Lebanese mother (article 8)».

Not only Lebanese legislation relating to work does not address the situation of the refugees, but it also discriminates Palestinians, considering the tenet of reciprocity, by which foreigners are allowed to work in certain professions as long as their country extends reciprocal treatment to Lebanese workers, a condition not applicable to Palestinian workers due to the occupation of their land, and the *de facto* inability of Lebanese nationals to step on Israeli administered soil.

Refugees cannot apply to up to seventy professions, regulated by special legal clauses, syndicates and associations. The same principle observed in Decree No. 1756 applies to the creation of businesses, preserving the interest of the nationals means in practice that a foreign business permit is hardly ever granted to Palestinians. Till 1997, Palestinians were exempt from the requisite of the work permit on two work environments, seasonal workers in the agricultural sector and casual labour in retail enterprises. After having cracked down on them throughout 2019-2020, sparking protests, the government decided to lift the ban on Palestinians. Probably not because of solidarity, but because of the flight of Lebanese professionals with enough economic, cultural and social capital, as to leave Lebanon in search of better opportunities; the economic and labour situation was perceived as desolate. As of mid-2022, the measure aimed at opening job positions to Palestinians had been halted.

The right of Health Care. UDHR Article 25

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1. Everyone has the right to a standard living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection

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The aftereffect of the deprivation and difficulties disclosed in the previous sections drives masses of refugees and dispossessed to live in the camps. The ones that cannot legally own their own house live door to door with the ones that cannot afford one, stuck in a country that will not acknowledge their status, residency or right to work either face the risky path to Europe in a dreadful manner or stay in the abject conditions of the camps or gatherings, which most of the time offer low health standards in overcrowded spaces and poor housing conditions.

Access to Lebanese health services is forbidden to Palestinians, thus leaving UNRWA services as the only choice. Externally funded as UNRWA services are, increasing budget cuts affect the services provided and the potential health care providers present in the camp, compelling families to resort to the private sector and facing situations that, due to the high costs, they cannot always afford.

The right of Education. UDHR Article 26

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1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children

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Regarding education, the Constitution states in Article 10 «Education is free so long as it does not disturb the public order, does not violate the morals, and does not touch the dignity of any religion or creed. The rights of communities to establish their own private schools cannot be violated, provided that they comply with the general requirements laid down by the state with respect to public education».

Furthermore, Lebanese Decree No. 686 of March 16 1998 (amending Article 49 of Decree No. 134/59), establishes «Education shall be free and compulsory in the initial primary stage and is a right of every Lebanese person of primary school age. The conditions for such free compulsory education shall be determined by a decree adopted by the Council of Ministers, as shall its regulation».

Palestinian are accepted in government schools and the Lebanese (public) University, although with restrictions. For example, secondary schools reserved 10% of the places for foreign nationals, including Palestinians (De Bel-Air, 2012, p. 17). This contravenes the 1989 Convention of the Rights of the Child, to which Lebanon became a party in 1991, the Lebanese government ignores children under its jurisdiction regarding Article 28, as it does not «recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular: (a) Make primary education compulsory and available free to all» (UNGA, 1989).

Having in mind the obstacles entailed in previously exposed fields, the chance of having an education for the future generations are reduced to the UNRWA programmes, and private education for those with enough economic capital, which affects the ratio of drop-out at relatively early ages. At any rate, the inability of accessing a job requiring a degree renders the problem worthless of consideration for people in dire need of any economical income.

4.3.c.iii. Refugee and statelessness protection

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 and Protocol of 1967

The United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees sets the one and only valid legal description of a "refugee", along with the conditions and circumstances necessary for their determination. A refugee is any person who

> owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (UNHCR, 1951,1967)

Even if it´s not defined in the text, persecution sets one of the core elements of the preliminary legal identity of the refugee. Nonetheless, Qualification Directive Article 9(2) of the Council of the European Union states that acts committed by both state or non-state actors qualify as persecution, among them: acts of physical or mental violence; legal, administrative, police and/or judicial measures implemented in a discriminatory manner; disproportionate prosecution or punishment; etc. As for the fear being well-founded, it is considered to be an objective standard, mostly owing to persecution faced in the past.

The original conception of the refugee was based upon the individual victim, subsequently, the 1951 text was not enough for the eventual build-up of the events. Originally designed to react to the situation derived from the aftermath of the Second World War, the content was restricted to the people and circumstances happening before the first of January 1951 in Europe.

This was not coincidental. As Krause (2021) warns, it is important to keep in mind the circumstances and colonial principles contained within the process of the development of the Convention, as well as its consequences in the present-day global refugee regime, and the production

of knowledge associated to it. The Eurocentric rationale, and tendency to marginalise the claims and demands of states "peripheral" to the most powerful states at the UN (Great Britain, France, and the USA) subdued widening the scope of the frame to a global scale. The 1967 Protocol dismissed the spatial and temporal restraints. However, other frames were implemented in regions where states still felt ostracised by an ethnocentric bias (Abuya, Krause, & Mayblin, 2021). On another note, the classification of certain type of community as a group of refugees breaks the legal tradition, according to which the refugee status cannot be granted to collectives. This is a procedure that UNHCR puts into practice nowadays, granting *de facto* instead of *de jure* refugee status.

Regarding its application to the Palestinian refugees, in principle, due to UNRWA having been established before the signing of the 1951 Convention, because of the disposition of the international urge, the Palestinians were excluded from being considered under the protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to avoid duplicities, technical, and bureaucratic issues.

In any case, Lebanon is not a signatory party of the Refugee Convention, despite the presence and operation of the United Nations (among other branches, UNHCR and UNRWA) in its territory, ruled under an *ad hoc* agreement for the very purpose of tending the pressing matters of the refugees, as well as avoiding the juridical inclusion of the term "refugee". But *de facto*, they are ascribed as refugees by the UN agencies, which is why some accounts (Halabi, 2004) apparently assume the state-sanctioned refugee status.

Nevertheless, the 1951 Convention refers to a fundamental right included in the UDHR, of which Lebanon is one of the original signatories. It is in fact related to the development of article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, acknowledging that

> 1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.
>
> 2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations (UNGA, 1948)

For its part concerning the refugee issue, Lebanon has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, despite the existence a Department of Political and Refugee Affairs (formerly known as Department of Palestinian Refugee Affairs, created by presidential Decree 42-1959; preceded by the Central Committee for Refugee Affairs, created in 1950) to administer the Palestinian presence in Lebanon.

The only legal singularities applied to Palestinian refugees are the types like the one banning foreign nationals from owning any real estate (Law No. 296 of 2001), and even if it would seem like the government would be opening up to this collective, allowing them to work in certain previously forbidden professions (involving construction, electricity and sales, Resolution No. 1/19, February 2013), it is questionable that the improvement of the refugees´ situation is one of the concerns.

Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons of 1954

With the aim of protecting stateless individuals and considering «that only those stateless persons who are also refugees are covered by the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, and that there are many stateless persons who are not covered by that Convention» (UNGA, 1954), further regulation for the improvement of the status of stateless persons was implemented. Lebanon was logically not a signatory of the convention.

Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness of 1961

In order to complement the 1954 Convention, it focuses on completing the framework for the addressing of statelessness. The first Article, clearly contravening Lebanese State policy, closes the doors to its ratification: «A Contracting State shall grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless» (UNGA, 1961).

LAS (League of Arab States) Protocol on the Treatment of Palestinian Refugees of 1965

The Council of Foreign Ministers of the member states of the Arab League agreed, in the 11th of September of 1965, the text of the "Casablanca Protocol". According to it, Palestinians residing in their territories would be granted the right to employment, in terms equal to its citizens; the right to leave and return; the right to enter and leave other Arab states, for a permitted period and stated purposes; the right to be issued valid travel documents; and the right to receive the same treatment, regarding visa and residency applications, to the bearers of these documents (League of Arab States, 1965).

Declaration on the Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Arab World of 1992

Under the sponsorship of the UNHC, the Group of Arab Experts agreed this text in the Fourth Arab Seminar on "Asylum and Refugee Law in the Arab World" held in Cairo, the 19th of November of 1992. The document stated the hardships endured by refugees and displaced people, recalling the "humanitarian principles deeply rooted in Islamic Arab traditions and values.

It acknowledged the need for the implementation of Resolutions 194 (UNGA, 1948), 181 (UNGA, 1947) and 3236 (UNGA, 1974), requiring the right of return or compensation of the Palestinian refugees, and establishment of an independent state. Recalling the 1951 Convention, as well as the OAU Convention governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU, 1974), and the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (1984), it appealed for national authorities to ensure the respect for the principles of human rights, international humanitarian law, and international refugee law, promoting them via education and dissemination (Group of Arab Experts, 1992).

The Arab Convention on Regulating the Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries of 1994

Adopted, but not ratified, by the League of Arab States, the text recalls the UDHR (UNGA, 1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UNGA, 1966), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UNGA, 1966), the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR, 1951,1967), and the Declaration on the Protection of Refugees and Displaced People (Group of Arab Experts, 1992). The document states the definition of refugee:

> Any person who is outside the country of his nationality or outside his habitual place of residence in case of not having a nationality and owing to well-grounded fear of being persecuted on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of or return to such country.
>
> Any person who unwillingly takes refuge in a country other than his country of origin or his habitual place of residence because of sustained aggression against, occupation and foreign domination of such country or because of the occurrence of natural disasters or grave events resulting in major disruption of public order in the whole country or any part thereof

It additionally establishes the conditions under which the condition of refugee shall not be applied, the need to refrain from discrimination, the principle of non-refoulement, and obligations of the refugee (League of Arab States, 1994).

Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration of 2016

In order to assess the situation and issues concerning global migration and refugees, the UNGA established, in the New York Declaration, a cooperative and "Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework", with 23 objectives, commitments, and actions, for sharing the responsibility of the response to migrant crises (UNGA, 2016).

Global Compact on Refugees of 2018

Recalling the resolution of the New York Declaration (UNGA, 2016), the UNGA affirmed the resolution (UNGA, 2018a) to establish a framework, devising designs for state and non-state actors involved in the transformation of "the lives of refugees and host communities", with four main objectives: «ease pressures on the host countries; enhance refugee-reliance; expand access to third-country solutions; and support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity» (UNGA, 2018b).

4.3.d. Humanitarian government

As Gatrell (2013, p. 129), among other historians observe, «the plight of Palestinian refugees was portrayed from the outset in terms of humanitarian disaster», disenfranchised from the history of colonisation and violence that ensued the raise of Zionism. The grounds for this can be directly associated to the 1917 Balfour Declaration, by which British Foreign Secretary Lord Arthur James Balfour approved «the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people», in spite of it stating that «nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine» (Jeffries, 1967).

The Otherness of Palestinians in Lebanon (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.2.b.i.) came in a cluster of meaning-laden conditions: confined spatially to the camps, considered derelict, ascribed socially as refugees but legally rejected as such, and made to survive on the basis of rations. Refugee camps came, on one hand,

> as part of the machinery of dismemberment and dispersion, separating them from each other and making them easier to control. At the same time, the camps offered rent-free housing and minimal services (garbage collection, water, health care, education) […] whilst the camps made it easier for the authorities to control the refugees, they also made possible the continuation of Palestinian village relationships and values. They became foci both of oppression and of Palestinianism (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 112)

On the other hand, the reclusiveness inherent to the refugee camp made it easy for humanitarian intervention. The aforementioned conditions, a «series of delinkages—temporal, spatial, legal, administrative, and policy—have been pivotal in constructing Palestinian refugees as objects of intervention and analysis (Peteet, 2005, p. 19). This "body politic", as the dimension linked to institutional and legal treatment, resembles what Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1987, p. 24) metaphorically compare to the human body, depicting an "inside" and an "outside": when the social order is perceived to be threatened, the "inside" of the body politic is considered the good (rather, a "hypergood"), vulnerable, endangered by the "outside" (the displaced, refugees, undesirables), composed of what endangers its stability and therefore needs to be purged.

4.3.d.i. Insides, outsides, Otherness and exclusion

Along similar lines, Agamben´s thought (1998; 2005) about the reinstating of natural life as a key factor for policy-making reveals biopolitics as a useful framework for the explanation of how human rights are introduced as a separation of the rights of the citizen, and used as a way of protecting (and simultaneously dislodging) those who have been expelled from the logic of the nation-state, and inserted in a humanitarian system in extra-territorial spaces.

Agier sees what the calls "humanitarian government", a global mechanism of control over these extra-territorial spaces, "out-places" in his terminology, constituted in the logic of modernity with a "functional organic solidarity" (Durkheim, 1893/2013, pp. 101-102, 57-84):

> Humanitarian intervention borders on policing. There is no care without control. Today, NGOs and all those working for humanitarian intervention find themselves caught in a process that is seemingly pragmatic, but far too powerful for humanist goodwill […] This takes place behind the wonderful screen of the interventions of rescue, protection, reconstruction and `peace building´ conducted by humanitarian organizations and UN agencies (Agier, 2011, p. 4)

The out-place of the vulnerable and undesirable, refugee camps, grew from the reflection of the universalistic aim of protecting the stateless (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.a.ii. & 4.3.c.iii.), produced after the non-recognition and rejection of the displaced. Gradually, a function of control was assumed to that of protection, narrowing down the distance between the functions of investigation, control, and care (Rabee, Kassis, Berland, & Hamash, 2022). The elimination of rights produces in turn masses of human life devoid of political agency (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.b.i.), reproducing the divide between the humanitarian field and the political field, causing the permanence of that which was originally temporal (Peteet, 2005, p. 74; Agier, 2011, pp. 11-35), keeping «a secret solidarity with the very powers they ought to fight» (Agamben, 1998, p. 133).

Hawkins and Paredes (speaking about development aid) indicate that one of the features of the international economic field since 1946 is that, at least admittedly, aid can be allocated for reasons different from national selfishness by the donor. Gatrell similarly points the emergence of the investment in the refugee category by states, transnational organisations, NGOs, and refugees themselves. The topic became a global phenomenon of political concern. Consequently, the United Nations agencies working in the field (UNHCR and UNRWA) repeatedly stated that they were non-political (Gatrell, 2013, p. 284). The exceptionalism implied in humanitarian action seems to be exhibited as an ambitious power, justified by a universalistic authorisation, almost divine (Agier, 2011, p. 86). Responsibility towards refugees is

> frequently conceived to be an ethical, and not a political responsibility. Appeals are frequently made to ethical and moral principles, and the response is justified in ethical or moral terms, which are in turn seen to transcend, or lie outside of the political. If the response is seen as a response on political grounds, its political nature is constructed as something to be avoided, and its political nature is defined as, and associated with selfishness, and ulterior, non-humanitarian motives (Czajka, 2008, p. 186)

According to Hawkins and Paredes, times immediate after post-war years saw foreign policy aspects in aid programmes, a fact that has not disappeared, but decreased, due to the existence and functioning of international specialised institutions (Hawkins & Paredes, 1974, p. 20). In order to be considered "aid", they specify that the involved goods and services must be out of the common commercial procedures; be tied to special terms and conditions; and must be a supplementary support to the common flow, so the receiving country can obtain necessary resources at lower costs. To this

they add, regarding efficacy, that the measure of the provided aid must be evaluated from the receiver´s standpoint.

In this regard, Latif, considering the specific case of Palestinians in Lebanon, denotes that humanitarian assistance relies on the value of voluntary charity. This in turn requires the quantification of need. To specify the goods and service that flow out of the common commercial procedures Hawkins and Paredes indicated the need to account for the charity volunteered and that the achievement be «clearly defined, measurable objectives» (Latif, 2011, p. 60). These objectives, originating from a quantification of need, necessarily entail values, since what can be considered basic needs, that is, biological survival, increasingly lead to newer, more "sophisticated" needs.

In this regard, humanitarian organisations gradually shifted the discourse about themselves, describing their endeavour as one of long-run economic development, and short-term relief (Gatrell, 2013, p. 201). Focusing on technical issues and promoting their own profile parallelly brought keeping history out of the picture. From the starting point of the fact that deciding who can become a citizen is an inherently political matter (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.a.iii.) comes the consequent fact of the political nature of deciding to grant aid. It is not by chance that, for instance, French and British aid initiatives took place in territories of their former colonial control or influence (Hawkins & Paredes, 1974, p. 22). History focused on refugees involves the historical processes of displacement, as well as the configuration of aid and assistance, as it takes places in the coordinates of modernity. Image-oriented identity might be comprised not only in the process of personal identity formation (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.1.a.), but also in the strategies put forth by organisations, including the ones involved in transnational aid. Claimed generosity involved in initiatives towards refugees might serve as a justification for population control (Agier, 2011, pp. 36-59; Gatrell, 2013, p. 283), particularly, of those considered the Other.

The tendency to inattention to the past by transnational aid organisation seems to be excepted only for "bland claims about their reputation". In addition, this forgetfulness of history seems to be applied to refugees. Focused on the management of the present, humanitarian doctrine tends to address refugees as a «*tabula rasa* with no history, past experience, culture, anticipation, skills, coping mechanism to interpret new situations [sic]» (Kibreab, G. on Gatrell, 2013, p. 284). Aid cannot be detached from non-economic aspects of development, for which knowledge of the historical context is necessary (Hawkins & Paredes, 1974, p. 22; Agier, 2011, pp. 16-21; Gatrell, 2013, p. 54). Agier suggests asking the question "Is a camp better than nothing?" for the purpose of discovering how «life is reborn in a history of death» (Agier, 2011, p. 64), along the same lines as Gatrell, who

expresses interest in a "history of refugee activism", as opposed to discourses of victimisation and deprivation, which miss the fact of the resourcefulness of the refugees (Gatrell, 2013, p. 296).

The creation of UNRWA in 1949 (UNGA, 1949), as a reaction to the Nakba and its consequences, set forth the subject of its assistance, defined as «persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict», specifying that the «descendants of Palestine refugee males, including legally adopted children, are also eligible for registration» (UNRWA, 2022), therefore setting an extraterritorial j*us sanguinis*, a "right of blood" linked not to a territory covering an applicable corpus of law, but to its *de facto* negation and subsequent legal identity. The work of UNRWA meant for some Palestinians the need of adapting to a whole new reality, materially, relationally and emotionally. It meant long-term «to prevent conditions of starvation and distress among them and to further conditions of peace and stability» (UNGA, 1949).

In a different sense, some fundings seemed to be based on political considerations. With the Cold War dividing states and fields inside them, UNRWA, having the USA as the biggest contributor, was steered towards keeping a potential source of subversion under control. An objective which only through high proportions of violence ended up being "neutralised" in the case of Lebanon and the Palestinians (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.5.). As a matter of fact, the State Department pointed out in 1961 that the relatively low cost of supporting Palestinian refugees was not a "bad investment" for keeping such a problem at bay (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 111; De Bel-Air, 2012, p. 15; Gatrell, 2013, p. 131).

During and after the decolonisation period of the 60s and 70s, humanitarian organisations perceived a change in the features of the refugee issue. Quantitatively, the masses were bigger, and the socioeconomic and political contexts were distinguished from those of previous periods. However, Gatrell argues, the difference in interpretation omitted similarities in the causes and policy involved, as well as the political nature of the plight of the Palestinian refugees (Gatrell, 2013, p. 201).

Regarding economic matters, as transnational humanitarian agencies raised increasingly high amounts of economic capital, the social distance towards the "beneficiaries" they ought to serve appeared to increase correspondingly. A higher distance meant less chances of communication, particularly those involving the needs of the refugees, moving away from decision-making processes; a circumstance actively sought for by some transnational agencies´ management (Gatrell, 2013, pp. 202, 280-285).

With respect to social capital, transnational aid agencies like UNHCR, have been accused (also from within) of involvement with governments in obstructing outside access to refugee camps and

independent research. Limiting their engagement to emergency relief, refugees have faced infantilisation, as well as judgements about “untrustworthy” or “subversive” behaviours (Gatrell, 2013, pp. 281-291; Scheper-Hugues & Lock, 1987, p. 24), when some degree of autonomous agency was deployed. Agier (2011, pp. 83-84) speaks of a “Janus-faced humanitarianism”: a public face, oriented towards the “first world” audience, compassionate, cosmopolitan, committed to ideals and values; and a private face, in view of the refugees, sometimes cruel, and nearly always ineffectual, the visage of power, which refugees might find not so different from other powers exercised upon them. Literature speaks of a refugee “regime” or “government”. However, the question remains as to who or what governs this regime.

4.3.d.ii. Governance without a government

In the onset of its work in the field, UNRWA focused on providing relief, education, and health for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The survival of the Palestinian refugees was guaranteed, but «it also created a false image of total dependence on international charity, concealing the fact that, through the destruction of an independent Palestinian economy, the Palestinian peasantry had been transformed into a pool of landless labour» (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 117). Governance, that is, the regulation, order, and production of rules and law, started to steer away from the exclusive domain of the authority of the government of Lebanon.

Although some accounts speak of “thousands” of refugees employed in non-agricultural occupations (Sayigh Y. , 1952, or. 65) before greater restrictions became effective, the tendency afterwards would point to marginalisation in the labour field. UNRWA itself was, and still is, one of the employers of refugees, even if top positions are not occupied by Palestinians (Gatrell, 2013, p. 132); additionally, refugees are also employed by initiatives stemming from the community, but financed internationally; and by externally-managed relief projects, oftentimes operated asymmetrically, either making assumptions about the refugees´ demeanour, and thus disqualifying their participation (Gatrell, 2013, pp. 129-132, 258), establishing categories of subjectification from outside. This means, as Suleiman (1997) indicates, that both practice and discourse concerning the organisational field tend to mix Palestinian popular initiatives, affiliated or non-affiliated to PLO, Islamist or other types of groups; and organisations managed otherwise. Moreover, the tendency to rely upon external funding by the first group, renders them vulnerable to external political changes (Suleiman, 1997, p. 408).

An area generally deemed important, education was the means projected both UNRWA and the Palestinians for development and occupational change, Sayigh indicates two flaws in the image: education provided by UNRWA was quantitatively limited; besides, educational as not the only structural obstacle to development (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 123). Although they did generate hope, the scarce economic capital, as a result of the obstruction to enter the labour market, has made education irrelevant to a high extent. Thus, the interrelation of the different kinds of freedom posited by Sen (1999, pp. 35-53) seems to be adequately depicted when speaking of the capability of Palestinians in Lebanon to alter the conditions of their existence.

As a consequence of perceiving a faulty system of services, Palestinian refugees realised about the necessity to complement UNRWA services. During the period of the Palestinian heterotopia (*Vid. Supra*, 1.5.b.) in Lebanon, the "left hand of the Empire" (Bourdieu, 1993; Agier, 2011, p. 200) was compromised by the agency of the refugees, as well as some subaltern elements, produced over the previous decades of *laissez faire* in the Lebanese State. Seeing that UNRWA health service were underfunded, the PRM elements focused part of their attention in responding to the need of a wider health care. In spite of the efforts of the time, defective implementation of those policies for the long-term meant that, despite a higher amount of health centres, the absence of mass health training programmes and surveys addressing health needs (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 183-186), it came to private initiatives to fill the gaps.

In the context of the complexity of the relations between the different stakeholders, the concept of multi-level governance (MLG) (Bache & Flinders, 2004; Piattoni, 2010) is employed to refer to the interactions and interdependences taking place around the issue of refugee protection and aid. The decentralisation of authority and decision-making has been dispersed between supra- and trans-national institutions, local and municipal governments, as well as private initiatives of different sorts. This dispersal affects the ways in which Palestinian refugees in Lebanon can carry out their agency. Even if it cannot be taken as a normative concept yet (Piattoni, 2010, pp. 175-247), MLG serves as an analytical model for the understanding of the complex interplays between the different actors involved, one with four main features:

- First, that decision making at various territorial levels is characterized by the increased participation of non-state actors.
- Second, that the identification of discrete or nested territorial levels of decision making is becoming more difficult in the context of complex overlapping networks.

- Third, that in this changing context the role of the state is being transformed as state actors develop new strategies of coordination, steering, and networking to protect and, in some cases, enhance state autonomy.
- Fourth, that in this changing context, the nature of democratic accountability has been challenged and need to be rethought or at least reviewed (Bache & Flinders, 2004, pp. 196-197)

Although focused on particular case of the displacement of Syrians, Fakhoury´s (2019) account on MLG in the Arab world sheds some light regarding the overall situation, particularly, concerning the agency of the refugees. The multi-level architecture of regulation regarding refugees relies on outsourcing refugee governance (mainly UNRWA, in the case of Palestinians), with the added obstacle of the reluctance of the Lebanese State, who contests the action of the varied actors (*Vid. Supra*, 4.3.b.ii.). This engenders a "push & pull effect" (Stephenson, 2013), «incongruous framings and agendas of the refugee issue, leading to fragmented responses and heightening at times policy conflict between actors» (Fakhoury, 2019, pp. 1318-1319), undermining a rights-based approach due to the implementation of measures aimed at strengthening security and commercial concerns.

The dispute between local interests and universalist principles might end up causing the "commodification of refugees", that is, the gaining of political or commercial leverage by using refugee mobility. States may take advantage of their position as gate keepers, allowing of disallowing the passage of refugee masses, as a measure to influence decision-taking in the economic or political field[35]. This serves to demonstrate that UN agencies hold normative power, as well as the capacity to carry out "norm entrepreneurship" (Fakhoury, 2019) , but implementation of rules always depends on the specific state.

However, refugees, in spite of being conceived of as objects of intervention, show the capacity to become full-fledged actors, conducting bottom-up governance. Such has been the case of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in the past (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.5.b.), and continues to be so in the present (*Vid*. *Infra*, 7.2.c. & 7.3.), resignifying their identity, history, and promoting their agency.

[35] An example of which is the EU-Turkey agreement of 2016 (CEU, 2016), or the events of June 24, 2022, in Melilla (HRW, 2022).

4.4. Summary

The idea of a Palestinian nation, albeit the inexistence of its state, articulates the sense of community and purpose. On the individual identity level, the past, loaded with a high emotional weight, appears to co-determine the way Palestinian in Lebanon articulate their sense of identity, belonging and attachment. The traumatic nature of the events in which this emotional bond is built on, might casts a shadow over how imagination engaged in the process of identification can be adapted to the current social conditions, needs and potential agency deployment modes.

For instance, the logic of modernity, permeating through several of the social structures present in the Palestinians´ lives, might be reflected in how affection is perceived, identified, and turned into agency. The centrality of the Western modern values, reified in difference, individuality and temporality, with their axes firmly established as a reference, can be disputed, not only as geographically foreign elements, but as principles ruled by a set of objectives that do not serve the purpose of the subaltern in general, and the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in particular.

In this sense, ethnic identity is categorised in Lebanon in two clear ways: normative confessionally when it comes to Lebanese citizens; normative and institutionally when it comes to "foreign nationals", like Palestinians, who are identified as such in their ID, the result of a process culminated with an ambiguous legal ascription, which nonetheless establishes a distinct ethnic divide, founded on an Otherness, based on the specific political objectives of keeping a certain statu quo. Palestinian foreign nationals are treated in Lebanon as a minority would be in a different setting, but at the same time, they are, concerning the institutions, treated as a potential threat, part of a majority that could break the balance in Lebanon, and subsequently the grip to power of the norm circles in the top of the economic, cultural, and social fields.

Despite the universal and naturalistic vocation, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, conventions, and protocols are superseded and made contingent on the modern logic of accumulation of economic capital, for which a loose regulation of the economic field is put in place. For the specific case of the State of Lebanon, contents such as Article 1 of the UDHR, stating «All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights», seems to be of great aesthetic but no practical value. As a by-product of an originary distribution of land, the divide between citizen and non-citizen appears as an exploitable asset. Legal ascription is turned into a global mechanism for both the biological survival and political deactivation of the undesirable consequences of the darkest moments of human history.

The reflection of the dominance in the social field lays bare the strategy for the disposal of those masses which, unable to fulfil a role, and thus dysfunctional for inclusion, are stripped of their inherent human political feature, their intrinsic agency, capable of altering the conditions of their existence. Included as excluded from society and unable to partake in it, and with an existence avowedly consisting of mere survival, the real consequences stemmed from deprivation assemble. The obstructed flow of agency finds its way through the resignifying of an identity collectively raised as a flag against oppression.

5. Research techniques: ethnography, observing, interviewing and coding

Field work was carried out in two stages. The first stage was comprised a stay from the 2nd of April to the 2nd of July, 2019. During this period, I was hosted by the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut. Perla Issa fulfilled the role of tutor, and thanks to her and the rest of the staff, I could expand the literature review, as well as expand my network of contacts.

I conducted a total of 19 interviews (of which one corresponds to a previous visit, for which I asked permission to use in this dissertation), with a total of 22 participants. Their backgrounds were different regarding the economic, cultural and social fields, as well as the agency exposed in their speech or stated through direct observation, because of some of them knowing me from previous stays.

The second stay, originally planned for March 2020, had to be postponed, due to the global pandemic, and the closure of borders; it was finally carried out during the month of September and October, 2020. A lengthier stay could have proven a good choice, but different circumstances, among which are the programme´s timetable, personal situations, and the obstacles introduced by the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, shaped the final form of the research.

After having lived in Lebanon for more than two years, since 2015, my knowledge of the language, customs and practices gave me an advantage when it came to carrying out the research. In addition, having lived in Shatila refugee camp meant that I did not have to build a network of contacts from the ground up, as I already knew people from different circles. The Palestinian experience in Lebanon has not been pleasant nor easy (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.5. & 1.6.); the time I spent in Lebanon was just the latest phase of it. A vacuum in the presidency of Lebanon, intermittent but continuous episodes of violence around the state, including the refugee camps, the relatively recent memory of the destruction of Nahr al-Bared (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.6.b.), and the aftermath of the war in Syria, all of it, as well as the inability or indifference of the authorities concerning the continuous deterioration of the conditions, added to the sensation of uncertainty and pervasive despair present all around the territory, from the southern territories till Tripoli and the Bekaa Valley in the east.

Old and new acquaintances were aware of the situation and gradual increase of unrest, as the interviews with the participants reveal. Often, Palestinians living in the refugee camps have, as usual, an extra share of dearth. A few exceptions can be pointed out, like the case of Mar Elias, or El-Buss, smaller and generally calmer camps. But the outside appearance should not fool the relational standpoint of its inhabitants towards their wider environment. Since 2019, the Ministry of Law had been seeking and punishing Palestinians who had circumvented labour regulations. The regional

scenery did not offer favourable prospects either, the "Deal of the Century" initiative, conducted by the USA, triggered the angry response of Palestinians, perceived as the latest attempt to dissolve the right of return and agency of Palestinians in the region.

In Shatila, an increasing overcrowding made the perception of the living conditions additionally stressful, with the additional perceived annoyance of a growing pool of potential competitors in the labour market. Seemingly random shootouts in Ain el-Hilweh, with the subsequent lockdown by the Lebanese Army, made everyday life tasks difficult. The completion of a wall around the camp brought memories of the Israeli policy, in the shape of a wall that turned 20 years in June 2022. Some of the people I spoke to, closer friends or acquaintances, openly indicated the likeness of policies, hinting at a hidden agenda, aimed at destabilising the camps, in order to legitimise further control and severe measures. As a consequence of this, but maybe because of my past visits, entering Ain el-Hilweh was proving to be more difficult than before.

Non-camp dwellers, and particularly foreigners, need a special permission issued by the Ministry of Interior to enter certain camps, a requirement originating decades ago (Sayigh R. , 1994, p. 5). Even if the effects of dysregulation might make its appearance at any moment, and entering some of these camps without having to pass a checkpoint has been possible; the contrary holds true too. I have randomly been asked for a special permission to bring a camera in, while at other occasions I could just go through the checkpoints, apparently invisible to soldiers., who might have been too tired, hot, fed up, disinterested, annoyed to care.

Resignation among the refugees felt common, but one can also sense a drive for surviving that overcomes that inscribed in the concept of "bare life" (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.b.i.). The core of the idea of my dissertation could be experienced there, in many of the ordinary everyday experiences. Seemingly in a continuous cycle of reconstruction, the camps feel like the material embodiment of the collective agency of the Palestinians living there: no matter how many times, demolished, bombarded, encased, marginalised, destroyed; never completely broken.

However, the situation would take a turn for the worse not long after. October 2019 saw a rare display of unity in the streets. A state characterised by division along sectarian lines, the common factor affecting the people in the lower positions of the economic field triggered massive mobilisations, due to the approval of more taxes. The movement soon achieved the symbolic success of forcing the president of the prime minister out. The resulting institutional crisis paved the way for a wide and deep socioeconomic crisis, dragging the economies down, as is customary, lower positions first.

It was during the peak of the crisis that another one overlapped. This time, the global pandemic, caused by SARS-CoV-2, and all the related enforced measures. The Beirut Port Blast came, as the government authorities, unable and unwilling to solve lingering issues, let it happen (Bikandi Eskutza, 2020b). Alarmed that it could be an Israeli bombardment, Palestinians from the camps around Beirut moved to the blast site to help in rescuing. The Lebanese started engrossing the base of the subaltern in the state. As inflation started soaring and reaching previously unbelievable marks, rage, hopelessness, and an increasing sense of the impossibility to change the situation mixed with mobilisation in the streets.

A month later I carried out my second field visit. Barely more than 40 days had passed since the explosion in the port, but several of my Lebanese friends and acquaintances had already left, all hope lost for a future in Lebanon. They had the means for it. As for the Palestinians living in the camps, leaving was rarely a realistic choice, less in a moment when the value of money was plummeting. In spite of that, several of my friends tried, and some eventually did manage to leave.

High prices of every commodity and service took a toll in life in the camps, as well as outside of them. For some people I knew or had met, it meant a matter of life or death. A state crisis overlapped with several regional (the lingering war in Syria, and an invisibilised one in Yemen, for instance) and global emergencies. It had all taken a toll in funding and subsidising of transnational agencies and NGOs. If uncertainty and despair was a pervasive impression a year before, it seemed like now it had taken root at a broader scale.

5.1. Semi-structured in-depth interviews

I chose interviews as the specific qualitative approach due to the subjective nature of the topic of the dissertation. One of the fields I wanted to reach was the lived experience of the Palestinians in Lebanon, in order to understand the phenomena as they are perceived, imbued with meaning, and interpreted by one of the main protagonists of the matter (Seidman, 2006, pp. 7-14). If we are to approach and understanding the intersubjective construction of meaning, the structures of the life world (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973, pp. 3-20), the basic units to refer to are their producers.

22 people were interviewed in the course during two stays: 2nd of April to 2nd of July of 2019, and 16th September 2020 to 29th of October 2020. 15 men and 8 women were interviewed in locations ranging from Shatila, Mar Elias, Ain el-Hilweh and El-Buss refugee camps, Beirut, Saida and Sour (added in appendix A). The interviews contained of a series of consistent questions comprised of the same topics for everyone (added in appendix C), with some questions varying, due to the semi-

structured nature of the modality, and depending on the foresight of the scope of subject matters the interviewee could be knowledgeable of.

Participants were handed a participant release agreement (added in appendix B), in order to inform of the intention, context, length, contact information and objectives of the interview, as well as rights of the interviewee. By signing it, they agreed that

1. I understand the purpose and nature of this study and I am voluntarily taking part in this project;

2. I grant permission for the data to be used in the process of completing a PhD degree, including a dissertation and any other future publication

3. I understand that I don´t have to take part, and I can stop the interview at any time;

4. The transcribed interview or extracts from it may be used as described above;

5. I have read this Consent Form;

6. I have been able to ask any questions I might have, and I understand that I am free to contact the researcher with any questions I may have in the future.

The signed form does not always ensure that the participant understands what the interview is about, what the use of it, conditions, rights, and responsibilities are. This is why visual informed (Lie & Witteveen, 2017) consent was guaranteed, as well as a previous conversation, before the recording gear was in place, to set the terms of the conversation, and whether the interviewees preferred to not have their image or voice recorded. The decision to implement a written consent form came after the first stay. Three of the people interviewed during the first one were unreachable (for different reasons) in the second stay. Due to the protocol established for the interviews, they were all informed about the procedure.

Even if I gave them the option to either allow or not the use of their real names in the study, I later concluded that having their real names meant no added value to the dissertation, and could somehow compromise their positions. Therefore, I decided to substitute all their names, and omit contextual details (names of organisations, even specific refugee camp names and similar particulars) that might reveal their personal identities. Permission to record the interview on audio and video was also requested every time; I considered the additional value of being able to account for non-verbal communication, and assured that their image would not be shown publicly (except for the tribunal

members of the thesis defence, if need be), nor used for other purposes. This seemed to be enough, but I cannot fully state the degree to which the presence of a camera, a voice recorder, and a Western researcher influenced the interviewees. In any case, I made it clear before the start of the interview that they were free to abstain from answering questions they deemed inadequate, or simply did not want to address.

It is worthwhile to consider the added potential obstacle of gender values. It is possible that women do not feel completely safe in the presence of a man, moreover if the man is a white European, coming in representation of the academic field. Most of the women interviewed showed no visible worry with this fact, but still the issue remains: a habitus containing the imprint of a patriarchal society, as well as my role as a male European researcher (with my own habitus), might have hindered the free expression of some of them. Whenever possible, I tried to be open to the circumstances where the interview would take place, in an attempt at letting them choose the space where they would feel the safest. Additionally, having a female translator was not an option I took by chance. Confidence, grown for long time before, allowed me to have her company and hear her valuable insights about situations, customs and other perceptions and intuitions (among others, gender matters) I might have overlooked.

Due to the raise of the global pandemic of SARS-CoV-2 (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2), along with an acute socio-economic crisis and a prominent general unrest, the locations of the interviews varied, depending on the options possible. Additionally, ongoing military interventions made mobility unadvised in many cases, particularly to the northern part of the state. Entry to certain areas, as well as specific refugee camps, had been rendered more difficult than before. During the second field work stay, entry to Ain el-Hilweh, Nahr al-Bared, Rashidieh, Burj el-Shemali had not been authorised. Aware of the particularly sensitive situation, due to the pandemic, I applied for the permission with plenty of time in advance, with the idea of guaranteeing a fair amount of time for bureaucracy. In addition, a friend with connections inside General Security (Ministry of Interior) tried a different path and, despite being assured the permission was under way, it never came. This fact prevented from carrying out several interviews with people who, for different reasons, were not keen on going out of their camps, for which reason alternative ones had to be fixed, with the invaluable help of friends and acquaintances.

The participants were reached, mainly, through previously met individuals, some of which I had met or interviewed before, which constitutes the “snowball” approach to selecting participants (Seidman, 2006, p. 55). Trying to approach individuals or institutions had proven futile before, the same it did this time. A common approach to interpersonal contacts, at least when it comes to

normative institutional ones, consists of mediation through common friends or acquaintances, social capital under the form of the practice of "wasta"[36].

This fact might imply easier access, but harder execution of the interviews, as someone else is implicitly included in the practice through their bond. I would have preferred to be able to have prior contact with all the interviewees, but it was not always possible, particularly with the case of representatives of different levels, who had tighter schedules. In any case, previous contact might also lead to some degree of familiarity. It can lead to distortion (Seidman, 2006, pp. 40-56), since previous knowledge might entail that the information provided consists not so much of what the individual might think, but of what the individual might think the interviewer wants to listen to; or to avoid controversial topics, for the sake of the relationship, of because of feelings of guilt or shame; or because interviewer and interviewee tend to assume what the other knows, thinks, or feels like. I tried to avoid these when necessary by inquiring about simpler notions, an approach I had to take with the interviewees I had not met before too, in some cases.

Purposeful selection (Maxwell, 2013, pp. 99-102) of participants might be problematic, as it comes with a previous intentional representation of the population sampled, based on preconceived ideas, and therefore potential biases. My idea of representativeness (although not strictly necessary in a qualitative study, still interesting to guarantee different voices are included) was established along the lines of gender and age-range mainly. I established three age groups, 20-39, 40-59, and 60 and beyond, as a general division of age ranges, roughly coinciding with Sayigh´s *Jeel Falasteen*, *Jeel al-Nakba*, and *Jeel al-Thawra*[37], to which another category could be added referring to those shaped by late

[36] "Wasta" can mean straightforward nepotism when it comes to, for instance, granting a public administrative position to a relative or a friend; to a lesser degree, it also means being granted access to a circle or contact to an institution through a common acquaintance. It is, after all, the institutionalisation of social capital, without which, more often than not, messages through official channels go unnoticed, requests ignored, and petitions for interviews overlooked. Being able to contact General Security through a friend could also be considered wasta, albeit a failed attempt in my case.

[37] Sayigh mentions how Palestinian in Lebanon refer to the different generations ("*jeel*") relating to different significant historical periods. These would be: "generation of Palestine", for those framed in Mandate Palestine (*Vid. Supra*, 1.2. & 1.3.); "generation of the Nakba", for those born outside Palestine, and shaped by the consequences of the forced exodus (*Vid. Supra*, 1.4.); and "generation of the revolution", for those who experienced the re-emergence of Palestinian identity and mobilisation of the 60s and 70s (*Vid. Supra*, 1.5.).

modern times, with uncertainty and doubt as the defining notions, to which I will refer to as *Jeel al-Shakk*[38].

Regarding gender, I could not reach a proportional number of women, which constitutes a clear bias in the sample. Cultural values, my own qualities, as a white (although sometimes taken for an Arab) European male, stood out as factors that made females not so reachable (Sayigh R. , 1994, pp. 6-8). I attempted to circumvent this obstacle by way of being accompanied by other women, as translators or fixers of interviews, so as to trying to raise confidence through a mutual acquaintanceship. Unfortunately, social capital is composed of more complex elements (entangled with cultural capital), and it did not always work when trying to arrange interviews. On another note, I assumed that the familiarity of some of the refugee camps´ effective figures with my role, which in some cases dates back to 2015, as well as my relationship with common acquaintances, assured that people would not think I was a spy, an option still present among some individuals, due to past experiences. Still, these constitute hardly measurable factors, matching those referred to the degree to which my foreignness, appearance, speech, frequently subpar Arabic language skill, and ideas imprinted in the conversation, did not steer some of the conversations in not optimal ways.

English was the language used in most of the interviews. Even so, some of them took place in Arabic, a language I am not thoroughly competent at. In spite of this, I could follow the development of conversations, but needed additional support, for the sake of not losing track of potentially important details, also for the purpose of expressing complex and nuanced questions in an adequate way. A person of trust, a Lebanese citizen competent in linguistical matters, both English and Arabic, carried out the role of translator on site, as well as the task of transcribing and translating the interviews in text. For two interviews I relied on *ad hoc* translators. Additionally, four of the interviews were translated by an external company. In all of the cases, given my ability to follow the conversations, the notes taken after the interviews, as well as the consonance between the on-site translator and the transcriber-translator version (when those differed), provided a sense of accuracy that, albeit imperfect, established a solid base for the subsequent stage.

[38] The term “shakk”/ “شك”, means “doubt”, “suspicion” (Wehr, 1976, p. 481). After decades of abandonment and perceived betrayal by Arab states, international community, Palestinian Authority and, in some cases, political groups, it can be inferred that one of the common and predominant defining ideas is uncertainty about the future, as well as suspicion, particularly regarding normatively institutionalised initiatives.

5.1.a. Participant profiles

The following are the specific brief participant profiles. In order to offer a more detailed background of each of the participants, a brief presentation will provide the following categories: sex, age range, functional diversity (sensory, motor or intellectual impairment), cultural capital (a preliminary assessment, based on intellectual perception), economic capital (a preliminary assessment, based on intellectual perception and context), place of dwelling, faction affiliation (states by the interviewee of implicitly assumed from context, site (of interview), position/occupation. For the sake of making the exposition of the resulting work in the next chapter agile, these profiles are set apart from the content included there, as introducing each of the participants during the presentation of their interventions might make the reading cumbersome, leading to losing track of the phenomena explored. However, one-time details contained in these profiles might be reiterated, when coherence might require highlighting specific details about background or situation.

Some of the details will be non-disclosed/non-disclosable (n/d), due to anonymity requirements. As stated before, names are fake, in order to keep anonymity; with some other details omitted for the same purpose. However, a brief exposition of the details related to the recording of the interview and relevant linguistical matters will be included. A binary system will indicate with a "+" or "–" sign the presence or existence of functional diversity and stated political affiliation; as well as roughly denote if the cultural and economic capitals of the participant were perceived as above the average.

An attempt at specifying the adaptive behaviour is synthesized in one last item. A deeper assessment of personality would have been necessary to properly assert the psychological background and adaptive strategies put forth by each participant. The present is only a preliminary attempt at determining the types, inferred from what few elements I could extracted from each encounter and previous information and experience. As a summary of what was previously exposed (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.1.b.), and as a brief guide, the adaptive behaviours considered are: refusers, dependent on some externality, little cognitive structure, poor formation of character and resources; drifters, more personal resources, but poor and inconsistent employment, disinterest and poor commitment; searchers, unrealistic high criteria of functioning, dissatisfaction, search for perfection and frustration; guardians, better cognitive structure, formation of character and resources, high internalisation of values, overidentification and rigidity, poor adaptive tolerance; resolvers, good cognitive structure and resources, development of skills and adaptive capabilities.

Fadi

sex	male
age range	60+
functional diversity	-
cultural capital	+
economic capital	+
place of dwelling	outside
faction affiliation	≈
site	n/d
position/occupation	NGO director, effective figure
adaptive behaviour	resolver

Fadi is the director and one of the founders of a Palestinian NGO, as well as an effective figure in one of the refugee camps (not disclosed because of possible references leading to personal identification). He was born the same year as the Nakba; his experience goes a long way back. I had the opportunity to interview him in one of my previous stays, once granted his permission, I could use it to additionally expand his discourse. The NGO was founded by him and a few other people, more than two decades ago. The organisation deals with educating Palestinian children who dropped from the UNRWA schools because of different circumstances, as well as Syrian and Palestinian refugee children from Syria.

From the account of his own experience, as well as the observable interactions, Fadi has a long story of very actively engaging in the issues, social and practical, surrounding him. A strong intellectual structure seems to support his sense of identity. Palestinian, struggler, albeit a refugee, mark the milestones of his lived experience. The resolver adaptive behaviour fits him, given his display of skill in different areas.

The interview took place in his office. Being the director of an NGO as well as one of the effective figures in the camp made the place frequently visited by various kinds of people with different kinds of requests in mind at random moments. Aware of this, Fadi locked the door, but to no avail, as some people seem to have the habit of demanding his attention by screaming from the outside, apparently, knowing that it is not easy for him to refuse to listen to what people who come to him have to say.

The interview was recorded on video, with an additional sound recorder as a backup sound recording. Apart from a few loose words and phrases, his level of English made communication easy. Besides, his extended experience in different fields, including extended stays abroad, made the conversation articulate and fluent.

Hannan

sex	female
age range	20-39
functional diversity	-
cultural capital	+
economic capital	n/d
place of dwelling	
faction affiliation	-
site	n/d
position/occupation	NGO coordinator
adaptive behaviour	resolver

Hannan is the coordinator of a Palestinian NGO concerned with women´s rights. A woman in her late thirties, she seemed to carry a fair weight of the responsibilities of the organisation. The moment I stepped into the building of the organisation (location not disclosed), a bustling atmosphere seemed to be revolving mainly around her. Her serious stance seemed to reflect her perception of the gravity of the issues she works with.

Her attitude seemed to reveal a solid composure, paired with a calculated sense of responsibility and assurance in her role, coordinating an organisation that seeks to promote those very features. Her identity assertion revolved around Palestinianness and gender, a fact that probably required a strong intellectual and emotional structure. The resolver adaptive behaviour suits her, as getting to and keeping her position seemed to have required a reliable inner structure, in order to deal with the outer hindrances.

The interview took place in her office, a small room teeming with reports, documents and papers. Despite the plentiful activity in the organisation, the interview was interrupted only once, in a way that did not even need to be reflected in the transcription, as it did not affect its continuity or fluency.

Video was recorded, as well as audio with the backup audio recorder. The translation of one of the volunteers of the organisation was necessary, as Hannan could to some extent understand English, but did not have the competency to speak it fluently.

Nazim

sex	male
age range	60+
functional diversity	-
cultural capital	+
economic capital	n/d
place of dwelling	inside
faction affiliation	+
site	n/d
position/occupation	Popular Committee president
adaptive behaviour	guardian-resolver

Nazim was the president of one of the popular committees, a member of the PLO, were he represented the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), and a member of the leadership of the popular committees, and assembly of representatives of committees from different refugee camps. Already in his seventies, Nazim had experienced the development of the refugee camps from the perspective of the membership of his faction.

Nazim could be thought of, regarding the adaptive behaviour, as something in between a guardian and a resolver. While not overly rigid in his values, his structure of thought seemed to be grounded on fixed elements, such as his belonging to a political faction, as well as his responsibility as a member of vertical structures. While eager to engage in processes of change, the presence of obstacles appeared to hinder his agency in the ways he devised.

The interview was conducted in one of the rooms of the headquarters of the Popular Committee. Several of the members were around, noises high, and interruptions frequent, in spite of (or maybe because?) of them knowing that the conversation was being carried out. Closing doors did not fully prevent from interruptions, as the men around seemed agitated and in need of communicating with Nazim, although for fruitless interactions.

The conversation was recorded in video and audio, backup sound recorded included. Nazim did not seem too confident with his competency of English language. A few conjectures of Arabic and English words and expressions, alongside some semantic creativity, helped make out the ideas coming up during the conversation. Although not very fluent, because of the recurrent interruptions, noises, and sporadic of language slips, the conversation was prolific. Unfortunately, Covid-19 claimed his life the year after this interview was conducted.

Mehdi

sex	male
age range	40-59
functional diversity	-
cultural capital	+
economic capital	n/d
place of dwelling	n/d
faction affiliation	+
site	Mar Elias
position/occupation	academic, jurist
adaptive behaviour	resolver

Mehdi is a jurist, a member of the Union of Palestinian Lawyers and the Union of Palestinian Authors and Journalists. Close to his sixties, his experience as a member of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine is combined with various activities in the field of Law, his specialty; but also with efforts aimed at networking and education.

His resolve points towards, precisely, to a resolver type of adaptive behaviour. Active, resolute and articulate, his conduct seems to denote a solid cognitive structure. His belonging to a political faction though, might indicate to an extent the constrain of some ideas to a specific political frame.

The conversation took place in his neatly organised small office in Mar Elias refugee camp. Just like what happened with Hannan, there was only one interruption, that needed not be noted down in the transcription. Being a smaller and calmer than the average refugee camp, Mar Elias seems to live in a different pace, compared to nearly any other urban location in Lebanon.

Video and audio of the interview were recorded, extra sound recorder included. Mehdi´s competence in English is above the average, so, added to the external circumstances, the conversation was conducted very fluently.

Ghali

sex	male
age range	40-59
functional diversity	-
cultural capital	+
economic capital	-
place of dwelling	inside
faction affiliation	≈
site	Ain el-Hilweh
position/occupation	NGO director
adaptive behaviour	resolver

Ghali is a man in his forties with a calm demeanour, the executive director of a Palestinian NGO. His experience in the position is both extensive and intensive, a reflective attitude and a critical standpoint merged in a rich discourse with many nuances about life in general for a Palestinian refugee, as well as the virtues and shortcomings of the NGO world, unavoidably related to the rest of the institutions present in the life of Palestinians, such as UNRWA.

His acutely critical stance regarding the structures surrounding him, as well as his apparent steadfastness concerning his own personal and professional growth suggests that Ghali is a resolver. No only he seems to have employed an extensive set of personal tools for his own self-interest, but has managed to do so, focusing his agency and specific skills directed at the topics he experienced concern about in his own skin.

The interview was carried out in his office, located in the building of the NGO in Ain el-Hilweh refugee camp. There were many interruptions by different people, but fortunately this did not affect the flow of the conversation much, mainly because he managed to discard the requests that did not seem to be urgent, noting that he was in the middle of an interview.

The main source for the transcription of the interview in this case was the audio file produced by the sound recorder. Bringing a bigger camera inside the camp did not seem a wise choice, as I had, in a previous occasion, been searched and blocked from entry by the Lebanese Army in one of the entry checkpoints, because of carrying bigger device. Allegedly, bringing this kind of devices was “forbidden”, even if I had more than once entered and used a camera for taping (with discretion). Video was recorded with a handheld device of poorer quality. The beginning of the interview served as an example of what to expect from him and his dilated experience in the field of NGO managing and other topics. A very articulate discourse, even if he considered his level of English language as “not so good”.

Badih

sex	male
age range	20-39
functional diversity	-
cultural capital	+
economic capital	-
place of dwelling	inside
faction affiliation	+
site	Ain el-Hilweh
position/occupation	activist, student
adaptive behaviour	guardian-resolver

Badih is an active man in his mid-twenties, a student finishing his degree (at the time), an activist, a member of a Palestinian NGO, as well as a member of PFLP. Due to his liveliness, he had much to say about different topics, despite his younger age (compared to the rest of the participants).

Although young, Badih shows signs of the deployment of a seemingly well-built cognitive structure. His adaptive behaviour could be located somewhere between the guardian and the resolver, leaning towards the latter. An occasional tinge of emotional rigidity can be perceived, but it does not hinder his capacity for adapting his ideas and behaviour towards a more critical attitude.

The interview happened in one of the offices of the NGO, which led to some telephone calls and a few people coming in. At the time of the interview some labourers were carrying out some road maintenance, which led to forced interruptions. However, we could keep a fluent conversation, adding some reiterations and recapitulations to keep the track.

Only the audio recording exists, as the storage of the handheld device had been depleted in a previous interview, and a bigger device would probably have prevented my entry to the camp. Badih´s English language competency is high, but his discourse felt sometimes rushed and edgy. Despite that, he provided a rich perspective.

Aida

sex	female
age range	40-59
functional diversity	-
cultural capital	+
economic capital	-
place of dwelling	inside
faction affiliation	+
site	Shatila
position/occupation	activist
adaptive behaviour	guardian-resolver

Aida presents herself as an activist, dealing mainly with obtaining grants for Palestinian students and financial aid for Palestinian cancer patients. She is also a member of the General Union of Palestinian Women. She has a university degree in Business and a Master degree in management. For some time, she worked in her field, but was fired because she was found to be Palestinian.

She seems to be a blend of the guardian and resolver adaptive behaviour type. On one hand, Aida´s determination shows the arrangement of intellectual tools, particularly in an area emotionally close to her. On the other hand, an overidentification with her collectives of reference hint at a rigid system of affection, a characteristic of the guardian´s relative intolerance to adaption.

The interview took place in the living room of her house in Shatila, a humble flat where she lives with her mother and sister. Aside from the traditional offering of tea, no important interruptions happened throughout the conversation, in spite of some other people showing up, as they saw the interview was being conducted.

The interview´s video and audio were recorded. A few expressions and words had to be made out through the occasional spontaneous linguistic collaboration. Overall, the meanings of the ideas expressed ended up being cleared up.

Abbud

sex	male
age range	60+
functional diversity	-
cultural capital	+
economic capital	+
place of dwelling	outside
faction affiliation	≈
site	n/d
position/occupation	UNRWA officer
adaptive behaviour	guardian

Abbud is an UNRWA officer, at the time, close to retirement. The mix of his personal experience with his professional account and background was regularly making it difficult to understand some of the ideas referenced; nevertheless, the difference of his profile produced a somewhat different discourse, compared to the rest of the participants.

He seems to fit under the archetype of the guardian adaptive behaviour. Apparently overidentified with an idealised notion of his personal, as well as a collective identity, he appears to have a tendency towards reductionism and intolerance to criticism.

The interview was carried out in the sizable space of his office, where a few interruptions occurred, due to the requirements of his position and secretary. The fluency of the conversation needed tracing back some steps, since, despite the overall stillness of the space, the participant showed a tendency to go round the questions of the interview.

Video and audio were gathered via the two devices at hand, and his English language skill made it easy to keep communication operative.

Farha

sex	female
age range	60+
functional diversity	-
cultural capital	-
economic capital	+
place of dwelling	inside
faction affiliation	-
site	El-Buss
position/occupation	housewife
adaptive behaviour	drifter-guardian

Farha is a septuagenarian housewife living in El-Buss refugee camp. Her discourse revolved around family and children, with the longing for Palestine as a central topic. She did not seem too interested in life beyond the walls of her house, but she did appreciate the calmness of the refugee camp, which, compared to the others sounded like a tale of an oasis in the epicentre of a storm.

Her behaviour suggests an adaptive behaviour that would be placed in between the drifter and the guardian. She displays a disinterest in deploying the tools of the cognitive structures, which she explicitly mentions, were denied to her during her upbringing. Her commitment is focused on her family, a rather narrow social and spatial space. However, she also exhibits a robust (and rather inflexible) set of ideas regarding identity. When this particular concern is perceived to be on the line, she manifests a patent ability to conduct an unwavering display of intellectual structures. These, on the other hand, show a certain degree of reductionism and rigidity.

The conversation was carried out in the front yard of her house, an ample space with a small garden, in front of a two-story house. Her eldest son, a man in his fifties present during the interview, made frequent remarks uninvited, which could be interpreted in different ways, but did not hinder the freedom of Farha to express herself. At some point during the interview, one of the daughters arrived, but remained silent and offered coffee to those present. At a later point, a man, seemingly a friend of the family, made an appearance, but also remained silent.

The interview, video and audio recorded, had to feature a translator, appointed for this and other interviews, as Farha did not speak any English. The translator considered that the man that appear might have been a member of one of the factions, so she discretely cautioned against speaking about that specific topic, just in case it could get the family into trouble. Fortunately, the interview could be conducted in a way that the topic of the factions was brought up in a natural way. Even if it cannot be said that complete freedom to speak about the topic was guaranteed because of the potentially

sensitive situation, Farha did express her opinion when asked about it, once the option of not answering if uncomfortable was repeated.

Aina & Samer

sex	female	male
age range	20-39	20-39
functional diversity	-	-
cultural capital	+	+
economic capital	-	-
place of dwelling	inside	inside
faction affiliation	-	-
site	Saida	Saida
position/occupation	activist, student	activist
adaptive behaviour	resolver	resolver

Aina and Samer are two young Palestinian refugee friends from Ain el-Hilweh. They both belong to a cultural NGO operating inside the camp but reaching beyond. The interaction between them proved very interesting, as they often disagreed in their views on particular topics, but expressed so in different degrees of intensity. He was more dominant, albeit aware of his tendency to monopolise the conversation. However, Aina was able to interject and did not seem to be a particularly passive person. Nevertheless, some degree of intervention was necessary to guarantee that both were giving their insights, so the conversation would not wander adrift and leave the participation of Aina out. They are both people with studies, but slightly differing paths. Samer appears to be more politically engaged, with a leading role in the BDS ("Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions" movement, aimed at Israeli products and services) movement, seems to try to reach a specific level of intensity in his endeavour, and a slight frustration because of lack of participation; Aina, in spite of having her own political views, seems to be more focused on her work in the cultural NGO, with a sensitivity towards socio-political topics that appears to reflect in the way she carries out this task.

Both seemed to be of the resolver type of adaptive behaviour. While they both belong to one specific organisation, the way they deploy their intellectual and emotional structures unwrap hints at different interests. However, they both exhibit highly developed characters, (mostly) gently confrontational attitudes, and a critical eye concerning the obstacles they perceive in their environment, which, in any case, do not seem to pose as the greatest threat to the mobilisation of their personal cognitive toolsets.

I was not granted the special permission to enter Ain el-Hilweh, after weeks of having asked for it. It could be plausible that suspicion was raised because of my many stays in the camp before, as it was not the first time that the permission, granted by the Ministry of Interior, was delayed for a long time. During the time of the interview, Covid-19 cases were on the rise in Lebanon, so that could have also played as a factor. Be that as it may, after trying through different through different instances, entry to Ain el-Hilweh was not possible, so Aina, Samer, the translator and I met in a place of their choice, a quiet café in Saida. Although not the best option, the calmness of the place granted a suitable environment for the interview, with only a few interruptions.

The interview´s video and audio were recorded. Their knowledge of English language was not high enough to keep a conversation, which was the reason why the service of the translator was required, in order to support my following of the ideas expressed to a higher extent and being able to convey more complex queries. Despite the mentioned factors, the interview provided interesting results.

Taher

sex	male
age range	20-39
functional diversity	-
cultural capital	+
economic capital	+
place of dwelling	outside
faction affiliation	-
site	Beirut
position/occupation	student
adaptive behaviour	refuser-drifter

Taher is a Palestinian refugee student in his early twenties living outside but close to Shatila refugee camp. Despite of the fact that he lives outside the camp, he is knowledge about the feel of it, since many of his friend and acquaintances live in Shatila, where he spends a fair amount of time. His young age and lack of engagement in specific matters, such as the specificities of the political field in the camps, did not hinder the interest and importance of his standpoint. Se offered the different perspective of an outsider who could also be considered an insider in some respects.

While displaying a solid intellectual demeanour, Taher shows a somewhat self-defeating pattern in his adaptive behaviour. His would be a composite of the refuser and drifter. He seems to be uninterested in employing his mental structures, he explicitly states that he does not see the point,

although he does not deny himself the chance to try. It seems he does not employ his tools consistently, maybe because he lacks an external source of support.

When asked about his preference regarding the site of the interview, he offered his own house, where we carried it out, with no interruptions. The conversation, video and audio recorded, albeit short, was smooth, aided by his calm demeanour and articulate speech in English.

Aisha

sex	female
age range	20-39
functional diversity	-
cultural capital	+
economic capital	+
place of dwelling	outside
faction affiliation	-
site	Beirut
position/occupation	housewife, unemployed
adaptive behaviour	searcher

Aisha was, at the moment of the interview, a housewife and mother of one in her mid-twenties, married to a Lebanese guy the year before, which meant that she opted for the Lebanese citizenship. She lives outside her original dwelling place, Shatila refugee camp, of which she does not have a high opinion. She attended university, but had opposed feelings about her experience in the educational field, one of internal and external uncertainty, as she could not find a subject that could both fill her interests and future expectations of finding a job as a Palestinian in Lebanon.

This fact points towards her searcher adaptive behaviour. Dissatisfied with her academic and professional life choices, she seems to strive towards something she did not find yet. She seems to have high expectations from her social environment, but appears to look for a way to fix this in adaption of her exterior, concerning space and lifestyle. Apparently not yet frustrated, the archetypical behaviour adaption might not prove completely fitting to her, as she shows cues of a behaviour that relies on understanding cognitively, albeit maybe not so much emotionally.

The interview was conducted in her flat, in the outskirts of metropolitan Beirut, a small flat where she lived with her husband and her small child. Just like the previous cases, the participant´s house proved to be a space where she felt comfortable, and devoid of interruptions.

Although hesitant about her ability to answer the questions and her level of English language, she was completely capable of offering a lively picture of her insights and ideas. She seemed uncertain as to if her speech was articulate or interesting, reason for which I assured her that there were no possible "right" or "wrong" answers, but a personal perspective on things that were made into a topic. She was the only one of the participants who asked about the camera, not knowing if she should look at it or me. This did not seem to affect her speech as, once she seemed to have gotten immersed in the conversation, she did not pay much attention to the camera or the voice recorder.

Alaya

sex	female
age range	40-59
functional diversity	-
cultural capital	+
economic capital	+
place of dwelling	outside
faction affiliation	-
site	Shatila
position/occupation	NGO coordinator, activist
adaptive behaviour	resolver

Alaya, a woman in her early fifties, never lived inside the camps, but wilfully took the decision to be connected to them and their dwellers at a specific time of her life in Lebanon. Born to a family that, despite of Palestinian background, did not suffer financial shortcomings, she managed to study and work in journalism. Afterwards, at a critical point of her life, her perspective of her role in the Palestinian community shifted. It did so in a way that her personal life took a turn with her at the helm. At the time of the interview, she was the coordinator of a Palestinian NGO she had also founded; and was also involved in separate projects as an activist/consultant.

An above-average intellectual upbringing appears to have granted Alaya a solid personal cognitive and emotional structure, making her adaptive behaviour fit the resolver category. In spite of the changing circumstances in her life, she managed to readjust, resignify and reinvent herself. She seems to possess a wide arrangement of social and individual skills, which she employs in a variety of forms, above the obstacles in her personal and social environment.

The interview took place in one of the rooms of the building of the NGO she was a founder of. There were absolutely no interruptions, and the conversation kept a flowing pace. It was recorded in video and audio, and her articulate discourse contributed to a dialogue.

Jamal

sex	male
age range	40-59
functional diversity	-
cultural capital	-
economic capital	-
place of dwelling	inside
faction affiliation	-
site	Sour
position/occupation	employee
adaptive behaviour	drifter

An employee in his mid-forties in a Lebanese business, Jamal seemed at first reluctant to participate. More because of not understanding why a foreigner would like to know about what he though, than because of the topics brought up. Possibly, also because the interview was proposed in a short notice. Due to the impossibility of entering other camps around Sour (where the special permission for entry was necessary), where potential participants were willing to be interviewed, but not ready to go out of their most familiar space, Jamal was a hastily found participant who, fortunately, fulfilled the geographical, age-range and sex conditions necessary to be included. He admittedly had not been interested in studying, so started working as soon as possible. Ever since then, working has been a struggle for him, one that took him abroad in an uncertain and risky trip. At the time of the interview, he seemed consequent about his decision and their consequences, showing pride in not having asked for help to anyone, including the Palestinian factions, as he appeared reluctant to incur in debts of any kind.

Jamal appears to fit into the drifter adaptive behaviour. Although he does not seem to possess an extensive intellectual structure, the skills he states having employed did not result in a satisfactory outcome. He is unambiguously not interested in employing his resources, as he considers it is not worth it, possibly due to his experience.

The site of the interview was the site of his employment, a crammed plumbing store, within walking distance to his home refugee camp, el-Buss. The space, albeit forming a kind of a backroom, was open to the rest of the store. Despite initial reticence because of the setting (an employee speaking about potentially sensitive topic with his employer listening), the atmosphere of camaraderie between employer and employee did not seem to hinder Jamal´s options of expression, although, needless to say, it could have had an influence. Being a rather unusual situation, a Lebanese employer and a

Palestinian employee, their story went back a long time, and some of his insights provided new perspectives and experiences, so the interview was finally carried out and included in this dissertation.

The conversation, at times haphazardly conducted, due to the unusual settings, was only taped on voice recorder, as Jamal did not seem so sure about having his image taken by a video recording device. Translation was necessary, as Jamal could not speak any English.

Karim, Khalid, Kismet

sex	male	male	male
age range	40-59	40-59	40-59
functional diversity	-	-	-
cultural capital	+	+	+
economic capital	-	-	-
place of dwelling	outside	outside	outside
faction affiliation	banned/dissident	banned/dissident	banned/dissident
site	n/d	n/d	n/d
position/occupation	activist, unemployed	activist, employee	activist, employee
adaptive behaviour	resolver	resolver	resolver

The three participants of this interview were contacted through a different person in a refugee camp. The three of them belong to an organisation that denounces the situation of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. They do not restrict this criticising to speaking about Israel, the Lebanese legal constraints, and international agencies (particularly UNRWA), they also see that the Palestinian factions are involved in an integrated system that reproduces the factors that result in patronage and clientelism.

It is because of this criticism that they operate covertly. The public members have been banned from entering the camps by the factions. At the moment of the interview, they claimed that the movement was growing, parallelly to the increasingly dire conditions of life for Palestinian refugees. Karim, the one who spoke the most, is a mechanical engineer and was, at the moment the interview took place, unemployed; Khalid worked in a dental clinic; and Kismet was self-employed, but did not disclose nor participate much in the interview, seemingly assuming the role of intermediary between the organisation and the person I met them through. Alongside this, they had designated roles in the organisation.

The three of them display a degree of determination and commitment that can only originate from a disposition tending to a critical approach to reality. Their choice of actively confronting the

established institutionalised social structures shows their resolver adaptive behaviour. Seeing the need of taking charge of their conditions of existence, they arrange their resources and social skills, in spite of facing explicit risks.

During the development of the interview, they disclosed the political affiliation of Abbud, who they did not know I had interviewed. Speaking of the connivance and interrelation between UNRWA and the Palestinian political factions, they exemplified this by specifying the role of Abbud, as an UNRWA officer and member of Fatah, a detail himself had omitted in the interview. It is only their word that can be taken in this matter, as I had no chance of meeting Abbud again.

The interview with the three participants took place in the outskirts of Beirut. A calm enough space, chosen by the participants, where they felt comfortable to speak about the sensitive topics that were to be discussed. There were no interruptions, and the interview was recorded in video and audio, after having guaranteed that their identities, images and voices would not be published to the general public indiscriminately. Although they were not interested in revealing their personal identities, they were aware of their exposure, they were banned from entering the camps after all; they were indeed interested in having people making their movement known.

Although Arabic and English were mixed more than once by both of the parties, the interview was conducted in Arabic. Although Khalid and Kismet did speak some English, it was Karim, who did not have the competency, who did most of the speaking. Due to the favourable conditions of the interview, the feel was that they felt comfortable with disclosing information, so the communication was fluent and devoid of the tensions one could have expected.

Kahlil & Imane

sex	male	female
age range	60+	40-59
functional diversity	+	-
cultural capital	-	-
economic capital	-	-
place of dwelling	inside	inside
faction affiliation	≈	-
site	Shatila	Shatila
position/occupation	unemployed	employee, housewife
adaptive behaviour	Refuser-guardian	refuser

Kahlil had just entered his sixties; Imane was slightly younger. He was and had been unemployed for a long time, himself pointing at the fact that being disabled had made it even harder to find a job. He had lost a leg due to diabetes, and was at risk of suffering more severe consequences, as he nor his family could not afford the medicine he needed for the treatment, and the subsidies from UNRWA and NGOs did not reach them in a timely manner. Sadly, his sickness advanced and he died in the summer of 2021.

Imane was employed, but her job made the claim mainly symbolic, as she worked only for half an hour, not enough for a living (she and her husband had contracted debts), and even less for affording the health treatment her husband needed for a heart illness. They both depended to a large extent on the charity of organisation and the budget spending of transnational organisation and UNRWA, as their immediate circle of friends and acquaintances were in similar situations of material and economic scarcity.

They both display elements of the refuser type of adaptive behaviour. Explicitly stating their dependency of external structures, Kahlil seemed not able to overcome the internal obstacle of his sickness, which relied on the funding of institutions subject to exterior decision-makers. However, their fingers pointed selectively to exterior elements: regarding their outside development, they demanded material resources from specific organisations; while, concerning their emotional structure, they praised the perceived dignity stemming from other concrete institutions, in what seemed an emotional overidentification.

The interview was conducted at Kahlil´s house, as that is what they chose. A small flat in Shatila, calm enough for having an interview, and familiar enough for the participants to speak openly. Kahlil´s wife was around, and at some point, she seemingly could not help but spontaneously take part in the interview, reason for which she signed an extra participant release agreement that had not been anticipated. The interview had to be stopped, as the emotional load had built up, and became unbearable for both interviewer and participants at a specific moment. Video and audio recording were stopped during the interruption, with the objective of having a break and make it easier to come to terms with how everyone was feeling. It was in this moment that I felt the need to thread carefully, as retraumatising the participants was not my intention, but an effect of the interview and the invitation to reflexivity (Gifford, 2013), initiated by me. A few comments were made during this break, that I afterwards took notes of, as they revealed certain valuable insights.

Kahlil and Imane did not speak English, so the assistance of a common friend from Shatila was necessary for translation. Although the person in charge of translating in this interview was not my

designated translator, I could follow the interview, make use of the support, convey through translation more complex ideas I could not ask in Arabic, and additionally, acknowledge the coherence and accuracy of the interview, as the translation provided by the external company revealed. The conversation, albeit difficult due to the almost permanent emotional load, provided the insight of two people in the direst of the circumstances.

Jawad

sex	male
age range	60+
functional diversity	-
cultural capital	+
economic capital	+
place of dwelling	outside
faction affiliation	≈
site	Tripoli
position/occupation	academic, activist
adaptive behaviour	resolver

Jawad is a scholar and an activist. His identity assertion consists of these two elements. On one hand, he is a researcher and a consultant in refugee studies; on the other, he is an activist in the right of return movement. He had participated in the foundation and institutionalisation of more than movement involved in the right of return of Palestinians, and is very active in publishing press and academic articles. For more than 20 years, he has been keeping a busy career focused mainly, but not only, on the situation of the Palestinian refugees and their rights.

The variety of scenarios where he has displayed his resoluteness gives evidence of his resolver adaptive behaviour. Academia and more informal spaces have borne witness to the deployment of his intellectual structures, driven by a determination that seemingly branches out in the direction of cognitive growth.

The interview took place in a public space in the city of Saida. Only audio was registered, he did not want video recorded. Jawad´s competency in English is excellent, so, the conversation was fluent and rife with articulate insight.

Hadid

sex	male
age range	60+
functional diversity	-
cultural capital	+
economic capital	+
place of dwelling	outside
faction affiliation	-
site	Shatila
position/occupation	retired UNRWA worker
adaptive behaviour	resolver

Hadid is a retired UNRWA worker in his seventies, but this ascription does not reflect his whole identity nor the extent to which he has developed his agency. He had the chance of studying medicine abroad, afterwards he applied and got a position in the UNRWA health services. Aside from that, he built up a space for gathering friends and general refugee public in Shatila. He envisioned it as a place for the organisation of different kinds of activities, among which are worth mentioning lectures, theatre plays, and gathering of with different purposes in mind. Some of these lead to novel initiatives he seems proud of.

The resolver type fits into his adaptive behaviour scheme. Intellectually solid, apparently his cognitive structure grew with experience. A solid character that, however, manages to have an open mind and confront the aspects surrounding him with refined toolsets that seem to go beyond the solely intellectual, reaching the emotional aspect. He even stated his own typology of adaptive behaviours (*Vid*. *Infra*, 7.2.c.).

The interview took place in this very space, where he appeared to feel at home. It was conducted with the presence of two friends, who prepared some tea and quietly attended, although they could not understand much of the conversation, as Hadid preferred to have the interview in Spanish, a language he is fluent in. Video and audio were produced out of this interview, fluent and lively, although Hadid´s usual vivacity seemed somehow curbed by the fact of being interviewed.

5.2. Participant observation, participant objectivation

The interpretations through research implies and objectivation of the researcher´s experience through a very specific set of lenses. One of these lenses is constituted by the very personal drive to research a specific topic, with its predefined set of elements, loaded with concrete meanings for the

researcher, who is co-determined by their habitus. Another set of specific lenses is constituted by the position of the researcher in a concrete cultural field (Bourdieu, 1984), in my case, the one composed by the university and PhD programme.

All these lenses, which I am aware of, partake in the act and process of observing and interpreting the reality (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, pp. 115-149) I have been involved at. Unfortunately, habitus is a complex matter, and the predispositions contained within it are not always detectable. The attempt at overcoming this embodied to objectivity might impel to trying to locate oneself in the position of a subject being researched. However, this task cannot be performed out of our limited set of tools. In this regard, Bourdieu points out that

> Those who want to believe with the beliefs of others grasp neither the objective truth nor the subjective experience of belief. They cannot exploit their exclusion in order to construct the field in which belief is constituted and which membership makes it impossible to objectify; nor can they use their membership of other fields, such as the field of science, to objectify the games in which their own beliefs and investments are generated, in order to appropriate, through this participant objectification, the equivalent experiences of those they seek to describe and so obtain the means of accurately describing both (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 68)

Furthermore, apart from not being able to exit our own embodiment and corresponding habitus, there might be sides of it that go completely unnoticed to ourselves, even those around us, who might be partaking in the same tendencies and lived them as intuition. For instance, even if a hard tone of orientalism (Said, 1978) might not be one of the constitutive traits ascribed to me, subtler underpinnings of rather subconscious thought might steer perception, cognition, and emotion to directions, overlooking specific aspects of reality, while accentuating others.

To some extent, ethnography, participant observation (Bryman, 2012, p. 431) and, especially, logging the anthropological endeavour, might prove convenient, not towards the neutralisation of the own habitus and biases, but as a written objectification available for accountability. In this regard, two ethnographic journals, written during both official stays, add a degree of detail to the information shared by the participants of the interviews, as well as exposing the lens through which I observed the reality in the field.

In this context, a cautionary note regarding Otherness needs to be taken into consideration again. The asymmetry of positions in the different fields involved might direct us to objectifying behaviours (Sukarieh & Tannock, 2013) and even the participants of the study. “Object of study” represents a

term valid in the academic field, for the sake of a regulated semantic system of production of knowledge; yet, the "objectification" of the subjects of the study might represent the unconscious (or not so) intention or raising above projected passive human beings, prejudging, presetting, and reproducing the very reified constructed patterns and notions that we are trying to overcome. Thereby, the requirement of having this fact in mind, before, during, and after the research tasks, should be reflected in the resulting gathering of information, as well as in the presentation of results.

5.3. Qualitative data analysis

5.3.a. Data analysis process

The data gathered from the field needs to be interpreted in a systematic manner. Once the interviews are transcribed, the analysis of the documents was based on ATLAS.ti 9 programme. Although fundamentally a qualitative data analysis computer programme, it provides certain degree of quantification.

After establishing the idea and phenomena of interest, the designing of the categories makes the path towards the classification of the information clearer. The documents containing the interviews are classified according to the relevant categories:



Figure 7 ATLAS.ti qualitative analysis programme. Documents containing the interviews, categorised according to age-range, gender, site of interview, etc.

Once categories have been established, the organisation of the content of the interview is due. By means of selecting and codifying, the pertinent content is highlighted and itemised. Additionally, various kinds of relations can be tagged during the same process, binding excerpts of one part of the interview with different other ones, expressing a continuation of the same idea, an extension of the explanation of an event or idea, or the contradiction between two statements:



Figure 8 ATLAS.ti qualitative analysis programme. The content of the interview is highlighted and codified for later purposes.

The different items refer to ideas, concepts, events, relevant for the semantic analysis of the interviews. These items, or codes, can likewise be grouped, depending on the purposes of the analysis.



Figure 9 ATLAS.ti qualitative data analysis programme. Codes and code groups provide a convenient arrangement for the late restablishing of relations.

In this case, the option of being able to filter what a determinate group of participants said about a specific topic, for instance, what the 20- to 39-year-old group expressed about their social experience, has the potential to make the task easier when trying to refine the search for specific co-occurrences.



Figure 10 ATLAS.ti qualitative data analysis programme. Participants classified in columns, codes and code groups in rows, access to specific occurrences is rendered conveniently accessible.

This way, the resulting filtered content provides an easy access to the selected topics, classified regarding the relevant features chosen.



*Figure 11*ATLAS.ti qualitative data analysis programme. The filtered results provide the possibility to build a fast and deep insight about the co-occurrence of the selected participants or participant groups, and codes or code groups.

As much as IT tools provide the means to process and classify information faster, some caveats need to be hand in mind. The semantic analysis of the interviews still needs to be carried out by the user/researcher. Co-ocurrences of the previously established classification and categories supply handy interfaces for processing big amounts of information fast. Yet, the relational binding of the content is up to the user, which comes with the tendencies stated in a previous chapter (*Vid. Supra*, 2.3.).

Additionally, contextual information, as well as some cues and situational information affecting the interview itself or its settings does not reflect in the gathered data. Reason for which hand written notes, immediately after the interviews, might guarantee that this information is not lost. Moreover, occasionally, what is left unsaid shares a degree of importance with what has been shared. For instance, omissions about belonging to a specific group, historical events, or the in-betweens of dichotomic speech might yield some valuable information about the non-expressed ideas.

5.3.b. Codes: identity and agency

The items originated in the interviews, that is, the ideas, concepts and events arising from the conversations, several were classified under 21 different code groups. Among these, it is adequate to specify the two main code groups, linked with the main topic of the thesis, identity (121 codes) and agency (78 codes). The following tables contain the codes contain within each of them:

IDENTITY

"political map"	agent: foreign labour	agent: Israel	agent: Lebanese Shi´a	agent: Palestinian factions
agent: Arafat	agent: Hamas	agent: Lebanese armed forces	agent: Lebanese stakeholders	agent: Palestinian high class
agent: children	agent: international community	agent: Lebanese Christian	gent: mothers	agent: Palestinian lower class
agent: Fatah	agent: Iran	agent: Lebanese high class	agent: Palestinian armed struggle	agent: Palestinian refugees
agent: fathers	agent: Islamic Jihad	agent: Lebanese lower class	agent: Palestinian Authority	agent: Palestinian women
agent: Palestinians in Lebanon	agent: PRS	agent: United Kingdom	colonisation	dignity
agent: parents	agent: refugee camp stakeholders	agent: USA	corruption	discriminati on

agent: Phalange / Kataeb	agent: SSNP	agent: Venezuela	dependency	effective figure
agent: PLO	agent: Syria	Arab states	despair	equality
agent: PRCS	agent: Syrian refugees	collective: trauma	dflp	ethnic cultural field
family	honour	identity shift	narcissism	religion
far right	hope	intermarriage	needs	responsibility
gender	human rights	islamism	occupation	right of return
guns	hygiene	migration	Palestinian resistance	safety
hijab	hypocrisy	morality	pflp	space: Ain el-Hilweh
space: Baddawi	space: Brazil	space: Europe	space: Jordan	space: Palestinian village
space: Beirut	space: Canada	space: Germany	space: Lebanon	space: Rashidiyeh
space: Bekaa	space: Damour	space: Greece	space: Middle East	space: Saida
space: Bint Jbeil	space: Dbayeh	space: Iraq	space: Nahr al-Bared	space: Shatila
space: Bourj al-Barajne	space: el-Buss	space: Jishr al-Basha	space: Palestine	space: South Lebanon

space: Spain	space: Turkey	survival	uncertainty	youth
space: Sudan	space: USA	tahalef	unity	
space: Sweden	space: Yemen	tawteen	values	
space: Syria	statehood	terrorism	victimhood	
space: Tel al-Za´atar	stress	tradition	work/job/employment	

AGENCY

"political map"	BDS	charity	contradiction	despair
agent: LPDC	bureaucracy	collective: conditions	corruption	development
agent: Palestinian armed struggle	Cairo Agreement	collective: cultural shift	covid19	dignity
agent: schools	camp government	collective: displacement	crime	discrimination
apparent reality	challenge	collective: material conditions	dependency	donation
education	gender	housing	leisure	needs
elections	guns	human rights	migration	occupation
equality	health	hygiene	mistakes	opportunity
ethnic cultural field	honour	hypocrisy	mobility	Palestinian resistance

freedom	hope	intermarriage	morality	peace
political solidarity	responsibility	shooting	survival	trust
protests	right of return	social media	tahalef	uncertainty
reflexive deliberation	safety	sport	tawteen	unity
relief	security committee	stress	terrorism	values
repression	self-organisation	structural violence	tradition	victimhood
violence				
wasta				
work/job/employment				

Some of the codes appear in both code groups, due to the overlap of different meanings assigned to them during the conversations, as well as the theoretical implications derived from the noema. The sign (word, expression) does not always imply the same reference (concept, object, event). In addition, this imbrication denotes the complex relationship between the discursive practice, the habitus, as well as different assertions and ascriptions at play.

5.4. Summary

Methodology entails a previous interest in a topic, a predisposition towards thinking in a specific manner, and a preferred set of intellectual and cognitive tools, as well as a motivation. The latter derived in my case from a perceived sense of injustice, but the objective of this dissertation is understanding the relationship between identity and agency in the specific case of the Palestinian population of Lebanon; if such a relation exists, understanding how it works, and how the entailed elements work is the next question. These enquiries lead us to take the path of the subjective world, as lived by the subjects of the study themselves, as well as knowing about the historical precedents, and the theoretical concepts involved.

This subjectiveness, the lack of universal meaning of the objects involved (and a lack of interest in forcing them into discrete categories), means a qualitative approach is the best option. This is so because it is not so much the numerical representativeness of these subjectivities what I set to discover, but the intricacies engaged in the process of meaning production and reproduction, as well as the relational aspect of intersubjectivity. The decision to take into consideration three different dimensions (the individual, the social symbolic, and legal dimensions) (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.4.b.) led me to adopt a phenomenological stance regarding the interviews; a historical perspective, as part of the dialectical characteristic of the specific kind of phenomenology I deemed suitable; as well as a set of philosophical, anthropological, sociological, political and legal viewpoints.

The interdisciplinary approach adopted stems from the perceived need of complementing the gaps each of the domains seemed to overlook. Côté and Levine (2002, pp. 10-13) employ, as a justification of the necessity of their connection between psychology and sociology, the Hindu metaphor of the three blind individuals and the elephant. Each blind person approaches an object they are bound to identify from different sides; one of them touches the tail, deducing that the object must be a rope; the second person touches the trunk, identifying it as a snake; the third one touches a leg, concluding that what they are before must be a tree. Their tactile ability does not provide an inherently wrong experience, but it is an incomplete one in each of the cases.

The human world is composed of a complex assembly of subjective and objectified realities in constant mutual engagement and transformation. The idea that a single discipline can explain complex realities like identity and agency might resemble the Hindu metaphor. In this sense, each discipline might offer a valuable, albeit incomplete idea of an isolated set of components of these realities.

On another note, I refused to admit the most uncompromising sides of postmodernist approaches, which deny the possibility of knowledge, or propose a relativity that renders it futile. I also adopted the perspective of the critical realists, who regard the possibility of the causal power of structures functioning at a relational level, and thus passing undetected, as they cannot be directly observed. This matches the vision of several of the thinkers we engaged in the second chapter. A complex relational assembly of subjective structures, initiated by emotion and expressed through inherited social structures (among which we find the very language we use to communicate), puts us in an interactive field where, more often than not, the institutionalised normative structures, presented as natural, logic, and neutral, actually seem to serve the interests of specific groups of individuals. These have the power and resources to impel the reproduction of the values that impulse the energy contained within society as a whole, but reflexive deliberation triggered within some of the members of society breaks through the illusion, allowing for different patterns of behaviour.

This very brief outline applies to the researches of this thesis itself. Aware of my location in a specific historical moment, at a concrete set of social coordinates, I am aware of the possible biases that could end up reflected in this document. But this awareness is not enough, as the personal configuration of belief systems, as much as I could intend to, does not allow me to leave my embodiment and enter an-Other´s embodiment. Nonetheless, I can provide a meta-account of the ways in which I approached this investigation, so its reliability, replicability, and validity can be assessed at a collective level.

6. Field work findings: multi-layered approach to a dynamic reality

Having in mind the previous phases of contextualisation, disassembly of the theoretical concepts involved, and disclosure of the methods employed, this chapter, divided in two parts, will address the discourse of the participants of the study. Following the threefold categorisation of identity (*Vid. Supra*, 3.4.b.), in its individual experienced dimension, social symbolic dimension, and body politic or legal dimension, this chapter was originally conceived as divided in three clearly defined epigraphs.

The first part (*Vid. Infra*, 6.1.) would deal with the features of the lived experience of the participants as individuals, the first body or dimension of representation and practice (*Vid. Supra*, 4.1.). The phenomenological account under this epigraph will take in consideration the direct, unfiltered, unfettered expressions of the participants, focusing the lens on the assertion of identity, without losing track of the possible hints at their agency.

Phenomenology (*Vid. Supra*, 2.2.a.) advises the employment of bracketing our known experience, accepting the meaning of what the participant is expressing, as part of a meaningful whole. Their "form of life", in the acceptation Bologh (1979, pp. 1-69) makes out of Wittgenstein´s concept (1953/2009), will be taken as a totality in its internal relation. Through this uncritical approach to the concepts and interpretations of the participants, we will be able to address their production of meaning from their subjective standpoint. *Epoché* will therefore be employed as we accept, for the moment, the direct relationship between the participant as a subject, and their interpretation as the object of their consciousness as-is, always as an intentional (Husserl, 1931/1960, pp. 37-38; 1900/2001, pp. 188-189) relation of *noema* (the sign, the object of though) towards *noesis* (the reference, the reality it addresses) in their speech.

The second part, initially devised to be the second body or dimension, was originally conceived of as dealing with the relationship of the symbolical structures affecting the participants in a separate way. Aside from the possible assertion of the own collective identity and agency, Otherness was pictured as having its own place in the account of the social experience of the participants. In this sense, bracketing would consequently be extended to the collective scope, as different forms of life, reified in the intersubjective commonalities, manifest further the bidirectional logic of social structures and individuals. Ascription of identity and agency of the Other was presupposed to provide us with a perspective of what the interpretation of the everyday social structures at play imply for the participants. If the object is no more a production of the individual conscience, but a collective and dialectical production of meaning, the "production" of the form of life, as an individual system, will probably have to attribute part of it to the collective "construction" of meaning. However, the process

of dividing these two dimensions proved to be an analytically inadequate endeavour, in light of the results, which is why this social symbolic dimension will also be featured under the same epigraph (*Vid*. *Infra*, 6.1.).

The third dimension will take into consideration the body politic, the interpretation of the relationship between the participants and the laws and institutionalised normative structures as they are perceived by their object, the individuals. In an inversion of the subject-object relationship, we will observe the way and extent to which the participants approach this relation in their forms of life. As objectified structures, bodies of law and regulations, in principle, impose themselves on other social structures and individuals, that is, the participants among others. But the seemingly rigid legal ascriptions of identity and agency might give in to a constantly changing reality, and the perception of these by the participants. The external legal status (specific identity and agency types) assumed by legal structures might not correspond with the internal production of meaning, and therefore status, of their object, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, some of whom will fill inform of the matter in this epigraph (*Vid*. *Infra*, 6.2.).

This whole procedure will pave the way to moving closer to how these dimensions appear to the participants in their day-to-day life; to the delineation of units of meaning. Having briefly summarised the main historical events in a previous chapter will provide the historical grounding for these units of meaning in specific coordinates. This in turn will provide in the next chapter the possibility of revealing nuances and contradictions, in conjunction with the exposed theory (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3. & 4.). On one hand, the interpretations of the forms of life exposed by the participants will be put against the frame of the historical (diachronic) logic of the production of meaning; in order to know if identity assertion coincides with the operating agency. On the other hand, we will try to reveal the networks of production and reproduction of meaning; that is, the way in which an expressed identity is (synchronically) constructed, and if its assumed agency responds to the reasons exposed by the participants, or are the result of a different set of interplay of social structures. Finally, the extent to which body politic determines and affects the identity and agency of the Palestinians in Lebanon will be explored.

Although this dissertation is of a qualitative nature, analysis tools bring about a certain measure of quantification. A preliminary and rough quantification comes in the word count, or "word cloud" in ATLAS.ti terms: a graphical representation of the words presents, each one with a varying size, depending on the number of times used in the interviews. Leaving out the words that are frequently part of any conversation and bear no significant meaning, a few stand out: "People" and "know" both tally 1,103; "Palestinian", 778; "work", 510; "Lebanese", 446; "Lebanon", 436; and "camps, 415.

Without engaging in a deeper semantic analysis, not much could be inferred from these facts, as we can know *how many* times the specific words have been used, but not *how* they have been used, leaving too much of a space for speculation. “People”, “Palestinian”, “Lebanese”, “camps” (as in “refugee camps”) and “Lebanon” might be taken as outright obvious candidates for high occurrence, as they refer to the basic identity of the agents interacting and their spaces of habitation. As for “work”, it constitutes an element of importance, not only because of its prominence in the word tally, but because it might carry a significance. Bearing in mind the potential relation between the concept of “work” and agency, that is, the ability to affect the conditions of existence, the possible polysemy contained in this word can yield interesting results.

Although based on theoretical concepts, the categories and codes employed (the whole set of them included in appendix D) are the result of the contents of the interviews. This content was then decoded as seen through the prism of the research questions and theory, interpreted by the researcher. This means that theory, questions, and interpretation might carry a certain degree of bias, because some elements are highlighted, while some others are left out. Additionally, the negative semantic space left might also be significant, albeit sometimes rather difficult to reflect through the analysis of the empirical data gathered in the interviews. All of these factors correspond to the integral sense and direction of the qualitative study, and therefore, leads to the effort of ensuring the integrity of the coherence of the project.

The three dimensions of practice (individual, social, and legal) help categorise and clear out the relation of the resulting items. As stated before (*Vid*. *Supra*, 5.3.b.), the polysemy some noemata might hold can be segmented in a manner that different lived experiences, through different habitus and adaptive behaviours, might yield a clearer analytic frame for the interpretation of the existing forms of life.

The 22 participants of the study offered a partial reproduction of their forms of life in the semi-structured interviews. The raw descriptions provided by the interviewees were then gathered under units of meaning, codes, as a means of arranging the content for its later analysis. An initial exploration of the co-occurrences between the codes employed for the systematisation of the interviews with the participants hints at a few interesting elements.

	agent: children Gr=73	agent: NGO Gr=80	agent: Palestinian factions Gr=50	agent: Palestinian refugees Gr=125	agent: Palestinians in Lebanon Gr=55	agent: PLO Gr=63	agent: UN Gr=93	camp government Gr=54	collective: conditions Gr=148	collective: cultural shift Gr=50	collective: material conditions Gr=152	contradiction Gr=84	despair Gr=47	discrimination Gr=77	education Gr=104	family Gr=87	gender Gr=56	human rights Gr=52	individual exp. Gr=491	legal exp. Gr=97	reflexive deliberation Gr=107	social exp. Gr=386	space: Lebanon Gr=60	space: Palestine Gr=86	space: refugee camp Gr=117	values Gr=87	work/jobs/employment Gr=143
agent: children Gr=73	0																										
agent: NGO Gr=80	12	0																									
agent: Palestinian factions Gr=50	2	6	0																								
agent: Palestinian refugees Gr=125	8	10	3	0																							
agent: Palestinians in Lebanon Gr=55	3	3	4	6	0																						
agent: PLO Gr=63	1	3	10	6	4	0																					
agent: UN Gr=93	7	10	8	13	1	3	0																				
camp government Gr=54	3	7	5	3	1	12	11	0																			
collective: conditions Gr=148	18	17	4	28	4	14	13	7	0																		
collective: cultural shift Gr=50	7	4	0	5	5	5	0	4	10	0																	
collective: material conditions Gr=152	17	25	12	22	4	18	16	5	52	10	0																
contradiction Gr=84	9	10	6	7	3	10	13	10	11	0	12	0															
despair Gr=47	5	3	0	7	1	2	0	1	12	2	4	1	0														
discrimination Gr=77	6	6	5	21	11	6	5	0	4	2	13	9	3	0													
education Gr=104	21	9	4	6	8	6	19	5	12	7	14	8	1	15	0												
family Gr=87	19	4	2	7	6	3	3	3	10	10	11	2	4	7	10	0											
gender Gr=56	9	2	0	1	2	1	0	0	7	5	4	12	0	2	5	11	0										
human rights Gr=52	4	1	2	9	7	2	2	1	5	3	5	5	6	5	5	4	11	0									
individual exp. Gr=491	36	37	14	47	27	21	31	18	71	25	61	49	23	29	48	60	29	17	0								
legal exp. Gr=97	7	9	1	24	9	6	13	6	17	3	11	3	3	15	9	2	3	13	20	0							
reflexive deliberation Gr=107	12	12	5	16	2	3	7	2	24	5	17	4	10	4	13	7	11	5	68	9	0						
social exp. Gr=386	35	47	28	64	28	42	30	35	85	30	84	29	22	34	37	27	26	28	106	49	40	0					
space: Lebanon Gr=60	4	3	2	13	6	5	4	0	8	2	9	7	4	12	3	2	0	5	26	8	4	23	0				
space: Palestine Gr=86	5	1	1	10	9	4	2	0	9	4	8	8	4	1	5	5	2	6	55	11	9	31	10	0			
space: refugee camp Gr=117	15	12	4	14	3	8	7	20	36	12	24	5	10	4	9	11	3	4	51	9	12	72	10	4	0		
values Gr=87	12	8	5	8	0	2	5	1	8	9	16	12	2	2	10	11	9	5	54	2	19	34	2	7	7	0	
work/jobs/employment Gr=143	11	13	4	18	3	2	14	2	23	7	24	12	6	28	24	26	7	12	81	21	19	43	12	6	7	17	0

Figure 12 Co-occurrence table produced with ATLAS.ti qualitative analysis programme. “Gr” stands for “groundedness”, the number of interview quotations tagged with the specific code. Mirrored cells shaded.

The table in *figure 12* shows the 27 codes with the highest volume (from the whole set of 227, appendix D), that is, the one that appeared the most. The number inside the cells refers to the number of times the code in the row and the column co-occurred, in other words, the times both codes were assigned to the same quotation. This does not entail that these codes or co-occurrences are necessarily the most meaningful, because, as we stated before, omissions might hold a degree of significance too.

The highest numbers correspond to the co-occurrence of "individual experience" and "social experience", with 106 co-occurrences. This can be understood under the light of various authors´ understanding of the problem of the division of reality in analytical spheres (Durkheim, 1912/1995; Erikson, 1968; Bourdieu, 1992; Marx, 1867/1990; Scheper-Hugues & Lock, 1987). In this sense, we might try to ask and understand about a specific phenomenon from a concrete perspective, only to find ourselves trapped in the employment of technical terms that try to fragment reality, making a comprehensive understanding harder to achieve. This would be the case if, for example, we would consider the phenomenon "work", exclusively from a psychologic perspective, or a sociological perspective. Either of the possible analysis would be wrong (*Vid*. *Supra*, 5.4.), but they would separately miss the relational nature of "work" as it traverses different fields of knowledge in its deployment in the interaction between the internal sphere of the individual, and its necessary external, collective and social nature (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.3.b.).

Among the highest co-occurrences are also:

- "Social experience" with "collective: conditions" and "collective: material conditions": 85 and 84 co-occurrences respectively;
- "Individual experience" with "work/job/employment": 81 co-occurrences;
- "Social experience" with "space: refugee camp": 72 co-occurrences;
- "Individual experience" with "collective: conditions": 71 co-ocurrences;
- "Individual experience" with "reflexive deliberation": 68 co-occurrences;
- "Social experience" with "agent: Palestinian refugee": 64 co-occurrences;
- "Individual experience" with "collective: material conditions": 61 co-occurrences;
- "Individual experience" with "family": 60 co-occurrences
- "Individual experience" with "space: Palestine": 55 co-occurrences;
- "Individual experience" with "values": 54 co-occurrences;
- "Collective: conditions" with "collective: material conditions": 52 co-occurrences;
- "Individual experience" with "space: refugee camp": 51 co-occurrences.

The original idea for this chapter was sticking to the occurrences of the interviews for the remainder of this chapter of the dissertation (the next chapter will discuss the phenomenological findings in light of the previous historical and theoretical considerations), in an attempt to reflect the ideas of the participants in three different parts. These three parts were to follow the disassembly of the experience in the individual, social and legal experiences. However, as evidenced already in the co-occurrence analysis, this intention does not seem to make too much sense. As anticipated in the theoretical section of this thesis, a clear-cut distinction of the individual sphere and the social sphere might be a thing of the practical (and even phenomenological) world; but it has proven to be not so feasible analytically. The Palestinian individual and their social environment seem to be unavoidably entangled. All twelve co-occurrences with the highest value refer to collectively shared realities, except for "reflexive deliberation", which, nonetheless, takes place in a social environment, in spite of belonging to the inner sphere of the individual.

We will firstly proceed to consider the co-occurrences exposed in the first two dimensions together (individual experience and social experience), and afterwards take on an epigraph dedicated to the experience regarding the institutionalised normative field.

The quotes from the interviews have been modified, as some spoken expressions are not stylistically completely adequate for written language. The ideas and their tone have been kept as in the original though. As explained in the previous chapter, names, in addition to some contextual references, have been altered, since they could potentially hint at the personal identity of the participants.

6.1. Palestinians in Lebanon, the individual experience of the social world – the social experience of the individual world

The following table shows the results of the codified elements appearing the most among the co-occurrences, classified according to the three age ranges:

	age: 20-39 5 344	age: 40-59 7 505	age: 60+ 7 362	Totals
agent: Palestinian refugees 125	30	62	33	125
collective: conditions 148	52	34	62	148
collective: material conditions 152	22	67	63	152
family 87	30	35	22	87
individual exp. 491	144	173	174	491
reflexive deliberation 107	35	43	29	107
social exp. 386	85	157	144	386
space: Palestine 86	19	23	44	86
space: refugee camp 117	25	37	55	117
values 87	26	39	22	87
work/job/employment 143	48	57	38	143
Totals	516	727	686	1929

Figure 13 ATLAS.ti qualitative data analysis programme. Codified elements, regarding the individual and social experience, along with the most mentioned related ones, arranged according to age-range.

"Individual experience" and "social experience" stand out, as they are the main guidelines followed when codifying quotations in the interviews. The remaining codes, "agent: Palestinian refugees", "collective: collective conditions", "collective: material conditions", "family", "space: Palestine, "space: refugee camp", "values", "work/job/employment", and "reflexive deliberation can be considered as the nuanced codes, referring to specific matters, often falling under the umbrella of the wider notions of "individual experience" and "social experience".



Figure 14 ATLAS.ti qualitative data analysis programme. Graphical representation of the most frequent codified elements, arranged according to age-range.

"Collective: material conditions", followed by "collective: conditions" gather the most mentions, followed suit by "work/job/employment". These will be the starting point of the phenomenological approach to the Palestinians' experience in Lebanon.

The following distribution in different epigraphs responds to the saliency of said itemised topic. Using the narrative offered by the participants, we will explore how they perceive the matters they examine, according to their lived experience. The titles of the fourth-level epigraphs themselves will be comprised of verbatim extracts of their forms of life, significant to illustrate, in their own words, the interpretation of their reality. They will furthermore be accompanied by a tag, "ID" (identity) or "AG" (agency), as a way of indicating the most prominent element present in the segment; although a clear separation will not always be the case.

6.1.a. Conditions of existence, spatial and material circumstances

6.1.a.i. "Not able for the insects to live in" (AG)

According to the interviewees, one is born Palestinian. However, even though all the participants share the ambiguous legal ascription of "Palestinian refugees", not all of them live in the same conditions in Lebanon. The collective conditions of the refugee camp, above all, appear as the worse option. Housing and its derived conditions seem to mark a variation of life circumstances. There is a general divide between living outside the refugee camps, which is considered affordable only for those with good finances; and living inside the camp, which nonetheless comes with a set of disadvantages. In any case, all the participants seem to be aware of the worrying conditions of the refugee camps. Ghali, executive director of a health centre in one of the camps, provides a concise outline of the topic:

> the general conditions of the camps, in general, is the same, but it varies from one camp to another. Those who are in close security control are more stressed than those who are living in free camps that are open to the neighbours. For example, those in Beirut, even in Shatila with the poor conditions and interference of all the nationalities inside the camp, with all - - they are open to the capital, so maybe they are more free in movement, they are more free to work maybe because they are near the capital, they might have more opportunities than in the south places or the rural places. But, in general, in practice, in practice, for all the Palestinian refugees, who - - those who alleviate their economic situation they go outside from the camp, so they, between brackets, they are "liberated" [laughs], you know? So, now they are - - they might have more chances to move, more chances to have better opportunity than those who are stuck inside the camp, and even more for those who are wanted and for those who are having some legal issues with the… with the Lebanese government

The "general conditions" of the camps, on which all the participants agree on, consist mainly, but not only on the material conditions associated with life in them. Fadi, who has borne witness to the different cycles of construction and destruction, remembers that

> Shatila camp used to be tents until 1958. Palestinians started bribing the police and bringing cinder blocks for building. Some houses started having electricity, iron doors, walls, but not roofs […] People used to build according to the size of the

> tents, so the size of the houses now rarely are bigger than 60 square meters. 17, 28, 48, or 60 square metres, which is the maximum. The maximum number of tents was two, for families with more than seven or eight members

Alaya, a Palestinian female in her fifties, although not a camp dweller, speaks in the first-person plural form about these general circumstances:

> we have problems of water, we have problems of electricity, we have the problems of the factions, we have the problems of the strangers, we have the drug … the drug addiction around and accessibility to drugs, you know, even for the girls it´s … you know, prostitution also, and others

She witnessed the change in the urban landscape of the refugee camps. Concerning Shatila in particular, she points out at the change of the looks of the camp. In the early 80s, even if there was no sewage,

> there were not sewerage pipes underground, they were, you know, on the street, et cetera. But it was different, it was clean, you can see the street, you can see the people sitting on the doorsteps and welcoming anyone who passes by, talking to people, and … friendly, okay? So, all these are gone now. *Ya´ni*, you see five, six, or seven, and sometimes, you know, at some point, there are ten floors, you know, on the edges of the camp. And it´s getting darker, it´s getting … definitely, more dirty, as you see the garbage everywhere. Slippery roads. Yeah, *ya´ni*, the used to speak of the air ventilation, now it´s totally novel, ventilation, let´s say. Or sunrise getting to many of the houses, in Shatila, for example. The same goes into Bourj al-Barajne camp, el-Baddawi in the north

As the refugee camp grows vertically, so does its demographic density, decreasing the sunlight that gets to street level, as well as the flats at lower altitudes. Hannan, the coordinator of a Palestinian women´s rights advocacy association, supports Alaya´s telling, adding to the problem the fact that the scarce sunlight coming in to some houses is further decreased, as the frequent electricity cuts deprive some houses of any light whatsoever.



Figure 15 A photograph of one of the alleys in Shatila refugee camp. Source: Aitor Bikandi Eskutza.

Aisha, a mother of one, used to live in Shatila. But after getting married to a Lebanese man, she moved out, and she does not miss living in the camp:

> I used to live in the camp, now I don´t like to go to the camp, *ya´ni*, I just go there to my parents´ house and just go - - come back to my - - my house. I don´t like it there. *Fa*, now, it´s different

Nazim, president of one of the popular committees, as well as a member of PLO, is aware of the problem of the electricity net. He blames it on the supply itself, as well as the fact that some camp dwellers tackle the problem with trying to tinker with the circuit breaker panels themselves, adding to the problem. He sees a similar problem with drinking water, a scarce resource that, according to him, some camp inhabitants do not manage as he would see fit. Karim, a member of an organisation that questions the paper of the popular committees, the factions, and the PLO, remembers in this respect that in Bourj al-Barajne, "within one year, 60 people died because of electricity", as a result of electrical wiring getting into contact with bodies of water. Regarding the infrastructure, Fadi, director of a Palestinian NGO, and the same age as the Nakba, sums it up with a phrase that might sound harsh: "Shatila is not able for the insects to live in, it´s not for the human being any more". Regardless of place of dwelling, age, and gender, living conditions in refugee camp in general are seen as unfit, and somehow on decline.

6.1.a.ii. "Is this really what you can call a house or a land?" (ID)

Although "not fit for human life", as Fadi laments, the refugee camps do hold life, sometimes in a demographically intensive way, a fact the participants do not overlook. However, not everyone experiences the present, nor the materiality around, nor temporal references in the same way. The following are two embodied examples.

Farha, a woman older than 60 living in the calm El-Buss refugee camp, can be taken as an example of one of the practices that used to be commonplace during the feudal times of Palestine, the one and only reference for her regarding home and land:

> I got married when I was 15 and a half years old. I did not know Abou Jawad [her would-be husband] but I was destined to marry him. Back in the old day, things were different from now. You did not make acquaintance with the person you would marry. The parents … it was the parents´ mission … So, we got married and we were extremely happy. We were happy the whole time […] There is nobody like him. You will not find anyone like him. We were so good together. I lived with him … he used to go to work in the operating room, he would stay there for two days. He could not come back home because of the surgeries he needed to attend. I stayed home with the children. And thank God, my daughters are well educated. They finished college. They are working and they are employees. I thank God for that

Farha was born in 1949, so, she was married around 1964. At the time of the interview, her husband had died a year before, after 55 years of marriage. She perceives her marriage as "destiny", and feels gratitude towards God for having had a good husband who provided education to her children, at the time of the interview, four women and a man, who had the chance of studying, living, and working abroad, in Europe and the United States. Be that as it may, she does not express the same kind of feeling towards the fact of living in el-Buss refugee camp in Lebanon. In a manner that could be considered passionate she narrates the following significant story:

> So … I was sitting here on this chair and I heard the door knocking. It was a young man working with the Red Cross. His name was Saad. He said: "You got permission to visit Palestine at this date…". They used to specify the day and the month. I offered him a coffee, so, he sat down to have it and he started to look

around. Back then, the part of the house where Awni [the son] lives now with his family did not exist. Our house consisted only of this part [pointing towards the part of the house where she currently stays] and of a small garden with trees and plants. The guy looked around and said: “I bet that even if there is peace between you and Israel, you will not go back to Palestine anyway”. When I asked him why he thought so, he replied: “Well, look around you, you already have a house and a piece of land”. I immediately replied to him: “Is this what you can call a house or a land?” Then I continued: “I have been there already to visit my relatives and I wished that they would never come to visit me here because I don´t want them to see how we are living. Is this really what you can call a house or a land?”. I told him that this house was more of a grave and that this land was no land. I added that I honestly wished that my relatives would never come to visit and see how we were living. He looked at me and said: “Oh, really?”. So, I answered: “Of course, I wish to go back to my homeland and live there in luxury. I want to live in my homeland and in my land, this is my true wish. Listen carefully to what I am going to say. There [in Palestine], we will not live in camps but in mansions because I went there and saw where my relatives are living. They live in mansions and they own a lot of properties”

We have no access to the Red Cross staff member´s perspective about it, but the cause of dissension regarding what a “house” or a “land” is, might stem from the difference in perspective in the experience of what these elements are. Immediately after this part of the interview, Farha proceeds to expose her lived experience regarding “land”:

According to my father, I swear by Allah, they did not bother to plant 10,000m^2 of land because they thought it was too small. My people in Palestine are big landowners, they have property, they have lands. The father of my husband had 2,000 dunum [2,000m^2] of land. All of these lands were taken by the Jews, by whom else? My own grandfather had a lot of land. The city Karmiel was built on that land, on his land. The Jews offered him money but he refused. He told them “I don’t not want any money; I want my land”. But they told him that he had no choice but to sell them the land and that they would never give it back to him. Actually, the amount of money they offered was worthless and it was just a scam to take his land away from him. To tell the truth, there is no such thing as fair or unfair price, because this is our land, and the land is worth the soul, it is our homeland. My father

> died refusing to take a single penny. And you can see now the city of Karmiel that was built on his land

For Farha, "family" and "land", and "homeland" seem to appear together in an unquestionable relation of union, even under the form of property; the dispossession as an unfair setback; and education as the source of an alternative to that which was lost, an alternative that could be considered a way of life to be thankful for, at least regarding the material conditions.

Similarly, Abbud, UNRWA officer and "the father of three well-educated sons" speaks about his offspring as having the chance of attending education in above-average universities, and afterwards reaching job positions and obtaining the citizenship in three different countries. His concern, when it comes to his family, does not focus on material conditions, but on the possible demographic dispersion on the base of this dynamic:

> Our generations how will be scattered after three or four generations? Their grand grandsons they will not - - or daughters, they will not know each other. And, most of the Palestinians, I´m telling you, my brothers, sisters, family, they were abroad. So the number of Palestinians are… they are minimizing, reducing in Lebanon, they are reducing, and they want - - look, they love Lebanon, but they want to live in dignity

On another note, when it comes to the education as one of UNRWA´s services, Abbud identifies himself with the UN agency in the following terms:

> when I´m speaking about UNRWA, you know I am a man who is not retired, but there are renewing for me, I am now 63 years old, and when I speak about UNRWA is as if I am speaking about myself, because I am UNRWA. I was born UNRWA too, my father was working in UNRWA, studied UNRWA, worked a certain time outside […] then I came to UNRWA. So it is in our life, because if there were no UNRWA, we are not here

It appears that pride is part of his discourse about the UN agency, as, according to him, its existence is tied with the existence of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, if we consider that "we" refers to the wider; although it could also be understood that it is his own presence in the agency that he is referring to. Sometimes, the transposition of the first voice of the plural feels ambiguous and ambivalent. However, when asked about his personal feel, he leaves no room for doubt:

> It is not only - - it is for every Palestinian, because, you know, there [in UNRWA] we have received our health services, vaccination when we were children, we received education, the alphabetical from A-Z, when we were there at school, how to write, how to speak, what is the arithmetic it's there, the culture there, understanding orders was there. You know, we are here UNRWA, and we came to Lebanon, the Francophone country, and we are our parents and sisters and, you know, they are Anglo-Saxon, so they brought the language with them, the language of trade and business […] Lebanon was French educated. So we were there, we were the leaders of this education, we helped them, we helped the Arab world. These camps […] from this camps the education came and it was scattered at the Arab areas and the Gulf countries and Lebanon. *Ya ´ni*, these are the situation of the camps and how we are running there our daily activities there amongst the people. We you have to be there, amongst the people […] To be a successful leader, to be a successful person, receive the admiration of people and accept what you want, you have to be amongst them, you have to listen to them

The transposition of his feel to the feel of the people who have received the services of UNRWA seems clear. Not only that, but also the opinion that the English-spoken education, grounded on the thought that it is the language of trade and business, seems to have a univocal value for Abbud, who also appears to take pride in being a leader that mingles with Palestinian refugee camp dwellers. Otherness seems to mix with attachment when speaking about education, transiting from the same ascription to some kind of ascription grounded on the coordinates occupied in the economic and cultural fields.

6.1.a.iii. “Camps used to be more …” (AG)

Even though accurate registry does not exist in any of the refugee camps, the competent authority in Shatila, that is, the Popular Committee, formerly lead by Nazim, does have an estimate of the figures: «There are around 8,000 Palestinian Lebanese in Shatila, around 3,000 Palestinians from Syria, and others from Syria and other nationalities. All of them are 25,000, the number varies between 22,000 to 25,000», although these estimations come with a caveat regarding figures in general, concerning the number of Palestinians in Lebanon, speaking in the name of the leadership of the Popular Committees, Nazim states that

> We know the population figures because it is [part of] daily work. Some figures are not real, the Lebanese authorities use it politically, if they want to project the image of a problem, they say it is half a million, if they do not care about it, it is 174,000

Different layers of objectivation exist regarding the political usage of objective conditions in order to influence subjectification and narrowing down of the different identities at play. Regarding the Lebanese policy-making structures, Mehdi states a clear portrayal:

> Lebanon is formed by confession-sectarian agreement between the representative of - - and these representatives are, some religious, and old families from the Ottoman time, and feudal representation. And because they are in power they benefit from the situation economically and socially, and they renew their grip of the power all the time

Circumscribing the socioeconomic coordinates comes with the situation of being a Palestinian living in the camps, as Badih puts it, «The pressure, the discrimination, the unemployment, and the political situation are all part of the conditions […] Our situation is always in our mind because it makes living conditions unstable and difficult for the people». A form of life present in practically every step of the life of most of the refugee camp dewellers. It comes as no surprise that when «we are sitting having shisha and coffee talking about the situation, we speak about our social situation, the security situation, the current affairs regarding the Palestinian situation, the political issues and what will happen in the future»; or, as Nazims depicts, «[Life] is very difficult, we know people who live on less than 10,000 lira on a daily basis». 10,000 lira used to be the equivalentof around six dollars at the time of the interview, and less than one after the socioeconomic meltdown.

Inwards, there seem to be different levels of knowledge and acknowledgement of the government of the refugee camps by Palestinians themselves. Some do not know much about it. Taher, for example, being a Palestinian who spends much of his time in Shatila, because of family and friends living inside, and although not an inhabitant of the camp, says that he does not “have the insights of the - - how is politics really affecting the camp. It is, it is certainly, but in what way, I don´t have the details”. Similarly, Aisha, who used to live there, says that

> to be honest, I used to live in the camp, *bass* I don´t know who rules the camp, you know? *Bass*, I know, *eno* … people who rules the camp, they are not doing anything, they just maybe taking benefits for themselves, like money *w heke*, or

> just to be, like *eno* "I´m powerful *w hek*, and I´m not doing anything, *bass, eno*, like if I enter fight, I can do anything *w hek*". *Bass* that´s it, I really don´t know anything about the parties or the organisations and these things, really […] I´ m not into these things, you know? Eno, I don´ t know what they work, Fatah, Hamas *w heke*. Eno, from we were young, eno, our parents didn´t want us to be … involved in any party or anything

In spite of saying that they do not know much about it, they do have the impression that something in the atmosphere of the camp is amiss. Taher, for example, even though a bit ambivalent when it comes to his own feeling about it, appear to have a nuanced non-binary perception:

> Honestly, camps used to be more … I don´t know how to say it … it used to be better […] It´ s not very safe. People are afraid. People that come from the outside are afraid […] They hear stories about the camp. It makes them think it´ s some kind of jungle or war zone. It´ s not

On the one hand, he appreciates change in the environment of the camp, it used to be somehow better for his taste. On the other hand, he rejects the picture of a "war zone" associated to the camp, saying that it´s a

> very nice place, very normal place. I grew there practically. Spent seven-eight years, I have many friends down there, many good people down there. It´ s now at the - - people see it so much different than what the outside-world pictures it

He thinks it´s "unfair" the camp has such a negative social image, which he attributes to "lack of awareness from certain people toward people of the camp, made everything that´ s happening today possible". When asked to develop this idea, he hints at what could be understood as the circles responsible, who, he thinks "are allowing certain people to do certain things that could be bad for the reputation, and for everything that´ s happening in the camp". Being the sensitive topic it is, eventually, he reveals a more detailed account:

> There is some people that you look at as responsible for the safety of the camps, are dropping sight of drug dealers, I will be frank with you […] They´re making them do their job very peacefully, very nicely, expand even. And you have kids, you have youth, in their first beginnings. They are destroying a whole generation.

> And no one even cares, because you are on a drug-dealer payroll. So you just sit there, every month you take your money, and just shut up

He admits that "even talking about these things down there could be dangerous". Aisha too is careful when it comes to dichotomising the issue, but she is clear about her feelings towards Shatila:

> *Eno*, it´s not like me, *ya´ni*, like, everywhere, wherever you go, there´s the good people and there´s the bad people, you know? *Bass*, the time - - the time I was growing … growing up, being a teenager and like this, the camp was full of troubles, full of drugs, full of this. *Fa*, I was growing - - I was opening my eyes on these things, *ya´ni*, I didn´t see the good people*, eno*, my parents, it´s - - they are a little bit … *ya´ni*, strict, they didn´t want us to, like, get in contact with people inside the camp, *eno*, they are afraid of us to know people, bad people or *heke*. *Fa* - - *fa*, that´s why, *eno*, I grew up seeing drugs, seeing - - like, this bad things, or even the … fights, and this stuff. *Fa*, I just don´t like the camp, don't like to go inside the camp. Of course, I have friends inside the camp, *bass, eno*, we don´t like - - *eno*, I can´t go to the place and come very often, you know?

To that, she adds the general disorder that she specifies in the following account:

> I didn´t go to another camp, except Bourj al-Barajne camp, only this one. *Eh, bass*, *la*, they are not organised, *yahni*, for example, me, if I want to build a house, I can build it above my parents´ house … I want to … like Saad [her brother] is a bad person, he can come and take money from me, you know? Because I´m - - I open like a shop, and then he - - he wants money, like, he can come and take money from me and go, like nobody will talk with him

She continues giving another example, the story of the parking slot taken from her father by someone else, just because they could, and no one would report them. In the same manner Taher does, she concludes that, even if she does not have a deep insight about it, she sees no organisation in the camp.

Alaya has two kinds of accounts regarding the organisation and general feel of the camps. Her lived experience, as someone who witnessed first-hand the past of the camps in the 80s, speaks of change in how they were organised, and how much different it is nowadays. On the other hand, her exchanges with camp dwellers and interest in what she considers part of her own ethnic and cultural background provides a detail account of a past:

> there had been once, actually, the secular organisations for the camps, that used to be respected *kaman*, and they used to go like… in, kind of, special hierarchy that is followed. We know that the Palestinian people, the Palestinian refugees, actually, are educated people. They came from cities and villages in Palestine, where they were ahead of other people in the region, you know, in many things. So they understand the form of municipality, they understand the form of having a… the *mukhtar*, for example

She brings up the example of the presence of the *mukhtar*, the Palestinian village representative of the families; regarding UNRWA, she shows what looks like an ambivalent distribution of official and factual responsibilities:

> We know that the UNRWA is responsible for infrastructure, building … you know, all these main things, while … somehow, whether it is said or done, but it is in the shape, you know, on the outer appearance, the UNRWA handles responsibility to the popular committees

She also mentions the "security forces", in charge of "maintaining security in the camp", and "civil society organisations", who handle issues like

> the food, for example, poor families, orphans, et cetera, responsible for the … to provide education, to help in the activities, to support in … [clears throat] sorry, in working towards, you know, all that is valuable to the Palestinians

On an organisational or administrative level, Nazim, president one the popular committees himself (and a member of PLO), details that its members are "not selected by people", that is, by the refugees in the camp, but by the factions themselves. He did not seem to like the fact that representativeness was defective, and some of the mechanisms that could possibly solve it were not being implemented because of lack coordination, or even interest, a fact he did not point out directly. He indicated the need to know "who is living in the camp [… and] meet the Syrian people", but recognised it was not easy.

His self-critique went further. For example, regarding the interaction between the Popular Committee and NGOs, he drew the attention to how, officially, they need a permission to operate in the camp; but in practice none of them even asks for the permission. He attributed this to the parallel initiatives carried out by the individual factions that compose the Popular Committee (and most of them PLO too), who let some NGOs come under their wing, if not build them up themselves.

He brought a significant element to the conversation regarding the practical details of working in the Popular Committee. At a moment of the interview, a member of the committee barged in the room the interview was taking place. In a rude manner, seemingly trying to get the participant´s attention and impose his intentions, immediately after the brief episode. left the room. When asked about how the functioning of the Popular Committee could be improved, Nazim answered the following:

> for example, [lowers voice] we have some members of the Popular Committee… they do not work, they are just “bombers”, when we remove them they make a problem, so it is something like "Look at me, I am a member of the Popular Committee". For this thing I think we have a problem, this man his party put him in this place, so this is problem. If we remove him, we must take permission from his leader to remove him. This is … this is a problem, this is a problem […] We have many people here, “Look at me”, he is … his gun and "I am somebody" [laughs]

This somehow correspond to what Taher opinion refers to, from his position as a non-camp inhabitant:

> In my opinion, just an opinion, the people, the Palestinian people that had the power, the authority, in the past, did some mistakes. These mistakes grew on. People and authority and power, these days, doesn´t have the intention to solve or talk about these issues, they just put it aside and go on with whatever they are doing. I don´t think these issues are important to anyone, or anyone think about them, about the main thing that should be done at the time […] Solving our - - making things better for Palestinians here. Because this country have the most amount of refugees that doesn´t have the basic rights

Coming back to Alaya´s perspective, she sees change happened after the Israeli invasion and withdrawal of PLO in 1982:

> the community, after 1982, they have changed, *yahni*, it´s been quite a … a defeat, you know? Something that victimised the - - truly, the Palestinian people after they were … they were looked upon as … strong, let´s say, and sometimes they were … it´s other than “strong”, the word than I´m trying to find, actually, because, in the 70s, you know, having this show-off, the weapons and the power in Lebanon, and being treating the Lebanese with disrespect, some of them, not all of

them, *taban*, so, as I said, it created enemies, it created hostilities in the communities

Regarding the feeling of safety, she resorts to the account of refugee camp Palestinians´ accounts. Even if all the camps share the same structures, although in difference circumstances, the overall feeling is that

> the people who live in the camp, who used to live in the camp ever since, they say the camp is not the same. It was, you know, long before, it was safer, it was a little like a village. People would think of each other - - would, you know, care for each other. And this is the case all over, in all the camps, by the way. *Halla*, it varies from one camp to another, yes, but generally speaking, it was totally different. It´s not only the type of buildings, of course, it´s the … the environment, the … how do we say … the aura that is in the camp

Compared to that, her own experience, which starts in the early 80s, hints at a different feel:

> it was organised, yeah, it was … it was structured in a safe way. But now, no. now every street, or every - - it´s not … it´s an alley - - in every alley it has its own controller, yeah, someone, you know … aside controlling, the idea. So, there´s no safety, no matter what they actually try, several times. Now, specifically in Shatila, they tried several times to … to stop, you know, the smuggling of, you know, drugs issues, the problems of water and electricity and … and you must have heard and seen definitely, many were victims of these … of these conflicts

Similar to what Taher´s intuition was about the feeling regarding safety, Alaya, a more acknowledgeable person, concurs. Despite having normative structures in place, the actual feel of the camp is far from that of a safe space.

Karim, the volunteer and member of the movement critical with the camp government, does not doubt pinpointing a network of agents and interests, all converging and resulting in the situation of the Palestinian refugees in the camps. He specifies three reasons why mobilisation is necessary, according to their organisation:

> There are three main reasons behind this movement. The first one is the host country Lebanon. The second reason is UNRWA, the UN Trustee for the Refugee Community. The third is the security chaos in the Palestinian camps. I will explain in detail each item, and I will explain why the refugee community is looking for

> refuge outside Lebanon to Europe, Canada and Australia. Starting from the first point, the host country Lebanon did not sign the Geneva Convention 1951 regarding refugee rights. After the civil war in Lebanon, the Ta´if Agreement was signed. One of the clauses of this agreement is to not allow the settlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon

Additionally, he points at three agents, according to him, the source of much affliction to the Palestinian community in Lebanon:

> Lately, with the economic crisis in Lebanon and with the COVID-19 pandemic, the Palestinian refugee rights and health, living and economic situation in the camps has become very bad. UNRWA, a bad mediator who is recommended by the United Nations. UNRWA was established temporarily, meaning that when it was established in 1949, the decision to establish it was temporary. UNRWA suffers from corruption and administrative slack, which has led to a lack of real reflection on the life of the Palestinian refugee. This corruption and administrative slack have been reflected in the services provided by UNRWA on the Palestinian refugee community. Although donor countries have provided billions of dollars to UNRWA over the past 70 years, these financial donations have not been reflected in the life of the Palestinian refugee. We in the refugees community lack relief and financial aids […] There is a small percent in work process but it's confined in Wasta and cronyism in the political factions. Factions control the majority of jobs in UNRWA. They are now dealing with the refugee community in a factional manner, meaning they have taken control of all

Karim and members of the movement claim to know the membership and affiliation of certain high level UNRWA officers to Palestinian factions, even initiatives as important as the reconstruction of Nahr al-Bared refugee camp (partially destroyed in 2006 by the Lebanese Army) are led by members of Palestinian factions. "*Wasta*", the Arabic word employed to refer to nepotism is used by them to refer to the way power and its different shapes are distributed among people affiliated to the factions.

The overall lack of financial and material resources means, for Mehdi, that the «majority of Palestinians who stay in the refugee camps are somehow related to or assisted by NGOs», dependent on the type of assistance and how long for external agents decide to assist them with. This is a fact that brings unrest in different ways. People like Ghali, who has a two-decade experience in the

specific field of provision of health, feels it can get to be shameful. Some other people, like Aida, the activist in Shatila, and Kahlil and Imane, both unemployed inhabitants of the same refugee camp, recurrently mention the shortage of funds for the health treatments they or members of their family need. Aida, who has worked as an intermediator to get extra funding for patients, points her finger to UNRWA, but also NGO in the field of health, particularly regarding cancer cases:

> patients they need help, NGOs cannot cover, and they cover a little, a little bit. If you want to go to hospital, for example, they make a little bit of donations to cover the treatment, and it´s not enough. Also, UNRWA. UNRWA covers a little bit of treatment, and it´s not enough for the cancers patients. Because these cancer patients need a lot of money, and every patient - - there is a law inside UNRWA, that every patient gets a little amount for their treatment during one year, it´s around 12,000 dollar for each patient, to cover. As you know well, many cancers, many cancers patients need more than 40,000, 50,000 dollar per year. So they cover about 10% of the treatment. Many patients died, died because they cannot continue treatment. They don´t have money, so many died. How they will continue? They must - - UNRWA must make a programmes, focusing on programmes for the treatments

Kahlil was disabled at the time of the interview; he had already lost a leg to gangrene, caused by diabetes. In his case, the treatment was not so costly, but monetary help had become scarcer with time:

> Even if I want to work, there is no work at all. We are depending on the "white hands". Nowadays, if anyone wants to work, there is no jobs. And if there is work, we cannot go to work. Generally, the Palestinian situation is a hopeless case. If there are donation, we can live with. However, if there is no donations, Palestinian people will pass away […] Recently, they don´t give us any donations

With no option to have an income of his own, he depends on the "white hands", charitable organisations, NGOs, UNRWA, PLO, and Palestinian political factions. The latter, PLO and factions, sometimes cover a varying percentage of some treatments, but not in every case. Imane´s husband needs treatment for his heart condition, which has affected his brain, but she barely makes enough for daily expenses:

> We can't live without the "white hands". We have no one to help us. For instance, I go to work for half an hour only. That is not enough for medicine. We owe. Most of the time, we don´t have 250,000 Lebanese lira at home and we search on how we will get the medicine. I went to the associations every 3 months to give us a donation once. His medicine costs 570,000. It means we can´t buy anything else, if the white hands don´t help us. One time every 3 months, the situation is too bad. My husband has a brain and heart diseases. He has no job. But his 10 years old son is the one who is working, so the situation is too bad. Sometimes, we have money and sometimes we don´t

When it comes to charitable organisations, they seem to understand that they cover the expenses only partially. This happens as, for example, the *zakat*, the charitable donation grounded on Islam (actually one of its five pillars), happens only when external donations take place. However, UNRWA appear to be on a different level of expectation. Speaking of the UN, Imane says the following:

> They give Syrians 700 or 800 thousand monthly, but we as Palestinian refugees gave us 300 thousand every 3 months, which is equal to 167 thousand monthly. We hope that UNRWA takes care of us […] We hope that UNRWA takes care of us. We need its help monthly not every 3 months. What is the difference between Syrians and us? I talk honestly, the Syrian has a country and he can return home, but we, as Palestinian refugees, are too sick. Not only me with my cause and sick husband but all Palestinians are tired and having a very bad situation

While Kahlil mentions that "We didn´t receive money for four months", Imane reiterates the injustice she perceives concerning the distribution of funds: "We hope that UNRWA takes care of us. Syrians have a country, and they have a lot of children […] They give Syrians everything". The increasing of funds by UNRWA appears as a just claim; and the perceived discrimination when compared to the Syrian refugees, a confusing factor. Just after this topic, when asked about PLO however, another agent mentioned in the conversation, the conversation is steered to other domains, not of claim and complain, but of praise. Kahlil speaks of it in the following terms:

> It is the institution, the Palestinian people, and the origin. It is the most important organisation. It is recognized by the United Nations. Since Yasser Arafat went to the UN, and made us so proud

The interview had to be momentarily stopped at this point, possibly due to the emotions accumulated throughout the interview. Kahlil did not want to stop speaking about it though:

> He is our symbol, Yasser Arafat. There is no one like him. He is the base. He is the one who built the PLO. And we follow his lead

Kahlil´s wife, present during parts of the interview, added more emphasis to her husband´s words:

> I want to tell you something about Abu Ammar [Yasser Arafat]; we hope that the PLO keeps us proud of it. In addition, thanks god, it always makes us proud. We hope that the Arab presidents don´t forget the Palestinian cause, because it is every Muslim and Arab person´s right. We will not give up Jerusalem; it is our blood and honour

There is yet another type of agent playing a role in this sense. Aida could be seen as an NGO of her own, a "one-woman-NGO", apart from being part of the women´s section of PLO (General Union of Palestinian Women), as she states. Apart from somehow brokering health treatments for specific individuals, she focuses on education grants, which she looks for among her international contacts. Resorting to meetings and her network within the General Union of Palestinian Women, she selects "the poorest ones, but these students must have good grades, because the students who have a good grade, you have to help him, or to help her". She sees the importance of NGOs, but sees that the overall effort is not enough:

> Of course NGOs are helping our society in some kinds of services and it´s very important, but it is not enough, they are not doing enough work. And they are focusing on some cases, not on all cases […] Palestinian people inside the camps, all of them need help, not some cases, all of them they have to be helped […] they need more donations these NGOs, maybe they have a certain amount of donations, because of this they focus on some cases

6.1.b. Camp conditions: organisational, factional, and humanitarian

6.1.b.i. "Just survival, being secure" (AG)

In any case, "Non-Governmental Organisations" appear as an umbrella term, containing many kinds of organisations. Regarding the quantity of NGOs, Mehdi, the Palestinian jurist from Mar Elias refugee camp, says that "in Lebanon there are a lot of NGOs working in the Palestinian field, but

sometimes they are competing with each other". Hadid, retired from his duty as an UNRWA doctor, and a member of the community who actively engaged in trying to mobilise people in the camp, sees that with so many NGOs present in the camps, little has changed; implying that, apart from not being effective, most of them are moved by the business opportunity, that is, money. In the same way, Fadi, whose motivation to found an NGO has already been exposed before, complains about the fact that the large number of organisation and the equivalent amounts of money that seem to be invested in some NGO initiatives do no really trickle down to the refugee population:

> for all Palestinian people in Lebanon, there was four NGOs, now in Shatila you find, at least twenty NGOs, so… The main people, the main stuff, I mean, the association, in each association they have so many stuff, but all them do the same

Aware of his own role as the director of an NGO, does hint at the difference in functioning regarding to founding:

> the donors come, as we say, as a reaction. They come to help in the "choke moment", in the beginning, they come heavily with their ideas, with their way, with their studies, with their way of working, which sometimes is not fit with the circumstances when you are trying to work with, or to help. And when there is a sign that the fire stopped, they think, or they behave as if it´s okay, now they can leave […] It´s the contrary! During the fight, during the bombing, during shelling, during killing, people look just for surviving, they don´t want anything, just to survive: They are living in shelters under the ground, they are living in unfinished buildings - - just to be secure, to be safe. Even they are sick, they don´t feed; even they are traumatised, they don´t feed; even they are having no food enough, it´s not - - no problem; no clothes enough? No problem; no cover enough? No problem. Just survival, being secure

The resilience of Palestinian people keeps them alive no matter the handicaps they are made to suffer. They do not have the time to feel suffocated in the "choke moment" Fadi refers to, in the midst of armed attack, bombardments, even massacres (Naharnet, 2022). It appears as if the fight or flight response would make extreme needs and circumstances insconsequential, according to Fadi. However, when the body allows itself to ease up, slow down, look around, and assess the situation, structural and basic needs arise again. Fadi continues description of this later phase:

> While, when the fire stops, all this comes up again. Then they start feeling that they are cold, they don´t have enough cover, they don´t have clothes, they don´t have enough good food, they don´t have good education, they have health problems, and they have to repair their destroyed shelter, or they have to find school, they have to find the clinic. All this is coming at once. Then [snaps fingers] there´s nobody to help with this issue. So, who has to be under this pressure? The poor NGOs *ya´ni*, because they have to - - because people consider them as the mean or mediator between them and the donors. But the donor, they already left, and they leave you in the face of all these difficulties

To some extent, Hannan, coordinator of a women´s rights NGO present in several of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, points out the essential difference regarding the possible strategies of organisations in general, and NGOs in particular:

> First of all, every association has its own program and plan, for example. We are the only ones who have a women's rights program, and we have a rehabilitation program in camps and psychological support. Everyone works with psychological support and emergencies. Everyone works in emergency services for children, but we work more with women, with women and men. Our plan involves 70% of women, 30% are men, and the man must participate in society like a woman. We work with both men and women. This is what distinguishes us here. For example, they work with children psychological support. We work with the family as a whole, and most importantly, women

Strategical development and approach to the community, or tactical emergency relief. Having Hannan´s disquisition, these seem to be the two main ends of the spectrum for NGOs. Attached to each one appear what some participants consider values tending to a more momentary and superficial, albeit necessary relief; and, on the other hand, long term, deeper, structural development. Participants whose experience in the field protracts for decades are clear about it. Fadi, for example, has seen the temporary sequence that triggers these interventions happen more than once:

> Those people are suffering in the camps, in the winter it´s hell and in the summer is hell; their children are dying, from the cold, or from the fire, or from the water. And, up till now they are the target for exploitation with the health issue, with the education issue, and so - - *ya´ni*, many of the children are not in schools. So, this amount of - - and, more than that: those donors, they came to replace and to

challenge the locals. Either they want us to be copy of them, and they make brainwash to us to accept their strategies, or their procedures, which is not ours, or they want us to be in a trouble in any second, now, any second, maybe, they will leave, if any new situa - - political situation in Syria they reach - - they will leave immediately, so, how we will handle the story and the economy? So, once I said "We are preparing ourselves not to be left behind just to decide to leave, how to manage after you leave, not while you are here", because those - - now they are having this so many… offices, so many staff, so many facilities… these for themselves. So, millions of dollars come, maybe ten dollars reach the refugees, because it has to go for the rent, for the cars, for the high salaries, for the benefit of the donors. And always they bring you specialist from abroad, as here we are just stupid

Similarly to what Abbud indicated, Fadi perceives an abundance of NGOs that are equipped not only with financial resources, but also strategies of their own, which sometimes seem to not have much of a connection to the circumstances and conditions of the environment they are supposed to assist in. These resources are not seen as something that really trickles down to their supposed beneficiaries, like Aida argued. Ghali, exemplifies the detachment of some outside NGOs from the actual conditions and needs of the refugee camp, adding to it his personal emotional reaction:

I got angry when I see those organisation who are… who are working only on relief things and go to the camp to have photos while they are giving the bread, they are… *ya´ni*, it's very shameful, for me it's very shameful, for me. And, for me, look, in the last clash here in [***], there was a big clash and there was a total neighbourhood was destroyed that time […] We were here and we are in the middle, between the conflict, after … after we finish, after 15 days of sleeping here in the hospital all the time and trying to see a safe way to bring doctors from outside and to run under the shootings, some guys came from outside, and say "Oh, how are you? Are you fine? *Kaza* … ah, okay we need to donate with water bottles for the people that were stuck", you want - - I am doing this big job, you are asking me to distribute water? [laughs] That is one issue for the NGOs that depend on many sources that come from the outside, it means that decisions also come from the outside, and the design of the functioning comes from the outside

Alaya too has a prolonged experience, according to which, she sees benefits and disadvantages in international NGOs. On one hand, in a more personal note, she highlights the better financial earnings; on the other hand, in the same vein Ghali and Fadi did, she sees an incongruity in the values bound to their actions:

> *Halla*, definitely, why the international NGOs? It´s because they provide better salary, okay? And because the relationship with the local community makes it different, *la eno*, it is difficult to be … to start, you know, from somewhere […] the institutions, the local institutions and … and organisations, they actually work for the welfare and wellbeing of the community, right? So, starting from that, any NGO starts with the values and the principles that it has. Then, there are outside factors that come to corrupt this […] It´s when helping them, or trying … trying to … sorry, trying to empower them within the contextual principles and values that … that we need to hold on to, okay? *Halla*, when NGOs become corrupted by effect of the international community, the people become repulsed, they do not accept what you bring along, okay? However, having someone from the community who works with the community, based on the … on the … on the values that they are and, actually, working towards improving the youth and the behaviours in this sense, the - - it becomes … a bit acceptable, let´s say, or more acceptable

This seems to be the reason why she chose to work on empowering the youth in the camps, when the aftermath of the Oslo accords made the feelings of loneliness, hopelessness, and desperation the rule.

Ghali has a matching standpoint regarding what could be thought of as an imposed hierarchy between local Palestinian NGOs, close to the life conditions and experiences of the refugees; and international NGOs with an agenda design abroad. He states that, built on the experience his non-profit organisation had with international donors, "we cannot expect the maximum from others". The ideal objective of reaching an agreement with UNRWA, the main health-care provider for Palestinians, along with the PRCS, seems far away, as he perceives that the UN agency is not willing to accept what they have achieved, but is looking for certain bureaucratic standards, an "accreditation programme", for which they would need an investment they cannot afford if they are to continue providing a service. This means he and his organisation are stuck with working with certain material standards, and specific values in mind:

> *Halla*, first, it starts from the values that you are working, within your values in the organisation, how you approach your community with the needed services, upon the gaps and upon the needs. So our projects should be based on community needs and community project, you know? So, if we don't have this in origin, we could be like superficial, we could work only as the trend that is going now, so only to collect money and have it like a business in order to make our people more dependent on our services

Ghali states not only the strategy-tactic divide, he also assigns a predefined set of values to each paradigm. Seeing first one as tackling structural issues with a link to the target community, while seeing the second one as the commoditisation of humanitarian action. He continues detailing the situational context in which he has seen this happens:

> So the origin starts from this perspective, from this point of view, because if you don't believe in your project, you only change upon the trend now, you will… you will, in time you will not appear at all, because we found, we… we recognised some of these organisations that only open during the war, and then [fsshh – wind gush], and they do a big business [laughs] during the war. So, this is the problem, and this is the bad … the bad, *ya'ni*, issue of the NGOs, without control, without - - and even in the Lebanese Ministry, the Ministry of Interior, they the only treating with the papers

For Samer, the young activist from Ain el-Hilweh, NGOs provide "the last space to have life, to have hope in life, to make some money and a source of income inside the camp". Although different life circumstances, Alaya and Samer agree with the fact that money from NGOs can be a positive factor in the life of individuals employed by them. He goes further, saying that

> There [NGO he partakes in] you are in accordance with the principles of volunteering. In the other centers, they say you are a volunteer but you're paid 15 or 20 dollars for each day you volunteer. That is shameful because when you are paid you are no longer a volunteer, you are a part timer or a paid employee. You are no longer a volunteer. In [the NGO he partakes in], you work 30 days per month on something you really love working on and you're a real volunteer because you are not being paid

Being or not being paid comes with other values attached, he sees it is not only about having a financial income. Additionally, he sees another advantage in working in NGOs, along with having a space for sharing and socialising, “They also play a positive role in the camp´s social life because they provide the possibility to meet people from different cultures and civilisations”. However, not everyone sees “multiculturality” in the same context and terms.

6.1.b.ii. “People have changed, there are many strangers” (ID)

In spite of having been destroyed more than once, some of the camps have grown to host an increasing number of inhabitants. Despite the fact that it is not officially legal to take construction materials in, camp dwellers´ agency has seen this restriction outstripped, the space has undoubtedly grown vertically to fit the growth of the population and the intake of newcomers from different countries. Aisha, who used to live in Shatila, but kept her distance from certain spaces and people, hesitates when describing her memories of some camp dwellers of her time there that she did not like:

> I don´t know. I´m sad that I´m saying that, *eno*, I feel […] I´m judging them, *bass* […] I can judge people from what I see, *bass*, I used to be, *ya´ni*, when I was a child [laughs], *eno*, I didn´t get, *eno*, I don´t have to judge people or something, *bass eno*, when I see fights all the camps is like this, *´arif shu*? *Bass* now, *eno*, I know … I … *ya´ni*, I know that I can´t judge them on that, *bass*, what - - *yahni*, I don´t know […] *La*, I can tell you why, I can tell you why now, for now, by - - before I couldn´ t understand them

Apparently aware of the emotional load, attached to her period in the refugee camp and her feelings towards it, Aisha displays a reflective awareness of her own position as an observer of the situation inside, curbing her initial insight about it:

> I … I was small, bass now, *eno*, they can … they can´ t have their lives, *ya ´ni*, even me. *Ya ´ni*, you can´ t work, you don´ t have life, you don´ t have anything, even your house is - - isn´ t, *ya ´ni*, the house you dreamed of. *Eno*, you don´ t have these rights, all people has it, you know? Of course you´ re like this, you have negative vibes inside you, this negative vibes will go to the children, the children will give it to another one … and it´ s like this. *Eno*, because of lack of rights, because of - - I don´ t know. They can´ t work, they can´ t build their selves

It seems that it is only when she comes to terms with the conditions for life in the camp that she comes to an understanding with how she feels about them. Badih personally relates to that feel in his experience. We already know about his opinion regarding the different people in Ain el-Hilweh refugee camp: some individuals opted for the easier ways out, like joining factions or militias they did not necessarily agree with (the option Badih disliked the most), or stopped trying to improve life in the camps. In any case, he empathises:

> there is some people doing what they can, you know. Because I really understand all of them, once you know, when you grow up, you are to have dreams, playing for your future, and when you, you know, have the - - you are surprised by the real life … the real life, it's a kind of shock, you know, okay, you try and you will try, but as a Palestinian situation, you know, it's always going worse

But, having in mind the population of the refugee camps, in many cases, is not composed only by Palestinians, the social experience of the participants does not always come in these terms. Fadi has seen the demographical development of some refugee camps. Gradually, a space built for Palestinian refugees became something else, with the common feature of being marginalised:

> So this population, suddenly, was in the same place with low integration, each community has its background: Palestinian, Syrian, Lebanese, Kurds, Gipsies, Palestinian from other camps, Iraqis, you find Jordanian, Egyptian, even Asians. So for this small location to have all those people - - the common among them: the poverty; the common among them is the depression; the among them, the no-future. So the it wasn´t the life easy in the camp any more. With these circumstances we have a new issue start coming to the camp, which is the drugs

With what could be understood as "multiculturality" comes attached a perceived higher risk of deterioration of the social environment. Ghali speaks of the "interference of all nationalities inside the camp", referring to Shatila; Nazim, one of the responsible agents in charge, does not have accurate figures about demography, as the president of the Popular Committee of one camp, he specifies that there are around 8,000 Palestinians, around 3,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria, and an unspecified rest, composed by around 14,000 people of "other nationalities", to complete a total amount of around 22,000-25,000 people. He admits this data is not accurate, indicating in addition that, in general, the number of Palestinians in Lebanon is a subject of political calculations, so, estimations are increased or decreased, depending on the interest, "if they want to make it a big problem, they say we have half a million".

In any case, the perception of the “Palestinian” camps not being so Palestinian any more, regarding the demographical proportions, appears to be widespread among the participants. Mehdi, the Palestinian jurist, mentions the possible consequences of this phenomenon:

> now there is a change, you may realise it when you go to the camp of Shatila, for example, the famous Shatila-Sabra massacre of Palestinians, now one third of the population is not Palestinian. And, in this, I think, this is something bad for Palestinians and for the Lebanese also, because there is a moment that UNRWA will say "We want to give the services but, because there is a shortage of money, from American pressures, etcetera, we will cut all those who are outside the camp from assistance", so it's also diminishing the capacity of coherence of the families to stay in Lebanon, whether by Lebanese discriminative laws, whether by the diminishing of assistance internationally

This is somehow contradicted by Fadi, who sees a difference between the “burden” Palestinian and Syrian refugees are, and the poverty belt built up around it, which nonetheless adds to the infrastructure problems:

> *Ya´ni*, really I am thinking about those - - *ya3ni*, the Syrian refugee and the Palestinian refugee, they are, I can say, burden, it´s not right to say this word, but I say they are heavy responsibility in the poor areas, like Shatila camp, like other Palestinian refugee camp, or the poor surround in the camp. Because, as if you move in the street, you can´t move. The electricity is not enough, the water is not enough, the garbage is not - - will not have enough people to move it. And United Nation, UNRWA for the Palestinian, they say “It´s not our responsibility, we are responsible the Palestinian refugee”. So who is responsible about the services of those refugee here? Thanks to his giving hand, but… I mean, again, those they were respected in Syria, they have their own home, they have their own jobs, they have their own properties. They were respected people. Here, they are refugees, okay, but they have feelings, they have human feelings, you have to respect their dignity, you have to feel that they are not… *ya´ni*, punished because they are seeking the survival

On another note, Alaya, expanding her insight about the change in the camps, hinting at the already mentioned risk of deterioration of the social environment:

People have changed, there are many strangers, there are many strangers in here. Not only, you know, there are what they call the “displaced” and the “incomers” as they explain - - as they use the expressions. The displaced are those who came from Syria, for example, whether Syrians or Palestinians from Syria. So, adding up to the refugee crisis in … in the country here. And, the incomers are Syrians, Syrian Syrians, and the other nationalities, okay?

Seemingly reflecting the official categories employed by transnational agencies and NGOs, Alaya makes a distinction between what she ascribed under the label “strangers”. People coming to Lebanon from Syria seem to fall under different consideration, depending on their nationality, but mainly the ascribed reason for their mobility. Syrians and PRS are “displaced”, while “other” Syrians, regardless of the reason for their flight, are incomers. The distinction is clearer when it comes to a different kind of “stranger”:

What about the fugitives? The Lebanese fugitives, who actually find their safe haven inside the camps. So, that was not seen, you know, even for the Lebanese who were here. They act- - they were integrated within the Palestinian community […] People have changed, there are many strangers, there are many strangers in here. Not only, you know, there are what they call the “displaced” and the “incomers” at they explain - - as they use the expressions. The displaced are those who came from Syria, for example, whether Syrians or Palestinians from Syria. So, adding up to the refugee crisis in ⋯ in the country here. And, the incomers are Syrians, Syrian Syrians, and the other nationalities, okay? What about the fugitives? The Lebanese fugitives, who actually find their safe haven inside the camps. So, that was not seen, you know, even for the Lebanese who were here. They act- - they were integrated within the Palestinian community, but I wasn´t - - because, still it was closed, it was limited, but nowadays it´s too much different, yahni, in the past 15 years it has totally changed, not only the - - of course, yahni, we add to that all the poor people who come to cluster around the poor, okay? Like the people from Bangladesh, the Srilankese that used to be here, the people from Ethiopia, Sudan ⋯ you know. This mixture have changed the texture of the camp, you know? According to the people. And, if you notice that all the youth are leaving the camp, you know, they get married, they want to ⋯ to establish their own families, and they leave the camp, they find places outside to rent, which is their

> right to leave, because they fear for their children, this insecure life. We hear of the - - we hear and see, actually, the drug dealers, drug users

She specifies that this fact might be linked to a general strategy aimed at Palestinians:

> losing the right to work, with the right to employment, all these … issues that, you know, civil rights, that the Palestinians are deprived of. Other than that, it´s … there´s no chance or opportunities for them to get a … you know, to receive money, even the - - even those, you know, who are enlisted within the factions, because of the sanctions on the Palestinian authority, they are unable to send the salaries to the - - to those individuals as well. So, it´s all like - - it is targeted, you know, the Palestinian refugees are targeted to reach this situation, and even the camps, to be open in this way, and get … yeah, I don´t know … mix- - it´s not mixture, it´s something …you know, different … ah! I can´t find a word now … it´s *al-uan*, you know, *al-uan*, *khalit*, *khalit* in a sense … that is … you know, any mixture, any mixture [will] actually break the purity of one solution, you know, so we have many solutions and … okay? Poured into one cup, so … it has changed the situation

The camps closer to urban areas have become cramped spaces for the subaltern. It might look like it is in fact not a completely accurate term to brand them as "Palestinian" refugee camps. The inhabitants of Bourj al-Barajne and, particularly, Shatila, look at the influx of non-Palestinians (and sometimes Palestinians from Syria too) with concern, and somehow relate it to the deterioration of the environment. In spite of the presence of UNRWA and some other NGOs, focused on assisting the Palestinian population, other organisations take into consideration refugees from other states, frequently originating from similar situations of abandonment by the Lebanese State.

6.1.b.iii. "They want us to be dependent" (AG)

Although Lebanon does not avow the existence of any refugees in its territory, according to Ghali, the ambivalence of being a "refugee" means that

> The Palestinians in Lebanon are not legally distinguished as refugees, nor foreigners, they are dealt with in a very special condition, which entails discrimination. The discussion of providing civil rights, opening the camps and giving them the opportunity to have a proper job and identity is set in these parameters

This notably affects their rights and material conditions, as Mehdi states, «The situation of the Palestinian refugees is connected with the confessional political distribution of power in Lebanon». As we saw earlier, the confessional balance, stemed from the National Pact in 1943, set a fixed cuota for each confession, and due to the majoritarian Sunni population of the Palestinians, their inclusion would hypothetical distort the balance and lead to instability. In practice, due to the inexistence of an official census since 1932, this balance has been artificially kept as government quotas, regardless of the population´s real proportions.

Something similar happened to the population management of different organisation, among them UNRWA. Abbud admits that the «population of Palestinians in Lebanon, according to UNRWA figures is 450,000, but there is not more than 240,000». A partial answer both this inconsistency and the prior confessional balance is given by Ghali:

> There is a fear of the normalisation of the Palestinians in Lebanon. Palestinians risk their lives in the sea and travelling to Europe, there rest stay in Lebanon and could be normalised, their number is not a big issue for balance of the sectarian division, even between Sunna and Shia. The Palestinian populations would not change the balance

It would be difficult to prove this, as there seems to be a deliberate effort to keep numbers relating to demography obscured, by more than one of the parties in the Lebanese State. Estimations could be set, projections forecasted, but reality is that no party seems to be interested, considering that ambiguity relating to numbers can be strategically employed for objectives in the economic, social, and political fields. In any case, Ghali continues, Palestinians «are not recognised in Lebanon as refugees nor foreigners, they are dealt with in a very special and discriminatory condition, Lebanese rules discriminate against Palestinians, so some of them feel frustrated, it has been 70 years in this situation». Supporting this end, Karim stated that «the Lebanese State deals with us according to its mood», to which Khalid added «the Lebanese State sometimes treats you as a refugee, sometimes as a foreigner».

This way of dealing with the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, according to Mehdi, affects «the capacity of the families to feed their children, the chances of having a salary, the chances of finding a job, the options of going to the university», since the «Lebanese authorities´ refusal of standarising Palestinian refugees´ work leaves them with three choices: joining armed groups, leaving the country, or staying». This staying apparently constitutes the grounds for the lingering in a *de facto* refugee cycle of life, a permanent state of construction or reconstruction, where both the urban and human

landscapes seem to be trapped in a spiral of constant degradation, where keeping afloat means struggling to keep a basic lifeline steady.

This insecurity was the alleged original cause for the creation of UNRWA. Established in 1949 precisely to assist the refugees in such a situation, in spite of the Lebanese polity not being as clear as it would later be regarding its treatment of the refugees. Abbud insists in the apolitical nature of the agency he belongs to:

> Since its establishment, UNRWA is a humanitarian organisation aimed at helping, supporting and providing services to the Palestinians […] In UNRWA we run a business with 3,000 staff members, we have employment offices, collaborate with other companies, and have our legal offices for our protection and survival […] We understand politics, but we don´t get politically involved, we want to be politically neutral

The divide between "humanitarian" and "political" seems to be clear for Abbud. Focusing on the technical matters of running the agency though, he mentions the need for "protection and survival" by legal means, a statement that might be understood in ambivalent ways. Centering on the apolitical nature of UNRWA, Abbud continues:

> We use politics as a network for our humanitarian actions. We know politics in order to have good relations with the community leaders, who are constituted by politicised elements from different parties, whose thinking we need to understand in order to know how to work. We want to keep political neutrality and equilibrium amongst them […] We are like a government without a police force and without a political background, nor political interventions, which are related to the Palestinian factions and the Popular Committees and the Lebanese political parties

This brief extract from the interview with the officer of UNRWA seems to reveal a meaningful set of precepts the UN agency works with, a world view, in addition to a strategy and an understanding of the reflexivity at work among its officials, at least at a formal level. However, on what appears to be a more personal note, Abbud seems satisfied with the agency´s role, referring to a "lack of political background", while also admitting that «UNRWA has to help to keep the Palestinian cause alive», which comprises a political aim in itself.

From the perspective of some of the camp dwellers (field journal 2019, 2020), «All the stages of UNRWA life present services for the people, but it does not solve the Palestinian issue, it helps with

a certain quality through its services, but does not solve it». What is more, according to Ghali, this dynamic makes the "beneficiaries" «dependent on UNRWA, who makes them reliant on their services» (Ghali, 2019).

The way Palestinians in Lebanon have ambivalently transited from the uncertainty of displacement and dispossession to the certainty of having to rely on their own strategies, seeing themselves entangled in a socio-political field where they perceive the habitus of the Lebanese citizens and the state-wide policymaking embroils their opportunities have drawn a distinction: «The Palestinians believe they have always been discriminated whenever the discussion of providing them civil rights, opening the camps and giving them opportunities to have a proper work and identity has taken place», Ghali states, while «Lebanese politicians exploit the poverty and need of the people», as Fadi adds. The conditions of displacement, dispossession and struggle appear to mix up and create a complex construct of interlaced strategies, protracted difficulties that include the consequences of power assymetries between state, refugees, humanitarian government and external influence.

Both Mehdi and Ghali try to clarify the relation between the situation of the Palestinian refugees and the demand of rights and their return to Palestine. The second one indicates that

> Providing civil rights to the Palestinians in Lebanon does not go against our right of return, but the Lebanese are afraid of providing civil rights, specially after the civil war, unfortunately Palestinian factions took sides, this affected the minorities in Lebanon, the Christian community, who is afraid of the presence of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, because they think they are coming to take over Lebanon

The implications of being dependent on UNRWA work as follows for Mehdi: «Giving money to UNRWA does not [imply] asking Palestinian refugees to reject their right of return [… This has to do with] the lack of development of the application of UN´s resolutions».

Palestinians agency in Lebanon is demanded to be taken into consideration, regarding the development of their own community, as Abu Mujahed stated before, and also concerning the shape of support: «Palestinian refugees in Lebanon need political help, not charity» (Fadi, 2017). Having in consideration that they can take matters into their hands and apply the strategies that the community might need, since they are the one the future is depending on, the ones who, day by day, face the consequences of the negligence of representatives of identities misrecognised and instrumentalised. Yousif doesn´t exclude himself from the solution: «We have to be (socially-politically) involved in

everything specially because we are the youth, the main factor for change, if we want to change we have to act» (Badih, 2019).

This is so to a point that some, like Aida, straightforwardly reject *tawteen* as an option, «they´re afraid from *tawteen*, and we are against from *tawteen*». One more, the transposition of the lived experience is expressed in a form of life where the same disposition is assumed. Furthermore, she states that «If you meet any Palestinian in Lebanon, in Jordan, in Palestine, in Gaza, in the West Bank, any Palestinian will say the same, we cannot forget our country, even if we didn't see it, because it's in our ideology».

Someone from a completely different background like Abbud, ina higher position in both economic and cultural fields, speaks in a very similar way: «we are Palestinians, we came from Palestine, and we don´t know that if you´re Christian or Sunni or Shii, we are one, we are united». However, this union is not unambiguously specified in his speech. Mention of classes is significantly absent most of the time in the participants´ speech.

Be that as it may, an objective reality is imposed upon a segment of the Palestinians in Lebanon, those living in the refugee camps, particularly the lower positions in the economic field. In this sense, agency in both its objective and subjective perspectives seems to be diluted in a network of being political but not acting politically. An objectified dimension of UNRWA´s presence pervades the Palestinians´ lives, as Mehdi admits: «Palestinians in Lebanon need UNRWA», although in a limited manner, as people like Ghali criticise, both regarding its general practice: «Since the Nakba, they want us to be dependent, this way, they built UNRWA so we only take their rations», and in respect to its particular methods, for example, concerning education: «I was one of the refugees affected by the poor UNRWA quality standards […] Palestinian refugees who studied 12 years in UNRWA school can not speak English […] This is an indicator of the quality standards of the UNRWA».

6.1.c. Education, values, and nation

6.1.c.i. “UNRWA does not solve the issue of the Palestinians” (ID)

Ghali, the executive director of a health centre, offers what seems to be a more complex sketch of being a beneficiary of UNRWA´s services. Based on his personal experience and the outline of his career, he mentions not only the indispensability of UNRWA education, but also nuances involved in progressing in the wake of the circumstances of living in a refugee camp:

> I´m the executive director of [***], I used to study - - I lived here in Ain el-Hilweh camp, as one of the Palestinian refugees that - - who are living here, because my grandfathers, my father, after Nakba, they didn't have any choices but living in the camps, so we are considered the third generation after Nakba. I used to study in UNRWA school, and I was graduated after the 12th class in Siblin training centre, which is the educational training centre belonging to UNRWA organisation, and I have a specialisation, like a diploma in business and […] later on I tried to improve my career and I did different various type of training, leadership, management, project management, finance, I have different types of training during my career until I reached this position

This does not stop him from being critical with the UNRWA policies. He speaks from the standpoint of "one of those refugees who was affected by these standards", claiming that

> the problem is that UNRWA does not solve the issue of the Palestinians, it helped, it does not solve, it helped, yes. But when - - my personal opinion, when you play with the standards, with the quality of the service provided - - for example, I give you an example, in education, the Palestinian refugees who studied 12 years in UNRWA school, you graduate, you cannot speak English […] this is an indicator for the quality of the standards that they put or introduced to the education system in UNRWA

From his perspective, having had, for example, to improve his English language skill on his own, he disputes the founding principles of the UN agency. The members of the dissident organisation went farther, claiming that it is UNRWA´s interest to keep principles and standards low. Ghali, acknowledging that its role was of importance, he differs about the necessary lines of work for relief and development, arguing that relief is the main rationale for UNRWA services:

> UNRWA at the beginning with the Nakba, it was important, because any … any displaced people or any refugee they needed support to … to survive, to find food, to find shelter, to find anything, but once it´ s sustained for 70 years, it becomes like the only hope for the Palestinian and they now catch with UNRWA as … like evident of the refugees´ problems, and it´ s a kind of tool that it should remain until the people return to Palestine. Why? During all the - - it's my personal opinion, all the stages of UNRWA life, it presents services for the people, but the people how they present and what quality they present?

As if like answering Ghali´s question, for Fadi, the initial idea of building up an association was tightly related to the conditions he saw in the refugee camps, in special attention to children:

> the Palestinian refugee in general, and mainly children and women, are suffering from the isolation, from the poverty, from discrimination. And with high rate of drop out of schools, early child labour, and in - - *bass*, it was still beginning, wasn ´t seen yet clearly that the children are target to the abuse, to the exploitation, physically and morally. It was as a sign that we need to establish an association to deal with the children from six to 18

Being from the same generation Farha is, the lived experience regarding the reality of the family differs. While the first one relates to her own family experience, the second seems to be set in motion due to the circumstances he sees some families in the camps live in. Additionally, he points out to a perception of maturity present among the Palestinian refugees, judging that six-year-old children are mature enough to take care of themselves:

> from zero to six […] people there have some psychological feeling that to take care of the children still they are - - but when they reach six and they have to go to the elementary school, some psychology issue again makes people feel that the children became mature, mature enough to take care of themselves, which is not true, it´ s not right. And that makes the children target easily in the street or in the wait to school, or when they are going out of home to some kind of exploitation

Regarding the work his association carries out, he sounds frustrated with how immediate conditions, particularly material and economic scarcity, limit the possible impact they might have in the life of families and children:

> So, every time our programmes, our projects, our priorities change. From - - sometimes you want to think about sustainability, but the refugee, the relief work comes to you. So, who is losing in all this process? Unfortunately, the children. Psychology, or economically, or morally, or socially, really, the children; and, I have to say, the mothers, because they are receiving the most of the burden of this unstable condition […] we are talking about no house, no infrastructure, no work, no income, you know? We have families splitting, family division, mother and father and one part of the children here, sometimes, other children somewhere else;

> sometimes the father with part of the family, the mother with other part. The circumstances, really, is not easy to describe

His vision of improving the life of the refugee camp dwellers through education, appears to come to come to a halt when more pressing matters, related, for example, to housing and basic income, burst in their lives. While the material conditions seem to be an important hindrance to their way and form of life, there is a difference as to how they refer to the issue. Most of the times, the participants mentioned nothing about their economic nor material condition. An exception to this is Aida, active as a mediator for acquiring health subsidies for cancer patients and grants for Palestinian refugee children and youth, who explicitly admits that "I am not rich, I am poor", a condition she lived at a younger age, which seems to motivate her drive to assist in the educational field:

> my hope and my dream is to help everyone, every student, Palestinian students. Because when I was … I was in the university nobody helped me, I worked, I worked in summer season, and continued my university facing all my costs, on my own

The intake and presence of Syrian refugees fleeing from war, particularly since 2014, still tangible, she perceives injustice in the distribution of international aid. When asked about it, she reasons in the following way:

> I´m focusing just on Palestinian society, because, as you know, our Palestinian society, nobody helps them, all the world is now helping just Syrians, and they forget us, they forget the Palestinians, in spite that Palestinian is now in more need for the help. So why I have to focus on Syrians? I have to focus just on our society

Apparently, some people living daily life in refugee camps have a perception of UNRWA services that, in spite of admitting its usefulness, can imagine a better system. Against these claims, Abbud defends the UN agency:

> some NGOs they are surviving, they are attacking UNRWA to receive money […] To fill the gap of who are they are speaking about the gaps of UNRWA? […] it is not only with UNRWA, with our camps, it is in the Syrian camps. You see how many hundred NGOs they are working there? And the money is there, and there is … there is corruption […] We, while we are UNRWA, we are 70 years old, we have our audit […] after the Syrians came, there is no money, UN organisations are working there and there are main chiefs living in Bekaa and - - The people are

> seeing the difference between us and the others [NGOs] […] our cars, they are old cars [laughs], and the others they are the best cars, where are they living, how much they are receiving - - the people are, *ya´ni*, of course, they are seeing what´s going on, and they started to see how much we are UNRWA

Apart from the growth of the refugee collective, Abbud cites the budget cuts, and the dependency of the criteria of the donors, who might pledge their money to thers countries. Even if "accustomed" to these circumstances, he thinks that UNRWA´s existence is in danger; in line with what he thinks when asked about the possible disappearance of Palestinians in Lebanon, he states that

> The plan is this, to make them disappear. But I don´t think so. I am seeing those generations who were born in America. I am seeing them one day they are coming to the Middle East as American- or Canadian-born. But how - - they speak Arabic, they don´t read - - they don´t read Arabic, but I see how much they are Palestinians, how much… how much they are Palestinians, how much they are close to the land. And I think them abroad, they will be the good voice

It is not clear what being "the good voice" might mean, but considering the variety of opinion concerning education at its crossroads with the lived experience and conditions of each participant, it seems like being Palestinian comes with a different set of expectations and responsibilities, apparently varying depending on the person speaking, that is, their economic, cultural, and social capital, as well as their experience, expectations, hopes, fears.

6.1.c.ii. "Women are a main part of the revolution" (ID)

The outlook on Palestinian women is generally that of a continuously improving matter. However, this ongoing empowerment seems constrained to the labour world. Some of the participants look at the past looking for what sound like inspiration: women are a main part of the revolution

> back in history it has always given me the power, as a woman, okay? That the Palestinian woman have always been active, and they have always got role in the … even in the struggle, in supporting their families, and working, ever since. What happened is that they… *ya´ni*, back in *Falasteen*, before 1948, I know that the women were actually *fedayeen*, they used to smuggle the weapons, they used to support their husbands, children, et cetera

Inspired in the historical example of struggler women, she draws the pervasiveness of the strength of the "Palestinian woman", which she raises as the "model":

> They were - - the Palestinian woman is a… is a strong person, and you can see that even now, you know, I´m not talking about in diaspora, also look at those women in *Falasteen*, what they are doing, and these are actually our model

She does consider herself a "feminist", although she states that she has been, and is still working, on advocating for the rights of women. In her vision of a future State of Palestine, women and men would have equal rights. Badih, concerning the present, states that there is not so much of a problem with gender inequality in the organisation he belongs to,

> for us we don´t have a problem, since the revolution started, women are a main part of the revolution, since its start in 36, 48, and 67, and here since the invasion. Because we believe that, as a Palestinian, we don't have this part of differentiation between woman and man, because we believe that it´s a main part of the society

Once more, the transposition of one individual´s thought to the collective might cover a more complex reality. On another note, a closer look at why the role of the woman is important for Badih reveals significant information:

> the importance of the woman, for me, it´s really completely important, because the woman will take care of the children, she is the first one who put these [ideas] in mind, you know, the loving of Palestine, how to keep with the… keep with these issues as refugees, and she is the first one who put everything above Palestine for the children

The function of the woman as a caretaker, and transmitter of ethnic-national memory, a selfless and even self-sacrificing figure seems to stand out as reasons for the importance. On a second thought, he does see a problem related to the acceptance of women, which he ascribed to Islamists. Opposed to that, he states that, in the organisation he belongs to, they do not give in to this discrimination. Most of the volunteers are women, even though positions high up are occupied by men (field journal, 2019), so, whoever works with them, needs to accept the presence and work of women.

Close in age to Badih, and asked about the role of the woman in the Palestinian community, Taher shows a more critical stance:

> These days we should believe in equality between men and women. Anything a man could do, a woman could do, and she even could do it better. So, yeah, we are - - everyone is in this, everyone should participate, engage, improve, in the Palestinian community. And the woman is no less than a man, in such things

Unlike Badih, he notices restrictions to advancement in this sense. Even though he thinks that capable women should lead, he emphasises that "a woman can´t speak her mind", which hinders that path. Hannan, due to her work as the coordinator of a Palestinian NGO that works precisely empowering women, explains how women have and still are going a long way, towards higher shares of equality, and recognition of their agency and rights. Recalling a specific initiative as an example,

> The women painted the camp to make it more beautiful. They work a lot to make the society better, and all of that is because they start to know their rights, they start to be more aware. Now they work to help their families. Before many years, the woman was prevented from work, from having a job. Now everything is changing, there is more awareness, women now know their rights and start to take her them

Apparently, for Hannan, the employment of women, their more active agency in the public sphere, and claiming and possessing rights go hand in hand. Their work at the association, against early marriage, awareness about harassment, and rape, she highlights, have made these problems non-existent among Palestinians in Lebanon, unlike regions of the Lebanese countryside. Additionally, women´s remunerated work acts as a fail-safe, as the family can count on a backup salary, an experience she saw herself in. Economic independence acts as a catalyst for change in her mind. Not only for matters like divorce, but also for the improvement of her overall situation

For Aida too, there seems to be a focus on work in the public sphere, regarding the empowerment of women. She likewise contrasts that, in the past, women used to be limited to working inside the houses, while, after the Nakba, women became aware of her role in society, some of them even enrolling in military operations; just like Alaya, who sees in the martyr women an example. Regarding the present, she seems to associate the belonging of women to organisations like the PA or PLO, to the importance of their agency. Concerning the future, she sees the woman "beside her husband, her babies", and working in the PLO and NGOs, influencing the society.

Hannan sees that, to an extent, this image has come to pass already. Citing the case of a shooting, she exemplifies how the agency of women can steer public life in a better direction:

> I mean, once when there was a case, let's say shooting happened in the camp. The women went and talked with the factions that we didn't want weapons; at that time many offices were closed and it was thanks to these women who went and talked. I mean, we support them, we support them with their rights, but we are not a party in factions or anything

Concerning partisanship, she is very clear as to how they deal with the issue. Common grounds and initiatives are possible with other organisation, but setting clear boundaries is a must, according to her:

> We do social work and social awareness. We are with women and we are with the local community. We see its issues and help in them. If we were invited to an event by any factions or organizations, we respond to the invitation but we work separately. We may deal with the popular committees for example. Maybe we as institutions band together, see what we want, and put up a memorandum or something like that, but the main goal is women - not women only but the society

On a more critical turn, two of the older male participants share somewhat a similar insight. Fadi seems to find it distressing that family values seems to be fading with time. He mentions divorce, the separation of the different members of the families with children in different countries, which he relates to lack of common understanding. For Hadid, part of the problem related to children lies within the values associated to communal living in the camps. Education and common understanding relate to the role of parents, rather mothers, judging from his expressions. Instead of thinking that their upbringing consists of "feeding and cleaning" them, reflection and psychology is needed, in order to improve collectively.

6.1.c.iii. "My village is …" (ID)

Concerning the Palestinian collective in Lebanon, Fadi mentions three of the keys aspects that define its conditions as follows:

> when you talk about the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, you are talking about 68 years, the question is not about giving of those refugees some blanket, or milk, or some clothes, which is also right. The first thing for those people, or those kind of refugee is to give them - - to support their dignity. They have a country they belong to, but it´s occupied, Palestine. So the question of the Palestinian refugee is

> not to give them some ration, or some food, or some clothes. They have right as a human being, because they have no state now, because of the Israeli occupation, and the European and American support of the Israelis

The situational perspective and delimitation of the refugee experience of Palestinianness brings a grounded perspective of the noema, an image of thought that relates to sociohistorical coordinates. Abbud, a Palestinian UNRWA official in his sixties, sounds outraged when he says «I once heard Golda Meir say she was Palestinian. In spite of some people saying there was no Palestine, there is Palestine, it is the history». It is significant to note that an antagonist´s words are taken as prove for this point.

In a different way, Badih, an activist in Ain el-Hilweh, expresses the same issue: «Our issues go back to Palestine. The refugee camp is a symbol of the existence of the right of return and the existence of the refugee», that is, refugees, who had a limited set of options regarding resettlement, like in the case of Ghali: «My grandparents and my father did not have any other choice but to come to live in the camp».

Even though the arrival at Lebanon and the different refugee camps was not homogeneous, biological and geopolitical family structures were willingly simulated in some of them. In the early years of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, the older generations witnessed the first stages of the refugee camps. Fadi, whose "memory started working three years after the Nakba", nevertheless states that the camps were not "formulated by anybody, but by themselves … formulated as village and families". Shatila, for example, used to be an empty space, only sand. It was 1949 when the first families settled in the lands of a Druze landowner who

> said "Ok, let them use it, they don´ t … *ya ´ni*, it´ s empty, and it´ s just sand", so when the Palestinian came, they said "Ok, come", and they come the Red Cross was there. There was three or four villages, the people who came were from Majd al-Krum, Nahf, Farradi, not Farradi, also, Sbsaf, Sbasf, and, *ya ´ni*, it´ s three-four villages. And then, the others knew they were opening camp here, so who came first? The cousins of those who were here, from the same villages … And then, you know, the families some times they have intermarriage with other villages, then they came from Biejour, from Sasah, from… Those were the ones who came at the to Shatila …this area here next to the mosque, usually there are mostly Majd al-Krum. And the Sufsaf there, and afterward other people came from Jaffa, in the corner, where the school is; here it is Sasah, down the street, the main street

This mapping of the camp relates to the villages in Palestine their dwellers originally came from. The perception Abbud was speaking about in the previous epigraph is grounded in the explicit organisation of the different villages in specific sites of the camps, leading to double geographical identifications. Kahlil for example introduces himself as "My name is Kahlil, Palestinian, I´m a 48 resident of Shatila camp, I´m from Jish, and I´ m 60 years old. I born in 1960", the same goes for his friend Imane, who says she is "54 years old, a Palestinian from Jaffa". In Kahlil´s case, the identity is located along three coordinates: he is Palestinian, specifically from a village in the "48 lands", that is, the territory nowadays known as "Israel", and a resident of Shatila refugee camp.

When speaking to random people in refugee camps (field journal 2019, 2020), this pattern is commonly reproduced. Palestinian refugees in the camps usually present themselves not *from* Shatila, or Bourj al-Barajne, or Baddawi, but *from* Safad, Jenin, Haifa, and *living* in Shatila, Bourj al-Barajne, or Baddawi. Along with these primary and secondary references, sometimes a third element is mentioned: the renaming and prior erasure of their villages. Such is the case for Hadid, a retired UNRWA doctor, which we mentioned before, his village and Aida´s shared the same fate under the Israeli occupation:

> I´m from Safad … a village located at the mountain close to Maroun ar-Ras … now there is a settlement called …Kiriyat Shmona, Kyriat Shmona settlement, my village is ´Ammuqa Qad as-Safad, it´s located on Kiryat Shmona

The memory of having being expelled from their land lives on through the Palestinians born in Lebanon, who, in spite of this very fact, when asked about their origin, not only do they undoubtedly mention Palestine, but the specific locations their ancestors lived at. Thus, in the refugee camps, when explicitly asked about their place of origin, oftentimes we don´t find people from Shatila, Ain el-Hilweh or Mar Elias, but from Haifa, Jenin, Nablus, or Jaffa, as such is the case with Nazim, who specifies that his mother was from Jerusalem, while his father was from Jaffa; or Aida, who is from «´Ammuqa Qad as-Safad, in the mountains of Maroun ar-Ras, located in Kiryat Shmona settlement now», a town ethnically cleansed and obliterated (Palestine Remembered, 2021), cleared for the foundation of Kiryat Shmona, an Israeli city.

It is possible that being a refugee camp dweller comes together with having a more present memory of the specific Palestinian village the person´s family originally came from. Not only the participants that never lived in a camp but also the ones who moved outside the camp did not disclose their "original" village. This is the case of Aisha, who moved out as soon as she married her Lebanese husband; conversely, Alaya, a woman in her mid-fifties who never lived in the camps, got attracted

to them due to her Palestinian origin and her desire to contribute to the improvement of their conditions; Abbud too, who speaks of how the camp environment made the picture of a land he never saw come alive, overlooked specifying his village of origin. None of these examples, with the common feature of being Palestinian refugees living outside the refugee camps, seem to relate, at least not in the first instance, to a specific village. It appears that it is not the age, nor gender, but the intensity of the assertion embodied in the immediate social life that sets the parameters of the affection towards a specific space, while keeping intact the Palestinian Otherness.

6.1.c.iv. "They have to know" (AG)

As a matter of fact, this affection comes entangled with Otherness for Palestinians in Lebanon. As we have already seen, according to the participants of the study, one is born Palestinian, irrespective of territory of birth and place of dwelling. Having been born in a refugee camp in Lebanon does not exclude from the assertion (self-given) nor the ascription (given by others) of the ethnic background; just like having migrated to another country does not invalidate it. In this respect, participants born in the age of the Nakba (Jeel *Falasteen*) seem to be inevitably melt with the historical event of the exodus. Fadi for example, presents himself like follows:

> I´m a Palestinian refugee since 1948 in Lebanon, and now I am settled in Beirut, after having lived in many places and camps since that time. Like the rest, I was never settled, never in peace, never in stability. The main thing for me is that we have survived, and we are still trying to survive

Hadid was born a year before, in 1947. His is the account of a majority of Palestinian in their flight from harm´s way during the Nakba:

> I was born in 1947, in a village called Khalisa, close to the border with Lebanon, eight kilometres from it, more or less. Nowadays, it is called Kiryat Shmona. The same year I was born, according to my mother, I was six months old, when they expelled us from the village, from Palestine, and we came to a southern Lebanese village. When I was more or less six years old, we went to a camp, to Nabatiyeh refugee camp for Palestinians

For those living in the North of Palestine, not only the ones as close as Hadid and his family, but also Safed, Galilee, Haifa and Acre, the fastest path to survival was crossing to the closest

neighbouring country, Lebanon. Mehdi, a Palestinian jurist from Mar Elias refugee camp, expresses how the first period unravelled for his family:

> I´m a Palestinian refugee who came to Lebanon obligatorily by the Israeli occupation of our country, and our main city, Acre, Akka, in the north of Palestine. We reach Lebanon because it's so close to the frontier, and the family came, and at the beginning stayed in the south of Lebanon for more than one year, realising that the right of return is not going - - going to be implemented directly, they - - my father came back to Lebanon searching for a job and he made a small grocery, and since that time, we are in Beirut, in Shatila camp, and until the moment the massacres happened, we left before due to the war and the Israeli occupation and the demolition of the camps



Figure 16 Map of the displacements from rural and urban areas of Palestine in 1948. Source: PalestineRemembered.com.

For those born only a year after the Nakba, like Farha, in 1949 (*Jeel al-Nakba*), Palestine would become a livelong memory of the ancestors, a dream to long for. Her parents were in their honeymoon in Lebanon when the exodus started to be enforced by the Israeli armed forces:

> My parents were stuck here and they had to stay. They tried to come back to Palestine but they could not. But my uncles, my mother´s brothers, who were back then American University students, were able to come back to Palestine. In fact, when Palestine was taken, my grandfather, mother´s side, reached for the Red Cross, who managed to get his children back to Palestine. It was easy in their case because they were students. But my father did not want to come back. He believed that things would be settled in Palestine in a very short time. He thought that his stay here would last only a few days. And here we are now, it has been 72 years since he got here now. So, my parents stayed here. Their parents died, their brothers and sisters died and all the elderly people in their family died here

In her case, Palestine is not only a memory lived through the eyes and reminiscences of others, but a somewhat fresher recollection of her two exceptional visits to the village her family lived in, the exception that proves the rule. The first visit was in 1982, during the turmoil of the Israeli invasion, she and her family took advantage of special permissions issued by the Red Cross, a chance they could profit once more in 1992, in the aftermath of the Lebanese civil war. Recalling these visits seems to rekindle a lively picture of the land:

> Its beauty drives you crazy. It is so beautiful. The day I return, I will open my eyes wide to fill them with the sky of my country. I swear by God Almighty … Homeland is very precious and very beautiful … It is all you have, right?

The reverie of Palestine appears to be commonplace among the older generations. Abbud, a 63-year-old officer of UNRWA, never lived in a refugee camp, but he got his impression of Palestine through the inhabitants of the camps:

> During summer and holidays, we were very much happy, me, you see, you are coming from a village and - - you are coming from the mountains, and you like to come to the camp, we were finding ourselves in the camps, we were seeing ourselves there in the camps, it is the culture … and you see there the people how they are living, your people are living there, traditions there, language, the accent is there … they are speaking of the villages, and they are speaking about our villages in Palestine and you are a child and listening to them. They are speaking about your dream, which you didn't see. You are speaking about some thing missed in your heart, and you are listening to it, we were thinking that the orange in Palestine [laugh] is completely different than the orange in Lebanon [laugh]. This is how we were thinking, we were thinking about the olive in Palestine, it is different than these of Lebanon or any place in the world

Since the moment of birth, and particularly throughout childhood, “Palestinianness” seems to be imprinted in life. Education in its non-regulated form, that is, the values, ideas, and overall ways of feeling, thinking and doing, attained via socialisation, appear to orbit around “Palestinianhood”, as the main identity-assertion. Taking as an example the case of Aida, an activist in her forties in Shatila, educating children with Palestine in mind seems to be an explicit duty:

> Palestine it's our home country and we have to … to teach our kids, our future children that Palestine will return one day. Not to forget. We now are old, and we

> may go [laughs], but the coming future kids have to know, they have to know. We must teach them about our case, about our country, about our village

"They have to know" refers to territory, to Palestine, the "case" of Palestinians displaced to Lebanon from the villages they used to live in; "our case" broadly hints at their forced displacement from Palestine. While conducting the interview in English in Aida´s home, her mother, a seventy-something non-English speaking lady present during most of the interview, maybe prompted by what the sporadic usage of words and expressions in Arabic kindled within her, spontaneously uttered "We will return to Palestine! We will fight Israel!". Taking a framed picture of himself looking at the visible horizon, Fadi expresses a similar feeling, the desire of going back to the homeland, but being stopped from doing so:

> This is Palestine, and I am looking to Palestine from the the border of Lebanon with Palestine, I´m looking from a distance of three kilometres to where my village is! I have never crossed to visit my village, while everybody in the world can visit, except me, and I am the owner of this place

"Ownership" as stated in this quote, might be taken a figure of speech, but it can also refer to actual deeds of ownership of land. Some of these still exist, claiming official rights over buildings and plots of land in Palestine, issued by the British Mandate. On the other hand, the rhetorical image of ownership exists in yet another form: the symbol of the key. Even if actual physical keys to doors of the houses left in the exodus also exist, the key comprises one of the most salient symbols of the right of return, along with the Palestinian flag.



Figure 17 On the left, a small framed memorial, consisting on the map of Palestine, with the names of some cities; the key, a symbol of the right of return, and a phrase: "This is they key to our house in Palestine". On the right, "Handala", the picture of a child, symbolising the plight of the Palestinian refugees, drawn originally by Naji al-Ali, himself a Palestinian displaced in the Nakba. Sources: Aitor Bikandi Eskutza (photograph); www.handala.org (picture).

Palestine, the right to return, the duty to preserve it, as Aida mentioned, seems to have been effectively transferred throughout the time elapsed since 1948 and the subsequent generations, and bound to the body, almost as sacred duty. Samer, an Ain el-Hilweh refugee in his early twenties, born of a Lebanese mother and a Palestinian father, perceives that

> In general, what you can see in the camps is the people still attached to the idea of the right of return, that is the most important thing. People still know the map and remember the flag. You go to visit people in the morning and you run into an old lady who tells you a story that reminds you of Palestine or you run into an old man who begins to explain to you about the oranges in Palestine … despite the big problems we are facing and that are growing bigger, we haven´t forgotten. It is something that stays with us

Fifty years of difference between the age of these participants do not seem to make much of a difference regarding the values held towards the idea of returning to Palestine. Badih is an active member and project manager of a centre in Ain el-Hilweh refugee camp, committed to promoting social solidarity through the Palestinian refugee lens. Regarding the existence of Palestinian refugees, and its relation to the right of return, he declares that

> because - - since that days, you know, as a Palestinian, we believe as Palestinian refugees that - - we love the camp, you know, but not because of the camp, you know, just we don't like to be refugees all … all of our life, but the point is, because we have issues, because our issues to go back to Palestine, you know, just to go back to my homeland and live there, and the camp is like a station, it´s a kind … a temporary … for us it is a temporary homeland, because it´s symbolic, the existence of the camp is a symbol for the existence of right of return, the existence of … the existence of refugees, the existence of what happened in 48 during the Nakba

The very existence of the refugee camps seems to compel him to think of it as the reified cause of the situation of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Not only a physical space, but a reminder of the historical development that caused it, as well as symbol of the right of return, the refugee camp appears as temporary station for an eventual return. The shared Palestinian ethnic background appears as the most salient of the common elements of the identity-discourse of the participants. A shared ethnocultural history, as well as the set of restrictions applied as a rule, as members of a specific and legally sanctioned ethnic community residing in Lebanon. This seems to bring under the same national conscience a wide spectrum of people characterised by different age-ranges, genders, positions, experiences, hopes and expectations.

6.1.d. Working to fight, fighting to work

6.1.d.i. “Then you say you are a Palestinian, and there is no occupation for you” (ID)

According to the current social and symbolic structures, one is born Palestinian. Moreover, being Palestinian in Lebanon appears to imply an automatically singled out portrayal of one´s possibilities. The labour world is a particularly salient issue for the participants of the study, especially for the refugee camp dwellers. Employment, work, jobs, a topic tightly related with their legal experience, but also closely tied with agency, in terms of having a basic income in order to garner a certain level of safety in the day-to-day survival in the material and economic aspect. Being Palestinian, or rather, being identified as Palestinian, means outside the camps that there is no possibility for a job, not at least in equal footing. Taher, a 23-year-old Palestinian refugee living close to, but outside, Shatila, tries to be clear about it:

> Restrictions here …. An employer would be - - I´ll be very, very honest with you: you go for an interview, for example, for a job, we talk about the interview, you talk

about your qualifications, the employer is impressed, you can see he´s impressed. Then you say you are a Palestinian, and there is no occupation for you, there is nothing. And that´s how it goes, not just for me, for a lot of people. Some - - a lot of people have been there

This kind of discrimination seems to work in different ways. Aida, older than Taher, explains her case and offers an insight regarding the normative underpinning:

The Lebanese government does not allow us to work […] 75 professional jobs we are not allowed to work in. I don't know if you see inside the camp, there is many shops, many dentists … health related, it´s - - they are working inside the camps, *ya´ni*, just refugees working for each other, this is the economic situation inside the camp. But out of the camp they cannot work, a little bit, for example, I have a licence in business and I got a masters in management, okay? But, even though, even though - - I cannot work. Why? Because I am Palestinian. In spite of having a long experience […] I was working in a company, okay? But now I'm not working, because the owner - - there was a new owner and when he know I was Palestinian, he force fired me from the job, in spite of having a good experience, I had a licence, as I told you, okay? But because I'm Palestinian he replaced me with a Lebanese

Although we do not know how this new owner, a Lebanese manager of Aida´s workplace, knew that she was Palestinian, the account of other people might shed some light on the issue. Jamal a plumber from el-Buss refugee camp in Tyre, South of Lebanon, seemingly, looked Lebanese enough to be offered a job, but something seemed to have gone amiss:

Someone once came and asked me "what´s your job?", I replied "I´m a plumber" […] then he said to me "I have a workshop in *** and want to take you to work with me" […] he asked me "are you a Lebanese?", he thought I´m a Lebanese and wanted to let me work with him immediately, but when he knew that I´m a Palestinian he said to me "You must have a work permit"

Whether it was extra caution by the potential employer, or some impression gave away Jamal´s ethnic background remains unknown. In any case, failure in immediate stereotyping does not seem exclude the possibility of being discriminated. That is why Khalid, a member of an association critical with PLO, Palestinian factions, and UNRWA, resort to disguising Palestinian cultural features: "When

we go to Christian areas, for example, we try to hide that we are Palestinians, so that they treat us better". Yet another example might provide additional insight: according to Alaya, her father, a Palestinian in late 70s Lebanon at that moment, seemed to be conscious of the possible consequences of revealing one´s ethnic identity, especially in Christian predominant areas:

> when I was too little, even my father did not speak the Palestinian accent as true as it is, okay, but I - - he - - his work was - - he used to work in the Eastern part of Beirut, and his friends were Lebanese. He never … *ya´ni*, he had never tried to … to hide that he is a Palestinian, but it´s just, you know, the accent gets - - he gets along with it

The Lebanese State´s ambiguous list of banned occupations is grounded in a not-so-ambiguous policy of denying foreigners job positions Lebanese citizens could fill. Additionally, at the time of the first round of interviews, the Lebanese government´s Labour Ministry carried out a campaign aimed at ousting undocumented Palestinian workers, that is, those who had no "foreign worker" permit. Aina, a 28-years-old woman from Ain el-Hilweh, reviews the situation as follows:

> We love Lebanon, of course we do, and what happened lately [crackdown on Palestinian workers] and what is happening makes us feel sad. Lebanon is our second country as we say. We were born and we grew up here. We don't know Palestine, we know it only by name thanks to our grand-perents and family stories. But we've never seen it, this is why we consider Lebanon to be our second country. Nonetheless, we are being treated with a lot of discrimination. For example, once I applied for a job in accounting and when the recruiter knew I was Paletsinian, he told me that he couldn't hire me because I was Palestinian. Then on my way out, he stops me to say that he could give me a job as a cleaning lady. But I was applying for a different job and he only can give me a job in cleaning. How am I supposed to accept that and to love living here?

From the Lebanese employer´s perspective, it seems a Palestinian is not worth the risk of going against labour regulation, unless the position is one deemed less demanding education-wise. An apparent contradiction arises, as she states "we love Lebanon", but then questioning how one can love living there, having to withstand such discriminative policies. Territory and social conditions seem to be detached, but certain indeterminateness remains concerning subject, approach, and predicate. In any case, Aina continues, speaking about the possible consequences of the overall labour policy towards Palestinians in Lebanon:

> Let's get back to the decision of the minister concerning Palestinians and their right to work in Lebanon. So we are home in the Camp and because of that decision my brother can just come back home and tell us that he has lost his job. So we stay tense the whole time. My parents are always worried because my brother has children and he can lose his job at any moment because of such decisions. When the decision was made, we had a lot of protests in the camp and a lot of things happened. Some Lebanese people made racist comments about those protests and some people supported them

Mehdi, the Palestinian jurist, points out to a strategy of discrimination, one with a specific set of outcomes that overflows the spaces of the refugee camps:

> In our experience for example, in Lebanon, okay, it's too natural that everyone had the right to work because he has to get some money to feed himself and his family, oh yes, and the Lebanese, they did it indirectly, they let the Palestinians work *illegally*, in the black market, without organising. The refusal of participating legally is something influencing the whole bulk of the Palestinian capacities. Okay, Lebanese, at the same time, they say "If we close it, no to work of Palestinians", means every Palestinian will have three choices: on one hand, to join the political armed groups or to some clandestine groups, many polluted by the terrorists

Mehdi, as well as Karim, connote a rather intentional creation of a "reserve army of labour" that takes advantage of the exclusion of Palestinians (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.4.c. & 4.3.b.). Aida indicates the same risks. She is afraid that jobless, incomeless, hopeless people might have to resort to alternative ways of survival, "forced to take risky things, like drugs […] many will be forced to terrorism". Other participants, like Ghali and Karim, argue that discrimination is deeply rooted in the Lebanese State. The first one´s insight about this topic details what could be understood as institutionalised discrimination:

> There is a rule here in Lebanon, the reciprocity […] So, because the Palestinians are not distinguished in Lebanon as refugees or foreigners or whatever, they are dealt in very very special conditions, and mostly it´s a discriminatory rule against Palestinians. So, the Palestinians feel frustrated, because I am living here since 70 years, and I don't have rights, while, if I go to Europe, only five years, and I can benefit from all the services of the government and I have right and everything, and I get - - I have a choice to be - - to have the citizenship or whatever

For the second one, Karim, a member of an association critical with PLO, the Palestinian factions, and UNRWA, Ghali´s point in proven in the historical development of the Lebanese government´s attitude towards Palestinian refugees:

> Since the Ta´ef Agreement to this day, all Lebanese governments have always tended toward not giving the rights of Palestinian refugees and to issue unfair laws against them, preventing them from working, from owning property, from the guarantee of medical care, and several unfair laws against the Palestinian refugee community […] All these factors, such as not giving rights from the host country, not being recognized, treating us once as refugees or once as foreigners

Badih, aware of the hopelessness around him, seems convinced of the need of being active in the social field. His idea of being Palestinian is tightly related with holding a certain level of commitment, but also understands the stance of those who decide otherwise:

> because of the idea we believe we are Palestinian, so we can´t give up, you know, because we have an issues, and just everything happened with us, all this problem, because we are Palestinian, so we can't give up. We have to be involved in everything, because, specially, you know, we are the youth, so we are the main factor for change, if we want to change just we have to act […] there is a category [of people], they left, they left for the EU, and they - - there is some people - - some … you know, they left their schools and university, because they have nothing after they graduate, they starting to work, they - - nowadays they are unemployment […] I really understand a lot of these people, what they are doing. But what I don't understand, you know, this other category, this that they choose to go with Fatah or the Islamic groups for money, you know, just I don't understand that, okay? You don't have … you don't have to work, there is unemployment and you can't find a good job, okay, I understand that, but it´s not the solution to solving the problem, solving the problem by becoming the problem, because Fatah and these Islamic people they are used and they use their money, and they just add to the problems

He does not seem to see the option of migrating as the best one for the collective, but his opinion is worse regarding membership to some specific Palestinian factions, which he sees as a problem, rather than a contribution in the path to any solution. He sees that as the last resort for people who have no other choice, but signing up, in order to have an economic income. He is not the only one perceiving this correlation. Karim sees an association, as well as a network, between what could be

considered as chronic unemployment, and subsequent deterioration of material and overall conditions, and the reproduction of the Palestinian factions and their power:

> Factions control the majority of jobs in UNRWA. They are now dealing with the refugee community in a factional manner, meaning they have taken control of all […] It means that all work opportunities become cronyism

6.1.d.ii. "It is our world; we are Palestinians and we cannot give up in any way" (AG)

The social ascription, and consequently the ambiguous legal ascription stemmed from it, represents one of the main obstacles for the lower positions in the economic, social and cultural of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The ones who, by virtue of their economic, social or cultural capital made it to a higher position, don´t necessarily displace their Palestinian ethnic and social identity assertion.

Such is the case of Alaya, her Palestinian accent makes her feel more comfortable, a recognisable mark of Palestinianness she kept, unlike her sisters, and «Despite the fact that I´m holder of a Lebanese passport, because of my marriage». Different as her situation is, a Palestinian living outside the camps, but closely related to them in her phases as both a journalist and an activist, she also acknowledges that «many Palestinians used to hide that they are Palestinians», a reality that must be had in mind in light of the social and labour consequences of this ethnicity in Lebanon, especially after the end of the civil war in 1990, in the shape of discrimination and exclusion.

Nevertheless, Palestinian pride does not only reflect in the iconography displayed in the camps themselves, this is but a mere reflection of the affect shown in different aspects. Badih proudly states that «It is our world; we are Palestinian and we can not give up in any way, we have an issue to fight for […] I believe in the strength of the Palestinian refugees because of their existence and the existence of the right of return». Alaya, along the same lines, speaks about how «as a Palestinian, it empowers us with the dignity, the respect, the struggle, holding on to your rights […] it provides the support, it gives great support to go on and move on».

This "moving on" was not always given rise to under the same "branding" (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.1.d.). As Fadi indicates,

> The slogan changed, in 1990, 1991, from… "armed struggle for liberation" to "civil social rights". This slogan, maybe the leaders didn´t understand how it would impact the people. The people started seeing that the Palestinians in Lebanon… they started seeing that they had been left behind

Which means that the transition from “displaced” people in the outset of the exodus, to the mark of the “refugees” up to this day, seems to hide a shift that has seen different stages and virtual configurations of the adaptive nature of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, a transformation that came with consequences in every aspect of their lives.

With their agency at its centre, this gradual adjustment of strategies to varying conditions has the mentioned identity shift as its core, with one feature permeating the whole issue: «There is no Palestinian in Lebanon who is inevitably not involved in politics», as Mehdi declares. Even if, as Badih points out, «[social-political] involvement is different from person to person», there is an implicit and an explicit involvement in politics when it comes to the Palestinians´ lives in Lebanon. According to the young activist, «Our society is political, everyone belongs to a political party».

It is in this sense that Nazim expressed that «We Palestinians are still struggling». With a 40-year gap between them, both Nazim and Badih relate their issue «with going back to our homeland Palestine and living there. The refugee camp is like a station, a temporary homeland, its existence is the symbol of the existence of the right of return», as Badih expresses. A right of return linked to both past and future.

As for the projection of Palestinianness in the present, some of the participants show a kind of idealised picture of their would-be society. One person from Shatila camp (field journal, 2020), chatting after an interview about the related topics, was shocked after having heard that some people in Europe live in poverty, not owning their own house because of lack of money and support. This person didn´t understand why “we” (Europeans) did not give them a job, support, any kind of help to get them out of their plight, arguing that “they” (Palestinians), if they had their own country, would employ everyone and leave no one behind.

This opinion does not only reflect a high degree of idealisation of eidetically homogenous physical and human spaces like Europe, Palestine. The agency of Palestinians appears as highly romanticised, omitting the intricacies of contemporary public life under the rule of an interdependent global system. However, in spite of this idealisation into the future, and in spite of all the hardships, some of the Palestinian refugee camp dwellers express a certain attachment to the camp. Farha (who also expressed a highly idealised image of past-Palestine and projected it into future-Palestine), who has lived in El-Buss for all her life and lives a relatively comfortable life; or Aina, who, conscious of its defects and disadvantages, admits to “love the camp”. This fact in no way does get rid of the fact that the future return to Palestine is lost from sight.

The land of Palestine, the belief in the existence of an endpoint to their decades-long suffering in the shape of a homeland, acts as an incentive for most of those seemingly engaged with an eidetic construction of their identity, remotely related to an ingroup image-oriented identity. It also functions as an assembly where the subjective ideation of a glorified past and praised-in-advance future can be filled out with a wide range of rhetoric.

On one side of the spectrum, the image of the Palestinians from the past is put in absolute, and even mythical terms. Abbud depicts this end of the spectrum: «We are the uncles of Jesus, we are the Palestinians […] we are loyal, transparent, honest people who believe in others and dignity, and want everyone in the world to live in peace».

Mehdi sets the rationale behind the dignifying of the Palestinian past in Lebanon as follows:

> Most of the new economy in Lebanon was built by Christian Palestinians, whose expertise, acquired under the British mandate of Palestine lead them to have a competence in English language. They brought money and investments to Lebanon, were president Camille Chamoun saw the potential disadvantage of not letting them be part of the state-economy

In any case, the eidetic protracting of the features of the reified Palestinian from the past into the present comes, in several cases, constructed in terms of a supposed equality between Palestinians. They are sometimes thought of as a homogeneous group, sometimes also regarding a general willingness to action. Badih says that "they", Palestinians

> do not have a problem as a Palestinian people, we believe we are together, we are brothers, Palestinians, that is the main thing, the issues we have in common, it is a simple thing for us, everything we do, we do think thinking about Palestine

Along the same lines, Aida reaches out farther away, pointing out that «Any Palestinian you meet in Lebanon, Jordan, Gaza, or West Bank will say the same, that we cannot forget our country, even if we have never seen it, it is in our ideology». Nevertheless, different positions in the economic, cultural, and social fields appear to affect the way this portrayal is sketched. Abbud, shows partial awareness of his idealisation when speaking about his childhood memories in a significant manner: «We thought that the orange or the olive in Palestine was completely different from the one in Lebanon or any other place in the world». Nonetheless, he overlaps the mental image of past-Palestine with the present, all the while projecting unity:

> We are the Palestinians who came from Palestine and I don´t know if someone is Christian or Shi´i, Palestinians are one and are united […] We are the same, the same blood, the same belief, there is no difference between a Christian, a Muslims and a Jewish, we believe in God, we believe in one God

This monolithic sociocultural envisioning of Palestinians is then contradicted when speaking about the specific facts of daily existence and structuring of public life. Palestinian activists, workers, and camp dwellers, especially those who spend most of their time within the confines of the camp, as if compelled by the raw force of their everyday reality, overstep the boundaries of reified versions of reality and indicate more grounded and nuanced version of the same noema, revealing a human landscape made up of different textures, as well as substantiated on the basis of everyday practices.

6.1.d.iii. "Who would want to have children and drag a whole generation into the unknown?" (AG)

Different standpoints regarding economic, cultural and symbolic field notwithstanding, there seems to be a generalised impression of uncertainty among most of the Palestinians in Lebanon. The differences concerning their positions entail different strategies, some of which some oriented towards bare survival, while others contribute to the reproduction or subversion of different fields in varying ways.

Aisha, a relatively new and young mother, does not see herself with any more kids: «I don´t see a future for my child - - for ***. I can´t give birth to another child just to make him suffer here, or make her suffer here, you know? It´s really bad here». Despite having the assurance of the Lebanese citizenship, because of having married a Lebanese man, she aware of the bleak future in Lebanon.

As young as Aisha, but living in Ain el-Hilweh refugee camp, Badih likewise speaks of how complicated it is to know what will be of the future. Unemployment, the "siege" around the camp, security issues, checkpoints, and a long list of uncertainties make life "not normal" (in spite of him using "normal" to refer to "common" everyday life). To uncertainty, he adds the fear he sees around him, which, according to him, stems from the abandonment Palestinians in Lebanon have been subjected to: PLO, Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian factions, the alleged "close" Lebanese parties (he mentions Hezballah and Tanzim al-Nasri), … none of them translate their words into actions, deepening the neglect of the Palestinian refugees.

Hannan, around a decade older than Aisha and Badih, adds to the prospective of a dark future the fact that regionally things are not going better. The interview took place when the USA´s "Century Deal" was all out both in mass media and street. The sight of Arab states dealing with Donald Trump´s administration made her think people have reasons to be worried.

The conversation with Aina and Samer was particularly articulate regarding the topic of uncertainty. They both felt highly doubtful about the future, «I don´t know what will happen to me in one hour», declared Aina plainly. The explosion of the port of Beirut had happened barely a month before, and it probably affected the possible foretelling of two young people who already had been living their lives in a highly volatile refugee camp, in a highly volatile state.

> A while ago, the issue was about the right of asylum and immigration and that Palestinians must leave Lebanon. Now, for example, when I am talking with friends, they say that they will leave right away if they can. But I don´t even know where I would go if I left here to get out of this miserable situation I find myself in, where I have no idea about my future, where I don´t know when I can go to college or when I can find, where I don´t know at all what will happen to me. But at the same time, I don´t want to leave this country because this is the only place that ties me to our Cause, to Palestine, to the right of return

She had previously said she loved Lebanon, but after confronting herself with the ties that bind her to Lebanon, she seemed to find herself torn between two gravity pools: the objective socioeconomic dead-end of living in the country, and the subjective affection felt towards Palestine. In the middle, her relatedness:

> It´s the people that make me feel related, I mean by that people who live inside the camp and outside of it, Lebanese and Palestinian. The country itself means nothing to me, it is just a second country, a country where I live and where I grew up. But at the same time, I am living in a country where the future is a complete mystery

Just like Badih, she seems to regard Lebanon as a spatial instrument for the achievement of eventual goals. Samer, usually more talkative than Aina during the interview, engaged in a reflexive mood, after which she picked up the baton, leading to a significant conversation we will capture in a longer but valuable excerpt:

S: Look at us, we are really becoming schizophrenic because we think that the future could be either good or bad, that we could either be alive or die at any moment. And we are dealing with those two opposite possibilities in the same way. I swear by God that now we have to calculate before going out of our house, because anything could happen while you are out. So, you tell yourself that if anything bad happens, make sure to die while you´re feeling happy

A: But it has always been like that! We would always wonder before going out of the house if we would be back alive. Forget about the situation in Lebanon in general, we live in a refugee camp and our life has always been like that. I would be out of my house and all of a sudden, an armed clash would erupt and no one would know the reason behind it. I have always lived with this uncertainty.

I can give you an example of what I am going through every day. I am sleeping and all of a sudden, I wake up frightened by gunfire sounds and I realize that there is a clash. Then you start wondering about where you can hide and where you can go. And then diseases appear and you have to worry about your entire family. And above all, you need to worry about what the future holds for you. We have no idea about what is coming. Of course, we hope that the situation will not get worse. But then again, if it does get worse, you tell yourself that we´ve been through worse… so, we don´t know.

S: As I told my friends many times: before now, we had something we were afraid to lose, now we don´t. My friends ask me when I am going to get married or get engaged or start building a house…

A: What for?

S: It´s not a matter of what for… it´s a matter of contributing to the good of society.

A: Who would want to have children and drag a whole generation into the unknown?

M: I would always tell my friends that up to four years ago we used to think about the future. But things have changed now and we can only think of the next day, the day after or the week after at best

Identity, agency, and reflexive deliberation combine in what might be thought of as a clearheaded discourse about agency and prospective. Aina, a single young woman in her late twenties, wearing a hijab, member of an NGO that promotes social values considered bold and unorthodox by the conservative part of her community; questions the dubious choice of having children in an environment where constant tension, violence, and uncertainty are customary. The existentialist tone appears to challenge the basic cornerstone, not only of the Palestinian community but of every community ascribed as such: biological reproduction, unconsciously takes as a duty, under the veiled social pressure that compels towards it. Samer, who initially thought of a recent shift in their predisposition towards incertitude and insecurity, agrees to the idea of the hopelessness that surrounds traditional life constituents.

The same feel applies to participants higher in the economic field. Taher, who never lived in a refugee camp, although he is very familiar with the social atmosphere in Shatila, does not think himself capable of foretelling:

> the future is really complicated. For a Palestinian, studying doesn´t really have, most of the times - - you need to have this goal and opportunity to work in your field that you studied, you spend three, four, five years of your life studying, sometimes more, and you expect to have an outcome of this time that you spent in university. Most of the time you don´t. So it´s blurred

Around twenty years older than him, but sharing a similar background, Alaya uses the same term, “blurred”, to refer to the future. Just like Hannan, she concurs with the thought that «on the political level, internationally, regionally, and locally», there is little capacity to predict what might happen, particularly with the Palestinian refugees, considering the initiation of the normalisation of ties between the Arab and Israeli states,

> it´s like, again, the refugees are being let go alone, on their own, and knowing that the ruling autonomy, the Palestinian Authority, also is not following up on the refugees’ issues, it´s more like trying to save their next and compiling their wealth, and, in a way, that will also leaving the Palestinians to meet their own fate and destiny

Even if the future looks dark, it does not look like it imposes the rhythm in most of the cases. Taher, in spite of not seeing his studies will be fruitful states «you do what you can do, you do what you have to do, and just wait for a chance in the future». Aina and Samer come out as steadfast committed

young adults, engaging their agency in mobilising conscience and social environment. Badih sees a positive side to the regional and global stirring, as he sees that something is moving and could yield a somehow positive outcome. Older people, like Ghali, who engaged actively throughout all of his adult life, insists in highlighting the structural side of the situation:

> the projection for the future... They don't let us to think about the future, they only think, let us to think for the daily life, to survive for daily life, but for ambitious, for ambitious people, for people working in the future, we must not live in these conditions, we have to change, we have to ask for our rights, but using the good tools. Now, sometimes resistance could be by weapons, but we have to look to another type of resistance, which could be more effective in this time, in these stages, because every time it has its own tools, so sometimes you could have another tools that you can fight for your rights

Badih sums up the idea by saying that «Palestinians only have Palestinians» for mutual support. Considering his distrust of the normative structures (and despite his membership of one of the factions), "Palestinians" seems to entail here a different paradigm, the construction of rank-and-file Palestinian refugees as active and reflexive agents, conscious of their capabilities and engaged in their path towards the improvement of the conditions of their existence.

While the *Jeel al-Nakba* might think of themselves as too old, or «out of energy», like Hadid admits; younger elements, like those who would compose the *Jeel al-Shakk*, still engage and seem capable of harnessing the inner-outer emotional load in their unclear path towards a better future. To this end, Badih places his hopes in the youth: «the percentage of youth is very high, so you can imagine if we can have this unity», a new share of improvement of the life conditions could be achieved. In the same way, Hadid, about 40 years older than Badih, suggest insisting in something he himself has put in practice before:

> I think that young people have to play a good role in this. Not making NGOs, making clubs, for culture and making culture, not making a club to bring money. A club, for example, of culture, right? A programme so that the other young people come to see how we are advancing in our culture. And there are very simple ways, watching a movie and discussing it, reading a book and discussing it, going to the movies and discussing what we have watched, right? Going out to the street and seeing how people live and how to change it

He speaks of some of his personal experiences in the area of promoting culture that way, some of which were successful, while some others not so much. However, he looks forward to seeing other people take over the helm and putting them in practice

> Look, those are my ideas, but I already have… I don't have much strength, I don't have much strength, those young people have to do it. There has to be someone who has the balls to tell those NGOs, or the parties "You are doing wrong!, You are doing it wrong, what change, for the better have you brought for society? How much money have you taken in the name of this camp, and you have not made… you put it in your pocket?" These are questions that must be asked. And this, I mean, I think young people have to do it. Already at my age, what? I am already 73 years old and I feel tired

On another note, Alaya, on a similar note as Mehdi, considers the need of having the international community involved in the struggle for the implementation of rights and improvement of the life of refugees; without losing sight of the internal capacity of the Palestinian people of having the will and determination to resist, and eventually return to Palestine.

6.2. Palestinians in Lebanon: the ambiguous normative experience of Otherness

The involvement of the international community would mean reinstating the "nomos of the earth" (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.a.iii. & 4.3.c.), in the sense that the determination and reflection of Otherness in normatively institutionalised and regulated structures, as a fundamental mechanism for exclusion, could be reverted, and rights granted to non-citizens, as part of the "human family" (UNGA, 1948), and not as part of a specific state.

Participants implicitly speak of rights, freedom, and international community, but it is not the general topic that centred their discourse in most of the cases. This originated in the fact the questionnaire was not focused on the topic, and everyday life does not seem to include the contemplation of the different law applied and potentially applicable. However, the Palestinian experience in Lebanon in inevitably traversed by the (ambivalent and ambiguous) reality of law. The following table shows the results of the codified elements appearing the most among the co-occurrences, classified according to the three age ranges:

	age: 20-39 5 344	age: 40-59 7 505	age: 60+ 7 362	Totals
agent: international community 47	4	21	22	47
freedom 9	1	7	1	9
legal exp. 97	10	46	41	97
international charter/agreements 7 27	2	19	6	27
Totals	17	93	70	180

Figure 18 ATLAS.ti qualitative data analysis programme. Codified elements concerning the legal and institutionalised experience with the most co-occurrences, arranged according to age-range.

The code "legal experience" stands out. Its main correlates are "agent, international community", "freedom", and "international charter/agreements". The latter is actually a code group, comprised of "1951 Convention Relating to Refugees", "Cairo Agreement", "Camp David", "Century Deal", "Oslo", "resolution 194", and "Ta´ef Agreement". They could be graphically represented as seen in figure 17.



Figure 19 ATLAS.ti qualitative data analysis programme. Graphical representation of the most frequent codified elements, arranged according to age-range.

"Legal experience" was mentioned mostly by people of *Jeel al-Thawra* and *Jeel al-Nakba*. Although this could be indicative of the dimensions different generations have in mind, it could also mean that the *Jeel al-Shakk* has lost its interest in this specific field, since, possibly, it could be taken as one of the main factors affecting the uncertainty that grips them. However, we cannot take this for

granted, as the possible considerations are very probably more complex than this idea. In any case, as we discussed earlier, the legal field, the same as "refugee" as a category (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.a.i. & 4.3.a.ii.), does not constitute a self-sustaining reality, but one originated in a specific state of affairs regarding the economic, social and cultural fields (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.a.iii.). A process that takes a concrete shape in the case of Lebanon (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.b.).

Just like in the previous section, the distribution of epigraphs will contain the most co-occurrent topics, made consistent with the narration of the participants´ lived experiences. Correspondingly, fourth-level epigraphs will honour the literality of their forms of life, putting the accent in the significance of the content. "ID" (identity") or "AG" will follow the phrases, denoting which element is predominant, despite their separation being more an analytical than reflective task.

6.2.a. Socioeconomic ascription, legal ascription

6.2.a.i. "You can´t be the devil and the angel at the same time" (AG)

According to Lebanese and international Law, one is born Palestinian. A stateless, albeit ethnically recognised, ambiguous legal status. While opportunities for employment are the main generalised concern among the Palestinians in the camps, due to the chain of sociohistorical events that configured the present situation, security in the camps and prospect of an even more deteriorated situation are topics that worry their dwellers. These realities have their roots, at least partially, in the normative structures established historically and, I would add, the concept of "politics as a map", a witty and convenient metaphor coined during the interview by Abbud.

The problematic divide established by the UNRWA officer might be seen as providing a sketch of the function of UNRWA in the field, and probably other organisation as well. "Politics" seems to be considered as an avoidable element, both the external (structure related) and internal (subjectively considered) dimensions of any action taken, especially when dealing with the survival and provision of basic services to the Palestinian refugee community (*Vid*. *Supra*, 6.1.b.iii.). "Politics" seems to be imbued with a pejorative load in Abbud´s discourse, as a discrete element of reality from which one can withdrawn from at will, seemingly avoiding the harmful effects of being involved in a role outside the purely technical-humanitarian field:

> We understand politics. But, but, we don't play politics. We use the politics to be a net for us to run our humanitarian activities. We know politics in order to have good relations with the community leaders, and you know that, they are all them politicised and from different parties, and we have to understand how do they think

> in order how to work. We want to keep neutrality, and we want to keep equilibrium amongst them, so we can run our activities

Fadi advocates for looking at a wider picture, even before starting to speak about humanitarian assistance: «the way people look at, they "zoom" or "look at part of the map", they don´t see it as the map in comprehensive way. Again, we have to say that, when we are talking about Palestine, we are talking about historical conflict, between who and who?». This is the context where he locates the outcome of the Palestinians´ predicament, which he expresses in a rather outspoken way:

> So, this story is the same one continue: people, some players, they come here, go there, but the essence of it is the same: they want to take Palestine to be Israel, and full-stop; no rights for the Palestinians, Palestinians are dismissed, this is the plan from the beginning. So, some people, like the European, for example, they send people to kill you and, on the other hand, they try to show you some love by sending you some flowers, some bread… *ya´ni* people can´t be two, you are one, you can´t be the devil and the angel at the same time, it is either devil or angel. So, because they are liars and always try to fool you, you have to look at the map as whole, not as part. Don´t look at what is in the one hand, look at both hands

His agitated speech included reified references to "Europeans" as a whole, but he would later specify that he meant the governments of European countries, rather than the peoples, since it is some of these peoples that he feels accompanied by in many cases.

Jawad, a well-versed Palestinian scholar, is clear about the roles of the different dimensions present in Lebanon regarding the situation of Palestinians:

> you have to focus not only on law, you have to mention the laws, and to see how the laws are implemented. Because this base on discrimination against Palestinians, this is based on the policy of the Lebanese successive governments, related to marginalising Palestinian refugees socioeconomically, cultural marginalisation, spatial marginalisation […] Laws are not important in Lebanon […] Nobody here expect laws. The political class, or the elite

He relates this to his understanding of Lebanon as a «fake state, if not a failed state». At the moment of the interview, barely two months after the Beirut Port blast, he saw the state well under way towards being a full-fledged failed state, the roots of which he places in the National Pact of 1943, which instituted, according to him a "gathering of people".

6.2.a.ii. "It's not the Palestinians who are the danger, it's the formation of Lebanon itself" (ID)

Mehdi, looking at how Palestinians managed to survive and get around the different states in the region, seems to glimpse and harbour hope in Palestinian agency:

> we have one million and a half Palestinians, minimum, in the 1948 lands, they developed their situation to the level to have representative even in the Knesset. Some two million and a half, or more, in Jordan, they are distributed in many camps, also in poor areas, some of them are better than here, in spite of them being accredited by the ID as Jordanians from Palestinian origin, but they are negated a lot of rights

Despite that, he recognises the past and present need of UNRWA for survival. This does not prevent him from advocating for the implementation of rights, without negating the right of return. Thus, in line with what Fadi vehemently expressed,

> if you give, as Europeans or Americans, etcetera, money to assist UNRWA, that doesn't mean to ask us to pay the price to negate our right of return. And this is what we are contrary to: the plan of American actual administration, that what we need is, yes, there is a lack on the legal field of UN application of its resolutions, specially the resolution 194 stipulating about the right of return; the second, we want to push in some legal instances in Europe, in America, etcetera, to have a community of legal experts, how to prioritise on the application and to overcome the veto done by the Americans and the application concerning the Palestinian rights

He hones in the specific intricacies of the international political and legal framework, indicating the need to overcome concrete hindrances, in the shape of international interests positioned, mainly, against the right of return of Palestinians, pinning it in the execution of resolution 194 (UNGA, 1948). According to him, resolving this entanglement is part of the long run; in the shorter term, he sees the need for promoting the capacities for striving in this specific side of the struggle, by means of training members of the Palestinian community for a better performance in the legal field. For this end, not neglecting this field is necessary, according to him; which means that organisation is necessary in the social field, so the long-term foundations can be established. In this sense, in spite of admitting that, still «You can find a University graduate driving a car, as a driver, because he want to live in an honest

way», but cannot find a job in his specific field, he thinks the following about the work carried out by his immediate activist environment:

> I think, we made a successful steps. At the beginning, we thought that very traditional to have the right of work, but we found that is very complicated in Lebanon. And when the people realised that our work is good, with other NGOs, we asked the PLO and the organisations to stand with us, and they appealed for many demonstrations before the instances of UN, ESCWA, and we made a lot of protests, and we present our needs in the field of human rights in Lebanon. We don't want to be a reason to be manipulated by others against the security of Lebanon, but, at the same time, we want the minimum of human rights not to be pushed out of the market

In it in this regard that Hannan sees the problem. She sees «legislative obstacles in the Lebanese law», citing conventions that have not been ratified, or legislative customs like limiting the grant of citizenship in a patrilineal way, or the Personal Status Law, by which the custody of the children and the entitlement to living in the household can be revoked from a woman. In this respect, Hadid, a septuagenarian of *Jeel al-Nakba*, sees the necessity of advocating for the education of women, for them to be aware of their rights and obligations, entailing far more than giving birth to children. In any case, Hannan sees a hindrance in Lebanese state law:

> The Lebanese law doesn´t support us, we don't have much. We, as young Palestinians, suffer everything, violence and discrimination. And they don't suffer from bad treatment like beating but suffer from not giving him a chance to work, from not owning a house or put it in his name, for example, my brother is a doctor and he couldn´t open his own clinic because he is Palestinian. He partnered with a Lebanese man and he gets only one quarter of the profit

Once again, the general dearth situation of Palestinians in Lebanon is narrowed down the inability of securing means of procuring a way of reproducing themselves socially in a dignified way, through work. Both Mehdi and Jawad agree on pointing out this is not by chance, but the result of a deliberate policy of marginalisation; according to Mehdi:

> That's why they have these, every time they have a lot of contradictions and they make consensus how turn the curves and that. For them, since the beginning, Palestinians were considered as a danger on this balance between the sectarian

> formation. Practically, it's not the Palestinians who are the danger, it's the formation of Lebanon itself

The rejection of the 1951 Convention, the marginalisation, the stripping of political features of the refugee assistance, it all seems to stem from the intentional detachment of the political side of the Palestinians in Lebanon. A tendency which, even if stemmed from the ethnic and social differentiation of the community, it is contained within the legal field, partly within the territorial confines of Lebanon, partly within international law.

6.2.b. Normative (?) organisation of the camps

6.2.b.i. "There is a difference between human and humanitarian" (ID)

There is, however, one relatively good side to the historical development of the legal field in Lebanon. Mehdi recalls how the popular committees of the refugee camps in Lebanon, part of the reason for the capability of self-organisation, originated due to the signing of the Cairo accord in 1969. This changed when the accord was rebutted in 1987, in spite of which, the refugee camps, or "security islands" as the Lebanese government deems them, remained:

> They don't recognise the political factions, because it has to be issued by a law, and they were in a corner, as usual, they go to facto relation without recognition. But, de facto also facilitates, if we need some water piping in the camps through the committee. It was an integral part of the formation of the social part of PLO, the social work of PLO

Mehdi implies that the *de facto* recognition of the function of the Palestinian political factions, through the popular committees, grants a share of governance in the camps. He specifically highlighted the case of Ain el-Hilweh, which holds a popular committee that, despite the heavy securitisation mentioned before, collaborates with the garbage collection of the neighbouring municipality of Saida.

Regarding the old times of the refugee camps, some people still remember the early days of the Palestinians settling and trying to get on with their lives. Fadi recollects: «I remember in the camp… there was no leaders, no government, no responsible», and even no right to interpellate the Lebanese authorities nor government. Not till the popular committees were created, as a reflection of

> the Palestinian political presence. In 1972 talks started about how to formulate it, the first popular committee started in Rashidieh camp. Maybe in Beirut a few

> months before, I don´t know, but then the Popular Committee talk to the presence role from PLO. So, PLO was controlling the life of the camp, and they were able to run whatever they need in the camp. So, the Popular Committee was the power of PLO in the camp

Alaya, herself from the *Jeel al-Thawra*, recalls second-hand testimonies by elders present during the first years of the community in Lebanon. She mentions the knowledge they had about township administration. It is possible that the tradition, instead of disappearing, was kept latent. Jawad indicates two general approaches to agency among the Palestinian community:

> Of course, people who were included or involved in political activism are more aware about how to delegate themselves, and also, look at the NGOs activists, the majority of them were previously members of factions. So, in this respect we have to differentiate between two approaches: [a base] right approach, which consider refugees, or, according to this, they consider themselves as right bearers, not only recipients of humanitarian aid. And this some researchers try to relate it to UNRWA enforcing this humanitarian approach: so, we are people in need of food, education, et cetera

He points out what can be considered "bare life", as we exposed in previous chapters (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.b.i.). The result of the administrative deprivation of rights, prior to the consideration and treatment as subjects (or rather, objects) devoid of capacity for political action, that the humanitarian government (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.d.) sees as "beneficiaries"; eligible for biological survival but nothing else. To this respect, Jawad opposes "human" to "humanitarian":

> So, *vis-á-vis* this approach, there is the humanitarian approach, not human, there is a difference between human and humanitarian. This is rejected by refugees, by activists, expressed in their political - - look at the media, at the Facebook, at the … how Palestinian recall their history, recall commemorating their national … events, and … so, the other … the other approach, which is the human rights approach, which considers them as rights bearers, deserving to decide their fate by themselves, and not to be decided by someone on behalf of them. And their voices should be heard, their voices should be heard

Although potentially controversial, it could be said that the popular committees rose from the logic of considering the refugees "right bearers", potential managers of their own fate. There is more than

one popular committee in some camps. Nazim, president of the Popular Committee in Shatila till his demise, says that «The Popular Committee is one of the two committees present in the camp. One is the PLO Popular Committee, our work is to serve the people in the camp; the other one is the allies´ committee, *Tahalef*». The latter being an homologous organisation for non-Palestinians.

Nazim reflects on the problems present on the camps: «There are problems in the streets with electricity, the supply system is very bad»; as well as stating the functions of the Popular Committee, which mainly: «consist in all the services: the supply of electricity, water, drinking water, and sewage. Also we provide solutions to the problems between neighbours in the camp. It is another 10 comrades in the Popular Committee, and we act as a municipality, we have the municipalitie´s duties».

Concerning the employment problem and having in mind he was also a member of the leadership of popular committees (the gathering of representatives of popular from different refugee camps), he had the idea « of opening an office for employment that would connect a registry with that of the [Lebanese] Ministry of Work but it is difficult to carry out because of how the minister thinks of us». And lastly, regarding the security, he seemed ambivalent regarding its effects and control, since, while mentioning "security is under control", the mention of people shooting in the air at random moments seems to bring no so much stress as the issue of the presence of different ethnic origins in the camp and employment chances, solving potential violent issues through their joint initiative and coordination with the Security Committee, «If we have a problem between two people and we cannot solve this problem, we send it to the Security Committee».

Hadid, coetaneous of Nazim, believes there is a need for regulation in the camps, in the form of laws. Asked about the possibility of having the popular committees and security committees implement some kind of normative regulation, he claims that what he calls "local forces", referring to the committees (popular and security) could impel, by implementing rules and fines, the behaviour of the people. This could steer space-sharing towards a better model of coexistence, a better mentality that, in his mind, would improve the people´s social and cultural standing.

However, the inner structure of the Popular Committee is not exempt from issues. Nazim himself revealed a meaningful insight, concerning the attitude of some of its members (*Vid*. *Supra*, 6.1.a.iii.). On top of that, he clearly asserts that "The Popular Committee is not elected by the people", which he deems a problem, but the initiative of elections is a difficult task that has not only technical requirements as an obstacle, but also factors entailing the political structures and, as some other people state, a will too absent to make such a fact come to fruition (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.6.a.). This idea is rooted to a point where, individuals like Mehdi think that «Palestinians have no leadership [and] are

not able to work in a combined way». An idea that echoes what Badih sees: «We do not have a clear vision of our mission as Palestinians».

There seems to be two aspects to this quandary, one was already hinted by Nazim, regarding the individual component of people high in the local political field in the camps. The other aspect involves a difference in strategies that are overlaid by distinct perceptions of identity.

As for the first aspect, regarding the effectiveness of the organisation of the Palestinian factions, traditionally part of PLO, Mehdi indicates that «The competition between the Palestinian political factions means they want to be thought of as capable potential members of PLO […] The need and potential impact of being organised is something that is not fully considered by Palestinians». Badih goes farther in his opinion concerning the Palestinians´ institutions in Lebanon:

> I am not with the Palestinian Authority Embassy in Lebanon, I do not believe in it, I do not believe they should have it, since we do not have a Palestinian State […] If the Palestinian Embassy is in Lebanon, they should talk with the Lebanese government officially, face them, talk with them about the unemployment, discrimination, about stopping dangerous people from getting inside the camps. But what Fatah and the Palestinian Authority Embassy are doing is everything the Lebanese tells them, they never demanded a thing for the Palestinians

Fatah, the leading faction among the Palestinians in Lebanon, and therefore the organisation, seemingly, with the higher capability of binding the Palestinian community´s agency, does not appear to earn the trust it used to boast in the 60s and 70s. This, Mehdi illustrates in how he sees that PLO, in the hands of Fatah, rather creates troubles in the everyday life in the refugee camps, causing division among the interests of the people, for the sake of projecting a image of themselves as leaders and providers of assistance, but only for the families that support them, and neglecting those who endorse groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

Alaya relates the local political disaffection, lack of security and instability with the situation beyond the borders of Lebanon. She closely relates the local material reality, particularly the circumstances around the refugee camps, and the broader perspective of a failing leadership in the Occupied Territories and Gaza, with two fronts pitted against each other.

> this security … because the factions have weakened and because the popular committees, they [help] not that effect with these disputes among the factions. And

> it´s not only the factions locally, it´s in relation to the authority in *Falasteen*, and definitely, before going over there, actually, it´s the surrounding of the camps

Aida points out there is a delocalisation of the interests of those Palestinian political representatives present in Lebanon:

> If something happens in Gaza or the West Bank, all of us in the camps here will be with them, we are all one hand and support each other. If there would be a protest now in Gaza or the West Bank, at the same time we would protest in all the camps in Lebanon

She suggests a kind of reciprocity that does not seem to add up to the specific strategies carried out by the major factions (Fatah and Hamas) in the camps in Lebanon, «We are centralised in this matter, the decision taken from Gaza or West Bank will be the same in all the camps in Lebanon». Contravening her own idea, this centralisation answers to the logic criticised by Badih before, that is, leaving the Palestinian refugees out of the equation.The young activist states the following:

> Because Hamas wants to dominate there is this conflict, which can be noticed in everything. There is a Popular Committee for the PLO and a Popular Committee for *Tahalef*, the other parties, because of that division we are not strong enough

A substantial problem seems to be posed in the eyes of those who long for unity. This problem appear as the regional strategies put forth by the main political actors, who, while praising an identity shared by Palestinians regardless of their place or residence, contradict and neglect the objective conditions suffered by their supporters in the ailing situation of the camps in Lebanon.

The second aspect closely relates to the dislocation of the interests of the proxies present in the camps. Mehdi asserts that «Foreign [interests] meddle in the internal refugee camp affairs». Referring to the more extreme and violent elements, present especially in Ain el-Hilweh camp, «The Lebanese authorities continually use the security pretext involving the potential troubles caused by armed people in the camps».

Armed strife, one of the consequences of the pressure for the domination in the economic field, seems to answers to the logic of patronage, a field that has seen the rise of specific tendencies, as Mehdi argues that Islamic political tendencies are surfacing some needs not met by the PLO. And not only that, they seem to manage to capitalise identification in regard to what could be considered the symbolic field, consequently gaining the support of a share of the camp inhabitants, who are pushed to a narrowed down set of choices, blending the extreme needs of survival of the people with strategies

of dominating. According to Ghali, «sometimes there are external agendas that could affect the Palestinians, specially after the presence of those who are of extreme behaviours». Similarly to what Mehdi was critisicing, Badih sees that Hamas and some Islamist groups "use their money and are used", eventually increasing the problems of Palestinians.

6.2.b.ii. "You don´t have to be a slave to work" (AG)

Ain el-Hilweh can be taken as a good example of how these confrontational dynamics take place. Ghali describes Ain el-Hilweh in a powerfully significant way:

> Ain el-Hilweh has a population of more than 80,000 and lives in a kind of siege because of the wall [surrounding it], we are living in a ghetto or prison, which puts the people under more stress, depression, and causes hopelessness. This atmosphere brings violence and armed clashes

Leaving out the possible discrepancies regarding the number of inhabitants in the camp, population density is above-average, particularly taking into consideration the area of camp is less than one square kilometer. Dispossession and displacement converge in a singular way, Ghali, recalling episodes of scarcity, because of the lack of funding by external elements, remarks that «On the pretext of antiterrorism, they blocked almost all the money coming to the Palestinian community». He pins this down on the attacks on USA territory of the eleventh of September 2001. As a consequence, local initiatives, aimed at the relief and development of the community, were effectively constrained. Drops in financing, oftentimes depending on non-related events (but, apparently, connected to some factors possibly depending the imagery of the beholder), are seemingly related on the weaving of a net of interdependency, composed of factors that appear to omit the objective needs of the community they allegedly were committed to assist.

We already observed how Ghali disapproves of humanitarian aid when it is detached from the needs he perceives in the community (the episode of the bottles of water, *Vid*. *Supra*, 6.1.b.i.), and how uncomfortable it feels the patronising he perceives in these kind of acts. But mismatching in the assessment of the situation do not seem to be perceived the same way. Although not reaching a normative consideration, there seems to be a prevalent idea of the drawback of having non-Palestinian people in the camps, attributing to them violence, lack of security, and lack of harmony, at least partly (*Vid*. *Supra*, 6.1.b.ii.). Aida says that

> After the war in Syria many foreigners started living in our camps, they are not from the origin of our camp, so, it is risky. They are not from Palestine, I guess they are Syrian […] There is many people dressed with headscarfs, specially in narrow streets. In the past we could walk freely, now we can not. They are foreigners, not from Palestine; Syrian, I guess, but I do not know. They are foreigners, they are a risk for us

Although admitting, after being asked, that "not every Syrian is doing the same thing", she does not retract from the way she manages her activist-mediator endeavour of fixing grants for only Palestinian children, and funding for Palestinian patients; she considers the Syrian refugees have enough attention from the UN (*Vid*. *Supra*, 6.1.c.i.). Additionally, she demands that UNRWA and NGOs provide more funds for the medication for the patients; although she is aware of the fact that it is a private company (Novartis) setting the prices and legal clauses that bind UNRWA, she directs her request for adaption to UNRWA.

In that respect, Hadid, based on his experience as an UNRWA doctor, considers that not everyone is aware of how they pin responsibilities down. In this case, he refers to how he received complaints about structural issues, unable to understand, for example, that wanting to be tended in a specific private hospital was not up to him, as a health worker, but up to this concrete hospital not having an agreement with UNRWA.

Aida is not the only one displaying worry in the heterogeinity of the refugee camps, and establishing interdependences in this sense. Alaya interrelates three factors in the change of the situation, compared to past periods, among which we can also find the presence of "foreigners". We already saw her mentioning the change in the sentiment generated by the aftermath of the Oslo accord. The second one, according to her, would be the increasing pressure of living a dignified life, and the subsequent change of values concerning the strategies to maintain a precarious position in the economic field. The third one, related to the "openess" of the camp, attracting and allowing in not only the displaced, but also Lebanese fugitives, who find a safe haven in the "exclusion zone" the refugee camps represent for them, as the Lebanese Internal Security Forces or Army will not venture inside, unless for reasons of *force majeure*:

> People have changed, there are many strangers, there are many strangers in here. Not only, you know, there are what they call the "displaced" and the "incomers" […] What about the fugitives? The Lebanese fugitives, who actually find their safe

> haven inside the camps […] we add to that all the poor people who come to cluster around the poor

Steering away from the subjective affection implications, Mehdi describes what the consequence of this hetereogeneity might mean for the camps,

> One third of the population in Shatila refugee camp is not Palestinian, something which is bad for Palestinians and Lebanese […] Cultural heterogeneity in the refugee camps and pressures from USA will bring budget cuts to UNRWA concerning people outside the refugee camps

This, he thinks, would affect the people´s range of options concerning their strategies in the economic field. Similarly, Aida comments how this pressure may translate into reality, overflowing the boundaries of the camps:

> Many people, specially the young ones who are still not aware, will be forced to join terrorist groups because of the money. Having them will be risky not just for the Palestinian society but also for other societies like the Lebanese

Other accounts, like Fadi´s, take a more historical perspective. He recalls how, after the long civil war and the Ta´ef agreement, in 1990,

> the displaced people returned back where they were living. The Lebanese, mostly they went back to where they belonged, but the people who belonged to the security zone in south Lebanon and the other camps, like Tel al-Za´atar camp, Jisr al-Basha camp, or Nabatiyeh camp, those were demolished during the war, and were not allowed to rebuilt

The intensifying of the ostracism towards the Palestinians after the civil war, together with the relocation of the remainder of the population of the destroyed camps and the intake of refugees from other areas of the region, engendered by the various conflicts, caused the density of some camps to grow exponentially and

> They found Shatila as a place for them to come, to stay, to live in. So Shatila passed from being from destroyed camp, almost empty, to suddenly host 4,000, 6,000, 8,000, 10,000 people. So this population, suddenly, were in the same place, with low integration, and each community with its background: Palestinian, Syrian,

> Lebanese, Kurds, Gipsies, Palestinian from other camps, Iraqis, Jordanian, Egyptian, even Asian

Along with this came the general feeling brought by the Madrid conference and the Oslo agreement from 1991 on, which did not bring good news for those living in Lebanon. What had been deemed to be an opportunity for peace worldwide, to the Palestinians living in Lebanese territory meant a disappointment and a defeat, the difference between being "Palestinian" and "Palestinian refugee" had never been so clear before. Thus consider Alaya and Badih, around 20 years apart from each other, yet they convene the same consequences for the subjective identity they have been holding to for all their lives. Yousif sees that the purpose of all the negotiations since Camp David and Oslo have been to cancel the right of return and make the refugees disappear as a nation. Alaya suggests a turning point for Palestinians in Lebanon,

> it started with the Oslo agreement in the beginning, when they lost hope, they lost the support, as they felt it, they felt like they are left alone as refugees, not as Palestinians. Because, the Palestinian authority focused on establishing itself inside the Palestinian territories, but the refugees were left alone

Jawad seems to speak from this role as a scholar, but also as an aggravated Palestinian:

> Palestinians in Lebanon, they don´t see that the PA represent them, so you have to look the issue of representation. The PA represent the people who are living in West Bank and Gaza. They look at PLO as the sole representative of Palestinian people, that´s why they are struggling for rebuilding and redemocratising the PLO. PA doesn´t represent them. PA is a tool, should be a tool within the PLO. The PLO should use the PA as a tool for socioeconomic rights, for administering the livelihood of Palestinian, but it doesn´t represent me, the PA doesn´t represent me, they represent anybody. So, this feeling, this sense of things is strong in Lebanon, if you ask any, except those who are, *ya´ni*, among members of some factions, like Fatah and, you know

Displacement, dispossession and the struggle to survive, that is, the multiplicity of strategies to adapt to the environment and make the best of the position occupied in the unstable economic field, evidence the multifaceted origin of the everyday plight for the camp dwellers. Be them people asserting themselves as Palestinian, Syrian, Lebanese or any of the other ethnic identity, they seem to seek a social field where not so much ethnicity, but socioeconomic identity sets the filter of belonging

to the exclusion zones that comprise the camps in Lebanon. Nonetheless, this is only one of the many faces of reality in this spaces, since agency clears the way for what might appear to be a hopeless fate.

In this sense, Hadid provides an insight the rest of the participants do not seem to have in mind. Contrary to the seemingly deeply established notion of employment as the most important root cause of the problems of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Hadid points out what he sees as a lack of interest in fields beyond work. He uses the example of one of my friends in Shatila, who, is

> working seven days a week, from eight or seven in the morning until one at night. He does not have a day off; does not he have anything to do outside? So, what does that man live? Not only him, his whole family is in the store, what does that mean? It means that you don't think about anything else other than work, so you are a slave to work. You don't have to be a slave to work, you have to work at ease, you have to have free time for yourself. Free time, they don't have it, you see that in all the stores in the camp, more or less the same. This must be changed, and who will change it?

He suggests, like he did in previous epigraphs, the implementation of laws, so this and other attitudes and customs can be changed. The way he sees it, it is not about specific attitudes of dispositions, but an overall habit, tending to make people isolated, each in their struggle for survival, inadvertently contributing to a culture of each-for-their-own.

6.3. Summary

The inexorable bond between the individual and social dimensions of the experience does not entail homogeneity in the perception and deployment of agency, just like it does not involve assertion of identity in uniform parameters. There are though a few common features that seem to permeate all the participants, who, without exception assert themselves as Palestinians.

Judging from the gathered details in the discourse of the participants, reference to oneself appears to imply a historically produced situation, dating back to the exodus of 1948. The difference of the particular circumstances of each family on the onset of the Palestinian flight, particularly regarding the position in the economic, but also cultural and social fields, is completely omitted topic in all of the discourses. However, these differences differed significantly and, as a consequence, produced considerable dissimilarities concerning the deployable strategies, and the eventual outcomes of their situations in the economic, cultural, and social fields. A few of the member of the *Jeel al-Nakba*

(Farha, Abbud, Hadid), whose originary position provided them with what could be considered above-average (economic, cultural, and social) capital experienced a life devoid of the more pressing issues that camp inhabitants endured.

Nevertheless, this did not mean an easy life for them, as they had to face marginalisation in different terms, even if the chances of avoiding it were rendered higher by means of their capitals. Ethnic ascription always means for a Palestinian in Lebanon that they have high chances of being excluded, marginalised, or taken advantage of. The few cases where legal ascription could be carried out (Alaya, Aisha) meant that their standing, regarding the legal field, would be comparable to that of a Lebanese citizen. Be that as it may, their social ascription remains, based on fears of fellow ethnic Arabs who, guided by the norm circles establishing suspicion towards a potential political distortion factor, promote their ostracism. Reason for which, some Palestinians resort to transgression in different forms, for instance, hiding their accent, in order to access to positions that would be socially and legally reprehensible.

The Palestinian identity assertion comes sometimes with what appears to be an unequivocal tendency to resort to ethnic background as a claim for the right to return to Palestine, as well as the rights most of them claim to need. These need consist in being able to have a job that pays enough as to reproduce their way of life. A seemingly basic claim, which nonetheless remains at the core of the predicament of the Palestinians in the lower positions of the economic field in Lebanon. Carrying this simple task out, something some of them are convinced comes naturally in others state in the planet, is at the core of their existence. The rest of the factors appear to originate from the possibility to rely on a regular income, balanced with the increasingly difficult and uncertain situation in the state. This uncertainty reached unprecedented marks after the scalation beginning in late 2019 and peaking, but not concluding, with the Beirut Port blast in 2020. Although it was a shocking string of events, the *Jeel al-Shakk*, the generation affected by the logic of late modernity, is seemingly stuck in a cycle of events that expand previous milestones of incertitude. This is especially true for those who live in environments where the tension arising from the competition around economic and symbolic capital results in armed violence, and stays latent, in the form of patronising.

This patronage is denounced as noxious by members of all the generations, as it deactivates the potential growth of agency among the individuals, who, additionally, live under the implicit but veiled dynamic of the “humanitarian government”. This administrative structure, although necessary (particularly in the early years after the displacement), renders all life within its scope to the rank of bare service receiver. Some of the participants deem this dynamic humilliating, specially when they see through the image-oriented practices that don’t advert the real need of the refugees.

7. Discussion: emergence of identity and agency

The planned disassembly of the elements involved in this dissertation is complete. The analytical process reaches here a point where reassembly is due. From invalidating the logical, historical and relational inadequacy of assessing identity as an unchanging, and therefore permanent entity; to associating it with agency in a processual relation, we carried out a good amount of dismantlement of the cogs that might hold that idealistic view.

Being Palestinian, by means of assertion or ascription, does not seem to explain the contingency of the agency deployed by the individual or the collective. This is not so because of statelessness itself but, in some cases, it does appear to influence the inception of reflexive deliberation and call to action in some Palestinians in Lebanon.

The different periods of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon saw them transit from different identity assertions and ascriptions: “temporary displaced”, “dispossessed”, “refugees”, “strugglers”, “terrorists”, “revolutionaries”. Sociohistorical shifts pushed Palestinians to adapt their cultural mechanism (their agency) according to the conditions, but also consequently with the projected set of fears, hopes, objectives, and along with these elements, identity itself.

Those shifts not only respond to synchronic causes, but to an ongoing diachronical and relational processes with causal power. We could preliminarily assert that the continuum composed by identity and agency, individually and collectively embodied, has causal powers of its own. Relational downward causation (Elder-Vass, 2010, pp. 48-62) lies at the core of this chapter. The causal impact of entities constituted by lower-level parts, in this case, the impact social structures might have upon the individuals that constitute them, keeping in mind the causal power of the parts over the whole; divided in two dimensions: and embodied socially relational one, and an institutional dimension.

Agency and identity, thought of in their broadest acceptation, imply a wide range of realities, interconnected layers of different fields of knowledge associated in a relational logic. From the range of possible disciplines, this dissertation deals with the phenomenological account of the participants; the historical background against which several elements can be compared; the sociological aspect, regarding the intersubjective construction of social structures and symbolic exchange of meaning; and the legal backdrop in which the institutionalised normative realm takes shape.

In spite of trying to orderly explain the phenomena present in this dissertation, different biased approaches could take place. One of these possible biases could originate from the limitation to analysing the psychological spectrum of the individual. Which would imply we assume our phenomenological analysis conceives our subject of study as universal, not as particulars, as

individual creations, rather than social products, as the logic of modernity would impel us to. As Wallach Bologh points out, this would ground our study in the exclusive observation of: personal motives (such as private sympathies or ambitions, *Vid*. *Supra*, 3.3.a.); external causes (attributing cause to belonging to a certain position in a social structure, *Vid*. *Supra*, 3.3.b.); personal experiences (such as deriving views from childhood socialisation, *Vid*. *Supra*, 4.1.b.); or underlying assumptions (such as attributing agency a supposed human nature, *Vid*. *Supra*, 3.2.) (Bologh, 1979, p. 13).

A second biased approach exposed could be constrained to explaining the effects of structural realities and exterior determinations, would see this study reduced to taking into consideration taken-for-granted notions (seeing social reality based on commonly held views, *Vid*. *Supra*, 3.2.b.); objective conditions (considering social reality as the observing and reporting of external conditions or occurrences in the world, *Vid*. *Supra*, 3.4.) (Bologh, 1979, p. 13).

Notwithstanding the exclusion of these dimensions as analytical fields in their own, their relational aspects will nevertheless play a major role. They conform the gears of the internal conditions of the subject as they operate and, at the same time, are operated by the outer mechanisms that press ahead the forms of life in normal everyday life. This specifies in the capability of an entity to have causal effects in its parts, stemmed from the specific organisation of its "lower-level" entities, which hold their own causal powers, as parts of a whole that can affect its composition. This chapter´s purpose is to outline a "map", a "blueprint", regarding the relational features of the entities involved. Having in mind theory and empirical gathered data, the first epigraph will explore the historical development of production of meaning; the second will analyse the individual and social dimensions of identity and agency; and the third one will explore the possibility of a relation between social structures, identity and agency.

7.1. Relational identity and agency

During the development of this dissertation, the analytical unequivocal divide between the individual and social aspects of identity was taken for granted. Practice proved this perspective inadequate. The Palestinians interviewed for this thesis frequently speak of their selves and the collective in interchangeable terms. "I", "Me", and "us" seem to blend, configuring a collective experience in which individuals see themselves reflected, asserting their identity, by means of ascribing the same identification to the other members of the community. Subsequently, a "they" seems to express Otherness in a form of life that usually perceives belonging in terms of ethnic and national difference.

At the same time, it seems to be through this collective experience that they project their hopes, expectations, as well as their agency. In terms of symbolic interactionism, it could be said that the "Me" prevails over the "I" (2.2.b.ii.), that is, the socialised self appears to overlap and take over the selfhood (Mead, 1934/1962), portraying the individual experience as fused with the collective one. However, the deployment of agency of the different individuals is not homogeneous. Examples among the interviewees illustrate how, from a similar overlapping of the individual-social self, different extents of agency arise. The formation of the "I", the reflexive individual might then be conceived as part of a mechanism of downward causation (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 125), that is, the interaction of higher-order entities, composed of lower-order entities, organised in a specific manner, from which concrete properties arise. However, because causal powers do not operate in a unique direction, lower-order entities might and do affect the organisation of higher-order entities.

The formation of the "I", as an entity with the capacity for reflexive deliberation (Archer, 2003), seems to depend on the causal power effected by habitus, the internalised historic dispositions transferred transgenerationally (Bourdieu, 1977), and the adaptive behaviour developed by the individual, as well as normative institutionalised structures, which mostly restrain agency for Palestinians in Lebanon.

Psychological, sociological, anthropological, nor legal accounts on their own seem incapable of explaining a process where entities entailing different causal mechanism interact. These result in different configurations, where identity assertion and ascription yield meanings that are not necessarily shared by everyone in the same extent. Similarly, agency mobilisation can be barely explained by resorting to a unique disciplinary background.

Subjectivity and objectivity intertwine in complex ways. What is embodied in a person does not originate from an entirely individual process, nor is it determined by a collectively established practice. However, understanding the way in which social practices develop and generate habitus offers an invaluable source of information concerning the conditions in which adaptive behaviours might produce strategies (deployment of agency determined by the individual to a higher extent) of adapting to a social environment. The production of this historical networks of meaning are underpinned by ways in which human thought developed, and how higher-order entities, that is, social structures and norm groups with enough causal power, produced social systems where this thought was established as predominant. The next epigraph will discern the main elements at play regarding this fact, the production and reproduction of meaning (regarding identity and agency); afterwards, this "blueprint" will serve as an overlay for the case of the Palestinians in Lebanon.

7.1.a. Historical networks of meaning

We observed that thinking in terms of essences (a primordial substance of which objects in reality are composed of; things in themselves, as independent of any other entity), when referred to identity, might leads us to think that we live in a static world, where things just *are*, continuously, permanently, without change. Furthermore, if things constitute a reality of their own, but because of our limited experience as finite beings, this guides us to think that this supposed permanence is impossible in our world, we might refer to an ultimate realm, one where the real things exist (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.2.a.i.).

Social beings as we are, dependent on each other for survival, thought takes place socially in a conscious and intentional way (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.2.a.ii.). The thought of a "*hinterwelt*" as Nietzsche (1887/2007) put it, hints at a specific mode of thought, one that prioritises a specific set of social behaviours, and a concrete hierarchy for individuals (specified in ascribed identities), their positions in the collective, even their thoughts and emotions, which can then be branded as "good" or "bad", depending on how well they align with the prioritised behaviours and permitted actions.

These behaviours stem from a system of survival that eventually gets settled down for specific collectives that, since ancient times, took root in specific territories they eventually took as their own. This appropriation frequently entailed violence and domination, agency deployed for the objective of establishing a cultural and moral authority. This way, a collective´s system of survival, or culture, originally a set of mechanisms aimed at adapting in the most efficient way to the ecologic, material, technical, and social circumstances, becomes socially rooted. The collective feels it is part of their collective as well as individual intuition, embodied in them, habitus is engendered. Social stratification, the division of labour for the reproduction of life, entails ascribed identities, attached to specific ways of achieving social roles.

The original distribution of these social identities, of the capacity to make decisions for the sake of the survival of the group, is assumed by specific individuals, or groups of individuals, with the recognised power of creating norms (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.2.b.iii.). The constitution of these norm circles comes with the institution of discursive practices: from all the possible networks of meaning, a few become a reflection of knowledge in language, set up in the specific spatial and social circumstances of the collective.

Despite its limitations (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.2.a.iii.), the "form of life" contained within, is the locale where the reproduction of behaviours, beliefs and tendencies takes place, embodied in the individual (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.4.a.), who feels it as an innate feature. This habitus, a transgenerationally transmitted

set of dispositions, is the result of the distribution of different kinds of resources (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.4.d.), which roughly locate an individual or group in the collective, defining their position, depending on their economic, cultural and social capital.

Contrarily to what could be thought of from what has been exposed, the individual is not predestined to repeat and reproduced the exact same behaviours they obtain through their insertion into the collective (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.3.b.iii.), that is, socialisation. Due to the fact that humans are not guided by reason alone (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.3.a.i. & 4.1.c.), the dynamics of change respond to a number of complex and interdependent factors (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.2.a.), intertwined in the social world, and composed of networks of meanings that inform the actions of the individuals and groups, who reciprocally assume and expect responsibility and accountability (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.3.a.iv.). However, these systems are not left to be complied with at free will or judgement, the social structures that compose them are normativised, fixed in laws and regulations, which are connected to specific bounded territories (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.c.).

7.1.b. Palestinian historical networks of meaning

Palestinians of premodern times, were circumscribed under the rule of the Ottoman Empire (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.1.). Traditional culture was based on the reproduction of life through the extraction of value from the land. Premodern Palestinians were mostly peasant who, in order to survive, had extensive families. Biological families extended and became political families, as the options for survival seemed to increase along with a broader social-based strategy.

Threats like the Ottoman authority´s forced conscriptions, Bedouin raids, were kept at bay; while mechanic solidarity in times of material need, provided a support system in the long term. Salient examples of these mechanisms are the *musha´* system for the rotation of the usage of plots of land (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 30; Khalidi, 2010, p. 95; Krämer, 2008, pp. 46-47), and inter- or intra-village weddings, which served as a way of redistributing surplus of produce, as well as tightening the bonds in the social field, were social capital could be transubstantiated into economic capital. Heteronomous identity (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.1.a.) was the rule for Palestinian of this period, ascription of identity took place with birth, with a low probability for social mobility, as the dominant mechanical solidarity (Durkheim, 1893/2013) meant a rigid lifestyle, based on extracting value from the land.

However, the original accumulation of land (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.a.iii.) gave rise to an asymmetry in the economic field. A minority of land owners, internal and external groups of individuals, held larger

plots of land, and lived out of the extraction of value of the work of the peasants that worked it. This pattern gave way to the transubstantiation of economic capital into cultural and social capital.

The surplus of value extracted by the *fellaheen*, the peasantry, had two distinct paths. The peasant families lived committed to a way of life that employed intensive human labour, necessary for their biological reproduction. The landowners, the *a'ayan*, who appropriated the surplus value extracted in the economic field by the *fellaheen*, could transubstantiate it into social capital (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.4.d.), investing it in weaving vertical coalitions (Krämer, 2008, pp. 74, 85; Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 40-41; Morris, 2004, p. 20) in two directions: "downwards", in the direction of the *fellaheen*, in line with ethnic (not yet national) bonds, based on the values of loyalty to the village, in a fundamentally patriarchal social field; and "upwards", in the direction of the Ottoman authorities, bound within shared interests in the economic and political fields, for the sake of stability and maintaining the status quo.

Yet another intermediary level was instantiated in the figure of the *mukhtar*, a man who held the authority of a village, or group of villages. A kind of arbiter towards the *fellaheen* and, at the same time, a local representative of the Ottoman authorities, in charge of managing tax collection. Before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the relation towards the land was strategically altered. With the impending wave of modernity at the gates, the Ottomans commoditised land by force of law, in an attempt to gain leverage, as their political position was put at stake. The effects of this decision trickled all the way down to the people in the lower positions of the economic and cultural fields, the *fellaheen*. The change in the paradigm concerning their relationship to the land was an epistemologically difficult task, they struggled to understand the concepts of trade of land, now monetised. It could also be expected that it was emotionally taxing too, as it affected their attachment and way of life, inscribed within their culture for a long time.

The economic field was open to investment by external agents. European investors began interceding in the process of modernisation. On one hand, they purchased land; commoditised the local economy; introduced a foreign form of life, one with its discursive practice centred around the revaluation of capital at the helm; and the introduction of the local economy into the global backdrop. Value of use became secondary to market value as stockpiles of high-quality produce entailed bigger costs that imports.

On the other hand, among the newcomers, even if they would not stand out in the beginning, a gradual inflow of people, coming from diverse parts of Europe and asserting themselves as Zionist Jews, began establishing in the land. Originating in European territories, where the logic of modernity

was more advanced, they seemed to be much more adjusted to the principles of the new era. Despite the previous existence of self-asserted Jewish population in the land, the newcomers appeared interested in promoting difference on the cultural field, regarding their alleged ancestral rights over the land, and disregarding the indigenous inhabitants, that is, the Palestinians. In the economic field, they advocated (frequently with violence) the purchase of land from the hands of the local inhabitants, simultaneously hindering the employment of the surplus population. This population was eventually forced to migrate to urban areas. In the social field, Zionists fostered the intertwining of their culturalist exclusive perspective with the tenets of capitalism, aligned with the colonialist effort of the British.

The establishment of the British Mandate (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.2.), after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, facilitated the strategic deployment of Zionist collective agency, aimed at establishing a homeland. Orientalism (Said, 1978) took root in the portrayal of the Palestinian inhabitants, ascribing them as illiterate, barbaric, and violent, particularly during the episodes of resistance to the logic of modernity. The co-optation of the *a'ayan* and the *effendi* (incipient bourgeoisie and landowners) seemed to trigger the advancement of their transubstantiation of economic and social capital into cultural capital. Asserting themselves as more sophisticated members in higher positions in the economic field, they pursued social ascription under the logic of modernity, while still instrumentalising the social capital bound to the local network of loyalty with the *fellaheen*.

A land well under way modernisation, organic solidarity (Durkheim, 1893/2013, pp. 88-155) replaced mechanical solidarity in the urban environment. Accordingly, individuated identity (Côté & Levine, 2002, pp. 123-128) became the paradigm for entrant rural Palestinians, based on labour division. In spite of it, increasingly solid walls in the cultural field between Palestinian and Zionist proletariat, prevented any unity in that respect. Causal power stemming from the structures of Zionist were stronger than those potentially arising from social ascription and transcending cultural strategies. Rising tensions, originated in the increasing confrontation, mainly between the Zionist elements and the urban Palestinian proletariat, ended up in open armed conflict.

Downward causation originating in the alleged ethnic origin of the Palestinians did not become effective. Dissimilar positions in the social field, as well as a salient differences in objectives and expectations, made the lower entities in the economic, social, and cultural field, parts of a weakly held whole Palestinian community, carry out an effort in causing change in the dominant structures in the economic and political fields. The rebellion of 1936 miscarried; agency deployed by the lower entity positions in the Palestinian cultural side failed in causing effective changes in the structures

that kept them dominated. Furthermore, part of the strategic assets, such as military capabilities, were neutralised, diminishing the causal power in said sphere, and distorting leverage.

As a consequence, the economically, politically, and militarily sanctioned structures of the dominating Zionist movement facilitated the exodus of the Nakba (*Vid. Supra*, 1.3.), overwhelming the Arab offensive, another poorly joint whole, whose parts did not integrate a coherent enough organisation, with no causal power in the military nor politically organisational fields.

As a result of the forced displacement, part of the Palestinians terminated their flight in the South of Lebanon, due to proximity, in most of the cases. The territory held a local population lower in the economic and cultural field than the newly arrived Palestinians, as literature and memories of the participants indicate (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 107; Fadi, 2019; Farha, 2020). The rather newly found Palestinian national identity was under shock, unable to adapt (*Vid. Supra*, 4.1.c.ii.) to the new situation, even denying it, as emotion took over reason (Hume, 1739/2007, pp. 265-268) and agency, in the beginning of what probably constituted the grounds for individual and, to some extent, collective traumas.

Emotion, as the basic grounds for adaption, appeared seized by the loss of land, the affective bond to it, as the nexus of assertion of identity and referential entity for networks of meaning. This affected both identity, as a vacuum of assertion and attachment (Greenberg, 2017, p. 31); and agency, illustrated in either self-defeating cognitive schemas (Côté & Levine, 2002, p. 3), seeing in themselves peasants (or proletariat) without a land, with no means of providing for the family, which seeped through their sense of identity. Nevertheless, an attempt to rearticulate spatial identity emerged within the collective. This was initially performed via the attempt at reproducing the geographical distribution of their original villages in the new reality of the refugee camps, as Fadi stated (*Vid. Supra*, 6.1.a.i.).

Insecurity started being the new normal for the Palestinians in Lebanon (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 102; Fadi, 2019). Meanwhile, the newly founded Israeli State started implementing image-oriented strategies as a strategic line of action. Abbud (2019) attempted to employ Golda Meir´s words about her being Palestinian to prove the existence of the nation (*Vid. Supra*, 6.1.c.iii.). However, her «actual words were: "There is no Palestinian people. There are Palestinian refugees."» (Meir, 1990), an idea she then instrumentalized to avow Palestinianness to the Jewish settlers established in the land in the wake of World War I. Normativisation of the modern logic of exclusion was carried out and exemplified in the Israeli Prevention of Infiltration Law (5714-1954) (Knesset, 2022), preventing by force of law and arms the re-entry of Palestinians into their homeland.

Increasingly aware of the significance of the Nakba, for Palestinians in Lebanon, «Re-creating Palestine through memory was not only a natural reaction to forcible separation, it was also a way — the only way — of passing on to children the homes that were their inheritance» (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 3). This was performed through the mentioned reproduction of the distribution of families and villages in the camps; and also through keeping figures like the *mukhtar* (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 212; Alaya, 2020), as a re-enactment of township administration. It would be possible to locate at this point the continuation of a tradition fixed in vertical and mostly patriarchal structures (*Vid*. *Supra*, 6.1.c.ii. & 6.2.b.). This figure eventually reflected the functions in the face of UNRWA, newly created by the United Nations, to assist "Palestine refugees" (UNGA, 1949), which somehow echoed a continuity between the past and the present (Alaya, 2020), as an additional element reinforcing collective memory (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 4, 136; Fadi, 2017).

The official intention of UNRWA was that the Palestinian refugees be absorbed into the local population in their host countries. An end that was partially reached in Jordan, in a lesser degree in Syria; but had the outright opposition of the Lebanese State, because of the fear of the consequences of *tawteen* (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.b.ii.) (Aida, 2019; Farha, 2020) . Even if the term was and is subject of polysemy (Meier, 2010), apt for an assortment of argumentations, the objective reality is that not only naturalisation of the Palestinians is prevented, but also any other measure that improves their situation rejected (Ghandour, 2017), with the exception of those who, occupying high positions in the economic and social fields, are deemed deserving to be included in an otherwise exclusive state.

Causal power of the Lebanese State as a whole, derived from a habitus that stems from a similar colonial origin as the Palestinian refugees, seems to be grounded on emotions of fear, rejecting a population whose cultural instances overlapped with their own. The fundamental precepts of modernity, in the form of exclusion, blend into a seemingly maladaptive schema based on fear, resulting in the reinforcement of the exclusionist tendencies. These transformed into repression, in the hands of the Deuxième Bureau, which employed methods common to colonial Arab political states (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 141; Abbud, 2019).

On the labour field, Palestinians, officially banned from working in an assortment of positions, were and are still subjected to conditions of exploitation, particularly in rural areas and construction, employed as disposable cheap labour (Winslow, 2005, p. 93; Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 118; Ghali, 2019; Taher, 2020; Hannan, 2019). However, lack of causal power, in the form of subjection to the logic of modernity in Lebanon, was not all that was within the Palestinian collective. Jeel al-Nakba was slowly giving rise to Jeel al-Thawra, through the resignification of the Palestinian identity and its concomittant agency (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.5.b.).

As a matter of fact, Palestinian agency in Lebanon developed to a point that it disputed the political field with the Lebanese State, and the economic field with UNRWA. This triggered the fear-based response of parts of the Lebanese society, those closer to in the economic, cultural and social field to the Western states, whom amplified the difference-based identity (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.2.a.), in an attempt to intensify a political perspective prone to essentialist views. Past inertias, originated in the structural political organisation, based mainly on ethnic difference, ensued a violent succession of conflict that lasted 15 years (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.5.c.). The posterior withdrawal of the PLO, and afterwards its political abandonment, felt as such by the Palestinians in Lebanon (Sayigh R. , 2007; Peteet, 2005; Mehdi, 2019; Alaya, 2020).

Since that time, legal ascription as refugees has been the main strategy carried out by Palestinians in Lebanon with low economic, cultural, and social capital. This in turn amplified the restrain of agency by the humanitarian government and its logic of inclusion by way of excluding (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.d.).

7.2. Signs, references, and habitus: individual and social identity

Considering the historical account, and judging from the resignification of the Palestinian identity, it seems that identity is related to agency in a way where, in the absence of a causal power that binds the formation of collective identity within a restrictive frame from an external source, emotional response adapts and enables a deployment of agency based on reflexive deliberation. This in turn takes into account the potential maladaptive load of the habitus, tying up a specific style of attachment to values that misrecognise the source of personal unrest for the doctrines of norm circles.

The asserted identity and conception of Palestine and Palestinians serves as a counterpoint of a seemingly lineal and underdeveloped discourse regarding their agency. In other words, discourses about how the story of the Palestinians in Lebanon came to be, seem to focus not so much around what “Palestinians do” or have done, but around what “Palestinians are”.

7.2.a. Village identity, ethnic identity, class identity

As Sayigh and Peteet highlight, poverty and class oppression of the old days in Palestine tends to be buried, concealed under the memories of a romanticised past (Sayigh R. , 2007; Peteet, 2005). This, constituted as a sign, a subjective image that likewise seems to omit the principles that support the reference, appears to reconstruct the narrative of a past filtered through an emotional load, omitting the sociohistorical grounds of its complexity. This fits with Frijda’s law of emotions,

particularly the law of situational meaning (emotions arising in response to the meaning structures of given situations), the law of concern (emotions arising in response to events that are important to the individual's goals, motives, or concerns), and the law of apparent reality (emotions being elicited by events appraised as real) (Frijda, 1986/2001; 1988; 2007).

Village and clan solidarity as mechanisms of relief in the face of inequality, a residue of which still remains in the camps (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 1-14; Peteet, 2005, pp. 214-216) also seem to stem from this habitus. And although it serves a purpose, its restrictive cultural (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.3.b.v. & 4.2.b.i.) logic still seems to misrecognise ethnic difference as a criterion exclusively originating within the individual.

The tendency to blur the situations of poverty and class oppression seem to be present in participants like Abbud and Farha, who explicitly idealise Palestine. The first one acknowledging his own romanticisation, but reproducing it anyway; the second one, seemingly, transposing her ideas of a life worth living, assuming social and economic capital in the same way for every Palestinian. However, this tendency is implicit in the discourse of many other participants, if not all of them, in a varying degree. Except for the members of the organisation that holds a critical discourse against the Lebanese State, UNRWA, and the Palestinian Factions, the rest of the participants hold an idealised vision of the return to Palestine.

Additionally, the pragmatical substitute of the return to Palestine, migration to Europe or Western countries, appears idealised too. Some people, Fadi among them (who is an educated member of the collective, relatively high in the economic field), barely believed that poverty and extreme poverty exist in states of Europe (field journal, 2019). This is not highly consequential, at least personally for him. But I have personally witnessed the situations of different people who, with an idealised image of their would-be lives in Europe, dared to take risky migration routes. A few of them made it. Some others, like Jamal (2020), tried, risked their lives, returned, and resigned to deploy their agency in any other way.

Knowing that their villages were destroyed, or turned into Israeli settlements does not stop the intention of returning to them. It rather seems to amplify their political drive (Nazim, 2019; Badih, 2019) and steadfastness. Sayigh (2007, p. 5) establishes a distinction between generations that, in this respect, the participants in this dissertation proved limited, as members of the *Jeel al-Shakk* are still holding to the values and the moral basis of the struggle, albeit not explicitly centred in the "virtues" of the *fellaheen*, but employing the features of the image-oriented identity in their struggle for recognition (Badih, 2019; Aina & Samer, 2020).

A common assertion seems to exist, taking into consideration the participants. All of them consider themselves Palestinians. Some of them identify with a lower or higher position in the economic field, but nonetheless project themselves as a part of a whole, the Palestinians. This whole does not always circumscribe to the territorial limits of Lebanon, nor Palestine, and sometimes not even the Near East. "Palestinians" is sometimes a seemingly universal identification that transcends and equalises everyone ascribed as such. This transposition works as a meaningful symbolic whole. But it additionally seems to conceal the difference of strategies present within the alleged comprehensive collective, which does not work as a whole, as exemplified by the berated official strategies of PLO and AP alone (Badih, 2019; Ghali, 2019).

An old Bedouin proverb, «Me against my brother; me and my brother against our cousin; me, my brother and my cousin against the stranger» seems to work within the Palestinian community in Lebanon, most of the times. With the exception of the members of the critical organisation that openly defy the Palestinian factions as part of a norm circle that employs image-oriented strategies to hold their causal power, the rest of the participants hold hopes for a re-edition of a unitary mobilisation.

Despite the incertitude gripping the youth of Jeel al-Shakk, that part of the habitus, as well as the praise of sacrifice for the community, seems to come with the deliberative reflexive capacity of the most active members among the participants. Emotional attachment seems to play an important role in this respect.

7.2.b. Language and thought; signs and references

Language is the channel through which we communicate and interact. It is also a tool we use to communicate with others, and our selves. A means of articulating the events occurring in our life; explaining our experience, actions, reactions, our selves, successes, failures, and identity. All of it made to have sense in and through language, a tool that depends on the historical moment, the dominant relations of power, relations of material production, the resulting moral tenets, as well as the unconscious of each individual (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.2.a.iii.).

The relationship between "the word and the world" (Appadurai, 1996, p. 51), involve a noesis, a reference in reality; and a noema, the sign, living within the individual, or the collective. Participation in a culture comes with a specific configuration of the entities involved. Downward causation of the material, ecological, social and political higher-order entities codetermine the development and arrangement of language. Identifying things in reality, as well as identifying ourselves, is a constant

act of reproducing the product of the cause of these higher-order entities. But agency remains, and thus, not every reference holds the same meaning for every individual or collective.

A major distinction in reference in the modes of existence of "Palestinian" exist among the subjects interviewed for this dissertation, two approaches to the noema of their own identity: perceptions of a shared cultural reality that fuse the idea of Palestinianness with a projected image of an atemporal set of meaningful values; and a judgement of the actualised state of affairs recognised in their daily interrelatedness.

7.2.b.i. Perception and projection

Prior to the Nakba, "Palestinians" were rather members of Majd al-Krum, Safad, Jaffa or a village, rather than members of a unitary nation; afterwards, caused by the dispossession and flight, the sense of nation, as a unitary community prevailed until nowadays. Specific origin still relates to villages, but over it prevails the sense of belonging to Palestine as a nation.

By force of dispossession, exclusion, and marginalisation, the perception of belonging to a whole, a national community, seems to permeate the participants. However, points of departure, regarding economic, social, and cultural capital, were dissimilar in origin, and frequently resulting in unequal grounds for agency deployment, via resources grounded on economic or social capital. Nonetheless, this disparity does not seem to stop some of them from projecting their own specific identity (beyond the national identification to a national community) to the community they deem their own.

The narrative of "my village" (*Vid*. *Supra*, 6.1.c.iii.), is still an anchor to the past for many displaced Palestinians. Within this narrative, frequently lies a tendency to project a homogeneous and univocal version of both past and present. This perception seems to translate into a projection where not only inequalities in the different fields, but also class oppression, are omitted (Sayigh R. , 2007; Peteet, 2005). The transposition of one´s experience to the others´ experience, through the common "we", seems to apply to an all-encompassing image of thought, assuming a noema from the own lived experience. As Peteet states, «refugee camps may figure prominently in the Palestinian imagination and collective consciousness, yet not all Palestinians reside in them nor do they all suffer equally (Peteet, 2005, p. 197).

However, this tendency is not reproduced only by the members of the Palestinian community in Lebanon who occupy higher positions in the economic, cultural or social fields (Farha and Abbud, as the most salient examples). Participants in lower positions (particularly Aida, Badih, Kahlil, and Imane) seem to partake in the reproduction of the ideology of a homogeneous "ethnicity", where an

oversimplified identity ascription seems to respond to a cultural system articulated with a specific socio-political programme. The usage of emotive language in these cases acknowledges the "ideological potency" of "identity" as an idiom (Geertz, 1973; Malešević, 2006), an expression partially emptied of the complexity of the reference it pertains to, masking and legitimising political claims as identity statements (Malešević, 2006, pp. 157-184), as a reflection of the projection of the interests of higher class over the lower (Marx & Engels, 1846/1998, pp. 34-36, 41-43; Marx, 1867/1990, pp. 164-167, 172-176; Marx, 1939/1973, p. 88). Therefore, emotion seems to play a fundamental role as a productor and reproductor (Nussbaum, 2013), not so much of rationality (not even the one posited by Taylor, as an expanded rational choice) nor self-concern, but of misrecognition of the own interests, against the background of a seemingly more enticing visceral, emotion-driven moral irrealism (Bhaskar, 2008 [1993], p. 193), grounded in the devaluation of social life.

There is a difference in the discourse though. While claiming an effective unity with expression like "we are all one hand" (referring to Palestinians in Lebanon, as well as abroad), the subjective perspective of the provider of this idea-overlay relate to their respective positions in the different fields, particularly the economic field. Notwithstanding a perceived and taken for granted Palestinianness, the different economic, cultural and symbolic capital held by the different subjects in the fields they partake in entail different strategies put forth, among which, some are oriented to survival, while others contribute to the reproduction or subversion of different fields in varying ways.

While persons in the socioeconomic coordinates of Abbud and Alaya might underline the innate, natural features of the Palestinians, collapsing notions of time and space regarding identity (Peteet, 2005, p. 189); those closer to the more difficult day to day material circumstances of life in the camps (Nazim, Badih, Aina, Samer, Karim, Khalid, Kismet) highlight the purported active stance Palestinians have in common, portraying them as a consistent body (Peteet, 2005, p. 196) that can even transcend the states´ borders and particular circumstances of their separateness. The different strategies put forth by the subjects seem to shape the image they project into themselves and their peers.

On a final note, regarding the projection of the own perception into a whole, Mehdi, and to a higher extent, Abbud, both imply the positive impact Palestinians had in the Lebanese economy. While arguably true, the type of polarised statement that suggests a unilateral direction, such as Palestinians having a positive impact in economic terms, omits the complexity of socioeconomic matters. In this instance, Intra Bank, «the biggest and strongest of the banks with Lebanese and Arab capital», directed by Christian Palestinian Yusuf Baydas, controlled a «number of the country´s major

companies» and «financed the [Lebanese] government´s infrastructure and transactions». It´s insolvency, declared in 1966 and derived from its «adventurism and speculative character» pushed the economy to a substantial crisis, concurrently strengthening the «tendency for the reduction of the intermediary role of the Lebanese financial sector» (Traboulsi, 2012, p. 150). This sank the state´s economy into a system incapable of productive economy for the sustenance of its population, limited to fulfilling the external economic interests of regional and global stakeholders, that is, the present-day Lebanon.

7.2.b.ii. Identity and the production of meaning

As humans, agents, entities capable of having an effect in our conditions of existence, our perception acts as a departure point for how our agency evaluates our surrounding, also socially. As part of a social system, we engage in the cultural production and reproduction of this evaluation of the surrounding. Through our capability to reason, we engage with our peers, having in mind the rules that guide our actions, aware of the fact we can be held responsible and accountable for what we do, and how we do it (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.3.a.).

We are embodied individuals, surrounded by social structures we identify as external, but they also reside within us (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.3.b.). Culture, as a system of survival, aimed at adopting mechanisms for the adjustment to ecological, technical, material, social, and political environments, carries within a measure of ambivalence and coercion (Durkheim, 1912/1995, pp. 208-209; Lindholm, 2007, pp. 193-194), as it addresses collectives not completely homogeneous. Accordingly, cultural systems come with social status, that is, expectations about external social behaviour (a “Me”), stratified according to the interests of norm circles (*Vid*. *Supra*, 3.4.).

Along with an external set of expectations, that is, a social status; the internal dimension, the state, comprises the inner world, changing circumstances affecting only the individual, also their way of feeling, thinking, and doing (an “I”). The way part of the outside resides inside, the habitus, is a set of dispositions, transmitted transgenerationally through culture, but felt as an individual matter. This happens to an extent that it is frequently not lived as an external entity, but a very personally lived one.

However, the ambivalences might induce stress, both externally and internally; to an individual, or to a collective (Taylor, 1994, pp. 63-64). Asserting identity through attachment to a specific culture means, for the individual, accepting a set of rules which they do not agree with in its entirety. For a collective, a culture not of its own might trigger a variety of responses.

The dispossession and displacement the historical development of the Palestinians endured introduced a stress response. Collectively, claiming of their ethnic identity meant, on one hand, the denial of the logic that causal powers forced upon the majority of their population. On the other hand, the claim of a nation-state of their own corresponded to the political strategy of the norm circles high causal power enough to manage such a structure.

Concerning Palestinian identity, a fusion seems to take place between the individual identity and the collective one. The development of this thesis assumed a clear distinction between an individual inner sphere and a collective outer area. Practice proved that, in the case of the participants, this is not so.

The common predicament of being a Palestinian in Lebanon (regardless of the position in the economic, cultural, or social fields) seems to prompt its automatic assertion. An identification grounded on a shared history of suffering, as well as a common frame for ascription in the individual state, as a landless, worthless displaced on a foreign land. The dominant production of meaning stems from this common history: Palestinians are steadfast strugglers, but at the same time, victims of an arrangement of structures that abused, abandoned, or neglected them.

In the narratives explored in the dissertation, a complex arrangement of "I", "Me" and "They" exist. The "Me", if we are to take Mead´s (1934/1962) approach, seems the predominant, as it projects the individual´s socialised self in front of their peers. Erikson (1968) would point to the effect of the social structures upon the individual, indicating that the interplay between the different instances shares importance with the development of the personality of the individual. The "I" sometimes appears to be lost, deindividualised in the integration of the Me in the collective.

Being Palestinian seems to mean, to the participants of this dissertation, sharing dire conditions since the onset of the very awareness of their dispossession. The Nakba set the parameters of dislocation, statelessness, and abandonment that accompany them up to this day. The causes of their predicament, oftentimes point towards a "they" (*Vid*. *Supra*, 6.1.a.iii. & 6.2.a.i.). The variation of this subject depends on the field of reference, but it frequently seems to be grounded on the same logic of difference (Grossberg, 1996) that played a key role in the consecutive dispossession and dislocations Palestinians in Lebanon suffered.

"They" is sometimes constructed around structures of power. The state of Israel, being the original actor behind their displacement and dispossession, is followed by a wider spectrum of actors, institutions, organisation, and tendencies. Due to historical ties, the USA, EU, UN, are also in the

other end of identificative terms. Even if some Palestinians work in UNRWA (seldom in high positions), "They" are still part of a tendency that neglects them.

A specific and different case of "They" involves the future generations of Palestinian children. As Aida was suggesting "they have to know" about the Palestinian case, "about our country, about our village". This is precisely what seems to lie deep within the identity matrix of Palestinians in Lebanon, premodern village life. Not only as a romanticised idea of life in a glorified Palestine, but also as a habitus were certain dispositions, like arrangement around nuclear and political family ties, or attachment to vertical hierarchical structures, seem to ground the structures of though present nowadays.

Life with meaning, that is, transcending daily-life survival and struggles, in many of the cases of the participants, seems to be resolved around the identity granted by Palestine, and the return and future settlement in the land. Provided by the immediate social environment, and actively sought after by the members of the community, with women at the forefront of transmission of this knowledge, coherence between the participants (except for the member of the dissident group) is high. This would star answering the subset of queries contained under the first main research question (*Vid*. *Supra*, 2.1.):

- Is there a common set of assertions between the Palestinians?

The ethnic belonging to Palestine is the axis the assertions of the participants revolve around. "Village" (*Vid*. *Supra*, 6.1.c.iii.), or the contemporary equivalent of the eidetic common belonging, which could be thought of as the wide Palestinian community. This is reflected in the locatedness of choice (a specific refugee camp, for instance), which seems to be not only something desired, but also necessary for the cultural survival of the collective, also beyond modern-day borders. Additionally, the idea of the village as a network of interdependence and mutual aid, seems related to connection and belonging, which translates as identity assertion for the individual, ascription for those surrounding or related to them.

Somehow, the means of achieving this seems to be correlated to employment. Working in dignified conditions is difficult and generally banned for Palestinians in Lebanon. However, economic capital is projected as the way of keeping their culture, their identity alive, by means of transubstantiating economic capital into cultural and social capital, with the hopes of building a network with causal power enough to advocate and achieve the right of return. Partly political, partly pragmatical, the income of money, through employment, is, by and large, the main practical concern.

7.2.b.iii. Work, job, employment, vocation, calling, purpose

Having in mind the restrictions in place by the Lebanese State (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.b. & 4.3.c.ii.), concern about employment is proportionate to the degree to which the participants express their worries. In spite of the announcement of opening up work restrictions for Palestinians in Lebanon (Rose S. , 2021), the situation is dire (Al Taher, 2022), Palestinians, as well as other refugees, and Lebanese themselves, see no future in the country and decide to emigrate.

Purchasing power is then not granting the higher comfort it was assumed to bestow. As a result of a catastrophic management by the government, but possibly due to a misconception of the presumed qualities of the exchange value. The dispositions contained within a habitus that values collective life, connection and belonging, might not find much solace in the individualised patterns surmised to the exchange value. The collective principles of a premodern world clash with the individualised modern one. Wealth, as a hypergood, in a world that seems to foster the idea of an independent individual whose needs are fulfilled through commodities, does not fit in a social environment where the connection comes through emotional ties.

Participants like Aida and Samer state a clearer hierarchy concerning the meaning of work. Splitting up an apparently polysemic word, the activity of a job does not grant Aida a purposeful life. Samer sees there is something else to "working" in an environment where personal growth can be attained, although he admits working in some organisations provides a necessary income. Aida finds purpose in her association of meaning to obtaining grants to students, trying to fill a gap in the social service sector (Peteet, 2005, p. 200) ,so they do not have to through the situations she had to endure. Even though not referred to commodities, the supposed objective nature of work, as an activity aimed at getting an income, is resignified and subjectivised by these two participants, making a distinction between "work" as employment; as a calling, a vocation or aspiration; or a vocation, a personal interest, involving a degree of emotional investment.

The commonplace perceived sign of work as a means for an end does not match Hadid´s idea of dignified life (*Vid*. *Supra*, 6.2.b.ii.), but that of a self-enslaved one. It could be possible that the values contained within a habitus that stems from premodern times have transpired until present times, through a transgenerational transference of meaning.

Some authors question the view of youth in the Middle East in general in a dichotomic divide: either frustrated and ripe for radicalism, or rational choice agents. Hashemi (2017) advocates for bearing in mind the group´s influence on the aspirations of the individual, that is, the meaningful social structures (household, school, community in its different widths) around which the individual´s

dispositions (values, beliefs and strategies) are shaped. These socially determined aspirations might provide meaning and a sense of purpose, achievable only if the structural conditions are met; but they will not necessarily bring them out of their predicament, or achieve long lasting structural changes. These aspirations might be shaped by a need to fit in circles where purpose is expressed in material commodities (pricey clothes, cars, electronic devices, etc.), imbued (ascribed) with culturally specific meanings and values that can be appropriated (Marx, 1867/1990, pp. 163-177; Appadurai, 1996) for the formation of personal identity (Côté & Levine, 2002, pp. 125-126), which possibly do not contribute to structural change, but its opposite, the reproduction and reinforcement of cultural conditions (Marx, 1932/1988, pp. 69-84; 1939/1973), for the sake of a desire «to fit in, be close to one´s family, or to prevent the loss of one´s dignity» (Hashemi, 2017, p. 99).

Palestinians, particularly the newer generations, might be trapped in between two different frames of production of meaning, and therefore identity. A premodern habitus, obtained through socialisation, acting as a gravity pool, pulling towards collectivist patterns of attachment and behaviour; and a modern habitus, attracting them to an individual frame, centred around the alteration of the own capital (identity capital), as a means of belonging to a global trend of fulfilment through commodities, which entails become an objectified product. We can now continue answering another research question from the first subset (*Vid*. *Supra*, 2.1.):

- What are the needs of the Palestinians in Lebanon, stated by themselves?

The answer comprises a twofold division, a generalised twofold drive. On one hand, honouring their past, the village, the struggle to politically resist the erasure of Palestine and Palestinians. This includes the narrative of "failure as triumph", present in the collective organisational mentality, epitomised in the figure of Qassam (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.2.c.) and the incarnation of the values of martyrdom, sacrifice, and altruism, and the concept of *Karama*, dignity, a symbol for the Palestinian organised factions (Khalidi, 2010, pp. 195-197). Older generations (Fadi, Nazim, Mehdi, Alaya) seems to have this driving force as main constituent of both identity and agency. Younger generations (Badih, Aina, Samer) keep the feel "Palestine" as their prime mover, but are likewise compelled by more practical, pressing matters, which leads us to the other drive.

On the other hand, we find a pragmatic acquisitive approach to fulfilment, striving for better conditions of existence, through education, employment, and, frequently, the search for better opportunities abroad. Several participants (notably Alaya, Aida, and Jawad), concur in highlighting what Sayigh warned about 15 years ago: marginalisation, instability and exploitation in the labour

field keep pushing Palestinians out of Lebanon (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 129), Jamal being the living and frustrated proof of this predicament.

7.2.c. Reflexive deliberation

The suggested monolithic sociocultural envisioning of Palestinians is somehow contradicted when participants allude to the specific facts of daily existence and structuring of public life. Palestinian activists, workers, and camp dwellers, especially those who spend most of their time within the confines of the camp, as if compelled by the raw force of their everyday reality, overstep the boundaries of reified versions of reality and indicate more grounded and nuanced version of the same noema. They reveal a human landscape made up of significantly different situations, supported by their everyday practices.

Participants with less contact with the direst situations tend to focus on idealised entities. Apparently, getting closer to life in refugee camps «validated their Palestinianness, ostensibly shrinking moral and class lines of distinction. Thus, the guiding assumption was that the camp´s authenticity, purity, and capacity for struggle would virtually rub off on the visitors. Visitors also felt they were supporting and participating in struggle by visiting» (Peteet, 2005, p. 189). This keeps being the case, as Abbud explicitly states his feeling on visits; and Alaya admits to having a part of her come closer to an essence she did not feel outside of the premises.

However, in her case, it led to an active disposition towards getting involved and increasing her presence in the camp. Conversely to what she admits her father doing, that is, dissimulating his accent for the sake of the approval of the Lebanese community; her "investment" went in the direction of becoming "more Palestinian", to the astonishment of her own family. In both cases, «identity became the object of a conscious project of negotiation, manipulation, and dissimulation. Refugees spoke openly about disguising their accents to go unnoticed» (Peteet, 2005, p. 212) image-oriented identity, aware of the value of identity capital (Côté & Levine, 2002).

An internal conversation seems to take place in these cases. The premise of reflexive deliberation comes and depends on the awareness of the stratification of the self (Archer, 2003); exposition to certain realities; the type of reflexiveness employed; and, possibly, the adaptive behaviour received during upbringing, and the equivalent cognitive and emotional structures. As Badih pointed out, individual involvement in socio-political matters differs, even though he admits to living in a "political society", where everyone belongs to a political party. This view is supported by Issa (2014), who concludes that the practice of politics goes beyond separate and distinct entities. It is rather a

network of trust relations, underpinned by the more tangible «aid distribution, physical representation, and factionalism […] that controlled people´s lives and fostered mistrust in the community» (Issa P. , 2014, pp. 249-250).

Before concluding that political belonging necessarily entails reflexive deliberation about identity and agency, two considerations must be had in mind. On one hand, as Elder-Vass (2010, pp. 102-114) argues, the "internalisation of the external" keeps acting as a gravity pull, towards conformation to cultural practices, normalised and taken for granted; the political practice implied by Issa points towards a habitus, owing to vertical hierarchical structures (*Vid*. *Supra*, 7.2.a.) rather than to the result of an internal conversation. On the other hand, reflexive deliberation does not necessarily end in a specific line of action.

If we admit that reflexive deliberation takes place indirectly, as a preceding stage to action (Archer, 2003, p. 127), when immediate dispositions do not support decision-making, in an interplay with the pull of habitus (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 136); then, the event (noesis, the exposition to the reality of the camp), is mediated by the eidetic thought (noema, the mental layer), and its transference to the objective, calling into action a consciousness that might overlay the preconceived over the reference in reality and its translation into specific meaning and behaviour (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 109).

On the other hand, the extent to which this overlay acts seems to be additionally be affected by the type of reflexivity deployed (Archer, 2003, pp. 167-341), roughly associated to their adaptive behaviour (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.1.b.). Individuals characterised by the refuser or drifter type of adaptive behaviour, resorting to fractured reflexivity will possibly result in inaction and compliance with their environments most accepted behaviour. In such a case, Taher, Kahlil, Imane, Jamal, or Farha, despite their regular contact with the environment of the refugee camp, seem confined to a fractured reflexivity, unable or uninterested in deploying their agency, possibly due to a defensive pattern or poor commitment and emotional attachment to the witnessed reality of the camp.

On a contrary course, a guardian or a resolver will probably engage in a kind of reflexivity that engages agency. Abbud and Nazim, prone to be characterised as guardians, pursue agency as autonomous reflexives, engaging in action from their individual internal conversation; and to a lesser degree, as communicative reflexives, engaging in communication with others to complete the results of their internal conversation. Resolvers, such as Ghali, Alaya, Hannan, Hadid, Jawad, Karim, Khalid, and Kismet, might have also felt the need to complete their internal conversation, in addition to taking to meta-reflexivity, questioning perceived dissonant events, concepts, and ideas, and acting according to the result of reflexive deliberation.

Hadid constitutes a curious case of meta-reflexive, as he states his own typology of agency-patterns:

> There are positive, negative and indifferent [people]. The positive is the person who thinks and makes plans for the good of all, without looking to earn something for himself, and he does not lie to people, he makes plans engages, if he manages to, he does it with everyone. The negative one, the one who tells people "I'm going to do ta, ta, ta, ta, ta", and when he gets to the job he wants, he doesn't want to have anything to do with people, he just thinks of himself, he lies to people to get a position and uses this position for himself. The indifferent one is the one that [says] "Ah, this is being said, such other thing is said", and he has no opinion

Pride in the Palestinian identity seems to come differentiated in different levels of emotional attachment, which ensue different levels of agency deployment. Yousif explicitly states this pride, in his case, as Sayigh indicated, this «pride in being Palestinian is closely tied to the ability to struggle and to suffer» (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 177). One of her interviewees questioned the "ability of other people to endure their hardships", just like Badih did in our interview. This seems to tie a specific identity matrix with a concrete expectation of reflexive deliberation pushing towards agency.

This in turn implies a sense of social proprioception, that is, the locatedness of the individual concerning their environment. Their position in a network of meaningful social structures, and the awareness of the function and origin of these; as well as the role of the individual in reproducing or subverting them, and the potential consequences of each line of action. The relation of subjectiveness and objectiveness, or rather its perception, and the emotional load involved, seem to play key roles. Another research question, from the first subset, can be answered at this point (*Vid*. *Supra*, 2.1.):

- Can a habitus be identified among Palestinians in Lebanon?
    - If so, what are the main elements of the habitus of the Palestinians in Lebanon?

In accordance to what we have explored throughout the dissertation, every person participating in a society holds a habitus. Therefore, Palestinians in Lebanon, judging from the input offered by the participants and according to the findings, hold a habitus. Even though the degree to which it manifests itself in identity and agency varies, the main elements of their habitus consist in what we could consider the forceful and precipitated adaptation of their premodern collective culture to the shift and conditions of a modern one, protracting to the late modern period.

The apparently immovable set of social statuses present in premodern Palestine, perceived as such, due to precisely an ancestral habitus, contributed morphostatic (*Vid*. *Supra*, 2.2.b.) dynamics, that is, the persistence of the social structures in place. Stratification of the collective in rigid layers (proto-

social classes), based on heteronomous identities, might have provided the certainty of existence, as identity was probably irreflexibly ascribed from birth. Not individual, nor the collective, questioned the causes, the impact of this state of affairs, in spite of oftentimes entailing a ruthless way of life.

The irruption of colonialism introduced hasty morphogenetic dynamics. Land and the identity associated to it, suffered a significant shift with the intrusion of the tenets of capitalism. The shift from use value to exchange value, particularly of the land, caused a cascade of effects that involved the way of life of Palestinian peasantry. However, they seemed to retain the form of life, that is, the relation of meaning production, subjectifying and objectifying meaning against the cultural background, and therefore shareable by the collective at large through language. "Village" was the identification nexus, the main element of identity, driver of agency. A fact the members in high positions in the economic and cultural field took advantage of, neglecting the deterioration of the conditions of existence of much of the population.

With the social elements of modernity (mainly division of labour) matured in urban areas, a "negative class consciousness" made its appearance, allowing awareness of the causes of vertical coalitions (Krämer, 2008, pp. 74, 85; Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 40-41; Morris, 2004, p. 20) had on the collective agency of the subaltern population. However, after the dispossession and displacement of the Nakba, this awareness did not seem to remain in the discursive practice of the entities with enough cultural capital to establish the string of causation of their flight and predicament.

The narrative seemed to focus on the morphogenetic causes produced by entities external to the Palestinian collective, permeating the identity, now under the appearance of a whole, the nation of Palestine, an idea originally promoted politically by the political elite during the Mandate, but put into practice by the rebellious collectives of the working class and peasantry. The underlining of the victimisation and ideation of Palestine as a utopia, established in the habitus the concealment of the responsibility of entities within the wider collective.

Criticising this end remains highly unpopular. With the period of the heterotopia of Palestinians in Lebanon, new socio-political structures emerged, as a result of the organisation of agency in specific manners (as well as the support of external entities). Highly organised, but focused on the military opposition to Israel, the narrative of sacrifice was renewed, and a new paradigm erected. Participants like Kahlil, Imane, with very low economic and cultural capital, praise the leadership of these structures; while other participants (Badih, Taher, Jawad, Hadid) are sceptical as to their practices, indicating the clientelist networks that resemble a re-edition of vertical coalitions of the past. It appears as if identity capital (denotative of the image-oriented late modernity period), that is, the

investment in the projection of a specific matrix of identity, based upon ethnic belonging and militancy, manages to conceal what transpires of the agency deployed by the Palestinian factions, as well as PLO and AP.

Openly challenging this identity capital and its corresponding narrative remains highly socially and politically penalised. Karim, Khalid, and Kismet, members of the organisation that criticises Palestinians factions (as well as the Lebanese government and UN), suffer the consequences of disputing the discursive practice contained within the habitus. Heavily tied to identity, they have been disallowed to the space where this identity was resignified and turned into a more dignified entity, the refugee camps.

7.3. Causal power of structures: identity, agency, and body politic

Actions are the result of a form of life, values, inclinations, commitments. These are based on the subjective production of meaning, albeit influenced by habitus, transgenerationally transmitted dispositions via socialisation This, originally conceived in a developing cultural frame, is mainly produced by norm circles, collectives part of a society with causal power derived from economic, cultural, and social capital, whom retain the advantageous position of setting the rules in each equivalent field.

Actions, that is, deployed agency, reveals who the actor is. Social function, and a specific habitus, determined by the social location of the individual or collective, is defined by the configuration of the entity´s economic, cultural, and social capital. However, late modernity involves the emergence of image-oriented identity, the investment of resources (mainly psychological) to project who one is. If we consider that the production of meaning is a construct, therefore a subjective production (Beauvoir, de, 1948/2000), and not a reified entity based on an objective truth, the interplay of structure and agency is comparable to how the ideas of subjectivity and objectivity are developed.

A collective surmises socials structures, these comprise social identities, based on social status, which bring about identity ascriptions. Objective assertion of an identity does not necessarily entail that the ascribed entity, for instance, an individual, will comply with the associated status, nor its function, or an assumed agency.

If we attempt to apply this to the case of the Palestinians in Lebanon, it is relevant to turn to Sayigh: «we need here to distinguish between the Palestinian Resistance Movement as an organizational structure that has grown and changed in response to successive crises, and the Revolution as a state of consciousness amongst the Palestinian masses» (Sayigh R. , 2007, p. 151). Having in mind the

disjunctive conditions of present-day life, it is helpful to refer to Geertz, Grossberg, Bhabha and Malešević, among others, to recognise the structures of power at play (Marx, Beauvoir, Bourdieu) in the consideration of category of identity, as it can lead to misrecognise the political component of the cultural reality, in the grounds of its eidetic conception, overlooking causes and effects in practice.

Along the lines of Beauvoir´s disassembly of the concept of "woman" in different categories (*Vid. Supra*, 2.2.a.ii.), "Palestinian" could be separated in different categories. A historical category would imply what has already been analysed in this very chapter and before, the development of a historical string of events that would lead to the notion the nation of Palestine, a collective asserting itself as such. A legal category is faintly denoted by, for instance, the recognition of the State of Palestine by 138 out of the 193 member states of the UN, recognised by the latter as non-member observer state (UNGA, 2012), which does not imply the general recognition of a legal identity, because of the inexistence of a State of Palestine. This fact, participant Badih explicitly expresses, even though he believes in the actualised and future potential of Palestinian unity. This in turn contrasts with a phenomenological category (assumed by Badih, as well as the rest of the participants), that subjectively presumes both the assertion of being Palestinian (individually), as well as a group ascribed as such (collectively).

An empirical category would be difficult to establish, as the blend of all these categories might result in different considerations regarding the existence of a Palestinian identity. Reasoning, observation and experience alone cannot seem to establish this category. However, different social structures yield a different result, concerning the acknowledgement of the Palestinian identity. This seemingly depends of practical strategies in the political and cultural fields. We are now able to answer the remaining query from the first subset of the main research question (*Vid. Supra*, 2.1.):

- Which are the most salient identity ascriptions?

Even though an empirical category of "Palestinian" unfeasible, it appears as if, socially, this issue is perceived differently. Palestinians have been ascribed by members of their own community, as well as others, in very different ways. Among their own circles, as we have already explored in this and previous chapters, the ethnic ascription seems to entail perceived common features of honour, devotion, self-sacrifice, attribution of resilience and struggling capacity, as well as those related to victimisation and being owed restoration of rights, land, and dignity.

Outsiders sometimes ascribe Palestinians in Lebanon with a different set of features. Even though the aforementioned are also present, on the other side of the spectrum other qualities are highlighted. Sayigh depicted the ascription of Palestinians as «in a category similar to that of "gypsy" or "bastard"

– a person of no known origin, and therefore of no respect, the lowest level of human being» (Sayigh R. , 2007, pp. 134-135). She appends to this ascription ostracising behaviours Palestinians had to cope with, including mocking, absence of politeness, avoiding expressions of welcome, and cheating on deals.

These examples convey the ascription of the Palestinians in Lebanon as "undesirables" (Arendt, 1973 [1951], p. 283; Agier, 2011) in the social field, but it is conceivable to think that state-policies, such as the harassment by the *Deuxième Bureau* was executed in accordance with the social perception, as well as the political practicability of the stereotyped ascription. However, militancy and organisational agency shaped the outer perception of Palestinians. From being seen as passive vagrants, the deployed political, military, and social agency procured them the identity of the struggler, activist, freedom fighter, or soldier. A question of perspective, these ascriptions took a negative hue: terrorists, invaders, the opposing force, in the eyes of some sectors of the Lebanese community.

It is to this respect that it is necessary to pay heed to the way legal identity ascription, stemming from objectified normative structures, feeds on the process of the social construction of identity, arrogated by norm circles with the causal power and interest to establish law codification in specific manners, nomativising the meaning attached to identity ascriptions (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.). Therefore, the most salient identity ascriptions, attending to the consequences they entail, would be the ones which accentuate the outlander, marginalised, disposable features of the Palestinians in Lebanon; in short, the traits that depict them as the "undesirable".

In this sense, coming back to the notion of identity and culture as an intrinsic part of a political sociohistorical frame, means that social structures in place affect the interactions between identity and agency. At the same time, individuals and collectives partaking in them are not necessarily determined by the structures, they can actually bend their meaning, transgress them, or be assimilated by them. An important distinction in this sense is located within the ascription of "refugee" as identity.

7.3.a. Refugees: objects, or subjects?

Despite frequently being considered a taken for granted identity, "refugee" responds to a complex sociohistorical and political development (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.a.). We then need to consider a social acceptation of the term "refugee", which might refer to any kind of displaced person (especially those of the last decade, originating from particular regions of the planet, like the Levant, with peaks of high mass-media attention). But for the term to have legal consequences, it is necessary to pay attention to the lawful usage of it, which come tied to the political interests of the host countries.

In spite of the transnational nature of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, in addition to the other refugee and statelessness protection charters (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.c.iii.), ratification is not always the case, and their binding nature (that being the case) is not always complied with. Lebanon is one such case. Not having signed the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 and its 1967 Protocol, it is up to the state to acknowledge the existence of refugees in its territory.

In order to avoid the responsibilities and human rights associated, Lebanon, or rather Lebanon´s norm circles, implemented active (legislating "against") and passive (not legislating "in favour of") measures to "protect its sovereignty", introducing morphostatic dynamics in the legal field. This reminds of the inherently exclusionist and violent nature of the foundation of states (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.a.iii.), and their role in the creation of refugees. Considered "foreigners", but socially designated as "refugees", Palestinians in Lebanon are one of the collectives in the middle of multi-level governance (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.d.ii.). Objects of intervention in a network of interaction and interdependence between different levels of institutions (municipal, local, state, supra-state level public and private organisation), they are ascribed an identity, as well as an agency. However, reality is more complex and, among this plethora of organisations, their own agency claims their right to be treated as subjects, rather than objects, in (at least partial) charge of their conditions of existence.

The legal consideration of "refugee", even if, officially, the Lebanese State doesn´t accept this designation, while accepting the operation of UN refugee agencies in its territory, brings about its political nature. As Karim and Khalid highlighted, the Lebanese State treats them as refugees or as foreigners, depending on "its mood". A status created for political reason in colonial circumstances, it purportedly derived from the political concern for the morality of aiding and giving asylum to the persons in need. Its tenets, included in the universalist principles of the UDHR, in addition to the rest of applicable conventions, treaties, and protocols (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.c.i.), clash with the local exclusionist and pragmatic precepts, personified, in the case of Lebanon, in the sectarian system, seldom spuriously identified with a consociationist one (*Vid*. *Supra*, 1.4.a., 1.5.c. & 1.6.c.).

Its eminently political nature is hardly deniable, as much as participant Abbud tries to. To other participants, particularly Ghali, Fadi, Aida and Hadid, selflessness ought not to be taken for granted, not in the case of UN, nor NGOs, especially the international ones. The principles of the free market and growth of capital seem to directly come into conflict with the universalist principles of protection of the most vulnerable. Dependence on exterior funding, and the situational balance of the revaluation of the exchange value, seems incompatible with development programmes. These are aimed at potentially ending situations of dire need of continuous relief aid, an element that might be appropriated by the logic of capital.

Next, we will explore how the participants of the study adapted to the structures related to the "Palestinian refugee" identity, among other relevant structures.

7.3.b. Manifestations of agency and its limits

The most significant rupture of the image of the "object" refugee came with the massive deployment of agency by the Palestinian community in Lebanon during the late 60s and 70s (*Vid. Supra*, 1.5.b.). The Cairo Accord not only was the institutionalisation of the acknowledgement of the Palestinian community in Lebanon, but also the legal recognition of their agency, autonomy, and resilience. The resignification of their identity, from victimised refugees, harassed by the Lebanese State and abandoned or neglected by the Arab states, cleared the way for the Palestinian struggler, capable of standing in their own feet. Not only that, but also the blooming space of resymbolising the Palestinian identity, the refugee camp, became a space of creation. Production and reproduction of identity laid the foundations for a more sophisticated organisation. Nevertheless, this organisation of lower-order entities was articulated in a higher-order coordination that regarded the exterior, rather than the interior.

Ghali and Mehdi were the only participants who hinted at the "mistakes" of the PRM. Focusing on the military opposition against Israel, apart from meddling in the sectarian balance of Lebanon and brought about the end of a "golden era", disregarded the long-term effect of neglecting the educational field. This resulted in a steep deterioration of the conditions of existence of the Palestinians in Lebanon, and a lack of organisational structures, and a dependence towards a leadership that would eventually focus on the Palestinian Occupied Territories. Particularly those with less economic, cultural, and social capital, were left with a legal status, that of the refugee, as the only asset to barely keep afloat.

From this period originated the Popular and Security Committee, another objective structure of Palestinian making. Nazim, president of one of the popular committees (*Vid. Supra*, 6.2.b.i.), as well as a member of the PFLP and PLO, held a somewhat wayward stance towards the management of the camps. With a sharp self-critical stance, he notices personal behaviours that appear to reflect a somewhat patriarchal residue, a legacy of the more confrontational eras, centred around aggressiveness, epitomised in the gun.

While some participants declared not being too familiar with the inner working of the popular committees nor their functions (Aisha, Taher; both significantly spatially and emotionally farther from the camps), others (Kahlil, Imane, and Aida) praised the function of the PLO, part of the

structures, as the providers of personal dignity. Other participants (Hadid, Karim, Khalid, Kismet, Ghali) emphasized a darker side of these supposedly selfless structures, indicating, in the case of the members of the dissident organisation, the existence of conniving vertical clientelist structures.

Turning our attention outward, Lebanese legislation forbids, via Decree No. 11614 (*Vid*. *Supra*, 4.3.c.ii.) owning properties by Palestinians in Lebanon. This, as well as the effective prohibition to form associations, reflects in the experience of some of the participants. Palestinian individuals, organisations and NGOs manage to administer their assets with the lawful mediation of Lebanese citizens. Ghali comments on the specificities, acknowledging that Lebanese authorities condone the practice; while Fadi notes the experiences of a lifelong of displacement.

A ubiquitous structure, contained within the habitus, is comprised by gender perceptions. While the phenomenological perception of the participants does not highlight a major problem regarding gender issues (*Vid*. *Supra*, 6.1.c.ii.), the literature suggests a rather effective concealment of gender oppression under the guise of ideological struggle against external threats. Somehow, internalised systems of symbols and meaning might hinder thought, particularly when states of tension and political confrontation are the normal state of affairs, and a collective need of acting against these pressing matters might be perceived. The role of the woman as a caretaker seems to be taken for granted, normalised; except for the case of Hannan, who works on the area of gender, but seems to hold a rather protective approach to "Palestinian" and religious values; and particularly Alaya, who has personally felt the weight of personified patriarchy, but managed to break free from it, to actualise her potential in the ways she decided.

It is in this regard, and having in mind the outcomes of the research (sub)questions previously offered, that we can now engage in answering the first research question (*Vid*. *Supra*, 2.1.):

- In the occurrence of subjective deliberative reflexivity, contingent on the overcoming of habitus detaching their conditions of existence from their needs, how is identity related to the agency of Palestinians in Lebanon?

Objective exogenous limits exist in different levels for Palestinians in Lebanon. Even though transgressions occur, it seems like the effective deployment of resources in a significant and effective way depends on a meta-reflexive and/or communicative stance, as the presence of these obstacles might prove to be too heavy to overcome, due to the needed economic, cultural or social capital; or too invisible, due to their overlap with a form of life that acts as an overlay for culture. The resulting homeostasis seems to hinder improvement of the conditions of existence, fostering a precarious "status quo", where the Lebanese State, keeping the situation as it is, actually "lets do, lets happen";

Palestinian factions, containing challenges to their hegemony, in the political as well as the social field, lets the community stagnate; and the humanitarian government, guaranteeing survival, but oftentimes fostering dependency, contributes to morphostatic dynamics, where relief aid is made to appear as the most pressing, more adequate line of action.

However, it is the agency of the Palestinians in Lebanon, particularly those reaching subjective reflexive deliberation (mainly through meta-reflexive and/or communicative styles), who seem to meet an image of thought that reflects the complexities of reality upon their identity. Notwithstanding the pull of habitus, the deployment of agency both inwards (reflexivity) and outwards (action in/for the collective) seems to contribute to the understanding and therefore reproduction of a Palestinian identity that nonetheless considers its constant (re)production in changing objective conditions. This in turn leads us to the only main research question that remains, the second one (*Vid*. *Supra*, 2.1.):

- Is causality a real possibility for the correlation between identity matrixes and deployed agency?

Considering the different configurations of the identity matrix of the Palestinians in Lebanon, there is no sole arrangement that we can see directly tied with a specific mode of deployed agency. Reflexive deliberation not always leads into an effective agency deployment aimed at improvement of the conditions of existence; just like habitus by itself does not determine the fate of the individual or the collective.

Different intensities of pulling towards deployment of agency seem to exist though, framed in specific configurations of the different types of capital. Participants like Badih, Aida, Aina, Samer share a low position in the economic field, but a high one in the cultural one. They all seem to be emotionally attached to the ethnic culture of Palestinians, but moved to intervene in their social environment, with varying degrees of criticism and commitment. They are all part of Jeel al-Shakk, so the uncertainty enveloping their lives might have triggered an emotional response aimed at reaching out towards a perceived sense of injustice that can be, at least partially, solved or soothed, by deploying their agency.

Taher and Aisha share a certain distance from the space of the camp. While for the first one, the distance is emotional, the second one seems to feel the need to physically distance herself from it. Both are disjointed from the space others have as a reference; but while for Aisha, the habitus in the family was inclined towards protecting her from the social space in the camp, Taher has the emotional connection she lacks. Neither of them engages in activist activities, nor are familiar with the structures present in the camps, except for the closest ones involving friends, family, and acquaintances, which

in themselves conceal structures of power that they do not identify, nor identify themselves with. Their strategies, in spite of holding economic and cultural capital, are restrained to demanding a way out, even though they acknowledge the meagre chances. For her, being a woman appears to have not supposed a bigger problem than being a Palestinian. However, the Lebanese citizenship, result of her marriage, has come in a moment where citizenship on its own in Lebanon does not bring the entitlements it is assumed to, particularly in the economic field.

Hadid and Fadi, contemporaries and close in their worldviews to some extent, opt for the mobilisation of their cultural and social capital for the sake of the community. Fadi carries this out through the organisation he founded, Hadid believes in a grassroots approach. Their economic capital stems from a cultural capital that was discovered key for individual survival. The same age of the Nakba, they are both the offspring of a generation that was caught in the shift of paradigms, amidst the confrontation of values and principles that left their environment torn to shreds. Their resolve brought them, above a high number of obstacles, to a position of reference in the community. Meta-reflexives and communicative reflexives as they are, sometimes feel somewhat frustrated with the fact that other people´s lack of reflexivity and connectedness drags the community down.

Abbud is slightly younger than the previous two, but he shared a similar historical frame. However, he seems to have enjoyed a higher position in the economic and cultural field from the start on. His eidetic narrative of Palestine and Palestinians seems to actively omit on-the-ground realities, and his reflexive deliberation appears focused on guarding the values UNRWA´s work of keeping Palestinians alive supposes for him.

Farha shares with Abbud her emotional identification with Palestine. She is one of the few Palestinians in Lebanon who was allowed to visit Palestine, in special circumstances. She was also taken out from school, despite having displayed intellectual resources. However, her emotional attachment is focused on the ideal overlay about Palestine, grounded on her brief experiences visiting. Not seeking a higher social capital might mean she is disinterested in her social environment, given that she seemingly feels fulfilled after a life devoted to family, and keeping the memory of Palestine and the right of return alive. Although her children are grown ups, some of them living abroad, she does not seem to give up the idea of belonging.

Hannan´s emotional attachment felt tied to her position in the organisation and her tasks, based on a high position in the social field, due to the success of their endeavour. Her reflexive deliberation, eventually directed to solving a problem she does not seem to want to associate with internal entities, appears to rely on social and cultural capital. However, structural issues seem to be out of the question.

Not even the participants that share similar resources, in the shape of capital, seem to show regularities that might demonstrate the existence of a relation of causality between specific identity matrixes and the agency deployed. We have observed the subjective and objective consequences of the change in paradigm regarding the change in the relationship to land as a space, a territory, a nation; and agency, as the capacity to alter the conditions of existence, related to sovereignty, citizenship, and the state, as a liming factor. However, the inability to demonstrate the existence of a relation of causality between identity and agency might indicate we are something is missing in the picture

8. Conclusions and open paths

Identity, be it asserted or ascribed, is not an unchanging reality, but a processual reality in constant change and adaption. It is founded in the human capacity for adaption in an inevitably social manner. The principles of thought established more than two thousand years ago might be considered naïve and ancient. But binary distinctions seem to still be deeply inscribed in our habitus, setting the grounds for the propensity to set eidetic overlays above reality. Our predisposition to feel, think and act in specific ways are not biologically determined. But the inherent need of insertion in society, along with attachment and belonging, appear as unavoidable factors containing the reproduction of habitus, and with it, the reproduction of old patterns of behaviour, grounded on structures that impel, compel or co-determine us in our daily endeavours.

Day to day life is the key element for this reproduction. Far from being discrete historical changes, and due to the non-linearity of history, identities gradually adapt to conditions. This takes place with a more or less involved reflexive deliberation that expresses the differential strategies in formation of personal identity, attached in different ways and intensities to the entities and structures present in the different collectives we partake in. Rather uncomplicated historical dynamics developed into a present form that seems to transubstantiate not function through agency, but projection of an alleged essence through image, in a paradoxical move backwards to a an inverted *hinterwelt*.

Different strategies, along with equivalent identification strategies, might result in addressing Otherness as a positive value, or difference as a threat. Identity is not fully determined by agency; the same way agency cannot fully determine identity. It appears that it is in the core of autognosis that reflexive deliberation can engage emotion and reason in a way that distortion of the own self nor of reality stands between the causal power of structures that impose disruptive habitus and maladaptive schema, serving the interests of forces other than ours.

Nevertheless, it is through agency that meaning is produced. With meaning comes identity, a way of locating ourselves and others, cognitively and emotionally, by means of attachment and belonging, in an attempt to diminish the pain of existential uncertainty and ambiguity. However, this frequently leads to rely on ready-made frames, tools, and entities, unknowingly inscribing within our selves principles that might oppose our own interests. Yet, through agency, communicative reflexivity and meta-reflexivity, alienating habitus can be transcended and overcome. An instance of this can be comprised in the confrontation of our own selves, for example, through a critical reading of history, and its usage as a tool for understanding our present situation.

Even so, this vanquishing through reflexivity entails focusing attention, not on the outer, but on the inner world. Responsibility to engage freedom in autognosis, a measure of ataraxia (one that does not deny or ignore the implication of emotion, but acknowledges it); and the synthesis of a jihad that looks inwards through a critical prism.

The sublimation (unconscious establishment of patterns) of the Palestinian in Lebanon appears to be located in the coordinates envisioning a nostalgic longing for a pre-Nakba lifestyle, equating it with the values of security, justice, and overall well-being, under the form of a nation-state. This end seems oblivious of the dynamics put forth by the ontology of the state itself, as well as the violent and exclusionist practices of the historical objective examples of the specific states.

The transubstantiating process of social patterns to normative institutions implies producing meaning through language, limiting its boundaries and partially shutting down the opportunity to adapt to objective relational changes. Arendt stated the paradox of contemporary politics, as the attempt at referring to "inalienable" human rights while, in practice, these are rather privileges, only enjoyed by a section of the "most prosperous" states.

Similarly, bounded categories, such as "Palestinians" (or "Palestinian refugees", "Palestinians in Lebanon", or any other combination of a predicated genitive), does not seem to adjust to reality, nor contribute to its understanding with accurate analytical categories. It rather serves the obscurement of the interested production of meaning behind it, concealing it under a veil of emotional identification through patterns of attachment and belonging.

Another paradox, consisting of humans being the product of social structures, but at the same time entities capable of transforming these, remains a difficult matter. However, the emergentist approach of Elder-Vass´ "internalisation of the external" into the debate about the role of reflexive deliberation constitutes an adequate attempt at getting closer to a more intelligible account on the matter.

Concerning the limits of this dissertation, the realisation that a deeper assessment of the psychological field would have produced an interesting set of resources came too late. Ego identity could have been an interesting addition to the other three dimensions (personal, social, legal spheres). It would have probably produced results in the field of emotional schemes, which would have added a deep value to the project. However, it would have also required prior and deeper understanding of everything involved, as well as a processing of the generated information in deeper ways. This is also the reason why the assessment of adaptive behaviour schemes did not result in a more valuable asset for the thesis.

On another note, a return to the community in Lebanon, with the idea of presenting the results of the dissertation, had been projected, but eventually cancelled. The situation at the moment of its completion, very particularly for Palestinians in Lebanon, is dire. An exercise of suggesting to focus on my dissertation felt like one overly centred around narcissism, rather than an academic endeavour, or an undertaking related to any kind of emancipation, debates on relief and development notwithstanding. Because of this reason, the return to the community with the results was postponed to a later moment in time.

This thesis, a document probably deemed too long by some, in a time characterised by immediacy, contends Bourdieu´s claim of a "total social science". Along with its length comes its complexity, in a time of frequent reductionism, oversimplification, and overidentification with entities we want to be defined by; it also constitutes an attempt at warding off the effects of dogma and doctrine, both veils for though, obscuring the perception of reality and limiting emancipative agency.

In respect to future paths, an attempt at reproducing the grounds of this thesis with the Palestinians in Palestine would be interesting. Moreover, applying it to other collectives (indigenous peoples of Turtle Island, in the territory known as North America; the ones in Abya Yala, roughly included in what is commonly named Central and South America; or the Burakumin in the State of Japan, for instance), particularly those located in similar parameters would be particularly interesting. The search for regularities, as well as singularities, could contribute to the understanding of how the creation of meaning in situations of dispossession, displacement, and marginalisation, affect agency and its development in these circumstances. Identity, as a constantly changing relational entity, deeply rooted within our embodied existence, and therefore embedded in our emotions, offers a mirror where past, present, and future, with all their lights and shadows, can be discerned.

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Appendix A, interviews

[annexed separately in an encrypted file]

Appendix B, participant release agreement

Interview Consent Form

Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed as part of the research project "Identity and Political Agency in the Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon". Ethical procedures for academic research undertaken require that interviewees explicitly agree to being interviewed and how the information contained in their interview will be used. This consent form is necessary for us to ensure that you understand the purpose of your involvement and that you agree to the conditions of your participation. Would you therefore read the accompanying information sheet and then sign this form to certify that you approve the following:

1. the interview will take one to two hours, it will be recorded and a transcript will be produced
2. the transcript of the interview will be analysed by Aitor Bikandi as research investigator
3. access to the interview transcript will be limited to Aitor Bikandi, academic supervisors and academic staff in charge of evaluation
4. any summary interview content, or direct quotations from the interview, that are made available through academic publication or other academic outlets can be anonymized so that you cannot be identified. With regards to this matter:

☐ I agree to be quoted directly. I understand that a brief synopsis of each participant, including myself, will be used, including first name, occupation and any other pertinent information that will help the reader to come to know and recall each participant

OR

☐ I agree to be quoted directly if my name is not published and a made-up name (pseudonym) is used.

5. any variation of the conditions above will only occur with your further explicit approval

By signing this form I agree that

1. I understand the purpose and nature of this study and I am voluntarily taking part in this project;
2. I grant permission for the data to be used in the process of completing a PhD degree, including a dissertation and any other future publication
3. I understand that I don't have to take part, and I can stop the interview at any time;
4. The transcribed interview or extracts from it may be used as described above;
5. I have read this Consent Form;
6. I have been able to ask any questions I might have, and I understand that I am free to contact the researcher with any questions I may have in the future.

Printed Name

Participant Signature Date

Researcher Signature Date

نموذج إقرار بالموافقة على المشاركة في البحث

شكراً على موافقتك على إجراء المقابلة ضمن المشروع البحثي "الهوية والعمل السياسي في مخيمات اللجوء الفلسطينية في لبنان ". إن الإلتزام بأخلاقيات البحث الأكاديمي يتَطَلَّب أن يُعلِن المشاركون بالبحث موافقتهم الصريحة على إجراء المقابلة وعلى طريقة استخدام المعلومات الواردة فيها.

إن هذا النموذج ضروري جدا كونه يمكننا من التأكد من أنك تدرك هدف تعاونك وأنك موافق على شروط مشاركتك بهذا البحث. لهذا السبب، نرجو منك قراءة المعلومات الواردة أدناه ومن ثم توقيع هذا النموذج لإثبات موافقتك على التالي:

1. إن مدة المقبلة هي من ساعة إلى ساعتين، وسيتم تسجيلها وإعداد نص مكتوب بمحتواها.
2. إن نص المقابلة المكتوب سيتم تحليله من قبل أيتور بيكندي بصفته باحث أكاديمي.
3. إن حق الاطلاع على محتوى المقابلة يعود حصراً لأيتور بيكندي، المشرف الأكاديمي وباقي الأكاديميين المسؤولين عن تقييم هذا البحث.
4. إن أي ملخص أو اقتباس لهذه المقابلة يغدو متاحاً في سياق المنشورات الأكاديمية أو أي سياق أكاديمي آخر. ولهذا الغرض، بإمكاننا عدم الإفصاح عن هويتك كي لا يتم التعرف عليك. وفيما يختص بهذه المسألة:

☐ أوافق على أن يتم اقتباس اقوالي بشكل مباشر، وأنا أدرك أنه سيتم تقديم ملخص موجز عن كل مشارك في هذا البحث وأنا من ضمنهم. كما أني أدرك أن هذا الموجز يتضمن اسمي الأول ومهنتي بالإضافة إلى أي معلومة أخرى تساعد القارئ على فهم ومعرفة وتذكر المشاركين.

☐ أوافق على أن يتم اقتباس أقوالي بطريقة مباشرة شرط عدم الكشف عن هويتي وذكرها تحت اسم مستعار.

5. لا يمكن إجراء أي تعديل على الشروط الواردة أعلاه إلا بعد الحصول على موافقتك الصريحة.

عند توقيعي على هذا النموذج أقر التالي :

1. أنا أدرك هدف وطبيعة هذه الدراسة وقد شاركت بهذا المشروع بطريقة طوعية
2. أوافق على استعمال البيانات الناتجة عن مقابلتي بهدف نيل شهادة الدكتوراه و ذلك في إطار كتابة
3. الأطروحة وأي منشورات علمية مستقبلي
4. أنا أدرك أنني لست مرغما على المشاركة وإني أستطيع إنهاء المقابلة في أي وقت
5. أوافق على استخدام نص المقابلة المكتوب أو مقتطفات منه على الشكل المذكور أعلاه
6. أني قرأت هذا النموذج بعناية
7. أني تمكنت من طرح جميع الأسئلة التي وددت طرحها على الباحث وأني أدرك أنني أستطيع الاتصال به لطرح أي سؤال مستقبلي

اسم الشخص (كتابة)

توقيع المشارك التاريخ

اسم الباحث التاريخ

Appendix C, questionnaire

Self-introduction

- Could you briefly speak about yourself?
  - Name?
  - Job?
  - Family?
  - Friends?

Everyday life – What are the main elements playing a significant role in everyday-nature events?

- What is your everyday life like?
  - How do you spend your time?
- Which are the most important things that happen during a regular day?

Camp perception – Self-perception and integration in the refugee camp

- What do you think of the camp?
- How do you feel about your life in the camp?
  - protected/exposed/in danger/uncertain
- Governance
  - Problems
  - Good sides
  - Security
  - Political factions
  - NGOs
  - UN
  - Lebanese State

Social circles – Networks for economic/leisure/family/political purposes

- Who are the people you spent your time with?
  - What´s your relation to them?
- Are you a member of any group or organisation?
  - What´s your role there?
- Role of the woman (gender)

Future

- Do you think/perceive that another massacre/Nakba could happen?
- Are you worried about the disappearance of Palestinians?
  - How does this make you feel?
- Does this lead to take any action?

} Suggestion risk

Appendix D, codes and code groups

Code	Grounded	Code Groups
"political map"	7	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
agent: Algeria	1	agent: states agent: Arab states AGENTS
agent: Arafat	6	AGENTS agent: Palestinian IDENTITY
agent: Canada	3	agent: states AGENTS agent: Western states
agent: children	73	AGENTS network: PAL REF camp IDENTITY
agent: Egypt	3	agent: states agent: Arab states AGENTS
agent: EU	19	agent: states AGENTS
agent: Fatah	23	political factions/parties AGENTS IDENTITY
agent: fathers	10	AGENTS network: PAL REF camp IDENTITY
agent: foreign labour	2	AGENTS network: PAL REF camp IDENTITY
agent: France	3	agent: states AGENTS agent: Western states
agent: Hamas	15	political factions/parties AGENTS IDENTITY
agent: ICRC	6	agent: international AGENTS
agent: international community	47	agent: international AGENTS IDENTITY
agent: Iran	1	agent: states AGENTS IDENTITY

agent: Islamic Jihad	1	political factions/parties AGENTS IDENTITY
agent: Israel	30	agent: states AGENTS agent: Western states IDENTITY
agent: Lebanese armed forces	11	AGENTS agent: Lebanese IDENTITY
agent: Lebanese Christian	5	AGENTS agent: Lebanese IDENTITY
agent: Lebanese high class	3	AGENTS agent: Lebanese IDENTITY
agent: Lebanese lower class	10	AGENTS agent: Lebanese IDENTITY
agent: Lebanese Shi´a	4	AGENTS agent: Lebanese IDENTITY
agent: Lebanese stakeholders	48	AGENTS agent: Lebanese IDENTITY
agent: Lebanese State	44	AGENTS agent: Lebanese
agent: LPDC	5	AGENTS agent: Lebanese AGENCY
agent: mothers	5	AGENTS network: PAL REF camp IDENTITY
agent: NGO	80	AGENTS network: PAL REF camp
agent: Palestinian armed struggle	17	AGENTS network: PAL REF camp agent: Palestinian IDENTITY AGENCY
agent: Palestinian Authority	14	AGENTS network: PAL REF camp agent: Palestinian IDENTITY
agent: Palestinian factions	50	AGENTS network: PAL REF camp agent: Palestinian IDENTITY

agent: Palestinian high class	12	AGENTS network: PAL REF camp agent: Palestinian IDENTITY
agent: Palestinian lower class	11	AGENTS network: PAL REF camp agent: Palestinian IDENTITY
agent: Palestinian refugees	125	AGENTS network: PAL REF camp agent: Palestinian IDENTITY
agent: Palestinian women	29	AGENTS network: PAL REF camp agent: Palestinian IDENTITY
agent: Palestinians in Lebanon	55	AGENTS network: PAL REF camp agent: Palestinian IDENTITY
agent: parents	16	AGENTS network: PAL REF camp IDENTITY
agent: Phalange / Kataeb	2	AGENTS agent: Lebanese IDENTITY
agent: PLO	63	AGENTS network: PAL REF camp agent: Palestinian IDENTITY
agent: PRCS	3	AGENTS network: PAL REF camp agent: Palestinian IDENTITY
agent: PRS	9	AGENTS network: PAL REF camp agent: Palestinian IDENTITY
agent: refugee camp stakeholders	10	AGENTS network: PAL REF camp agent: Palestinian IDENTITY
agent: schools	8	AGENTS network: PAL REF camp AGENCY
agent: SSNP	2	political factions/parties AGENTS IDENTITY

agent: Sudan	1	agent: states AGENTS
agent: Syria	5	agent: states agent: Arab states AGENTS IDENTITY
agent: Syrian refugees	17	AGENTS network: PAL REF camp IDENTITY
agent: UN	93	agent: international AGENTS
agent: United Kingdom	6	agent: states AGENTS agent: Western states IDENTITY
agent: USA	17	agent: states AGENTS agent: Western states IDENTITY
agent: Venezuela	1	agent: states AGENTS IDENTITY
agreement: 1951 convention	3	international charter/agreements
apartheid	1	CONCEPTS
apparent reality	44	CONCEPTS AGENCY
Arab states	15	agent: Arab states IDENTITY
asylum	7	CONCEPTS
BDS	7	agent: international AGENCY
bureaucracy	7	CONCEPTS AGENCY
Cairo Agreement	3	international charter/agreements AGENCY
Camp David	2	international charter/agreements
camp government	54	CONCEPTS AGENCY
Camp War	3	WARS
Caritas	2	agent: international
Century Deal	7	international charter/agreements
challenge	14	CONCEPTS AGENCY
charity	3	CONCEPTS AGENCY
civil war 1958	1	WARS
civil war 1975-1990	14	WARS
Cold War	2	WARS

collective: conditions	148	CONCEPTS AGENCY
collective: cultural shift	50	CONCEPTS AGENCY
collective: demographical conditions	41	CONCEPTS
collective: displacement	49	CONCEPTS AGENCY
collective: material conditions	152	CONCEPTS AGENCY
collective: multiculturality	22	CONCEPTS
collective: trauma	14	CONCEPTS IDENTITY
colonisation	3	CONCEPTS IDENTITY
contradiction	84	CONCEPTS AGENCY
corruption	16	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
covid19	6	territory: Lebanon AGENCY
crime	14	CONCEPTS AGENCY
democracy	9	CONCEPTS
dependency	17	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
despair	47	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
Deuxieme Bureau	4	network: PAL REF camp agent: Lebanese
development	33	CONCEPTS AGENCY
dflp	3	political factions/parties IDENTITY
dignity	14	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
discrimination	77	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
donation	15	CONCEPTS AGENCY
drugs	11	CONCEPTS
education	104	CONCEPTS AGENCY

effective figure	6	CONCEPTS IDENTITY
elections	2	CONCEPTS AGENCY
electricity	14	CONCEPTS
equality	6	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
ethnic cultural field	9	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
family	87	CONCEPTS IDENTITY
far right	4	CONCEPTS IDENTITY
freedom	9	CONCEPTS AGENCY
gatherings	3	network: PAL REF camp agent: Palestinian
gender	56	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
global development	19	CONCEPTS
guns	16	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
health	39	CONCEPTS AGENCY
hijab	6	CONCEPTS IDENTITY
honour	5	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
hope	27	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
housing	6	CONCEPTS AGENCY
human rights	52	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
hygiene	11	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
hypocrisy	13	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY

identity shift	31	CONCEPTS IDENTITY
individual exp.	491	three bodies
intermarriage	3	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
islamism	15	CONCEPTS IDENTITY
July War 2006	3	WARS
Lebanese Law	40	agent: Lebanese
legal exp.	97	three bodies
leisure	11	CONCEPTS AGENCY
massacre	6	CONCEPTS
migration	19	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
mistakes	2	CONCEPTS AGENCY
mobility	27	CONCEPTS AGENCY
morality	14	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
narcissism	3	CONCEPTS IDENTITY
needs	5	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
occupation	14	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
opportunity	17	CONCEPTS AGENCY
Oslo	10	international charter/agreements
Palestinian resistance	26	network: PAL REF camp CONCEPTS agent: Palestinian IDENTITY AGENCY
peace	4	CONCEPTS AGENCY
pflp	4	political factions/parties IDENTITY
political solidarity	15	CONCEPTS AGENCY
popular committee	32	network: PAL REF camp agent: Palestinian

port blast	4	territory: Lebanon
protests	2	CONCEPTS AGENCY
Qatari Red Crescent	3	agent: international
reflexive deliberation	107	CONCEPTS AGENCY
regional development	31	CONCEPTS
relief	41	CONCEPTS AGENCY
religion	20	CONCEPTS IDENTITY
repression	16	CONCEPTS AGENCY
resolution 194	3	international charter/agreements
responsibility	49	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
right of return	39	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
safety	21	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
security committee	6	network: PAL REF camp agent: Palestinian AGENCY
self-organisation	37	CONCEPTS AGENCY
sewage	2	CONCEPTS
shooting	12	CONCEPTS AGENCY
social awareness	26	CONCEPTS
social exp.	386	three bodies
social media	4	CONCEPTS AGENCY
space: Africa	4	TERRITORIES territory: MENA
space: Ain el-Hilweh	23	TERRITORIES territory: MENA territory: Lebanon territory: PAL REF camps in LEB IDENTITY
space: Asia	1	TERRITORIES
space: Austria	1	TERRITORIES territory: West

space: Baddawi	3	TERRITORIES territory: MENA territory: Lebanon territory: PAL REF camps in LEB IDENTITY
space: Beirut	17	TERRITORIES territory: MENA territory: Lebanon IDENTITY
space: Bekaa	4	TERRITORIES territory: MENA territory: Lebanon IDENTITY
space: Bint Jbeil	1	TERRITORIES territory: MENA territory: Lebanon IDENTITY
space: Bourj al-Barajne	11	TERRITORIES territory: MENA territory: Lebanon territory: PAL REF camps in LEB IDENTITY
space: Brazil	1	TERRITORIES territory: West IDENTITY
space: Canada	6	TERRITORIES territory: West IDENTITY
space: Damour	1	TERRITORIES territory: MENA territory: Lebanon IDENTITY
space: Dbayeh	3	TERRITORIES territory: MENA territory: Lebanon territory: PAL REF camps in LEB IDENTITY
space: Egypt	4	TERRITORIES territory: MENA
space: el-Buss	4	TERRITORIES territory: MENA territory: Lebanon territory: PAL REF camps in LEB IDENTITY
space: Europe	21	TERRITORIES territory: West IDENTITY

space: Germany	3	TERRITORIES territory: West IDENTITY
space: Greece	1	TERRITORIES territory: West IDENTITY
space: Iraq	5	TERRITORIES territory: MENA IDENTITY
space: Jishr al-Basha	1	TERRITORIES territory: MENA territory: Lebanon IDENTITY
space: Jordan	6	TERRITORIES territory: MENA IDENTITY
space: Kurdistan	1	TERRITORIES territory: MENA
space: Latin America	1	TERRITORIES territory: West
space: Lebanon	60	TERRITORIES territory: MENA territory: Lebanon IDENTITY
space: Libya	4	TERRITORIES territory: MENA
space: Mar Elias	2	TERRITORIES territory: MENA
space: Middle East	1	TERRITORIES territory: MENA IDENTITY
space: Nabatiyeh	3	TERRITORIES territory: MENA territory: Lebanon territory: PAL REF camps in LEB
space: Nahr al-Bared	9	TERRITORIES territory: MENA territory: Lebanon territory: PAL REF camps in LEB IDENTITY
space: Palestine	86	TERRITORIES territory: MENA IDENTITY
space: Palestinian village	13	TERRITORIES territory: MENA IDENTITY

space: Rashidiyeh	3	TERRITORIES territory: MENA territory: Lebanon territory: PAL REF camps in LEB IDENTITY
space: refugee camp	117	TERRITORIES territory: MENA territory: PAL REF camps in LEB
space: Saida	5	TERRITORIES territory: MENA territory: Lebanon IDENTITY
space: Shatila	43	TERRITORIES territory: MENA territory: Lebanon IDENTITY
space: South Africa	1	TERRITORIES territory: West
space: South Lebanon	12	TERRITORIES territory: MENA territory: Lebanon IDENTITY
space: Spain	7	TERRITORIES territory: West IDENTITY
space: Sudan	1	TERRITORIES territory: MENA IDENTITY
space: Sweden	1	TERRITORIES territory: West IDENTITY
space: Syria	16	TERRITORIES territory: MENA IDENTITY
space: Tel al-Za´atar	2	TERRITORIES territory: MENA territory: Lebanon territory: PAL REF camps in LEB IDENTITY
space: Turkey	1	TERRITORIES territory: MENA IDENTITY
space: USA	7	TERRITORIES territory: West IDENTITY
space: Yemen	1	TERRITORIES territory: MENA IDENTITY

sport	3	CONCEPTS AGENCY
statehood	9	CONCEPTS IDENTITY
stress	1	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
structural violence	23	CONCEPTS AGENCY
survival	25	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
Ta´ef agreement	3	international charter/agreements
tahalef	3	network: PAL REF camp IDENTITY AGENCY
tawteen	13	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
temporality: 2000s	16	time periods
temporality: 2010s	10	time periods
temporality: 50s	19	time periods
temporality: 60s	13	time periods
temporality: 70s	13	time periods
temporality: 80s	25	time periods
temporality: 90s	15	time periods
temporality: Nakba	24	time periods
terrorism	8	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
tradition	2	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
trust	7	CONCEPTS AGENCY
uncertainty	30	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
unity	17	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
values	87	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
victimhood	6	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY

violence	18	CONCEPTS AGENCY
war	25	CONCEPTS WARS
wasta	3	CONCEPTS AGENCY
water	13	CONCEPTS
work/job/employment	143	CONCEPTS IDENTITY AGENCY
youth	34	CONCEPTS IDENTITY